

The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future

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This article assesses the potential impact that a massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance movement can have on Israeli society. Based on the recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies internationally, the subjective Israeli perceptions due to a Jewish collective memory of victimhood, and the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we conclude that such an unprecedented strategy has a strong likelihood of yielding an independent Palestinian state alongside a state of Israel.

The nonviolent revolts against the long-ruling dictators in North Africa and the Middle East have spread like wildfire early in the second decade of the 21st century. At this time, many Palestinians have been considering how best to translate the strategies of such a spontaneous movement to meet their own needs. Clearly, there are some differences between what is in most cases a regime change with the massive support of the population, and the particular case of an uprising against the formidable military control of an Israeli government that has a large majority conditioned to support the suppression of an enemy's revolt.

A realistic analysis of Israeli reactions to potential sustained Palestinian leadership and massive nonviolent struggle could be shaped mostly by the impact of three variables: a) recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies in the international context; b) subjective Israeli perceptions based on collective memory of victimhood and persecution in Jewish history, and c) the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly from the experiences of the first and second Intifada. In this article we briefly discuss a) and b) but are mainly focusing on c), a variable whose effect the Palestinians can still determine.

In analyzing the latter, three key elements will be emphasized. First, Jewish-Israel-

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In a separate research project, a total of 26 cases of nonviolent struggle were analyzed, including 23 cases tabulated by Gene Sharp in addition to the cases of successful nonviolent struggle in Ukraine, Georgia, and the failure of Jewish settlers to stop the Israeli pullout from Gaza.³ The cases were analyzed to evaluate which of the 198 methods of nonviolent actions presented by Sharp⁴ (2005) were used in each case. In addition, the research team evaluated each case on its result (e.g., the struggle succeeded, failed, or had an indeterminate effect) and on the societal level of the struggle (e.g., local, local-national, national, national-international, or international). The data was analyzed by statistical software (SPSS). Using a quantitative tool to analyze Sharp's qualitative approach towards conflict and nonviolent struggle, out of the cases analyzed, 66.7% of the nonviolent struggles succeeded, while 25.9% of the nonviolent struggles failed. The most frequent societal level was national (51.9%), followed by local-national and national-international (18.5% each), while the rest of the nonviolent struggles were on a local level (11.1%). Success cases were predominantly transitions from authoritarian regimes towards a process of democratization, particularly in Latin America and the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

More directly relevant to the Palestinian case is the comparison of success and failure in the East Timor and Chechnya cases of self-determination, respectively. While the use of violence in the latter has mostly produced negative outcomes, the determination of the former East Timor guerrilla leader President Chanana to move from armed struggle to nonviolent struggle was crucial for enlisting the support of the international community and the success of the powerful intervention against Indonesia's repressive rule.⁵ But more recently, the nonviolent demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated how civil society could produce a regime change, even without a clear identifiable leader. The increasing success of nonviolent struggles at the global level has been recognized by many within Israeli civil society NGOs. However, Israeli decision makers' predominantly military background, particularly those involved in designing security policy, has led them to respond to Palestinian violence with more violence. ("When you have a big hammer, all the problems look like nails"). Yet, there seems to be a growing awareness that, given global progress towards democratization and self-determination, military means alone cannot impose peace; military options can separate the Israelis from the Palestinians with a fence/wall with short-term security. However, such military options can eventually be undermined from above and below — as in the case of the Gaza Strip.

JEWISH COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The legacy of the past has a profound influence on shaping the chances for success of nonviolent strategies in the present. The Jewish experience as a persecuted nation must

3. Edy Kaufman and Ohad Eylon, "The Effectiveness of Nonviolent Action Revisited," (unpublished paper, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2001).
4. Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*. 3 Vols. (Boston: P. Sargent, 1973); Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc., 2005).
5. Yo'av Karmi, "The Fateful Choice: Violence and Nonviolence in the Independence Struggles of Small Nations," Working Paper, *United States Institute of Peace*, (2005), pp. 32.

rahi perceptions and stereotypes of past Palestinian resistance will be briefly discussed. Second, based on the lessons learned and opinions gathered, we assess the potential impact that nonviolent resistance can have on official and societal Israeli behavior. In the concluding section, looking into the future, we assess the likelihood that a nonviolent strategy will create an environment for an eventual sustainable resolution with a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish State of Israel.

Means and ends have an important correlation. Moderation in Arab aims has occurred since the 19th Palestinian National Council in 1988, which established the Declaration of Independence recognizing the State of Israel in its pre-1967 borders. This moderation became regionalized with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Additionally, amid Palestinian reconciliation efforts, if Hamas genuinely joins the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) — at least implicitly agreeing to the Oslo Accords — there would be a larger Palestinian mandate to uphold a potential peace agreement with Israel. If such steps can be accompanied by a massive, long-term struggle legitimated by nonviolent means, then growing support at the international level and dissonance with unchanged (Israeli) official policy are likely to indirectly impact Israeli public opinion and strengthen the peace camp in Israel.

This article builds on previous research conducted with colleagues from the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) and Palestinian Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND, Jerusalem) between 2002–2004.¹ It draws on an analysis of the Israeli reactions to the first and second Intifadas, including public opinion polls; content analysis of the media and coverage of specific events; interviews with activists from nonviolent grassroots organizations; focus groups (academics, media, students); and the personal experience of one of the authors, having been actively involved with this issue since the mid-1980s. Backed by action research and participatory experiences, it also includes a review of other cases of nonviolent actions around the world. The conclusions also include findings of papers presented at the December 2005 Bethlehem conference of Nonviolence International, including Kaufman's own contribution.

THE UNIVERSAL CONTEXT

Looking at the big picture, the PLO, like many other movements around the world in the 1960s and 1970s, advocated the use of extreme forms of violence, including killing non-combatants. But in the last decades, particularly since September 11, 2001, such violent strategies, while gaining media coverage, did not lead to victories. Furthermore, "non-violent, civil-based resistance has emerged as a popular method for prosecuting conflict forcefully and effectively throughout the world, in various contexts and against different adversaries."²

1. Edy Kaufman and Lucy Nussibeth (Principal Investigators), "Maximizing Likelihood of Support for Nonviolent Action in both Palestinian and Israeli Societies: A Pro-Active Feasibility Study (2003–2004)." (Research project sponsored by the European Union). The full data gathered on the Israel side is available upon request.
2. Maria J. Stephan, "Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 20 (Summer 2006), p. 57.

FIRST INTIFADA

Skeptics argue that the Palestinians have already tried nonviolent resistance before, with partial success during this uprising (*Intifada*), which broke out at the end of 1987. If it did not work then, what is the point in trying it again? Indeed, prevailing nonviolent methods were utilized during this uprising, these methods being the most significant change compared with the previous (pre-intifada) period. Furthermore, this relative moderation was seen not only in terms of means — calls to refrain from using firearms — but also in terms of a call to reformulate the aims of the movement, putting successful pressure on the PLO in exile to move from formulas such as “a democratic and secular Palestine” to a “two state solution,” an Israeli and Palestinian state living peacefully next to each other. It is critical for such moderate aims to be accompanied by parallel moderation in means. In contrast, moderate means coupled with extreme aims, or vice versa, fuels distrust and thus hampers the peace process. However, certain elements of the first Intifada prevented it from constituting a true and complete nonviolent movement. It was massive but largely unorganized, not completely nonviolent, and lacked top-down support.

Palestinians gathered seemingly spontaneously, yet were under directives for massive protests across the Palestinian territories, blocking roads and Israeli army movements. Demonstrators threw stones at the Israeli soldiers despite the tear gas and rubber-coated bullets fired in response.⁹ Massive funeral processions also demonstrated nonviolent resistance to Israeli occupation. The bottom-up nature of the uprising can be recognized by the emergence of NGOs advocating nonviolent resistance. Much of the story has been covered by Souad Dajani, Mary King, Maxine Kaufman, and Andrew Rigby.¹⁰ What is important to our analysis is that most NGOs at that time advocated the involvement of Israeli activists in their struggle.

A strong impetus for a planned peaceful resistance was triggered by Mubarak Awad, the founder of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence that made its presence known by the then-illegal display of the Palestinian flag. A disciple of Gene Sharp, Awad delved into the nonviolent methods utilized by Palestinians during the first Intifada: demonstrations, obstruction, non-cooperation, harassment, boycotts, strikes, alternative institutions, and civil disobedience. One of the more effective demonstrations Awad described was the clean-up campaign that the youth of al-Birch and Ramallah organized to protest the dismissal of their respective mayors and closures of municipalities. Another example of defying the Israeli army in Ramallah occurred when Palestinians blew whistles and car horns protesting the closure of Bir Zeit University.¹¹ The Palestinian Center also managed a “Library on Wheels,” translating and spreading lectures and books advocating nonviolence to children across the West Bank and

9. Mary Elizabeth King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 6.
 10. Souad Dajani, *Eyes Without Country* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); King, *A Quiet Revolution: Maxine Kaufman-Lacoste, Refusing to be Enemies: Palestinian and Israeli Nonviolent Resistance to Israeli Occupation* (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, Ltd., 2010); Andrew Rigby, “Palestinian Resistance and Nonviolence,” PASSIA Publications (November 2010).
 11. Mubarak E. Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1984), p. 28.

DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINIAN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

be recognized in its historical context. The Inquisition, pogroms, ghettos, and, in particular, the Holocaust, remain major influences on Jewish self-perceptions as powerless. Palestinians have difficulty understanding the Holocaust because, from their perspective, it was a disaster in that it brought about the existence of Israel. Others, such as Mohammed S. Dajani, a Muslim-Palestinian social scientist, boldly state that incorporating Holocaust studies into the Arab curriculum is imperative: “Teaching the Holocaust to Palestinians is a way to ensure they do not go down the blind alley of believing their peace process with Israel is as hopeless as one would have been between Nazis and Jews. Discussion of the Holocaust would underscore the idea that peace is attainable.”¹² The current Israeli self-perception is that of the victim in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite their contradicting global image as the more powerful party.

Palestinians advocating nonviolent actions have made the case to the Palestinian community, and the world as a whole, not to perceive their struggle as inherently a violent one, with a history of immolation and suicide attacks that some have seen as the embodiment of a “culture of death.” Much to the contrary, many of them regard themselves, historically speaking, as nonviolent people, the victims of the British Colonial, followed by Zionist and Israeli physical and structural violence practiced against them. Palestinians paid a very high price because of the violence inflicted on them. On the other hand, this violence has engendered both nonviolent and violent reactions from them. In other words, the Palestinians have primarily been on the defensive.⁷

PLO PRE-INTIFADA

Fatah, an Arabic acronym for “Palestinian Liberation Movement,” has been the largest faction of the PLO since its founding. Its purpose, documented in the Palestinian National Charter (1968), was to wage an armed struggle against Israel to liberate all of Palestine. Originally, numerous articles in the charter indicate the impossibility of a two-state solution with Israel. Article 1 emphasizes Palestine as an “*indivisible*” part of the Arab homeland [emphasis added].⁸ Furthermore, Article 15 discusses the objective of “eliminating Zionism from Palestine.”⁸ These statements explicitly do not recognize the establishment of Israel and even claim the international document of the 1947 UN Partition Plan to be illegal. These extreme declarations both in terms of aims and means left little room for compromise in negotiations.

6. Mohammed Dajani Daoudi and Robert Satoff, “Why Palestinians Should Learn About the Holocaust,” *The New York Times*, March 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30iht-eda30.html?_r=2&sq=%20Holocaust&st=Search&adxnml=1&scp=1&adxnmlx=1301486438-LHhrqAH6DAvMNQ5Ha9mVJQ.
 7. Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, *Popular Resistance in Palestine* (New York: Pluto Press, 2011).
 8. “The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1–17, 1968,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Yale Law School. Lillian Goldman Law Library, May 16, 2009, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp.

stinian struggle gained international recognition and therefore added pressure on the Israelis to respond to Palestinian demands. Within Israel, the courage and determination of the Palestinians under occupation, as well as the resourcefulness and imagination of some of the nonviolent leaders, caught the public's eye. While they could not identify a distinct nonviolent leader, there was a sense that the previous status quo, characterized by the Palestinian acquiescence to a "benign occupation" that provided economic improvements, was totally gone. The transition from "steadfastness" (*sumud* in Arabic) to massive rebellion was recognized; Israeli political leaders realized that their partners for peace included the Palestinians — not only established Arab states — and negotiation with even the PLO became acceptable. Still, there was widespread criticism on the Palestinian side of nonviolent action as naive and ineffective because it did not surpass the "positive" results of the old violent tactics. Many on both sides continued to believe that "the only language Israelis understand to relinquish power is by force" as well as the reverse "the Arabs only understand that might is right."

It would be misleading to portray the outcome of the first Intifada as mixed. Despite the previously-mentioned shortcomings, positive outcomes prevailed.¹⁵ This uprising paved the way for direct PLO-Israel negotiations and the idea of the two-state solution. Salim Tamari summarizes the achievements of the Intifada after 30 months:

Its main achievement seems to lie behind: a spectacular ability to mobilize whole sectors of a civilian population through networks of underground civilian resistance and communal self-help projects, challenging Israel's ability to continue ruling the West-Bank and Gaza. The pattern of daily street confrontation has dealt a moral, if not logistic, blow to the might of the Israeli army. Above all, the Intifada placed relations with the Palestinians and the future of the occupied territories at the top of the agenda of all Israeli political parties.¹⁶

Sporadic polls of Israeli public opinion have focused on the issue of Palestinian nonviolent/violent struggle. A poll commissioned by the Luis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research in December 1990 showed that while the level of violence used by Palestinians was limited, it was not perceived as such by Israelis.¹⁷ Sixty-two percent of Israelis perceived Palestinian violence as unlimited; 74-78% categorized throwing stones at civilians and/or soldiers as unlimited violence — as opposed to supporters who saw stone-throwing as only "limited" violence. The most frequent recommendation made to the Palestinians (43%) was not to use any amount of force in order to achieve the desired results. An absolute majority (80%) believed that the methods employed by the Palestinians in order to establish a state were primarily violent methods. At the same time, half of those questioned (51%) agreed that the Palestinians would probably or certainly not achieve a state without the use of force.

During the first Intifada, media coverage in two major Israeli newspapers, *Yedioth*

East Jerusalem. Planned acts of non-cooperation included boycotts of Israeli goods, the refusal to work in the military government, refusal to pay taxes, refusal to sign official forms, and refusal to work on building Israeli settlements or engage in any other forms of "Judaization." Harassment of Israeli soldiers was conceived of as a psychological tactic to remind them of the role that they played in the injustice. While advocacy of such methods was made public, only partial implementation reached the organized efforts during the Intifada. Awad's presence in Jerusalem was subsequently declared illegal by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (although he was born there and was counted as a resident in the post-1967 census) and he was imprisoned for several months (thus, paradoxically, a non-violent leader was declared to be a security threat). The Supreme Court confirmed the decision to deport him and Awad was expelled. Another pioneer was the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement Between People (PCR) founded in Beit Sahour to lead the Palestinian community in nonviolent resistance against the occupation and in advocating for human and national rights. PCR was responsible for underground schools, the notorious Tax Revolt,¹² and dialogue groups with Israeli supporters of nonviolent struggle. In addition to these public activists, a much wider impact came from the clandestine "Unified Leadership of the Intifada," which distributed weekly to monthly leaflets that guided the mass uprising. When Israeli security arrested some of the organization's leaders, others replaced them and continuity was ensured for more than two years.

Yet, the resistance during the first Intifada was not totally nonviolent. While many protesters participated in peaceful acts of civil disobedience, others threw not only stones but also Molotov cocktails at Israelis. From the Israeli perspective, although the Palestinians were overmatched by Israel's military capability, their resistance was perceived as violent. Symbolic stone throwing was seen as life-threatening. In the Palestinian imagination, however, there was an idealizing of "limited," "non-lethal," "non-violent," "popular," "symbolic" violence (and a sharp drop in previous violent methods such as use of firearms and kidnappings). Two articles analyzed the negative perceptions of the Israeli public.¹³ Incorporating both strategies and taking the best from both worlds by engaging in only "limited violence" did not produce the desired results. Also, PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat's praise of the "children of the stones" was similar to his praise of the "children of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); the difference was that, during the Intifada, children aimed rocks not only at soldiers but also civilians. Consequently, the breadth of support from staunch nonviolent Palestinian advocates like Faisal Husseini and Mubarak Awad diminished.¹⁴ These two critical elements of a nonviolent resistance movement, uniformity of struggle in the Land and the Diaspora and their active top-down support, were absent in the first Intifada.

Overall, the world was sympathetic toward the PLO, marking a shift in attitudes in the West towards what was earlier considered to be a terrorist movement. The Pales-

12. The Palestinian Tax Revolt occurred in the West Bank town of Beit Sahour in 1989. It was a refusal to pay taxes to the State of Israel under the premise of "no taxation without representation."
13. Edy Kaufman, "Limited Violence and the Intifadah," *Journal of Arab Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 109-121. "Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians' Limited Violence" in the Intifada," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-38.
14. Karny, "The Fateful Choice," p. 32.

15. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Nonviolent Action in Israel and Palestine: A Growing Force," in Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem, and Juliette Verhoeven, eds., *Bringing the Divide* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 135-169.
16. Salim Tamari, "The Uprising's Dilemma," *MERIP Middle East Report* (May-August 1990), p. 4.
17. Edy Kaufman, "Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians' Limited Violence" in the Intifada," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-38.

Ahroni and Haaretz, was also studied. Reports of violent and nonviolent acts were monitored between 1988-1990.¹⁸ In media circles, it is generally known that "what bleeds leads." It may therefore not be surprising that the violent aspect of the Intifada was highlighted the most. The main findings were as follows: percentages of nonviolent actions reported in *Yediot Ahronot* went down from 50.6% (1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 32.2% (1990). In *Haaretz*, the reports went down from 48% (1988) to 34.9% (1989) and 30.7% (1990).

SECOND INTIFADA - AL-AQSA INTIFADA

Following the first Intifada, Fatah moderated its positions in order to enter negotiations with Israel in the Oslo peace process. However, its implementation lagged due to government reluctance to move all the way, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, and forces opposed to the accord from both sides (Hamas, for example, or the extreme settler movement who opposed any deals). The spoilers embarked on a paralyzing escalation of hostilities. As a response to the March 29, 1994 Hebron killings of 39 Muslims while they were praying in Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi by Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein, Hamas decided to intensify suicide bombing inside Israeli cities, targeting civilians only. Their extremist actions were no surprise given their uncompromising Hamas Charter (1988) which commits the group to the destruction of the State of Israel by striving to establish an Islamic state in all of what it considered Palestine, including post-1948 Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Furthermore, Article 13 asserts that the "so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement."¹⁹ The failure of the Oslo Peace Accords could not be salvaged by the Camp David meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat convened by US President Bill Clinton in 2000. Much to the contrary, the economic and security situation declined at times of rising expectations and left Palestinians frustrated. The prevailing tactic in the second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) was violence. Suicide bombing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad now involved the younger members of Fatah. Their militant and Islamist nature led to its designation as a terrorist organization not only by Israel but also by the United States and the European Union.

This set the path for the militarized Intifada. Hamas exploited Palestinian desire for revenge against Israeli retaliations. As average Palestinians felt more confined by increased Israeli checkpoints, curfews, a security barrier around the West Bank, and deprivation from the expected "peace dividends," Islamist groups gained popularity for their use of violence. Public support for the Islamists doubled from 17% in mid-2000 just before the second Intifada to 35% in mid-2004. On the other hand, support for Yasir 'Arafat's nationalist Fatah party dropped from 37% to 28%.²⁰ Suicide bombing targeted civilians only, including the most vulnerable sectors of society: children

18. Kaufman, "Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians 'Limited Violence' in the Intifada."
19. "Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library, May 16 2009, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
20. Khalil Shikaki, "The Future of Palestine," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December 2004), p. 46.

and senior citizens in buses; youth in discotheques; and the general public in eateries and markets. No military installations or governmental structures were attacked. Fear became generalized. Instead of fighting at Israel's borders, coastal cities became the "home" front. Personal security rather than national security became the main issue.

Few of the older NGOs remained and some new ones developed. The aforementioned PCR led a march to the military base of Shedma along with hundreds of Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals (activists from outside Israel/Palestine) protesting the killing of two mothers and one man and the damage of 200 homes. PCR efforts were hampered during the Al-Aqsa Intifada as mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians grew. Yet, they still welcomed Israelis to their movement and organized actions showing that nonviolent resistance appealed to Palestinians from various regions.²¹ Bethlehem became the focus of nonviolent activity as three new organizations formed despite the violent nature of the second Intifada, including the Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR), Wi'am, and Holy Land Trust. In 2005, the latter organized the largest gathering around Christmas of more than 400 international and local activists and brought in Gene Sharp, the most distinguished theoretician and strategist of nonviolent struggles worldwide. Other Palestinian NGOs based in Ramallah and Jerusalem have kept the momentum of nonviolent resistance alive, such as Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND) and the Center of Community Development and Democracy.

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM), founded in the summer of 2001, is another NGO led by Palestinians to raise awareness of the injustices of occupation by exposing foreign nationals to it. The participation of internationals at ISM protests was critical because organizers noticed a shift in Israeli responses when more non-Israelis/Palestinians were present. Israeli soldiers are more cautious in reacting with rubber bullets and live ammunition when more international media is interested in the event.²² In a two-year period, an estimated 1,000 international volunteers participated in protests with the ISM and later returned to their home countries to spread the word of what they witnessed.

THE POST-'ARAFAT PERIOD

The Hamas-Fatah conflict has been more pronounced since the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. President Mahmud 'Abbas, unlike Hamas, is open to negotiations with Israel and condemned the militarized Intifada. In August 2009, he organized a landmark Fatah conference of mainstream Palestinians from the Fatah party.

It was a three-day gathering, the first in 20 years and the first ever on Palestinian soil.²³ This gathering served as an opportunity to clarify goals and mobilize Palestinians. However, President 'Abbas's initial rhetoric remained ambiguous and sent mixed messages to his Palestinian supporters as well as Israelis. On one hand, he argued for a "new start" and lauded popular protests like the weekly demonstrations against Israel's security

21. Nancy Stohlman and Laurieann Aladin, *Live from Palestine: International and Palestinian Direct Action Against the Israeli Occupation* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003), pp. 63-64. This remains true to a degree, but Israeli participation has declined.
22. Stohlman and Aladin, *Live from Palestine*, p. 67.
23. Isabel Kershner, "Abbas Urges 'New Start' at Fatah Conference," *The New York Times*, August 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/middleeast/05fatah.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=kershner%20abbas%202009%20august%20conference&st=cse.

merely a phase in a larger picture of attaining more concessions and territory? Added to this perceived threat is the challenge posed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, an idea that is still rejected by even moderate Palestinians.

ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

Overall, deep-rooted trauma is making Jews fear incitement as well as actual violence. Many Muslim and Arab public and popular statements and behavioral expressions have not been conciliatory towards the Israelis and the Jews, including the questioning of the true nature of the Holocaust. The Israeli psyche is more prone to perceive the message as: "We will kill you all," even if many voices are standing up bravely among the Palestinians to publicly condemn suicide and car bombings. Still, *Ibbah al-Yehud* [butcher the Jew] has more resonance. True, the mirror image exists in the cry *Mawet la'Aravim* [Death to the Arabs] of the mob calling for revenge whenever Israelis are killed; both cries, even if not implemented, are terrifying. Similarly, for Jews the perception of the call for *Jihad* (Holy War) rings a different bell than the alternate perception of pious Muslims of an internal struggle within oneself.

Moving the Israelis Past Denial

Since much of the Israeli public perceives its government's repression as justified retribution for Palestinian violence, there is also a tendency to avoid recognizing occupation in itself as a major source of Palestinian suffering, what Galung called "structural violence."³⁴ In the focus groups, journalists agreed that the only other Palestinian image perceived by Israelis is based on reports of human suffering. The image of the suffering Palestinian shown in reports such as the Palestinian violinist forced to play his violin at the blockade security check, or the report about poor workers in Gaza treated rudely at the Erez checkpoint, raise moral discomfort and therefore leave a strong impression. Hence, "the road of nonviolence will make Israelis peer from behind their shields to see the Palestinian man and woman in their true size, in their true form ... They will then be secure enough to share the pain and empathize. Many Israelis will be able to join the struggle for Palestinian liberation."³⁵

Suspicion towards "Nonviolent Resistance" as a Manipulated Slogan

One journalist asked, "The question is how Israelis are supposed to speak with those who support non-violence, are they sincere? Or is their goal to dismantle Israeli unity by non-violent declarations?" Another journalist added, "Palestinians use violence instrumentally. They are now talking of cessation of violence in the media, but there is an ethos of violence there, the use of the word *Shahid* [martyr] has become

34. Johan Galung and Tord Hoivik, "Structural and Direct Violence — A Note on Operationalization," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1971), pp. 73-76.
 35. Eyad El-Sarraj, "Palestinians Should Try Nonviolent Resistance," *The Washington Post*, Tuesday, April 3, 2001. <http://www.radicalparty.org/it/node/506117>.

trivial. When they want to they turn the 'violence switch' on and now Abu Mazen [Mahmud 'Abbas] is turning the (violence) switch off ... It isn't authentic."³⁷ Israelis fear that even with the term "nonviolent struggle" as used by Fatah, the term "struggle" has a connotation of "war." Palestinian declarations regarding their intention to stop acts of violence are received with suspicion. A number of journalists suspected that there may be a certain degree of dissonance between what is being said and the underlying messages. Palestinians may be expressing themselves differently when they are talking to Israelis or are speaking to people within their own societies. Nonviolent declarations are perceived by many Israelis as driven by interests rather than real devotion to such principles of conflict resolution. And yet, most journalists agreed that the Israeli public has a shifting mood and short memory regarding violence, and even short periods of relative quiet result in increased optimism in the Israeli street. But inaction with no violence is not to be equalized with the recognition of the nonviolent action as a prevailing strategy.

MISCONCEPTIONS

At the public opinion level, a joint poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Search for Common Ground (SFCG) showed the surprising potential for nonviolent resistance among Palestinians. Two years into the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2002, the survey revealed that 80% of Palestinians would support a large-scale nonviolent protest movement and 56% would participate in it.³⁶ Similarly, 78% of Israeli Jews believed that Palestinians have a legitimate right to seek a Palestinian state, provided that they use nonviolent means. A 2008 study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) complemented the SFCG survey, indicating that nearly 70% of Palestinian young adults believed that the use of violence to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not very helpful.³⁷ More recently, a 2010 Fato poll confirmed the sentiment expressed in the 2002 PIPA/SFCG poll in favor of nonviolent resistance. Seven in ten thought that Palestinians should resist Israel by putting more weight on civil, nonviolent means. Also, the poll found that a larger share of the population favored a halt in rocket attacks from Gaza against Israel at the time of the survey than a year previously (61%, up from 53%).³⁸ Another survey conducted through The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem polled Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between September 7-21, 2005.³⁹ Even during tense times, the polls indicated a

36. Steven Kull, "The Potential for a Nonviolent Intifada," *Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Search for Common Ground*, August 28, 2002. http://truman.huji.ac.il/upload/truman_site_poll_28_June2009.pdf.
 37. "UN: 70% of Palestinian Youth Oppose Violence to Resolve Conflict with Israel," *Haaretz*, January 4, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1075465.html>. Hopefully, these results can clarify each party's intent and direction for the future. John Marks, President of SFCG, states, "We believe these findings reflect the real, but unrealized, potential that non-violence can play in ending the vicious cycle of bloodshed."
 38. Fato Institute for Applied International Studies, "Key Results from an Opinion Poll in the West Bank (February) and Gaza Strip (May) 2010," <http://www.fato.no/ais/middcast/opinionpolls/poll2010.htm>.
 39. Yakov Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, "Two-thirds among Palestinians, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs support the mutual recognition of Israel as the Jewish People and Palestine as the State of the Palestinian People," September 25, 2005, <http://truman.huji.ac.il/poll-view.asp?id=47>.
 The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman

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sion would be ineffective against a generation without hope and fear.⁴² The continued aggressive military response to Palestinian protests by the IDF is worrisome. It warrants the question, is the IDF completely inept when it comes to dealing with nonviolent resistance? The disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 serves as an example of the IDF's ability to follow orders while not reacting aggressively to nonviolent resistance. Much tension existed within Israel leading up to the evacuation and dismantling of Jewish settlements. Yet, despite all the hardships, emotions, and complexity, the disengagement demonstrated the capability of the IDF to respond appropriately to nonviolent resistance.⁴³ In anticipation of a popular uprising during the UN General Assembly session in 2011, the IDF widely trained soldiers in the use of non-lethal violent control equipment, including the development of new techniques. It still remains to be seen at the time of this writing whether acting nonviolently against your own Jewish civil disobedience can be easily transferred when acting against the "violent Arab."

Nonviolent Leadership

Among the focus group participants, reservations were expressed towards the idea of a top-down process and the possibility of creating a movement based on the perceived lack of strong leadership: "Unfortunately, the Palestinians do not have a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King, or somebody who will lead ... If no icon leads the movement, the non-violence effort will not last long."⁴⁴ Those who believed that the process was top-down in nature suggested that activities should focus on strengthening the central political leadership. Many referred to the fact that in order to influence, there must be a mass movement: "It has to become a mass movement, it has to be thousands" ... "and (it) must be sustained." If experimenting with nonviolent action in Jerusalem, there is a potential for an increasing role for foreign diplomats and world media, as well as solidarity from Israeli civil society in the city and elsewhere. Unfortunately, there is not much combative spirit left among Palestinians in the city, left without a legitimated leadership since the death of Faisal Husseini, and fear of Israeli reprisals that can damage them as individuals with a relatively better position than the rest of their brethren in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Some suggested that a violent reaction to a nonviolent action would most definitely enter the news. On the other hand, the recent uprisings in the Arab world confirm the widely shared opinion — Sharp included — that a leader is not a necessary condition for success in a nonviolent struggle. Gene Sharp, in an acceptance speech for the Peace Education Prize at the Al-Hibri Foundation in Washington, DC on October 1, 2011, emphasized that having a "Mahatma" is not a requirement.

42. King, *A Quiet Revolution*, p. 7.
 43. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), for example, approached Shati with a request to develop a model of constructive struggle to reduce escalation and violence at checkpoints, a model which ACRI can apply in its work with the Border Police. Tammy Rubel, Haim Omer, and Nachi Alon, "Strategic Thinking and Non-Violence in Israel's Disengagement from Gaza" (Shati — Conflict Transformation and Management Center, 2008), <http://us.unibas.ch/typo3conf/ext/x4emuncal/scripts/handleFile.php?file=6383>.
 44. This quote and the following quotations are from participants in the aforementioned focus group at Hebrew University.

mutual recognition of identity. According to the poll, 66% of the Israelis and 63% of the Palestinians supported a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Even more remarkable was the majority support for this step among Israeli Arabs: 63% supported and 34% opposed it.

Stereotyping a Culture as Violent

There is a generalized perception that contemporary Arab Islam has an inherent tendency towards violent means, not only against Jews but also towards each other (the first Intifada was followed by an "intra-fada" in which Palestinian killed each other in numbers as high as the casualties caused by the Israeli armed forces). With scattered exposure to contradictory information (as the media tends to rarely cover nonviolent activities), it is hard to change these perceptions, and therefore skepticism remains. A related concern that was raised regarding the concept of nonviolent resistance in the Middle East was the need for adaptation of known nonviolent theory and actions to a local context. In order to succeed, nonviolent movements should be context specific, i.e. based on local religion and culture.

Military correspondents mentioned episodes in which nonviolent rebellion could produce mixed results, in fact dividing the young Israeli active duty soldiers, particularly reservists that work many of the roadblocks.⁴⁰ Isolated stories may predict a pattern in which uncertainty could initially produce aggressive retaliation and the use of lethal weapons against nonviolent resistance; but such escalation could further evoke refusal by significant sectors of the military to comply with what could be seen as "illegal" or immoral orders. A majority of soldiers do not need to have this opinion before such a reaction can split Israeli society and even its leadership. Karny points to an anecdote related by the former Chief Psychologist of the IDF and later Deputy Director of the National Security Council Reuven Gal during an interview, when in a briefing to the top brass about the nonviolent nature of the first Intifada, they were shocked to realize that the arsenal of Israeli conventional weapons was not going to work against a group of young Palestinians without weapons determined to gain independence. Nonviolent resistance provoked a change of heart in a formative experience of the then-Defense Minister and later peace-seeker Prime Minister Rabin. While he at first called for demonstratively "breaking [the] arms and legs" of Palestinians, he later recognized that "the new strength of the Palestinians was not militarily quantifiable or militarily treatable."⁴¹ Furthermore, the repression of massive protests often results in fatalities, which exponentially increases the combative spirit. Former Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, notes that Israel was facing a popular uprising and that suppres-

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Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between September 7 and 21, 2005.
 40. The IDF is not adequately prepared to confront nonviolence. A soldier in the focus group mentioned previously recounted: "I remember when I was a new recruit in the IDF, I was serving in Nebata, a group of Palestinians started walking towards us holding each others hands, it made me face a huge dilemma, they were not violent ... Soldiers don't know how to react when there is no threat on their life ... The IDF does not know how to deal with non violent behavior ..."
 41. Karny, "The Fateful Choice," p. 13.

acres of olive groves that Bil'in's farmers had lost. They then set up an alliance of 11 West Bank villages to share these strategies, and some have borne fruit. Six communities have successfully challenged the barrier's route across their land. Activists have linked up with outside supporters to sneak water trucks into parched communities cut off by the army and to protect olive harvesters from harassment by settlers.⁵¹ Asked to explain the crackdown, a battalion commander said that protesters causing damage to the fence had been photographed and singled out for arrest. But after a week of requests, the army did not detail any damage claims.

But if to follow the revolutionary wave in the region,

masses of Palestinians, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, marching to IDF checkpoints and outposts, marching to Israeli-only roads, to settlements, to the security fence — to the nearest Israeli presence and screaming, "Out! Out!" And refusing to leave, what the hell is the IDF going to do then? Shoot them? Arrest them? With the whole world not only watching but, for the first time, already won over by other unarmed Arab masses facing down their oppressors? What will the IDF do under the eyes of a world that, for the first time, is seeing Arabs as people like themselves who want freedom, who deserve it and who are earning it, to say the least, with their courage?⁵²

JEWISH SOCIETAL REACTIONS

Perhaps the most striking example of the power of nonviolence is the resistance of activists in Budrus, a West Bank village that protested the building of the security fence/wall on much of their agricultural land. The story was documented in the Just Vision film, *Budrus*, and produced important reactions from Jewish audiences in the United States and Israel. It features protagonists who elicit empathy so that viewers can put themselves in the shoes of all the individuals and can identify with their dilemmas and roles. The Peace Index checked attitudes toward different methods of protest, which may be used by Israelis opposed to the forceful evacuation of the Jewish settlements in Gaza. It remains to be seen if attitudes towards means of protest, considered as legitimate on the Israeli side, could reflect attitudes in general, including attitudes towards Palestinian's legitimate methods of protest. The questionnaire distinguished between three possible protest methods: Within the law (e.g., petitions, legal demonstrations), nonviolent civil disobedience (e.g., unlicensed demonstrations, refusal to complete army service, refusal to pay taxes), and violent civil disobedience (e.g., the use of force against evacuating settlements). The results of the poll showed that, as in the past, there was support for protest as long as it was legal. 86.3% supported legal means of protest while only 13.5% supported illegal methods, such as nonviolent civil disobedience, and an even smaller number (6.5%) supported violent protest. In another series of questions, the initiators of the poll tried to find the levels of support for nego-

51. The precise new route was tied up in litigation until the IDF finally began disassembling the fence in late June 2011. Meanwhile, soldiers began reacting with greater force to the protests, and 28 protest leaders and participants were arrested in their homes during midnight raids that began in June 2011.

52. Larry Derfner, "People Get Ready — There's a Train a Coming," *Jerusalem Post*, February 23, 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=209574>.

ISRAELI OFFICIAL RESPONSES

During the first Intifada, the hard-line Israeli government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir insisted on the "iron fist" strategy. Defense Minister Rabin stated the government's formal policy on January 19, 1988: "The first priority is to prevent violent demonstrations with force, power, and blows."⁴⁵ In an effort to "tone down" the IDF's shooting responses to Palestinian demonstrators, the army distributed wooden and metal clubs to soldiers, with the authorization to break limbs. The army apparently took the command literally as a *Haaretz* article revealed that 197 Palestinians had been treated for fractured limbs within three days of Rabin's statement.⁴⁶ In short, the IDF was initially not trained to respond to nonviolent acts. Soldiers realized that while they were equipped to fight and psychologically prepared for external threats, fighting an enemy internally proved too difficult of a transition.

The inadequate training to confront nonviolent resistance is represented by the violent retaliation soldiers utilize even today. The IDF asserts that protesters hurl stones in protest, provoking more aggressive responses.⁴⁷ An illustration may be useful: In April 2009, another anti-fence demonstration in Bil'in by Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals ended fatally. Bassam Ibrahim Abu-Rahma was hit in the chest by a tear gas canister and died from wounds shortly after reaching the hospital. The IDF claimed that the protests were violent.⁴⁸ A few weeks later, in a similar Palestinian protest of the separation fence, Yusuf Srouf was killed by Israeli forces that shot him in the chest with a live bullet. Again, the IDF announced that they were responding to a "heavy barrage of rocks."⁴⁹ In December 2011, 28-year old Mustafa Tamimi from the Palestinian village of Nabi Saleh was shot in the head with a teargas canister fired at close range by an Israeli soldier and died of his wounds the following day.⁵⁰ At times the demonstrators are not entirely nonviolent. No matter the relative power of rocks to IDF armed soldiers and vehicles, throwing stones does not constitute a nonviolent action. On the other side, the IDF needs to respond to civil demonstrations with proportionate force. The rules of engagement prohibit firing tear gas at people.

But in the main effort in Bil'in, leaders led a clandestine construction crew across the barrier and built a makeshift hut on village land that had been usurped for a new neighborhood of the Jewish settlement (the stealth maneuver mimicked Israel's expansionist strategy of creating "facts on the ground"). When the army threatened to demolish the hut, the village went to Israel's Supreme Court and challenged the new neighborhood, which lacked formal government authorization. The court ordered Israel to stop building in the neighborhood, move the fence, and restore about half of the 575

45. King, *A Quiet Revolution*, p. 7.

46. King, *A Quiet Revolution*, p. 8.

47. "US National Badly Hurt in Anti-fence Protest," *ynet*, March 19, 2009, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3685953,00.html>.

48. Ali Waked and Anat Shalev, "Palestinian Killed in Bil'in Protest," *ynet*, April 17, 2009, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3702569,00.html>.

49. Avi Issacharoff and Anshel Pfeffer, "Israeli Forces Kill Palestinian Protester at Na'alin Rally," *Reuters*, May 6, 2009, <http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1090697.html>.

50. Nir Hasson, "Palestinian Dies after Hit by Tear Gas Canister," *Haaretz*, December 12, 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/palestinian-dies-after-hit-by-tear-gas-canister-1.400714>.

tations and whether support was conditional on the end of terror: 50.3% agreed with the opinion that negotiations should not be renewed as long as terror persisted, while 43.1% adopted the opinion that negotiations should start without any prerequisites.⁵³ Widespread nonviolent activities replacing stereotypical perception of Palestinians as terrorists could fulfill the preliminary demand of most of the public and act as a catalyst for renewed negotiations.

All in all, nonviolent activism in Israeli society has been rather limited. According to Abu Nimer, four main reasons explain the lack of a sustainable and effective Israeli nonviolent direct action movement. First is the manifesto of Israel's largest and most dominant peace group, Peace Now avoids any direct confrontation with Israeli military forces on the ground, yet it opposes many government policies, such as settlement expansion, human rights violations, and collective punishment (with many serving in the army or reserves). A second factor explaining the lack of a sustained Israeli nonviolent movement is that nonviolent direct action requires peace activists to take on a higher level of risk as they face the threat of arrest. The Israeli peace movement in general has relied on middle- and upper-class elite followers and organizers, who are often professionals living in well-to-do communities, which increases the cost of their open dissent towards the national consensus. Third, Israel's militarized society and economy has created a strong dependency on security clearances for jobs and promotions. A fourth explanation for the lack of a sustained movement is the interdependence between Israeli and Palestinian peace and resistance movements. The withdrawal or weakness of one often affects the other, as it is used by those advocating violence to reiterate the popular claim that there is no partner on the other side. We can add that a lack of a massive Palestinian civil-based nonviolent mobilization is another factor weakening Israeli nonviolent direct action groups. This is especially a factor during and after the second Intifada with many Palestinian peace and nonviolent groups hesitating to work or even coordinate with Israeli peace groups. At its outbreak, for more than 14 months Palestinian NGOs (as instructed by the Palestinian National Authority) formally boycotted any form of joint activities with Israeli peace groups. This has changed at the PA governmental level, which now welcomes cooperation, but civil society has remained under the tight control of those who reject such asymmetrical collaboration now or even in a more equalized future.

Hence, only the more radical groups, such as Uri Avneri's Gush Shalom, Yesh Gvul, Taayush, the anarchists, and a few Arab-led political parties would still offer unconditional solidarity rather than the larger components of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Network, who seek reciprocity while recognizing the unequal overall situation.

At present, there is still a very limited amount of Israelis who refuse to serve in the IDF and/or the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Small groups have come without an IDF permit into the West Bank to demonstrate on Fridays to villages that protest against both the building of the fence/wall and the eviction of Arab families from houses in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Shaykh Jarrah now possessed by Jewish settlers. All in all these, are marginal groups. However, it points to the potential of a massive Palestinian nonviolent action. Paradoxically, such activity in Jerusalem, when both sides could

53. "Peace Index," Monthly Survey, Tammy Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, <http://www.spirit.tau.ac.il>.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

So far, most Israelis seem not to internalize the growing signs of an incipient Palestinian nonviolent strategy. It may well be more difficult to understand it in the context of a deep-rooted perception of a lethal struggle against a committing bitter enemy. Changing such a predisposition is extremely difficult, when even positive messages are seen as propagandistic and unreliable. More specifically, our findings show:

- Public opinion polls indicate that the Israeli public in general is ready to end the violence and is leaning towards conciliation. More nonviolent actions reported to the Israeli public, we believe, will strengthen these positive trends in Israeli society and may promote further support and activism.

The small number of reports on nonviolent actions by Palestinians and around the world in the Israeli mass media may point to the need to find additional ways of connecting with the Jewish grassroots.⁵⁴ The term "action-forcing event" relates to an induced emblematic event, acting as a trigger for a higher focus of attention. After a period in which both societies were inflicted with violence, when it was easier to escalate rather than de-escalate, perhaps a dramatic nonviolent action can shape a clear-cut departure from the current spiral of mutual reprisals. Perhaps it may be possible to build wide consensus against the targeting of innocent civilians in the first stage, calling for reciprocity, namely stopping both terror and state terror. While limiting the scope of violence is not the equivalent to nonviolent action, a gradual decrease can contribute to finding common ground by means of deflating the current situation.

- Achieving such a mission will require promoting nonviolent activities in both societies: in Palestine as a tool to end the occupation, and in Israel in order to educate Israelis to treat Palestinians as human beings, leading Israelis to humanize Palestinians, and therefore use nonviolent rather than violent means against Palestinians.
- There has been no agreement among Palestinians on what constitutes nonviolent actions. Some combine nonviolence with peace building, avoiding stone throwing in their joint activities. Others consider nonviolent actions to exclude firearms, but they also accept stones as legitimate means for intimidating rather than causing bodily harm. Some groups are satisfied with conducting nonviolent education and nonviolent training; and a fourth cluster links nonviolent resistance with the boycott against Israelis, including boycotting universities and the Israeli Peace Camp, and calling for divestments and sanctions against Israel. With the additional frag-

54. In a lecture at the Truman Institute on the subject of nonviolence, Johan Galtung repeated the importance of the chain, or connection both within all strata of the resisting society and the connection to people in the other society. He mentioned the chain factor as a main contributor to the success of Gandhi's struggle to free India of the British.

side. Furthermore, the centrality of security for the Jewish people is not a slogan or excuse but rather the result of a long history of threats to their existence. So, in spite of a superficial lack of reciprocity in the resistance to occupation, concerned Israeli citizens have channeled, albeit it in decreasing numbers, their commitment to shared goals through involvement in human rights and peace organizations. But the refusal to utilize Israeli military means has been and will continue to remain negligible. Palestinian nonviolent empowerment is going to oblige greater numbers of Israeli citizens to look at the mirror introspectively and join rather than fight them. "When you are talking to the enemy, to an Israeli, your own people will ask you whether you are a traitor ... but, you cannot talk only to the world or with other Palestinians, you have to tell the Israeli what is happening..."⁵⁸

In sum, research conducted regarding the first Intifada and the more recent studies presented here suggest the importance of a clear goal — lasting peace — to be presented to Israelis while resisting only through peaceful means. But acts may not always be interpreted in the way that they are intended. The test of endurance shows the "other" the commitment to a lasting solution.

We should praise the sustained and relentless work undertaken by the half-dozen or so Palestinians NGOs in training for nonviolent action, acting upon it, and reaching out to Israeli partners. But lack of coordination among them, and the inability to persuade their government and political forces such as Fatah to stand up publicly and repeatedly endorse such efforts, is an inherent source of weakness that needs to be overcome. Current isolated expressions, as worthy as they may be, do not accumulate in the Israeli perception to act as a countervailing force to past acts of terror against their civilian population.

While majorities in both nations are ready to settle for a two-state solution, their pessimism about seeing that achieved in our lifetimes is making the goal a distant utopia. Peace as an end can be strengthened by peaceful means. Nonviolent struggle has the demonstrative elements to prove that the struggle for a just solution can be conducted heroically by such means. It may be possible to recognize already small but significant progress in the debate and limited actions towards bottom-up and top-down endorsement of Palestinian nonviolent struggle.

After a period in which both societies were afflicted with violence, when it was easier to escalate than de-escalate, perhaps a dramatic nonviolent action can shape a clear-cut departure from the current spiral of mutual reprisals. Perhaps it may be possible to build wide consensus against the targeting of innocent civilians in the first stage, calling for reciprocity, namely stopping both terror and state terror. While limiting the scope of violence is not the equivalent to nonviolent action, a gradual decrease can contribute to finding common ground with regard to means for deflating the current situation.

Abu Sarah suggests learning from the American civil rights movement: "Dr. King appealed to the deepest consciousness of the American people. He invoked the highest standard of American values: the constitution and the writings of the founding fa-

58. Samir Awad, "The Conference of Nonviolent Strategies for Palestine in the Light of the Changes in the Region," March 26, 2011, Al-Bireh, Ramallah, p. 88. This conference was organized by The Center for Democracy and Community Development and Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND) in cooperation with IKV OAX CHRISTI of the Netherlands.

mentation of party politics, such an unclear panorama makes it difficult for Israelis of good will to feel as if they are participants in a growing and united peaceful Palestinian resistance movement.⁵⁵

The continued aggressive military response to Palestinian and mixed protests by the IDF is worrisome. Previously discussed evidence does indicate, however, that the Gaza disengagement⁵⁶ Sharp identifies *conversion* among other approaches for a change of heart or mind and comes to agree with and work toward the activists' goal. "Conversion aims not simply to free the subordinate group, but also to free the opponents who are thought to be imprisoned by their own system and policies."⁵⁷

As in the earlier cases, nonviolent resistance and cooperation through civil disobedience across the divide may be undermined by spoilers from both sides — mostly religiously motivated. Hence sporadic acts of terror may continue to come up, and what is important is the clear-cut condemnation and disassociation by the leadership of organizations and the state.

There was a marked change when PM Fayyad's strategy towards statehood in two years focused on nonviolent tactics (economic and institutional building, and international support). The West Bank's decision to boycott Jewish settlement products in addition to isolated visits to places confronting occupation with civil disobedience are steps forward from violent terrorism. These trends should be reinforced even further, even when adverse circumstances from the Palestinians and provocations would and can occur. At the same time, there should be a clear message that official campaigns and proactive negotiations (or not) as a dominant strategy does not preclude the simultaneous use of nonviolent sanctions.

The argument that Hamas has lately adhered to a policy of temporary *tahdi'a* [tranquility] in Gaza is not congruent with total commitment to nonviolent means and is often violated by other extreme organizations. This is aggravated when accompanied by a clear continuation of their denial Israel's right to exist or the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) reluctance to recognize Israel as a "Jewish" state while Palestine is already a full member of an "Arab" league. Instead of justifying it as an approximation to nonviolent resistance, it is best to spell out the difference with peaceful means and ends.

Israel tends to escalate violence to high levels where superior power is clearly manifested. While Palestinian violence often developed when Israel troops or settlers had initiated such a cycle or responded with massive violence to Palestinian nonviolent resistance (i.e., breaking the arms of Palestinians after a Rabin decision at the beginning of the first Intifada, and the massive killing of the Palestinian demonstrators at the beginning of the second Intifada) it seems to be no short-term behavioral change when a massive nonviolent campaign could be launched. Sustainability of nonviolent resistance facing adverse circumstances and provocations is one of the major challenges.

Peaceful resistance in an asymmetric situation is an equalizing tool for the weak

55. The Center for Democracy and Community Development (CDCD), and Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND), Minutes of a workshop on the nonviolence strategies in Palestine, November 18, 2010.

56. Rubel, Omer, and Alon, "Strategic Thinking and Non-Violence in Israel's Disengagement from Gaza."

57. Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, p. 416.

Factors Influencing Military-Media Relations in Turkey

F. Michael Wutrich

While headway has been made since 2001 regarding legislation that provides greater civilian control of the military in Turkey, of primary concern in recent years has been the military's use of "informal mechanisms of power," a designation often referring to this institution's potent relations with the national news media. This concern has been offset by the military's even more recent silence. This article argues that to understand the potency of military-media relations and how, when, and why the military appears in the news, one must also consider the underlying domestic institutional and structural forces that strongly influence this relationship. Institutionalized military education, consumer capitalism, and the military's institutional command hierarchy, ordered according to weight, establish the opportunities and constraints that frame the current realities in military-media relations.

That the Turkish military has historically played an active role in the affairs of the state is well-known and has long been a topic of discussion and contention with regard to civil-military relations and the process of democratization in the country. Especially after the junior military officers' coup on May 27, 1960 and the subsequent changes drafted into the new constitution in 1961, the vehicle for the Turkish Armed Forces' (TAF) involvement in political affairs was formalized with the creation of the advisory National Security Council, whose powers in its role as protector of the nation from external and internal threats were strengthened after the 1971 and 1980 military interventions.¹ However, following the European Union's (EU) 1999 Helsinki summit decision to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership, there have been fairly significant legislative steps taken toward curbing what was considered excessive military powers and establishing greater civilian control over the Armed Forces.²

Despite the developments in formal mechanisms that have quietly continued throughout 2010, recent critical scholarship and observations of civil-military relations have begun to demonstrate concerns of a more "informal" nature. For example, in the progress reports released by the EU addressing the fulfillment of requirements for membership from 2006 to 2010, under the heading "civilian oversight of the security

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1. Metin Heper, "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2001), p. 14.

2. Linda Michaud-Emin, "The Restructuring of the Military High Command and the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2007), pp. 26-27.

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 HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/10.3751/66.2.13

thers. Thus, his appeals reached millions of American people and resonated within their hearts and minds."⁵⁹ The resonance of Dr. King with the American people is due to his invoking of American standards. Likewise, Palestinians should refer to Jewish morals and traditions to make it more salient for Israelis. Rabi and Prof. Gopin put himself in the shoes of a Palestinian peer, attempting to apply this tactic:

I am going to sit down at this checkpoint...because I am waiting for you to treat me with dignity and equality. I know you can as a child of Abraham, as a survivor of injustice and cruelty yourself, as a scion of a noble civilization... Shoot me if you want to follow orders, or join me if you want to rediscover your Jewish beliefs and values... You can have your Israel and we can have our Palestine, and God will show us the way to do this in peace and justice.⁶⁰

Such a message could truly be a tremendous wake up call for Israelis; it strikes Israelis at their core, their Jewish collective memory. It acknowledges past experiences with the cruelty mentioned. This is critical in gaining the attention of Israelis and showing a level of respect. There should also be an invitation to join their struggle. There is a realization here that the Palestinian cause is also in Israel's interest for security. The message is blunt in the impact that Israeli occupation has had on Palestinians, forcing Israelis to reflect on their conduct. Finally, connecting means and ends, it concludes by correlating Jewish beliefs with the values of justice and equality to remind us all that it is possible to have two states living in peace side by side.

59. Aziz Abu Sarah, "What can Palestinians Learn from the American Civil Rights Movement? Appealing to the Jewish Conscience," Common Ground News Service, November 12, 2009, <http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=26740&lan=en&sid=0&sp=0&isNew=1>. Abu Sarah continues: "Palestinians should also appeal to Israel's democratic ideals. As Israel maintains a belief in liberty and self-determination, so should Palestinians insist that Israel live up to its own ideals. This means highlighting that true democracy cannot allow for the occupation and oppression of others. The Palestinian struggle shares many similarities with Jewish history. From its fight for existence to the Diaspora experience, Jews and Palestinians have both desired a secure and free homeland."

60. Gopin (Full quote), "I am going to sit down at this checkpoint, in this airport, because I am waiting for you to treat me with dignity and equality. I know you can as a child of Abraham, as a survivor of injustice and cruelty yourself, as a scion of a noble civilization. I know your laws demand that you follow orders, that you point your weapons at my children and terrify them, that you force me to strip naked and violate my body. But your laws are unjust, and you can break them and join us... I know that you put up your wall for security and I too want your children to be safe. But you cannot use it as an excuse to steal more of my land, as an excuse to avoid apologizing to me for the harm you have done to me for sixty years. Join me and we will fight for peace and justice together, we will negotiate, but I will not allow you anymore to corrupt me, buy me, divide me, or humiliate me. Shoot me if you want to follow orders, or join me if you want to rediscover your Jewish beliefs and values. I will be generous as the prophet Mohammed was; I will be just as he was; I will welcome you to my home, as he did, but it is time for you to see me as equal, as a brother, and then everything else will work out. You can have your Israel and we can have our Palestine, and God will show us the way to do this in peace and justice."