A Theory of Development

Overcoming Structural Violence

Johan Galtung

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Preface

This is one of four related books, published about at the same time, devoted to the basic issues indicated by the key title words: Conflict, Development, Civilization, Peace. Preceding those words are "A Theory of". "A", not "The". And there is a subtitle about overcoming direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence, and to building direct, structural and cultural peace.

The three violencies are different.[1] Direct violence is an intended act of commission; structural violence is sustained by unintended acts of omission (if intended, then they are acts of commission). Cultural violence are aspects of culture--the symbolic sphere of our existence--legitimizing the other two, as normal, natural, parts of the human condition.

But violence is an evil, like disease; and like disease may serve as a wake-up call mobilizing spiritual and material counter-resources. Their total abolition is an abstraction. But their reduction is a major social and political program, whether at the micro level, in the family, the meso social level, the macro level between countries and nations, or the mega level between regions and civilizations. The term used in the subtitles, "overcoming", indicates a conscious process counteracting the violencies; and "building" peace indicates a positive process of solidification.

Basic theses--empirical, axiological, praxeological--about how to do this are presented in the first chapter of each book; specifying the title of the book. This preface will not repeat that, but point to some similarities and differences between the basic themes, conflict, development, civilization and peace.

The key words for the difference are logical: *relation* versus *attribute*. Thus, one of the concepts underlying them, *violence*, is obviously a relation, including violence against Self.

Conflict and *peace*, both in theory and practice, are about improving the quality of the relation, by such means as peaceful conflict transformation, conciliation and cooperation and harmony, for mutual and equal benefit. *Development* and *civilization* are about improving the quality of structures and cultures, through peaceful transformation. And among the criteria of successful structural and cultural transformation are, precisely, the ability to solve conflicts and to enhance the peacebuilding capacity. Development and civilization, both in theory and practice, are about improving quality of attributes. Thus, positive peace is a relation, and development is an attribute that facilitates such relations. And the same applies to civilization.

The relation-attribute distinction is not absolute. It is like health: much, maybe most, theory and practice of somatic health, is about improving the quality of individuals. But some aspects, particularly mental and social health, are about improving relations. In general conflict and peace are more about relations and development and civilization more about attributes.

The four books build on *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*[2], PBPM. The four books are self-contained, but

acquaintance with PBPM could be useful.

The same applies to *50 Years: 25 Intellectual Landscapes Explored* (Galtung, 2008b). In this book the intellectual-epistemological basis to come to grips with these phenomena is explored. The five parts are: TRANS (trans-national, trans-disciplinary, trans-level), EPISTEMES, PILLARS (deep Nature, deep Culture, deep Structure), PEACE (violence, war, conflictology, paxology) and GLOBALISM, exploring implications of the other parts for social sciences. Clearly the sources of inspiration were buddhism more than abrahamism, Gandhi more than Kant, daoism more than cartesianism. And the focus was on exploration of a potential reality with more peace and development. It was more on peace rather than the empirical reality of violence, war and security; on development rather than misery; and on civilization in general rather than Western civilization in particular. The goal: *practice-indicative theory*.

The books have been on the assembly line for some time: since 1958 for Conflict, at Columbia University, New York, and Charlottesville, Virginia; since 1962 for Development, working in Kerala exploring the Indo-Norwegian fisheries Project and in Latin America as UNESCO professor; since 1972 for Civilization--with a grant from the Berghof Stiftung for which I am most grateful to Professor Dieter Senghaas-- starting with an exploration of the similarities between liberalism and marxism; and since 1951 for Peace, after some kind of calling to explore what a peace studies discipline might look like, prompted by a decision to refuse military service.

The books should be seen as the outcome of very concrete. even dramatic, encounters with human-social-world reality rather than with libraries, books and academics. Practice has much more impact when conscious, reflected. Like mediation in well above 100 conflicts (*50 Years: 100 Peace & Conflict Perspectives*, Galtung, 2008a); living consciously not only the difference between the "more developed" and "less developed" but the relation between them; living deeply in other civilizations including marrying into one of them; living through wars hot and cold, with searches for peace. Which does not mean that other authors are not important sources, hence the many references. But library is not life.

There are two unpublished predecessors on www.transcend.org: *Theories of Peace*, TOPS, Oslo: PRIO, 1967, and *Theories of Conflict*, TOCS, Columbia University, University of Oslo, Universität Zürich, University of Hawai'i, 1958-69-72- 73. They are different from the books now being published; they were roads traveled, working sketches. They had not been lived enough.

Life came through a Sara Patton Boyle, Charlottesville, VA, standing up in courage for desegregation even after the Ku Klux Klan burnt a cross outside her house; a family living in the sewers of Palermo; a Danilo Dolci; a little girl in a Bombay slum, teaching me life at the margin of existence? And through that human fusion, the unity of love in all its aspects? And children in Norway in the SABONA project who discover how to turn the agony of conflict into the delights of peace-- before adults do.

My gratitude to Naakow Grant-Hayford and Karoline Weber for help with literature and Hajo Schmidt and Dietrich Fischer and many others for deep reading.

Alfaz, New Year 2010   Johan Galtung

Dedication

In deep gratitude, this book is dedicated to friends and colleagues for rich cooperation on the theory and practice of development through many years.

To the World Order Models Project, WOMP, under the brilliant guidance of Saul H. Mendlovitz for focusing research on key values--basic needs, freedom, social justice, eco-balance and their realization.

To the *Institut universitaire du développement, IUED* in Geneva in general, and its then director, the late Professor Roy Preiswerk in particular, 1975-76, and 1977-82. Roy was among the first to change the focus from economics to culture as the key factor underlying development, for good and for bad depending on the culture. I was a visiting professor, and the students, mainly but not only, from developing countries were a never-ending source of constructive criticism. And the same for the PhD students at the University of Hawai'i, Dept of Political Science, 1987-94.

To the *Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development, GPID* project of the United Nations University, Tokyo, for putting together and funding a concerted, interdisciplinary, international approach to the G and the P and the I; and particularly to the then Vice rector for Human and Social Development, Professor Kinhide Mushakoji and my assistant George Aseniero. I was the director from the start in 1977 till I resigned 1981. My approach, also emphasizing the role of the US empire (comparing it to the Roman empire in its decline and fall) seemed to stand in the way of publication. Many working papers (see www.transcend.org) and books came out of the GPID. The present book is my final report--particularly Parts I IV and V--trying to pull together many lines of thinking in GPID, and then going beyond. I am deeply grateful for that rich experience; the tiny ripple on the wave mentioned above notwithstanding.

To the *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, UNRISD,* for challenging tasks as a consultant. In 1995, March 11-12, I was invited to participate in an intellectual summit accompanying the UN Social Summit in Copenhagen, with a macro-historical overview, "On the Social Costs of Modernization". Post-modernity, with its destruction of social tissue and compelling social norms, was counted among those costs. Part Two of this book--except Chapter 10--is based on that paper. And in 1996 then director Dharam Ghai commissioned what is Part Three of this book on economic aspects of the fall of empires, published here for the first time the way it was written (except for minor language editing). The reader may perhaps compare what was written in Chapter 12 as Case No. 10, "The Coming Decline and Fall of the US Empire" with what is known today. Case No. 9, "The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire"--actually published as a prediction in 1980, "within 10 years"--starting at its weakest point, the Berlin wall, which crashed 9 November 1989. The empire followed quickly, and so did actually communism, Soviet style.

To the *UN Family* in general for giving me the challenge as a consultant to UNRISD, UNESCO (very many times, particularly for appointing me in 1968 consultant in Tokyo to a project on Japanese development, exposing me to another paradigm), FAO, UNITAR (Nairobi and Geneva), ILO, WHO, UNIDO, UNU, and others; "Specialized Agencies" many of them, an amazing, very successful mobilization of people of good will and skills from all over the world, a true globalization much beyond "trade without borders".

To all of them my most heart-felt thanks.

Introduction

There is no Final State of Development. And will never be.

Development is holistic and dialectic, like any *holon* with forces and counterforces--contradictions--as basic to anything human as cardio-vascular circulation. Their absence spells death. There are cycles, but final states only in fundamentalisms like Eternal Peace, End of History, Ideology or Capitalism. Development leads to mal- or de-development leads to new development leads to new mal- or de-development. The task is not to end the cycles but to handle the dialectic life cycles nonviolently-constructively.

In these life cycles--not necessarily revisiting earlier stages in the process, *panta rei*--something will vary with time; increase, stay, decrease, continuously, or discontinuously as a step function. That something provides a perspective for grasping the phenomenon, maybe for rooting a theory of development.

One such factor is *equity*, structural peace. Hierarchies are transformed into "equiarchies", liberating humans, societies, the world so they can develop more freely. But then inequities arise, with new hierarchies, and new mal- de-development. And so on.

At a deeper level *diversity and symbiosis*, robust ecology in a broad sense. Choosing that as *fundamentum explanationis* implies that other candidates, like growth, are unchosen; to be explored.

Terms fetched from natural sciences can be put to human-social theory use. Enriching equity with diversity and symbiosis into "equitable ecology" yields much to draw upon. Identifying development with robust ecology we can use the same discourse and practice for development and environment. Till maldevelopment and malenvironment build up: get at it, again. The book explores how.

But first some reality: *The Millennium Development Goals*.

Prologue:
Development and Structural Violence;
The Millennium Development Goals:
Why, How, and Why so Difficult?

The Millennium goals by 2015 are well chosen, even laudable:
[1] Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; reducing by one half those who live on less than $1 a day and those who are starving
[2] Ensure that all boys and girls complete elementary school
[3] Promote gender equality and empower women; removing the proportion difference of girls and boys in elementary school
[4] Reduce child mortality; reduce by two thirds the proportion of children who die before they are five years old
[5] Improve maternal health; reducing by three fourths the proportion of women who die in connection with pregnancy
[6] Combat HIV-AIDS, malaria; reversing the deadly diseases
[7] Ensure environmental sustainability; reducing by one half the people who live without access to safe water and improving the living conditions for at least 100 million living in slums
[8] Develop a global partnership for development; increasing development assistance, just trade, and debt forgiveness

They address basic human needs, privilege the most needy, and focus on gender parity, the environment, and global equity. There is no "growth first, then distribution" as that never-happening "trickling down", when "time is ripe". Right on target.

Problem: they are unattainable given the disconnect between MDG goals-values and absurd economies with 125,000 deaths a day, from hunger[3] and preventable-curable diseases. One has to yield. So far it has mainly been basic needs, for the most needy.

And yet it can be done, to wit, *for a focus on basic needs*:
- *food* by focusing on the local level of federations of neighbor municipalities with the means to grow the food needed on publicly owned, but privately used land, sales cooperatives, and to produce the means of production, short transportation distances for a sustainable environment, using old and new technologies;
- *water*, by distilling ocean water by solar energy and focused mirrors, using pipelines for humans, not only car oil;
- *housing* by easily assembled-disassembled inexpensive building blocs using local materials, easily reconstructed for changing family needs, on publicly owned, and privately used, land;
- *health* by combining a dense network of polyclinics--like clean water available to all--"barefoot" doctors-nurses, generic medicines; with

regional hospitals and helicopter transportation;

- *education* by focusing on everybody, not only children, and on alphabetization, for dignity through membership in the symbolic society, by mobilizing students, or officers, to live a year or so in needy villages, and a dense network of internet-connected schools; with regional secondary schools, and bus transportation;
- *For a focus on the most needy*: seeking them, helping them; being victims of social disasters they may be unable to cope themselves, like the many living in misery in US trailer camps;
- *For a focus on gender parity*: education is a proven approach; making it obligatory (and beyond elementary school) assumes that it also is free, and in principle guarantees parity;
- *For a focus on the environment*: energy being key, a massive switch is needed from depleting-polluting oil-gas-coal based technologies to sun-wind-water-bio- geo- and hydro-thermic based energy conversion, with fines and incentives, and energy profiles ensuring equal access to locally produced energy all over;
- *For a focus on global equity*: increased local, national and regional *self-reliance* in the production of goods-services for basic needs and normal consumption--necessities and normalities, not luxuries--intra- rather than inter-sector for equity (trade resources against resources, processed against processed, services against services); tariff protection for weak sectors; canceling (not "forgiving") debts not primarily intended to meet basic needs and incurred non-democratically. Development stimulus to provide employment for the poor for work in the basic needs sectors;
- *For more than $1 per day* (that measure has to be changed to a more stable currency): by a minimum living income for everybody, not only for those in poverty categories, or as a cash stimulus for everybody, even if below living income; particularly given the ubiquitous and increasing rates of unemployment.

All of this by cooperating local-state-regional-global actors.

What is in the way? Massively supported structural violence:

- *Economically*: financial resources are available for capital-intensive, quick, high return speculation, not for slow, low return from basic needs for the most needy with no buying power;
- *Politically*: there are several factors, such as:
  - democracy, may work for decision-making if the majority is poor (although India is not a case), but as the majority in many countries becomes middle class solidarity with the poor decreases;
  - an ideological obsession with the market system, demanding that basic needs are met by needy buyers buying goods and services--and what is needed for production-consumption, from private sellers;
- *Socially*: many factors, beyond prejudice and discrimination:
  - a wish to keep people down lest "they will treat us as badly as we have treated them" when-if they come up;

- a wish to have a reservoir in misery willing to do any work;
- those higher up may enjoy having *more*, not just having--relative not absolute status--and feel threatened when the gap narrows;
- small minorities afraid of losing their privileges, particularly when their wealth depends on the poverty of others;
- *vertical structural violence*: resilient correlations between assets and class-race-nation, carried by racism and nationalism;
- *rank disequilibrium*: those low down may demand much more when permitted to rise on one dimension, like educated non-whites;
- *rank discordance*: those lower down may pass income, education, health levels of those higher up, creating major tensions like men threatened by women catching up and overtaking them educationally;
- *Militarily*: misery-poverty alone leads to suffering in silence rather than to violence, but combined with such obstacles may
  - lead to armed efforts from below in order to progress quickly;
  - engender armed efforts by those higher up to halt and reverse any progress and any resistance;
  - that internal war may mobilize countries globally to intervene militarily in favor, or against, moves toward equality and equity;
- *Culturally*: people are different, and different to some means unequal, with no space for the category "different and equal".
  These obstacles often lead to two conclusions, drawn by many:
- *Domestically*: we need a revolution; turning society upside-down, to give the bottom half a chance unimpeded by the upper half; and
- *Globally*: decoupling from the dominant system, creating our own.

The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Iraq, Venezuela met basic needs for the most needy and gender parity; suffering deficits in democracy and human rights and US-West attacks.

The MDG are alternatives to revolution, like West European welfare states and East Asian Japan-led distribution in South Korea-Taiwan-Singapore-Hong Kong, and China. Evolution rather than revolution, but sacrificing a generation before taking roots.

So, why is this so difficult? Because there are the basic needs and human rights of those deprived of needs-satisfaction, even living in misery, but also the fear of those well-off, even living in opulence, of what they are in for. General formula: *lifting those low down, without threatening those high up*.

Toward this end, the basic needs and human rights perspectives are insufficient as they do not reflect the total structure, only non-negotiable positions of those at the bottom. Neither holistic, taking in all parties, nor dialectic, taking in contradictions, not only positions, a conflict paradigm-discourse carries further.

Those high up must learn to live in societies with parity for both

genders, all colors, for the older-middleaged-younger, many nations, no longer run by a ruling elite of male, white, middle-aged from one dominant nation. But others must learn that even if the social structures and the right wing attitudes of those at the top are unacceptable, they are human beings, not just "parasites". Maybe this deficit in left wing thinking is also a key impedi-ment?[4] A focus only on the deprived excludes preparing the privi-leged, not only for the inevitable, but for the pleasures of living in diversity and parity. They will not lose. But others will gain.

Thus, not only lifting the bottom of hierarchies that will reproduce the violence one way or the other, but of accommo-dating everybody to an "equiarchy", thereby removing vertical structural conflict and violence. The Nordic countries provide an example, greatly aided, though, by being small and homogeneous.

Revolutions are too threatening to status quo, and evolution is too slow.[5] The measures advocated above are neither one nor the other, but could bring about more equality, even equity.

Badly needed: structure literacy, transformation creativity.

Part One

DEVELOPMENT AS UNFOLDING

1 | What Is in a Word: Development as Unfolding

Let us try this definition, and see how far it carries us:

Development: Unfolding of the potentials in the nature, human, social and world spaces

Etymologically the Germanic words, like German *Entwicklung*, Norwegian *utvikling*, Swedish *utveckling* express this better than the English *development*, French *développement*, Spanish *desarollo*, Italian *sviluppo*. The Germanic words point to something already there; the Latin words convey more the idea of progressing from scratch.

Even if the consequences have not been drawn by these Western countries that export the same modernization = westernization mo-del, there are actually two different philosophies hidden in the words.

On the one hand there is the idea of a *tabula rasa*, the clean slate to be inscribed from the outside, and, on the other hand, the idea of a *code* already there to be manifested, realized, articulated. The nature-nurture dichotomy is too sharp, but the clean slate perspective leans more toward nurture, and the code toward both.

The word "unfold" covers the second philosophy. Plants, trees, carry seeds, the seeds carry codes; with nutrients, water, air and sunshine what is latent in the seed is manifested, realized, articulated. Plants, trees, unfold their codes. So do animals. So do humans, so do societies, so do worlds.

How much from the inside code, and how much from the outside, like a gardener, forester, parent, teacher, politician assuring that no species overshadows the other(s)--or assuring that they do--matters less than recognizing the code as reality. For live nature and humans a bio-genetic code, for societies of humans, and societies of such societies, worlds, a structural-cultural code. For *gaia*, the planet seen as an organism[6] hosting the unfolding of nature, humans, societies, worlds, more or less attuned to each other, makes sense.

Development as unfolding accommodates development as freedom. Plants and animals twisted like *banzai* trees in commercially profitable directions--or bound Chinese women's feet--impeding natural growth; males imposing bio-genetical codes through rape; parents cloning themselves in the offspring by "raising" children; middle classes "raising" working classes by schooling[7]; societies imposing structural-cultural codes by conquest-occupation, and by development assistance: they all negate freedom as *self*-realization.[8]

Problem: to certify a region as "more developed" privileges one

code at the expense of others, twisting unfolding into cloning, even culturocide. A crime against development, against humanity? But "more developed" for unfolding more of its own potential makes sense.

And: even without the cloning of others through these micro- meso- macro-mega mechanisms there is a huge problem of compatibility. Unfolding is an attribute. But how do the unfoldings relate to each other? Compatible, neutral, or, incompatible = conflict? Moral guidelines, like "my unfolding should not impede your unfolding", like for freedom, are helpful. But trees and flowers, humans, classes, countries, often overshadow each other, struggling for scarce resources. In families preparation and distribution of food are often in the skilled hands and minds of the mothers.[9] But where are the mothers for nature, countries, regions, for the whole world?

And: an equally important problem, the conflict potential between the unfoldings at the four levels. We try to regulate the world-states-humans unfolding through a triadic, UN-states-humans, concept of *human rights* (and duties). But nature was not included in that paradigm, and now gets back at us with a vengeance. And the state system as carrier of rights may be rapidly fading.[10]

Obviously three major themes in any theory of development.

All development is unfolding; not all unfolding is development. Codes have to be tested in terms of their consequences inside the nature-human-social-world spaces, and between the spaces, to check whether they qualify as development codes.

Thus, the social code for Occident II,[11] Western civilization during the "Middle Ages", hampered human unfolding at the bottom of feudalism, exhausted nature space, and left world space unused through low interaction in general and trade in particular. Being basically inner-directed humanly and socially the code allowed for much social, possibly also human, diversity, but little symbiosis.

Another example of a de-development code is the Soviet marxist model. It provided for somatic basic needs for many, maybe most, but at the expense of nature, freedom and identity, within and between societies, and inability to bridge the world faultline between liberal and marxist. A summary of the reasons for its demise.

Socio-cultural, like bio-genetic, codes appear, unfold, and disappear. For the bio-genetic the term "evolution" is used, like "development" connoting progress. For "evolution" *forces motrices* have been identified in three influential meta-historical narratives:

• *darwinian* through *competition*, like "survival of the fittest";[12]
• *kropotkian* through *cooperation*, like "mutual aid";[13]
• *imanishian* through *creativity*, exploring open niches-spaces.[14]

Do these forces also produce development as unfolding?

The darwinian perspective would give the leading development model the same dominant position as the human species in nature; the kropotkian perspective would focus on cooperation among mo-dels; the imanishian perspective on creative use of new spaces. Occi-dent II and the Soviet marxist models collapsed, did not cooperate with others, were low on creativity. Evolution may be necessary for development, but sufficient? How are the development narratives?

In mainstream development theory there is a narrative:

Problem: The *difference*-deficits in what MDCs have and LDCs have not;

• Direct violence arises out of envy as the MDCs advance further;

• *Remedy*: The LDCs have to imitate the MDCs and be assisted to do so;

• If imitative enough *growth* will make LDCs have what they have not.

This book challenges that, arguing an alternative narrative:

• *Problem*: The *relation* between poor and rich people and countries;

• Structural violence keeps poor people in poor countries in misery;

• *Remedy*: decouple vertical and build horizontal equitable relations;

• If horizontal enough nature, humans, societies, world will *unfold*.

The mainstream narrative has *one* darwinian champion, the liberal model, with some vertical assistance cooperation and creativity. The alternative narrative appoints no champion but opens for creativity by adding marxist, buddhist, islamic, Japanese, Chinese models (Part Four), overcoming the key impediment, vertical structural violence through the key remedy, equitable, horizontal cooperation. The darwinian narrative, so dear to the West, competitive and single-peaked, has disappeared; in favor of a more diverse, symbiotic, equitable development landscape.

The Western liberal model is not dead; it has still much to offer. But the idea of being the only model for the whole world is dying. That Western phantasy will not survive the brilliance of a Gilbert Rist[15] and a Wolfgang Sachs[16]. Nor will "peace" as security only of, by and for the West. But, like for "peace" we want to keep the term "development", only giving it another meaning as unfolding of codes, not imitation. As there are several social codes, there will be several developments; like buddhist, islamic, Chinese, Japanese, *and* Western liberal (but not US imperial) *and* Western marxist (but not Soviet) models. And more.

The darwinian-spencerian narrative of struggle for survival as the fittest, is anti-developmental; not only unattainable for all by definition, but undesirable except more softly as competition. But cooperation as mutual and equal benefit, and as creativity improving on codes, are clearly developmental. Western-liberal must adjust to that.

By what precise criteria would an unfolding not be developmental,

like when we excluded Occident II and Occident I US and Soviet versions? Basing a development concept and theory[17] on codes and their unfolding, the criteria would, as mentioned, test these codes. The criteria should be simple, few, empirical, and as noncontroversial as possible.

Here are four criteria for an unfolding to be developmental:
- in nature space: *eco-balance*; nature's self-reproduction;[18]
- in human space: *basic human needs*; human self-reproduction;
- in social space: that it serves or does not impede the above two;
- in world space: that it serves or does not impede the above three.

The social and world spaces are necessary for the human space to develop, but also sufficient for human and nature space to de-develop.

This generic development concept rests on two pillars: meeting basic nature and basic human needs--the latter somatic, nature-given, *and* spiritual--for self-reproduction. Social and world development derive from those two, full stop. They are human constructions and should be as open as possible, but not free to insult the nature-human spaces. If social = structural + cultural that is where to look.[19] This does not preclude some genetic engineering, with skepticism.[20] Better rely on the change processes competition-cooperation-creativity for nature-human self-reproduction, than on laboratory manipulation?

Development generates its dialectic twin de-development. Part Two explores macro-historical de-development, structurally and culturally, *in time*, counteracting basic needs of humans and nature. And Part Three explores imperialism *in space* as a structural-cultural arrangement that insults nature and human spaces in the center and the periphery. There is no linear development or de-development process; they even come together. But right now we may feel that there is more de-development than development around, and that much repair work is needed. But first a theory of self-reproduction in Chapter 2; then basic needs in Chapter 3, structure in Chapter 4, and culture in Chapter 5.

2 | A Theory of Development: Diversity, Symbiosis and Equity

A general development concept should be matched with a general development theory; *holistic*, accommodating the nature, human, social and world spaces, and *dialectical*, catching contradictions that may turn development into de-development and vice versa. Rejected is any grotesque reductionism to social space in general and the economic sector in particular, like reducing humans to weight growth only.[21]

Do the four spaces share some factors X that could serve as a basis for a development theory with self-generated reproduction that could make development sustainable? A general system theory? Or, a theory based on one of the spaces, and in that case which one?

Here are three reasons to base development theory on *nature* space:

Nature has been around much longer than humans have, changing, differentiating, evolving into higher forms of complexity. There must be some inherent "wisdom of nature" as a source of learning about holism, dialectics and resilience-reproducibiity-sustainability.

All the other spaces depend on nature space, not vice versa. Nature can survive without humans and their social and world spaces. We depend on nature; nature does not depend on us. The cosmic eco-cycle has the cosmo-, atmo-, hydro-, litho- and biosphere as a basis, with the homosphere as an expendable coda, and the cosmosphere as sustainable and generous context. We destroy nature, as evidenced by ecological crises, more than nature-outside-us destroys us through calamities of various kinds. Nature-inside-us ultimately kills us all--but so far not the human species. Nature is in us, so the theoretical X we are looking for may be a carry-over from nature's reproducibility and evolution.

Our insight in nature may be better than in ourselves. The distance between ourselves and the rest of nature may facilitate abstract and generalizing intellectualism, and holistic perspectives.

A priori we might assume better insight into all the other three spaces since we humans are in, of, and by them. But we may not have the distance necessary to arrive at fruitful insights in ourselves; we are too close with too much at stake in our values and interests. Nature sciences may simply be better than human and social sciences. It would be useful if nature could study us and file a report. Maybe it does.

However, using nature space for these reasons as model for the other three spaces is only one approach to be tested for its heuristic value in coming to grips with reproducibility-sustainability all over.

Ecological balance in *nature space*--including not only the abiota in the atmo-, hydro- and litho-sphere with sub-spaces but also the biota (micro-organisms, plants, animals, humans) in the biosphere--seems to depend on *diversity*[22] of abiota and biota, and on their *symbiosis*. From diverse building blocs symbiosis can produce ever higher complexity.[23]

It sounds plausible that diversity in abiota and biota with access to cosmosphere energy and symbiosis regenerating old and generating new abiota and biota, sustainable reproduction might result. And plausible that through *lack of diversity* in abiota and-or biota and-or through *malfunctioning symbiosis mechanisms* nature space might decay.

An example of the former would be monocultural agriculture with diversity supplied by artificial fertilizers and toxic pesticides. And the latter occurs when green house gases etc. in the atmosphere interact with the cosmosphere so that a key symbiosis like photosynthesis in nature space does not function optimally. Thinning and holes in the ozone layer let in too much cosmic energy; and the opposite too little. A tight and delicate balance.

We shall refer to the joint functioning of diversity and symbiosis as *system maturity*. The general line of thought for all four spaces will then be as indicated in Table 1 (see next page).

1, 2. Spaces and sub-spaces. The subdivision of *nature space* is classical; more problematic is the division of *human space* into body, mind, spirit. The body is material *soma*, the *mind* is seen as the seat of emotions-cognitions-volitions, and the *spirit* as the seat of self-reflection. How is the self, the *personality*, coded, how can it change, how about others, and how about Self-reflection, on the collective Self? If the mind stores knowledge, then maybe spirit is the seat of wisdom? No precise border-line is needed between mind and spirit, nor between them and a soma that is humans-in-nature and nature-in-humans. They are all parts of a *holon* cut through by countless contradictions.

Social space is subdivided into the micro-meso-macro. *Micro* is inside and the small group usually based on kinship and-or friendship; in other words primary relations. *Meso* is the secondary relations, organizations and associations with shared values and-or interests, and the tertiary relations, categories of people, like genders, generations, races, classes, nations and territorial units, dividing humanity with problematic faultlines; a *holon*, cut through by such faultines. *Macro* is the level of interacting nations-cultures and states-countries.

Finally the *mega* level *world space*, with regions, civilizations, inter-state, trans-state and sub-state actors, interacting. The code or agenda of a relatively homogeneous region constitutes a *civilization*.

Table 1: Development Goals and Processes: A Systemic Approach

1 Space	NATURE	HUMAN	SOCIAL	WORLD
2 Sub-space	cosmosphere atmo-, hydro- lithosphere biosphere	body-soma mind-psyche spirit-soul	Micro- primary meso- secondary and tertiary macro society and nation	region and civilization
3 Code	genetic code	genetic code personality	social code= structure+ culture	regional code= civilization cosmology world code?
4 System Maintenance (by definition)	bio-needs	somatic **needs** spiritual **needs**	social **interests**	regional **interests** world **interests**
5 System maturity (diversity with symbiosis)	several **biotopes** and exchange cycles	several **homotopes** and exchange cycles	several **socio- topes** and exchange cycles	different systems in active, peaceful co-existence[24]
6 Reproduc- tion (based on maturity)	renewal reproduction	reproduc- tion	recon- struction	Recon- struction
7 Resilience -to violence -to exploitation	injury to needs injury to reproduction capacity and renewal	injury to needs injury to reproduc- tion capacity	injury to interests injury to reconstruc- tion capacity	injury to interests injury to reconstruction capacity
8 Mainte- nance goal	eco- balance	self- realization	develop- ment	peace

3. Codes. In the second row is a hierarchy of increasing complexity, starting with a universe without human beings but with cosmic energy and ending with very complex world systems. Open one of these Chinese boxes and inside are the parts of the next. Each space is steered by its own logic, *code*, *program*, defining goal-seeking processes of that space, with complex feedback relations. At the end is the vision of one state in the world for one nation called humanity. Two key questions: what would be the code for the world space? And the generic human code?

In Chapter 1 above we have defined development as unfolding: these are the codes whose unfolding might constitute development.

Thus, each organism in the biosphere in *nature* space carries a bio-genetic code transmitted through reproduction, defining the upper and lower limits of that species in terms of differentiation and complexity. So also for the somatic aspect of human beings. But in humans codes for the non-somatic aspects emerge, summarized in the word personality; enabling us to recognize the person from one day, and hour, to the next. We attribute to humans the capacity to reflect on their personality--if not on the somatic code--and change it through spiritual transformation.

In *social space* the code is structural-cultural, built into the structure as patterned interaction, and into the culture implicitly as a social view and explicitly spelt out as ideologies, programs, etc. Much of this is subconscious, as *collectively shared subconscious.*[25]

In *world space* this becomes even more complex since we are dealing with larger systems, societies of societies. The "deep structure" and "deep culture" held in common by different societies, systems and humans in a region can be seen as the deep ideology, *cosmology*, or Personality of a civilization.[26] But it is cut through by faultlines; the dominant cosmology being the cosmology of the dominant groups-countries.

And that raises again the question of a code for the total *world* space, and a deep human code beyond the bio-genetic most humans have in common. Will the former accommodate the latter?[27]

4. Maintenance, meaning "system maintenance". The two key concepts are "needs" for *nature* and for *human* space, and "interests" for *social* and *world* space. Needs are the *conditio sine qua non*, the non-negotiable basis for system maintenance. If the needs of an organism are not met, then that organism disintegrates. So also for human beings, but basic human needs are not only somatic, they are also spiritual (Chapter 3).

The subject of *interests* in the *social* and *world* spaces is complex and controversial. What would be the interests of a social system, or a system of social systems, regional or world? "National interests" may be neither in nature's, human, other nations' or world interest, serving as pretext for wars and untold suffering. Anti-development, indeed.

The position taken here, as mentioned, is that *the only legitimate interest of social, regional and world systems is to satisfy the basic biological and spiritual needs of humans and the reproduction of nature.* Social and world systems are abstractions compared to the reality of sentient life and nature. They are means serving development, not ends.

This reductionism works like Chinese boxes: the world interest is to satisfy the interests of *its* members, the societies; the interests of the societies is to satisfy the needs of *its* members, the citizens. But since the latter eventually depends on finite nature space, there is a limit to the bio-needs of all organisms and their numbers. They also depend on abiota which have to be protected, e.g. against global warming. Ultimately we depend on ecological balance in a meta-space comprising all four spaces. In short: the primacy of nature.

There is a doubleness to this proposition.

On the one hand, nature's need for reproduction, and the human need for reproduction somatically and spiritually, are non-negotiable.

On the other hand, the social, regional and world systems are negotiable. The burden of proof--that they serve to satisfy the needs of nature and humans--lies with their promoters. They have the *right* to propose new systems with the satisfaction of these needs among the goals. But they also have the *duty* to explore their side-effects. Systems for governance-security and production-consumption, like a strong state or a strong market, are not goals in their own right. They should be judged by their capacity to meet nature's and human needs.

5. Maturity. In the fifth row, system maturity, the postulate is that system maturity is based on the level of diversity, and the level of symbiosis between the components in that diversity. The higher the level of system maturity, the more resilient the system, and the more capable of reproduction, both maintaining itself, of creating new generations, and of withstanding various types of injuries; even of setting goals for itself within the conditions of system maturity.[28]

In all spaces this calls for a diversity of types and symbiosis; *biotopes* in nature space, *homotopes* in human space, *sociotopes* in social space, and *mundotopes* in world space. Let us explore them.

We have only one world (so far), but a range of possible world systems, mundotopes. World history has given rise to a variety, let us

focus on two extreme mundotopes.

On the one hand is a world space consisting of a number of societies all of the same type, based on exactly the same, and low, numbers of components, populated by humans of the same homo-tope because they have cultivated exactly the same inclinations.

On the other hand is a world of very different societies with very diverse components in very complex cycles of interactions, populated by very diverse humans who inside themselves would cultivate diverse inclinations, synergizing all this variety into new and different ways.

The two mundotopes are worlds of very low and very high entropy. Monochromatic vs polychromatic, homogeneous vs heterogeneous; in our discourse immature-vulnerable mundotope vs mature-resilient-robust.

But why not replicate an ideal sociotope all over the world, like the Soviet Union when the end of history, communism, had been achieved? Or the United States, another End of History candidate, with democratic polity and free market economy? Only a short while ago they saw themselves not only as superpowers but as supermodels. *God forbid*.

Not only because of their imperfections, but for the reasons against any single sociotope: vulnerability, and stagnation. The chosen sociotope may have hidden weaknesses and with no sociotope to fall back upon the world, humanity and nature may be at stake. With no diversity no symbiosis producing new sociotopes, and history may be at stake. The *development = unfolding* rests not only on the right to unfold, but on the synchronic and diachronic benefits from developmental diversity.

Time has now come to explore the implications of this theory linking development to ecology by linking maturity-resilience to diversity-symbiosis. The conditions for ecological balance in nature space have been generalized to the human, social and world spaces.

To start: *nature is also a brutal place.* There are eco-cycles, like water, CO_2, solar energy producing saccharides and oxygen. But some cycles translate badly into human, social and world spaces, like the food chain with the higher levels feeding on the lower. Human omnivores feed on everything, animal herbivores and carnivores may specialize, plants feed on micro-organisms and abiota, micro-organisms on abiota, and abiota feed on humans, from the earth and back again.

The problem is with symbiosis, not diversity: sym-, not antibiosis, not parasitism. Symbiosis *senso strictu* as mutual and not too unequal benefit, as *equity*, not insults to the bio-needs of humans and nature.

At the level of *human space*, diversity implies respect and curiosity toward other homotopes, personalities, and at the level of *social space*

respect and curiosity toward other sociotopes, types of social organization; implying questioning dialogue. But that is not enough. Symbiosis implies mutual learning, exchange, mutual benefit.

Equitable symbiosis is a relational concept, meaning that parties should benefit about equally. Equality should be structure-generated, like fair trade, not distribution-generated or flagrant inequality.

The hypothesis is that diversity will, through symbiosis, generate more diversity. It will feed on itself, so to speak. The result will be an increasingly resilient system, able to withstand injury from within and without when systems love on diversity simply collapse.

One implication of that in *human space* is the strength of the person who encourages several homotopes, letting them interact, develop, mature. Take Gandhi: saint and politician, the two interacting in a very symbiotic way. Neither did the saint drive out the politician nor did the latter eliminate the former. *Inner dialogue, meditation, inside human beings, may be as important as dialogue between humans, mediation.*

But many societies process human beings into a schooling channel nurturing a limited set of inclinations as career-promoting or socially useful, teaching competition more than cooperation. The soul-body dualism carries an either-or message of saint or politician, priest or merchant, cathedral or stock exchange; not both-and. We pay dearly for suppressing important inclinations that are striving to emerge and develop inside ourselves, possibly with malignant tumors somatically, heavy mental disorders mentally, and-or disorientation spiritually.

The implication for *social space* is the same: a strong society would combine diverse sociotopes and put them synergistically together.

Economically this means not Blue market or Red planning but both, adding Green at the local, Rose mixed economy, and the Yellow based on fully articulated private and public sectors.[29] Thus, cooperatives are not state-run, yet based on collective ownership, and can more easily reduce the output, not the number of workers. Less vulnerable.

Politically this means not centralism only, nor decentralization only, but both, like federalism. How about Blue, Red, Green, Rose and Yellow cantons interacting, developing something new? The total social configuration could be resilient indeed, like in a "finance crisis".

A key implication of this theory is *democracy* itself: the coming together of diverse views of society in a symbiotic process producing something new. This points beyond democracy as rule by the consent of the ruled to democracy as inner human, family, local, national dialogue as a way of developing new ideas through dialogue and mutual learning, with human, family, local and social unfolding as possible output.

But mind the conditions: for this to happen the views have to be

diverse and the process symbiotic. Two similar parties deciding by voting make a weak democracy, diverse views in dialogue a strong one.

How about *world space*? There was once the Soviet formula of "active peaceful coexistence between the two systems", socialism and capitalism. The world could accommodate more than one sociotope, the coexistence should be "active" meaning symbiotic, and "peaceful" meaning tolerant of that diversity. More recently this is found in the Chinese formula "one country, two systems", opening for Hong Kong (and Taiwan).

But, if this is such a good theory for the world, then why not also *inside* society? Why did not the former Soviet Union accommodate some capitalist and some socialist republics or provinces? And, why between only *two* systems? Why not between five like above, not assuming that capitalism vs socialism exhausts the range of economic imagination? Is this the occidental fixation on the number 2 as part of the manichean fascination with dualism, in Russian history known as bogomolism?

And, was this a theory of world development or for transition to only one sociotope, socialist? Or a theory of convenience because capitalism was still strong and not in crisis digging its own grave? Or simply a way of claiming equal rights, like "the two superpowers"?

If the Soviet Union had practiced diversity inside the Soviet Union some would have survived the early 1990s, as would the USA of September 2008 with a strong islamic banking sector and many cooperatives.

6. Reproduction. In *nature space* reproduction is based on diversity and symbiosis; when threatened, so is natural reproduction. In *human space* there are two diverse homotopes known as man and woman, and the symbiosis known as love, intercourse, marriage, child-rearing. The condition for reproduction in human space in a biological sense is contained in the formula diversity + symbiosis, absent in same sex marriage. Thus, the theory touches ground in a very basic sense.

This also applies to reproduction as recovery from ill health. Humans rich in inner diversity would have a spiritual immunity system resisting disease beyond the blessed white blood corpuscles. An athlete may die from heart over-exertion in middle age as may an intellectual never taking care of the body. Balance is the key to health, letting many human flowers grow, inside oneself. *Mens sana in corpore sano*.

In *social space* planning exercises guidance on the market and the market energizes the planning with something to plan. Walking on two legs is better than limping on one, and three or more legs still better.

And the polity? As mentioned, democracy reproduces itself as the

richness of developing together, being each other's condition, not just using own victory to eliminate the achievements of the winner last time.

Thus not only love and sexual reproduction, recovery after injury, economic recovery, and democracy as renewal beyond reproduction are all accommodated in this discourse; one more confirmation of its validity.

A mature system is vibrant, organic. Hit at some point there may be injury, but a mature system has the diversity and symbiosis for repro-ducetion, as reconstruction, as recovery and beyond that as renewal.

In principle the same applies to *world space*: the more uniform and devoid of interaction, the more vulnerable; the more diverse, symbiotic and equitable, the more capable of reconstructing itself. In a rapidly globalizing world this becomes an increasingly relevant *problematique*.

7. Resilience, to violence. *Direct Violence* can be defined as insults to basic needs, giving us four basic types of injury in today's world:

• the negation of survival needs known as holocaust, *shoa*, Hiroshima;

• the negation of wellness needs known as "silent holocaust"[30], with people dying out and young human flowers cut off, never blossoming;

• the negation of freedom needs known as KZ and the Gulag; and

• the negation of identity needs known as meaninglessness, "spiritual void", or a materialist individualism[31] substituting greed for need.

High level maturity would enable them to resist and survive intact, with diversity in defense, production, decisions and culture-religion.

Structural violence: *soft exploitation* stops at the minimum for reproduction[32], *hard exploitation* goes beyond, till death; like the 125,000 dying every day from hunger and preventable diseases. But the human collective reproduction capacity from one generation to the next is very resilient. Exploitation in human space is ontogenetic, not phylogenetic; bio-genetic transmission survives even nuclear holocaust.

In *nature space* resources are extracted beyond renewal capa-city; the result is known as depletion. Leaving nature alone may be sufficient for recovery; if not the situation may be irreversible.

In *human space* human resources are used beyond reproduction capacity; the result is exhaustion, illness, death. Rest and food may be sufficient for recovery, if not the situation may be irreversible.

In *social* and *world* spaces resources to restore nature and human beings have also been extracted, leaving nature and humans defenseless.

But *nature space* may be sustained artificially by fertilizers and pesticides; *human space* biochemically and through genetic engineering; *social space* through development aid and debt schemes. The recipient is no longer autonomous but incorporated into a donor run super-system. There may be sustainability, but not the much deeper

reproducibility.

8. Maintenance as a Goal. That brings us to the final row: What are the goals of the system maintenance exercise based on system maturity?

For *nature space* the goal is *ecological stability* robust enough for humans to draw upon without hurting its reproduction capacity.

In *human space* the goal is somatic, mental and spiritual *health*, building on human system maturity: diversity, symbiosis and equity.

In *social space* the goal is often referred to as *development* in a more limited social sense, but not reduced to economic growth.

In *world space* the goal is often referred to as *peace* between states-regions and nations-civilizations; based on maturity.

Short formula: *Development = ecological balance + health + social unfolding + world diversity-symbiosis-equity = peace*.

The social space unfolding has to be tested for adequacy, not decided *a priori* on the basis of the bipolar MDC-LDC formula taken over from colonialism. A better formula might be that all countries are maldeveloped in different ways in different spaces. Today's MDC-LDC "cooperation" could tomorrow become equitable symbiosis between diverse societies, through mutual learning, possibly leading to new sociotopes.

With the focus on nature space at the 1972 Stockholm Confe-rence, and on human development in the UNDP Human Develop-ment reports, LDCs and MDCs have entered more symmetrically. And "sustainability" has opened for reproducibility. But MDCs are still subjects and LDCs objects of the verb "develop". Social pluralism is not celebrated, and a world development with social unfoldings attuned to each other is absent.

History seems to indicate that when civilizations think of themselves as perfect, then the end of that civilization is in sight. With nothing accepted as "challenge", why should there be a "response"? The final solution becomes the terminal solution; but not the end of history. For others, those who move on, will take over. And move in.

This is a theory of development. It covers *what* to do--unfolding of codes with equity--*how* to do it--with diversity and symbiosis inside and between humans, societies and worlds, letting codes unfold, blossom, compete, cooperate and create--and *why* to do it--for the dignity[33] of nature and humans at ever higher levels of their evolution.

How about economic growth? The answer is neither a necessary, nor as a sufficient condition. Growth primacy is dramatic, and ideological:

• being capital-oriented it presupposes a monetized economy;
• development is then tilted towards the monetizable and material;

• human needs will be defined in terms of somatic pain and pleasure;

• if also GDP oriented, then primacy to processing and markets;

• if also GNP oriented, then primacy to international trade.

This book is not against any of these five taken with moderation. But going for only these five carries ecological degradation, illness, lack of diversity-symbiosis-equity, and war over niches, in its wake.[34]

Conversely: an economy based on non-monetary barter--or on exchange of human labor, like one hour work for one hour work and sharing--would be soft on nature and humans. Health would be based on preventive, not only curative approaches. Small societies in line with the buddhist-daoist models below, will have no problems with peace. From the point of view of growth indicators they would look poor and undynamic. From the point of view of distribution indicators they would top the list; and the growth would be inside them as non-depleting spiritual growth.

How about population control? The answer is yes, focusing on the countries that do most direct and structural violence per capita to nature and humans, unless they change their practices. Much will be gained if the USA follows some EU countries in decreasing fertility.

Development is a precious concept even if it has been perverted by those who deliver a monetized, marketed commodity with economic growth as the overriding goal. But their days are coming to an end, as did the days of colonialism. The quest for development will survive all that.

3 | Development Meeting Basic Needs of Humans and Nature

Basic Human Needs

Two approaches to basic human needs will be accepted here[35]: *somatic needs* rooted in human physiology, and *spiritual needs* emerging empirically from dialogues, not from interviews or questionnaires.[36]

For the *somatic needs* the orifices of the body, and the quality and quantity of inputs and outputs, serve as a guide. The inputs are food-water-air, and impressions through the classical five senses of sights, sounds, smells, tastes and sensations. The outputs are human waste, ejaculation, ovulation, birthing, lactation, communication. Sexuality is so powerful because it combines so much of this. But throughput quality and quantity are also basic to meet human needs. Muscles must be used, use'm or lose'm. And rest-sleep is needed to restore balance.

Food-water-air are indispensable for the human physiology, so are housing and clothing to protect us against excessive cold or heat, wind, humidity. Impressions are stored in the mind, processed, and expressed as speech and writing by the spirit. The term *wellness* covers a sense of general physiology-based satisfaction.

For the *spiritual* needs we used dialogues based on "what you cannot live without".[37] For wellness five inputs emerged, *los cinco bienes fundamentales*[38]: food-clothing-housing-health, and education as broad communicative competence. And *survival*, the ultimate *sine qua non* for all needs. Nature endows organisms with a curve from birth via maturation and aging to death; survival is to complete that gift, the curve, preferably painlessly, bidding farewell.[39] To cut off this curve in a war, like with bullets, is also a crime against nature.

Two basic spiritual needs came up: *freedom* as choice, options: for spouse, job, residence, life style, polity and economy; and *identity*, as meaning with life, something to live *for*, not only *from* something.

That identification may be egoistic, focussed on self, or altruistic, as love for spouse, family, friends, colleagues, networks. The focus may be on some big Self like generation, gender, race, class, nation, country, civilization, region, humanity, God. Egoism and altruism may or may not exclude each other. But whoever has only one identity focus may lose even that one.[40] Better have more. Identity is a two-way street: not only to love and esteem, but to be loved and esteemed, by family, networks, nations, country, region, humanity, God.

One possible definition of lack of identity, alienation, would be as

"spiritual void". Life is lived, survival lasts even a long time, with wellness, and in freedom. But it is meaningless. "What is the purpose?" draws a blank. One negation of survival is homicide, and one negation of identity is suicide.[41] Needs open the gates to human drama.

Any meaning-producing identity might fill that void. Life can also have meaning when short and brutish. But the dialogues did not produce needs hierarchies. Non-negotiables cannot be put on hold or traded against other needs, like "identity against survival + wellness + freedom". These four needs categories are fairly universal, but no universal hierarchy can be imposed on them, like "first attention to survival, then the somatic aspects of wellness, only then come freedom and identity". Such hierarchies express well the bias of abrahamic religions putting soma somehow below spirit. The borders between the four basic human needs are as fuzzy as the borders between body, mind and spirit. Psycho-logic and soma-logic fuse in psychosoma-logic. There is much spirituali-ty in good food and sex, and much freedom in the choice of identity and identity in freedom. The needs categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they have to be to identify key problems: the endless variety in meeting-satisfying them, and in insulting them. Needs are felt individually, but satisfied or insulted by the context. These key problems can be identified as ways of insulting needs:

Table 2: The Four Basic Needs Categories and Their Negations

	Actor-dependent	Structure-dependent
Somatic needs	SURVIVAL death Auschwitz, Hiroshima	WELLNESS misery, illness silent holocaust
Spiritual needs	FREEDOM repression slavery, KZ, Gulag	IDENTITY meaninglessness spiritual void

The borders are fuzzy, but the political right in the West focuses on freedom needs, and the political left on wellness needs. Both avoid survival needs that may stand in the way of their favorite violence. And both take identity needs for granted as they have theirs.[42]

Could the hindu depository of human wisdom be useful? There are four overlapping life stages for all castes and classes: the *dharma* of morality, the *artha* of competence, the *kama* of enjoyment and the

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moksha of liberation, fulfillment. Moving on in life all four should be kept in mind, but the focus shifts along the *dharma-artha-kama-moksha* axis. And, whoever goes in for only one will lose even that one; like a King Midas surrounded by gold, and gold only to use a Western metaphor.

How are these hindu stages and the basic human needs related? *Dharma* builds meaning, *artha* secures wellness, *kama* takes wellness to higher somatic levels including sexual joy, *kama sutra*, and *moksha* to higher spiritual levels. Freedom and survival are not highlighted, maybe because the freedom of choice is incompatible with low caste, and "kill and be killed" is built into one of the highest castes, *kshatriya*.

The liberal West is more actor- than structure-oriented in the basic needs priorities, the four hindu stages more structure- than actor-oriented. The stages are built into the structures of living, regardless of actors' whims. And it ends with the older sharing *moksha*, their wisdom with the younger. In the West they are pensioned off.

The four basic needs challenge all civilizations to respond.

The four basic needs, when met-satisfied, are overlapping regions in an *altiplano* of well-being. There are peaks of ever higher levels of satisfaction, worth scaling occasionally, but not in order to take up permanent residence. There is that *kairos*, wishing time to stand still. But that is very taxing, and too vulnerable in the longer run; like the triple love of body-mind-spirit union not sustainable forever. But moving around on that *altiplano*, like the hindu project, is indeed preferable to life in the crevices with one or more needs insulted.

How do basic needs fare in the world? A very intuitive answer is given in Table 3 on the next page.

All 4x9 = 36 signs in Table 3 are debatable, but what matters is the profile.

The USA is high on freedom of choice and on identity with itself; an EU weak point, like in former socialist, present capitalist Eastern Europe-Russia where people got freedom of choice after the terrors of stalinism, and instead of wellness as welfare. A good deal?

Most of the Third world is low on all basic needs. In general the structure-dependent needs are more insulted, or less met, than the actor-dependent needs. Western marxist, as opposed to liberal, development models would reverse that, leaving other voids.

Humankind is far from well-being: no region scores +4. And the task is like squaring the circle. "Law and order" for survival is a part of the conservative package, "welfare state" for wellness a part of the socialist package, and "human rights" for freedom a part of the liberal package, also found in the other two.

Table 3: State of World Well-Being Early 21st Century

	Survival	Wellness	Freedom	Identity	No.+
USA	-	-	+	+	2
European Union	+	+	+	-	3
Socialist E Europe	+	+	-	-	2
Capitalist E Europe	-	-	+	-	1
China	+	-	-	-	1
Japan	+	+	+	-	3
Southeast Asia	+	-	+	-	2
West Asia	-	-	-	+	1
Latin America Africa South Asia	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	0
No. +	5	3	5	2	15

Identity may be cause and effect of the struggle for autonomy by a suppressed group--the women, the young, the non-white, the excluded, the non-dominant nations--but often rejected by middle-aged non-excluded white men from the dominant nation.

In short, those that tend to run political parties. So we have a double problem: the needs package is badly reflected in the political agendas, and it is not easily implemented.

At the end of the 1960s the present author directed a compara-tive interview study of the images 9,000 persons in 10 countries around the world held of the Year 2000,[43] like so many using the year with the three 0's as a projection screen for hopes and fears.

How did they see the prospects for peace--absence of violence-- and development--absence of misery--two important parts of well-being?

The more developed countries saw the future in terms of mental illness and narcotics, more desire for success, interest in material things, and more criminality and unemployment. The less developed countries saw only benefits from development.

The findings could be summarized as follows.[44]

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As to *domestic perspectives*: the organizing axis was the level of technical-economic development. Countries high on this dimension are pessimistic, bewildered and uncertain, probably because they see the negative effects of this type of development, and *because they feel they have exhausted the program of their societies and that the future is without challenging and clear goals.*

And countries low in development follow the program defined and developed by countries that are already disillusioned. People saw in development something social like mental health, not use of drugs, less "rat race" and divorce, less materialism, less criminality, more employment. But they got "economic growth".

Conclusion: *What people did not ask for they got; what they did asked for (basic needs) they did not get. A poor deal indeed.*

Basic Nature Needs

How does nature fit into all of this?

First, why do we assume humans and nature to be that different? Could it possibly be that the basic nature needs, the conditions nature cannot do without, are very similar to the basic human needs?

Take *survival*: Why do we talk about renewable resources? Because we want them reproduced, not eliminated. Human indivi-duals die, the species survives; that lump of food is consumed but the production of food continues. We have recently come to understand survival of nature much like survival of humans.

Take *wellness*: For live nature obvious, food-water-air applies, so does climate protection. Veterinarian services are added to make them better serve our needs; there is a dilemma there. Some, like dolphins, even get training--education--to perform for our benefit.

Take *freedom*: Let nature evolve for ever-increasing diversity.

Take *identity*: Let nature be nature with less taming-domestication.

Second, of course this is projecting human psychosoma-logic on nature. It works as far as it works. Nature as *oikos* has an *eco-logic* based on diversity and symbiosis, not simple and unambiguous, and it makes sense to identify how *homo sapiens* interfered with that logic.

The Nature-Production-Consumption cycle logic is the basis.

Nature generously gives raw materials to hunters-gatherers for immediate Consumption (air, water, herbs, plants, fruits, berries, animals), and to Production for processing and eventual end use, mediated Consumption.

Production gives industrial waste back to Nature, and Consumption gives household waste. Both conceive of Nature as a garbage heap.

A poor deal indeed for Nature. But humans produce and consume and distribute raw and processed materials between the three nodes.

By itself this is not serious. Nature has great transformation capability, breaking down complex organic compounds into the simplicity of H_2O, CO_2, CH_4, with some N-, S-, P- and K-based compounds. So, what is new? That today this does not work because of the preponderance of synthetic organic and anorganic compounds, beyond the breaking-down capability of rank-and-file enzymes.

Industrialization at work, in other words.

Thus, Nature can no longer renew herself with cyclical processes, and becomes a victim of the linearity of depletion and pollution, emptying Nature of non-renewable resources, returning non-degradable waste. There are huge, empty holes where ores or fossil fuels used to be, and mountains of slag and zillions of tons of CO2 in the atmosphere.

In addition, human beings are less able to come to the rescue of Nature when Nature's automatic defense against ecological degradation breaks down. The distance from cause to effect, or from perpetrator to victim, is too great with today's Nature-Production-Consumption cycles spanning the whole globe. Some impact may be visible locally, but the total connection between Nature, Production and Consumption economies in very distant corners of the world gets lost to the unguided mind. What used to be meaningful local action today becomes partial actionism.

Commercialization at work, in other words.

But if industrialization and commercialization, starting with one or the other, are key forces behind the increase in eco-degradation in recent generations[45], then one conclusion would be to de-industrialize and de-commercialize, using more bio-degradable and renewable resources to sustain the cyclical nature of nature's processes. And transparent local or national economic cycles to facilitate control by human agency. Green policies can be identified with such approaches, contrary to the idea of GNP growth that reflects exactly processing and marketing[46].

In the meantime eco-degradation, like needs-insults, finds new forms. Major eco-catastrophes can be identified cross-tabulating the shallow eco-variables "depletion" and "pollution" with the deeper eco-variables[47] "diversity" and "symbiosis" giving four types of causation, the effects, that also are causes, being in the body of Table 4:

Table 4: Major Eco-Catastrophes

	Decreasing diversity	Decreasing symbiosis
Increasing depletion	biodiversity decrease gene pool erosion	ozone layer problem deforestation-desertification
Increasing pollution	global warming toxic pollution	human overpopulation toxic pollution

Some classifications may be discussed[48]. But the seriousness of the situation is clear. Moreover, these are only some of the problems discussed today. Depletion-pollution continue affecting diversity-symbiosis, and thereby eco-resilience.

It is tempting to try to speculate a little based on Table 4, trying to make guesses about the problems of tomorrow.

Thus, Table 4 is based on the view of eco-resilience in terms of diversity in biota and abiota, and symbiosis. An eco-system high on both is in principle robust, mature, able to resist insults, producing and reproducing itself all the time as argued in Chapter 2.

Then, two insults are defined: depletion and pollution. Human overpopulation will probably counteract most efforts to decrease the depletion; deforestation for burning and cooking being one example, reforestation a remedy. But how about pollution?

Depletion is above all a threat to diversity, and pollution above all a threat to symbiosis by tampering with the delicate mechanisms underlying these processes, photosynthesis being a major example. Two types of pollution not included in Table 4 and in the current debate come to mind; possibly very harmful.

Thus, *radioactive pollution*, released through the use of fission and fusion processes for military (today testing) and civilian (energy) purposes, might be the kind of insult impacting on symbiotic potentials. Mechanical factors, like cutting down forest, or depletion through burning, would work on the quantity of photosynthesis. But chemical and radioactive pollution could have deeper impact at the intra-molecular and intra-atomic levels, and hence on the quality of symbiosis.

The same might apply to *electromagnetic wave pollution*. If ultraviolet rays coming through the ozone hole are dangerous, then how about the electromagnetic waves of all our telecommunica-tion? Are we

really to believe that they have no impact on life in general, from micro-organisms (including viri) to humans? Who studies such assumptions pro-actively, before there is any evidence?

Let us try one formulation to capture the essence of this "trend toward ecocide", to use the terse conclusion of a group of German ecologists[49]: *Nature's eco-logic (except for catastrophes) is basically cyclical; human-made eco-logic in an industrializing-commercializing world is basically linear.* There is increasing pollution and depletion because the cyclical cannot compensate for the linear. And cyclical relations between human causes and human effects are broken because the effects can be displaced far away in social space, in lower classes, castes, outgroups, in the periphery in geographical space, and in time, the distant future. Such major changes in the climate as +2.5C global warming may take 40 years, +5C 100 years. Crisis may come at +1.5C; but that is after tomorrow, hence little feedback from human victims to human perpetrators today. This also applies to humankind as a parasite on Gaia: non-human nature may react in ways humans do not understand, except when directly hit by toxic pollution and material scarcity due to depletion. So serious a situation, and yet so little action. Why?

This cybernetic system has very poor negative feedback mechanisms. High knowledge of disastrous effects is canceled by very low synchronic and diachronic empathy-solidarity. The conclusion seems unescapable: only by contracting these cycles, bringing cause and effect, victims and perpetrators, closer together, will robust remedies emerge.

In principle it is not difficult to see how this can be done. Cause and effect can be brought closer to each other by contracting the economic cycles, as mentioned above. If both are within the horizon the unguided human mind will easily comprehend what is going on, and act to balance the Nature-Production-Consumption cycle. This has actually for ages been human practice. Eco-problems with local causes and effects have generally been mastered; a reason why farms for local agriculture have survived as an institution. What is heritable must be sustainable.

But local causes with global effects, global causes with local effects and global causes with global effects, would not be eliminated. How-ever, "global" means "same local cause" and "same local effect", many places far apart. Global warming is an aggregate of local warmings.

Victim and Perpetrator, V-P, can also come closer if they rely less on State as problem-solver and Insurance to pay compensation. The purpose would not only be for V to confront P with a strong "look at

what you have done to me!", but also to enter a V-P dialogue to identify remedies, "what can we do about it, together?". Some of that happens.

The extreme case of V/p closeness is personal identity, like in the case of active smoking with the smoker occupying both roles. It helped.

A water-pipe bringing downstream polluted water into the director's office, and downwind polluted air into the airconditioning, would also help; amplified when used during meetings of the board of directors. So would an exhaust pipe into the car, with an assumption of enlightened self-interest when the perpetrator becomes his own victim.

4 | Development Overcoming Structural Violence

Above development is linked to maintenance, maturity, resilience and reproduction. Letting many flowers blossom makes a more viable garden than the mono-flower variety. Sometimes a gardener must help overshadowed flowers, or a forester must remove a fallen dead tree crippling the younger ones. Nature may need some human assistance.

Equity is the only value introduced; eco-balance, health, peace are-- like love and democracy--implied by development as unfolding. The negation is inequity which has many names: death, misery, repression, alienation to the extent they are generated by patterns of interaction, by structures. Structural violence, built into the structures and institutionalized, is impeding the unfolding known as development. We need a theory of structural violence, in observable surface structures as well as in deep, underlying structures.[50]

Is the deep structure in our mind, working its way into reality through speech and action? Or, is it working its way into us through observation? Or, is that a chicken-egg problem?

Let us cut that knot by simply assuming that there are two underlying, primordial, deep structures written in the language of geometry: the *pyramid*, and the *circle*. Like decision-making from above, and from togetherness.

In a *hierarchy* bilateral relations are vertical or absent. The pyramid is the geometrical metaphor; called an *alpha* structure[51] with a lonely topdog, T, on top of many underdogs, U, in the pyramid.

In an *equiarchy*[52] bilateral relations are horizontal-equitable. The circle is the geometrical metaphor, like in a "round table"; called a *beta* structure. No topdogs, no underdogs, only equidogs, E. And E should not be confused with a middle-dog, M, in a hierarchy, under the topdog, yet above the underdog.

In a *polyarchy* there are both relations, and in an *anarchy* no relations, no structure. Thus the alpha-beta interplay generates a tetralemma of four deep structures; itself a deep structure.

And deeper down is a neither vertical nor horizontal structural dimension: from *thin* anarchy to *thick* polyarchy structuration.[53] Actors are weakly or strongly connected. We may talk about *under-structuration* and *over-structuration*. Thin structures serve the "universalism with specificity" in parsonian sociology[54], relating to others according to thin criteria like level of education. High level alienation and dehumanization then come easily. Multi-stranded

polyarchic structures define "particularism with diffuseness"; more content, more mutual individuation. We relate, hence we exist[55].

Thus, alpha vs beta is not a dichotomy. They can be weakly or strongly articulated, yielding four combinations anarchy, hierarchy, equiarchy and polyarchy. We shall pursue these combinations in Part Two, diachronically as history and synchronically as geography.

Two structural archetypes have been identified, the pyramid or alpha structure, and the circle or beta structure. Alpha is vertical and can connect large numbers of actors; Beta is horizontal, but if we assume the interaction capacity of any actor to be limited, and that all interact with all, then the number of actors will have to be limited. For N elements N-l links are sufficient to connect alpha. Beta opens for N(N-1)/2 links, or N/2 times more links. Thus, for N=10 we need 9 links for alpha, and 45 for beta. Alpha is long on actors and short on links, beta is long on links and short on actors.

In social systems the actors are human beings; in world systems states or nations. The alpha pyramid organizes humans hierarchi-cally in large organizations, bureaucracies, corporations, and the beta wheel horizontally in kinship, friendship and neighborhood groups.

Alpha would organize states and/or nations in systems headed by hegemons like super- and regional powers, and beta in communities of neighboring countries like ASEAN, the Nordic Community and the EU.

As mentioned, alpha and beta can be combined in four ways, al-so indicative of four very different types of *structural violence*, *viz.*,

Figure 1: The Pyramid, the Wheel, Both-And, and Neither-Nor

ALPHA Pyramid **Strong** (n-1 links)	too dominant **Hierarchy**	too much **Polyarchy**
Weak	**Anarchy** too little too loose	**Equiarchy** too tight
	Weak	BETA Wheel **Strong** (n(n-1)/2 links)

Hierarchy is seen as too dominant, polyarchy as too much, equi-archy as too tight and anarchy is seen as the negation of both too dominant, too much, and too tight--at the expense of being too little and too loose. But how much structuration is too much, and how much is too little? How little is too thin, how much is too thick, where is the *quantum*

satis? The point in the center may stand for neither too much, nor too little and neither too dominant, nor too tight; four different types of built-in, structural, violence.

If we move northwest from that point we get into the region of repressive, exploitative, alienating to the point of incapacitating hierarchical structures; perhaps the best known forms of structural violence: *vertical* structural violence.[56] Problem: *too dominant*.

If we move northeast the structuration becomes polyarchic. The individual is inserted both in dominant hierarchies and in tight primary groups. Even if beta may compensate for alpha inhumanity, and even if they are complementary, alpha for production and beta for reproduction and consumption, there may be the problem of *too much*.

If we move southeast relations are tight, numerous, as hot as love and hatred. We have referred to the structure as "equiarchy". The problem could be *too tight*; *horizontal* structural violence.

And if we then move southwest we get into a totally different problem: de- and under-structuration, lack of structure, anarchy; *too little, too loose*. The person might like the freedom for some time, but then feel suspended in a social vacuum, or a world vacuum for a state, exiting from, or pushed out of the system, with no voice.

Thus, *structural violence is a theme with four variations*: too dominant, too much (over-structuration), too tight, too little-too loose (under-structuration). A good system of individuals or states would avoid all four, by settling in the middle, *or* by rotating among them, sensitive to yin-yang rhythms; not losing sight of the positive aspects: link-saving, balancing, equalizing and individuating.

To make this more concrete let us look at recent woman and less developed countries (LDC) emancipation, development, unfolding.

The vertical, hierarchy exploitation of women in patriarchy, and of LDCs in (neo-)colonialism, have rightly dominated thought, speech and action. But hidden in the deep alpha-beta interplay there are three other types of structural violence waiting, to be uncovered.

Alva Myrdal's famous study, *Women's Two Roles*[57] is a study in polyarchy. Women gain access to higher levels of alpha, and possibly also manage to horizontalize somewhat the family structure, only to discover that they are embedded in two very demanding structures, beta *and* alpha, not only one. *From exploitation to over-inclusion*.

They withdraw into horizontal communes high on solidarity with parties high on coffee, cakes, hugging and tears, only to discover that they have become marginalized. *From exploitation and over-inclusion to over-exclusion*.

And they extract themselves from exploitative families, retire from

alpha, only to discover that they have become lonely in single person households, maybe of one aging woman. *From exploitation and over-inclusion/-exclusion to under-inclusion.*

What is worse, to be exploited, overused, marginalized, or lonely? A wrong question. All these structural violences are avoidable. Thus, use woman solidarity and beta to counteract alpha with some joint work, after laundry machines killed the pattern of doing laundry together. Horizontalize alpha and enrich beta, bringing both closer to the center of Figure 1, with communes and cooperatives for mutual aid and sustenance. Find ways of rotating on a daily, weekly, monthly, annual basis. Milk alpha for what it is worth and put the money into beta. All four have something to offer; but alone, as the only context, they become oppressive.

Same story for the LDCs. What did Japan and the "tigers" South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore do? Neither alpha only, in a world hierarchy dominated by Northwest, nor beta only, marginalized in an East-Southeast Asia community. Both. The result was Japan's over-inclusion at a high alpha level, exploiting everybody, leading to some exclusion, some isolation and loneliness as bigger LDCs start looming: China, India, later maybe Indonesia. Other LDCs, in Latin America, Africa and Asia have not been able to follow the tiger trail but get stuck negotiating in the world exploitative hierarchy.

A personal case: how do I cope in this yin/yang game? Of course big Alphas, states, corporations, universities, have much to offer. Do your part even if the terms of exchange are unfair, lecture, consultations. But never sell your soul, and have a retreat for the lonely anarchy for reflection by a re-searcher who searches again and again. And never re-tire lest you too become tired again and again.

Enjoy the company of family and friends for equal exchange. Sometimes this will coincide with immersions into alpha, and you get a polyarchy calendar with much alpha hierarchy and beta togetherness. Balance with equiarchy and anarchy. Each form has much to offer.

The high point in this structural landscape is that middle point. But walking around the summit, down in the valleys, getting the best from the four structures, before they get you, is not bad either, but presupposes consciousness of the deeper structures.

The four structures impede self-realization of humans and states in different ways: exploitation. overuse, exclusion and loneliness. The implications on the other spaces are important. Thus, hierarchy may be habit-forming and lead to destruction of nature, including meatism as opposed to vegetarianism. We would expect topdogs to live longer than underdogs having more life-enhancing resources at their disposal, and

to die from modernization diseases (cardiovascular and malignant tumors), and underdogs dying from contagious diseases.

In polyarchies topdogs might die from being overburdened, the famous Japanese *karoshi*, overwork, collapsing in the office--but hardly due to work alone. In equiarchies people should have a high life expectancy. But in anarchies loneliness and meaningless-ness might lead to unipolar and bipolar mental illness. Rotation among the types may be stressful; the middle point may be too ambiguous. It takes skill and strength, as individual and country, to navigate structural landscapes, itself a topdog-underdog dimension.

Conclusion: go for equiarchy socially and globally, and extend it to nature as partnership. A tall bill as there are many dimensions. But not only will development overcome structural violence, but equity will promote development, and much more so than freedom and democracy.

Generate equality structurally, and the rest takes care of itself.[58]

5 | Development Overcoming Cultural Violence

In *Peace by Peaceful Means* (Galtung, 1996) the cosmology of six civilizations--Occident I, Occident II, Indic, Buddhic, Sinic, Nipponic-- were explored for their position on Nature, Human, Social, World, Time, Transperson and Episteme; the four development spaces, and three more major dimensions.[59] Those six cultures have to serve us here like the four structures served us above. What are we to expect in terms of ideas, theories, and practices for development, and against as cultural violence? Not as a deductive exercise with a given answer, but to articulate underlying postulates. Defining *development as the unfolding of a cosmology* this is essential.

What follows are six summaries trying to capture some essential points for and against development as here conceived of:

Occident I. In the construction of Time there is an Idea of Progress, at both the Human and the Social levels, building strong persons and strong societies, under an impending Crisis confronting Occident I with "make it or break it". Strong people who have made it become social Elites, and strong societies that have made it come to the World Center. In the process Nature is subdued, also by an anti-holistic and anti-dialectic Episteme in the service of development as nature, personal, social and world engineering. Guiding development is one, singular, universally valid Principle: to realize the Rule of God, personally and socially in the religious version (with Clergy on top), and to realize the Rule of Growth (with Money on top), personally and socially, in the secular version. The social and world Periphery consists of those people and societies that accept the guiding Principle; others, who do not accept the Principle, are Evil. Peace implies their elimination-incapacitation-marginalization, so that development can proceed unimpeded by evil forces.

Occident II. Progress and Crisis are there, but serving the Rule of God, the spiritual development of the person, and as entry into the Elite for the clergy and the occasional saint. The unfolding of the person takes place locally and does not presuppose social change. The space perspective defining Center is bounded, limited to local levels. The Episteme, mainly theological, serves this development, neglecting Nature, possibly with catastrophic implications for Occident II.

Indic. The focus for development is personal, given the Idea of Regress inherent in the cyclical (kalpa) theories of Society and the World. At this

point four basic guiding principles in hinduism--dharma (moral duty), artha (wealth, competence), kama (pleasure) and moksha (liberation)-- enter as guiding lights for development. Social life should conform to this, perhaps with those in the last phase imparting their wisdom to those in the first, and *artha-kama* not standing in the way of *dharma-moksha*. Two epistemes are operating: one serving *artha-kama*, more like Occidental science, and one serving *dharma-moksha*.

Buddhic. Development would serve personal growth in the sense of *moksha*, at the local level in the *sangha* community, not implying social or world changes beyond what is needed for the local level to provide neither too little nor too much for everybody's needs. The episteme serves this function with a relation to nature facilitating locally based satisfaction of the needs of humans and other forms of sentient life. Peace is within oneself and with all other beings.

Sinic. Development is personal and social, with ups and downs. The over-arching concern is preserving the social harmony of the Kingdom in the Middle. Development is above all development of China. If internal social transformation is needed for that purpose, so be it. If China is seriously threatened by Barbarians, defense is a part of development. Continuity through time rests with the survival of the clan, the local community and China. The Episteme shall serve these purposes.

Nipponic. This cosmology shares transcendental chosenness with the Occident I and II, and positive, defensive chosenness with China; but not identifying Evil such as muslims-pagans-communists around the world to be eliminated offensively. Development is personal and social, with its ups and downs, and of Japan. Salvation, reincarnation, or rebirth are weakly articulated, so the burden of continuity is placed on family and society. The personal and social accumulation of wealth needed to bring this about would be part of the development concept. The Episteme will have to serve all of this, being essentially Japan-centered.

So much for the codes. How about development, for and against? Let us locate development in the context of Time and (world) Space:

Table 5: Cosmologies in Terms of Time and Space Boundedness

	Space unbounded	Space bounded
Time bounded	Occident I	Occident II
Time unbounded	Sinic, Nipponic	Indic, Buddhic

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The extremes are Occident I and Buddhic. Occidental, abrahamic, cosmologies construct secular time as finite, with a beginning and an end to history, the world, telescoping time. Hence drama, crises as we are not in it forever. Redemption through a First or Second Messiah[60] will solve all problems, or an Apocalypse that also solves everything.

With only bounded space Occident II destroyed itself. Occident I constructed space as unbounded, and destroys Others all over, trying to save itself. As opposed to the Buddhic (and to some extent the Indic) view of good householding locally because "we shall be here forever".

Sinic and Nipponic are in-between, and could move in the Occident I, or in the Buddhic directions. Or both, they are more flexible.

So much for Nature. How do Humans fare under these codes.

Using freudian terms we see the Occident I Human self as equipped with strong Ego and strong Id, strong will and strong drives, and relatively weak moral guidance through a Superego. This tallies well with the Social construction as vertical and competitive, as the survival of the fittest for the upper niches. Such Egos would be well equipped for the expansionism in the code of that civilization.

Occident II is seen as the exact opposite, with a strong Superego filtering out all in Ego and Id that might stand in the way of salvation for the real world beyond this one. Death is built into the code.

Buddhic Self is similar, but since Time is unbounded and there is no parallel world in a paradise, the idea would be normative steering for an existence combining bounded space with everlasting time.

Indic Self, like Sinic Self, is seen as mixed, no clear profile, maybe an adequate formula for those giant pieces of space bound to harbor much diversity. And Nipponic Self is seen as more similar to Occident II and Buddhic, but with more allowance for the Id, the drives.

So, how will Humans fare in these six civilizations?

- Occident I Self will grab what can be grabbed at the expense of the vulnerable in Society and World, poor people and poor countries, and end up on top of a double--domestic and global--volcano of contradictions.
- Occident II Self, except for the top, will lead a modest life in modest Society heading for extinction given the space and time limits.
- Buddhic Self will lead a modest life in a modest limited space.
- Indic Self will be mixes of the above, regulated by caste.
- Sinic Self be the same, but conscious of unlimited time.
- Nipponic Self will be mixes of Occident I and Buddhic selves.

The Buddhic Self is best at survival not at the expense of others. Occident I destroys others, may oversatiate itself with greed, and suffer the price of victory: defeat. Very vulnerable. Occident II is Self-

destructive. The other three spin protective cocoons around self.

How do these six cultures serve to legitimize the four structures?

Occident is vertical, Occident II by birth and Occident I by merit. The appropriate structure is *hierarchy* by ascription or achievement, and many hierarchies lead to rank disequilibrium and rank discordance.[61]

Buddhic is more horizontal, the appropriate structure is *equiarchy*.

Indic has the two aspects of caste, vertical and communal, vertical between and horizontal within. The appropriate structure is *polyarchy*.

Sinic and Nipponic: the appropriate structure is *polyarchy*, with confucian verticality based on power based on education *and* buddhist horizontality; in China also community based, and in Japan cohort based.

This is found in Occident I in neighborhood and associations, by vicinity and affinity. But in Occident I self-realization is culturally linked to individual mobility-competition, making hierarchy so salient.

We notice in passing that the fourth structure, *anarchy*, is not represented by these civilizations; all six civilizations are cohesive.

Where is the cultural violence legitimizing structural violence and de-development? In Chapter 4 we took all structures to task for being violent, but in terms of basic needs verticality matters most, focusing on Occident I competitive individualism, among humans and societies, and according to Darwin, for the origin of species in general. His theory of evolution fitted Occident I like the glove the hand, as natural law.

One conclusion would be to assign most of the cultural violence to Occident I; the verticality being more naked and more multi-dimensional. But caste is also multidimensional. However, a major difference between Occident I and Indic is that the former generalizes to world space, the latter does not. No major effort to impose hindu caste system has been observed. Indic, like Occident II, is a threat to its own development in human space, Occcident I is a threat to all in an unbounded space that even transcends the World. A cultural revolution is needed.[62]

Part Two

DE-DEVELOPMENT
AS MACRO-HISTORY

6 | De-Development: Three Theses on Social Disintegration

The first thesis: many human societies are at the beginning of the 21st century in a state of advanced social and world disintegration.

The situation is not irreparable, but remedies have to be found and enacted, to halt disintegration (negative social development), and to build societies less susceptible to social disintegration (positive social development). Such societies should provide "human security", here interpreted as satisfying basic human needs (positive human development), or at least be capable of reversing processes of human needs deprivation (negative human development, *de-development*).

They should also be capable of enhancing the eco-systems[63] with diversity and symbiosis (positive nature development), or at least of halting eco-system degradation (negative nature development). And the world as a society of societies should be better integrated (positive world development), and processes of festering faultlines like West vs Islam, should be reversed (negative world development).

Four spaces of development--Nature, Human, Society, World-- and for each a modest negative, and very ambitious positive task. A tall bill! The goals may also be incompatible: a disintegrating society may be more flexible, more capable of meeting new challenges; and vice versa.

Let us face it: *we may be de-developing more than developing*.

Such dramatic statements are often referred to as "apocalyptic".

They can be brushed aside as one more drama supplied to meet a perennial demand for tragedy.[64] Another interpretation would be that there is much truth to them. But a point should be made: the thesis about social disintegration is *not* a statement about eco-crisis (depletion, pollution, over-population or any combination thereof), about misery, unemployment, low or negative economic growth, or violence and war; all major problems in their own right.

The statement is about society as something *sui generis*, of its own kind, as sociologists insist.[65] "Social disintegration" is of its own kind, closely related but even more significant in its consequences than all the other global problems referred to as nature-human-social-world development. And the problem will hardly yield to remedies designed for the old problems. New approaches are called for.

So, let us identify *social disintegration* as one global problem[66] among others, distributed on the four spaces of the human condition used above, adding the "spaces" of *time* and of *culture*:

Table 6: Global Problems in Development Space

Nature	*Ecological degradation, overpopulation, climate change*
Human	*Poverty/misery, repression,* spiritual alienation
Society	*Economic underdevelopment;* social disintegration
World	*War, terrorism,* state terrorism (inter-state, -nation)
Time	*Non-sustainability*
Culture	Inadequacy

The italicized global problems have received general attention, to the point of being the basic foci of the many endeavors by the UN under such headings as "environment" (for nature), "human rights", "human security", "humanitarian intervention" (for humans), "development" (for society) and "peace", "security", "stability" (for the world), with a time dimension added for all; "sustainability".

That state terrorism is missing goes without saying in a UN whose members are states. Terrorism is a tactic killing civilians for political goals. State terrorism kills from the air bombing, and uses torturism; non-state terrorism kills with suicide bombs and IEDs, improvised explosive devices. State killing of state killers is war, non-state killing state killers is guerilla, or a people's war. All four tactics may lead to massive category killing, MCK, genocide. They are all symptomatic of the social and world disintegration that is the major topic of this part of the book.

Although nobody is in favor of non-sustainable solutions to the problems, sustainability is a useful reminder of the importance of solutions being *reproducible*, if possible even self-reproducible, as opposed to measures that consume more resources than they produce.

The other three problems on the list above have not entered the general discourse. There are reasons for that. The specialists on "spiritual alienation" would be religionists and psychologists, on "social disintegration" social scientists in general and sociologists in particular, and on the possible inadequacy of mainstream, meaning Western, culture, religionists again, cultural anthropologists, philosophers. In other words, new expertise, so far mainly limited to UNESCO meetings. They do so far not carry the same weight as natural sciences,

economics, and security studies, all assumed to be adequate.

In addition, the three additional problems are found in the core of the dominant social formation, in and of the West, questioning the whole culture. Meaningless lives, disintegrating societies, cultures without answers, are serious problems in and by themselves, not only side-effects or side-causes of the acknowledged problems.

Definition: *social = structural + cultural*.

By "structure" we simply mean "patterned interaction", the macro, gross, general, picture of *who relates to whom, how, when and where*.

This is social traffic as seen from the top of the Empire State Building, not by watching drivers from the corners of Fifth Avenue and 42nd street, in New York City.

The key word is *pattern* with no individual name tags. Humans appear as "drivers", "cops", "pedestrians". Structures change over time but there are processes with stable secular trends up or down and cycles with any period, 24 hours-365 days, in the NYC traffic example.

By "culture" we mean the *what* and *why* of interaction; and the *what not* and the *why not* to explain missing interaction; the structure not there, the absent link of interaction. Whereas interaction is *between* actors, culture is *within* actors. But it may be shared as mutual rights and obligations, as binding normative culture.

The second thesis: *at the root of social disintegration is a twin process of destructuration and deculturation toward structureless-ness and culturelessness*. Following Durkheim we refer to culture-lessness as *anomie*[67]. For structurelessness we shall use *atomie*.

We have not come that far yet. Society is more than mutually isolated social atoms, individuals; and there is still much binding normative culture around. But it looks as if we are on the way.

But to where, to what? To a society of Leibniz' monads[68], fully self-sufficient? Obviously not, humans survive badly in isolation[69]. But to inter-action reduced to a thin minimum, like some e-mail contact, making society a set of relative isolates[70], not a thick structure relating individuals. And the normative culture informing these individuals what to do would be centered on the self-benefit of individuals and individuals only. No interacts, only acts.

In short: at the end of the road winding through history and into the future we see a social formation ("society" may no longer be the term) basically atomized into individuals, thinly and weakly related, each acting out of egocentric cost-benefit. We are close to this state of *atomie*, but there is still some interaction left. We are also close to *anomie*, where the binding normative culture left would be individualized cost-benefit analysis. Anarchy would be another term. Or

bellum omnium contra omnes, *homo homini lupus*. The social fabric, *le tissu social*, *el tejido social*, the social body, *lo social*, unravels.

The third thesis: *we are at a stage in human history where the problem is not only whether interaction structures between individuals, groups and countries are right or wrong, but whether there is any structure at all; and not whether the culture defining right or wrong is right or wrong, but whether there is any normative culture at all.*

On this de-development road we expect some unpleasant phenomena.

First, *we would expect the focus of interaction to shift from "mutual rights and obligations", a reciprocal mix of egoistic and altruistic orientation, to an egoistic orientation of "what is in it for me".* For organization members the shift is from reciprocity to "what can the organization do for me". Like predators they descend upon macro-organizations like State and Capital, preying on them for individual benefit, then withdraw with the booty. NGOs, part-ies, trade unions, churches, are used as stepping stones. Families and friends are not spared. Spouses will demand services like sex and security, but in addition "freedom" for self-promotion with others. The offspring sees the family as a launching platform in life and offer little or nothing in return after, and even before, take-off.

Second, *we would expect increasing corruption at all levels of social organization.*[71] "Corruption" is a corruptor-corruptee relation for egoistic net benefits, at the expense of others, using resources (money, sex) to influence decision-making processes.

Third, *we would expect increasing mobility away from binding relations and organizations.* People will vacate bonds between spouses, between parents and children, between siblings, friends, neighbors and colleagues, frequently, easily. New relations may be increasingly thin, shallow. There will be knots, not nets.[72] Toward the end of life the few friends and relatives left may have died, leaving a vacuum behind.

Fourth, *we would expect increasing violence at all levels of social organization.* There would be no absolute, binding norms standing in the way, no *homo res sacra hominibus*. Human beings inside the organizations will be seen as substitutable, the relation-ship being so thin anyhow, hence so expendable. Outside the organizations they will be seen as resources. The utility-benefits supposedly accruing from violent acts will be weighed against the costs or disutility of punishment by the probability of detection-punishment. As violence becomes pan-demic the latter will tend to zero, given the asymmetry between the ease of committing a crime and the difficulty of uncovering it. The needle in

a haystack may be more easily detected because of its low mobility.

Fifth, *we would expect increasing mental disorder*, assuming that humans are not made for high level atomie-anomie, but for interactive human togetherness guided by mutual rights and obligations in thin *and* thick human relations, definitely including the latter. Conduct indicative of mental disorders--drug consumption, alcoholism, sexoholic and workaholic behavior, perverse, self- and other-destructive physical and verbal violence--are also efforts to find identity in tighter and thicker human interaction, and in the deeper recesses of the Self.

These are outer and inner journeys. When such efforts fail, suicide is a way out; not only out of despair, but also as the ultimate act of egoism. Destroying nature, the base, is another. We cannot afford to give in to facile Nature and Human space development optimism.

This is a bleak, some would say far too dark, image of human society today. But the problem is to understand these processes, where we are right now--*où en sommes-nous*--and what to do. For that we need a macro-historical perspective, with all the shortcomings of abstracting and generalizing from a super-complex reality.

7 | A Macro-Historical Perspective: Structural Transformations

Imagine we divide human history into four phases, "primitive", "traditional", "modern" and then "post-modern".[73] "Modernity" is not seen as the end of history--and certainly not as a global market economy with a democratic polity--but as a social formation considered highly unstable. So a fourth phase is added after modernity, like the "middle ages" between antiquity and before modernity: the *post-modern* phase.

What do they all look like from a development perspective?

"Primitive" will be identified with mobile hunter-gatherers and nomadic pastoralists; "traditional" with sedentary, local agriculture and the emergence of classes-castes not engaged in manual work for a living; "modern" with large-scale organizations State, Capital and Science--bureaucracies, corporations, universities--and "post-modern" with destructuration and deculturation, chaos and anarchy. It is not modernity taken to a global level, but rather one of its antitheses.

The story to be told here, reduced to a simplistic formula, is *the story of humanity on its way from nomadism to monadism*. For that social story to be told we shall proceed on the two parallel tracks mentioned, one structural, one cultural; elaborating themes from Chapters 4-5.

Above some references have been made to *thick versus thin* interactive relations. Let us now shift to primary and secondary relations. We define primary (in the Weber-Toennies-Sorokin-Parsons tradition) as diffuse ("thick") and particularist, relating to particular Others, not to anyone of the same kind. A particular relation is non-substitutable. The definition of "secondary" would be based on the opposite pair: specific ("thin") and universalist, meaning treating everybody of the same kind who satisfy the same (low) number of characteristics, the same, universal, way.

The classical examples of primary relations would be relatives; the more remote (cousins four removed, for instance) included; and friends. And particular, not general, enemies. But it would also include some colleagues and neighbors, work places and voluntary organizations.

In short, *kinship* and *friendship*, *vicinity* (also community) and *affinity*, *workship* (also school) and *worship*. High interaction frequencies will rub off; over time small-and-thin relations will be thicker and less standardized. For all six cases some collective Self can

be defined, offering identity, and security, in return for altruism.

Let us then introduce a second variable, so often missing in social analysis: *size*, the sheer number of people involved. Organizations can be divided into "small" and "big", the dividing line being roughly the upper limit to the number of people with which a human being can identify, and relate to, positively, and-or negatively.[74] Order of magnitude would be 10^2-10^3. Since primary relations are based on identification, we arrive at the conclusion that *big-and-thick is impossible*, e-mail relations being big-and-thin. Secondary relations tend to be big (and vice versa); only when small can they be primary.

And let us introduce a third variable, *vertical versus horizontal*, here seen as relational, not only relative. Vertical is exploitative, grossly asymmetric in terms of net benefits. Why do people enter such vertical, exploitative relations? Because they may be forced by coercion or tradition, or there may be a paycheck as compensation.

The alternative to exploitation may be starvation. The result is vast action spaces for people on top, strait-jackets at the bottom; material enrichment on top, impoverishment lower down.[75] Challenges on top, standard procedures at the bottom. Horizontal relations distribute challenges and routines better, by definition of horizontal.[76]

We can now combine these variables using the basic structural modes introduced in Chapter 3: *Alpha*, the *pyramid*, and *Beta*, the *circle*[77], now defined as thin-big-vertical and thick-small-horizontal. In modern societies the three pillars, State, Capital and Science with their huge bureaucracies (e.g. armies), corporations, and universities, are Alpha. But inside Alpha there are Beta structures of people with primary relations, like colleagues who become friends or enemies, first nesting in cafeterias and repeated encounters in lifts, some evolving into the super-Beta relation known as love. Seen from Alpha they all introduce primary, subjective elements in the secondary, objective atmosphere of a perfectly constructed Alpha with everybody substitutable, meaning totally alienated, totally substitutable, and totally detachable, in a throw-away society. Something potentially subversive.

As pointed out repeatedly societies are mixes of Alpha and Beta; the question is how strongly they are articulated. So let us like in Chapter 4 introduce "strong" vs "weak" for both, giving us four combinations, making Alpha-Beta a tetralemma, not a dilemma (see next page).

History follows the I-II-III-IV, primitive-traditional-modern-post-modern trajectory, starting in the bottom left corner with a humanity divided into small mobile groups, clans, lineages, "in-groups" with primary relations dominating, essentially based on kinship.[78]

Figure 2: Human Social (Trans)formations: Structural Macrohistory

	Beta strong	Beta weak
Alpha strong	II. Traditional Society	III. Modern Society
Alpha weak	I. Primitive Society	IV. Postmodern Society

A tight net of mutual rights and obligations is spun inside the group, possibly with negative or no relations at all toward out-groups they would encounter on their wanderings. They, precisely *they*, would probably be conceived of as categories of people, not even with the *differentiae specificae* given to them by Alpha logic in terms of their social positions and their qualifications for being allocated to such positions. The in-group would be too small to develop layers of verticality beyond gender-generation, and for that reason be well integrated socially and humanly. The weak point would be not only the thin or empty relations to other groups, but also that the integration may be too tight, "suffocating" (the polyarchy in Chapter 4).

With sedentary ways of producing for livelihood and higher levels of agricultural productivity--one family working on the land pro-ducing enough surplus for 1.1, even 1.25 families--the material basis for caste-systems with non-manual castes emerged. Alpha was born.

The history of traditional society becomes to a large extent the history of the relative power of the upper layers in what has to be an Alpha structure, unless the unit--like the village--is very small.

One manifestation of Alpha is the *ranking of castes* as indicat-ed. The European and Indian systems are similar, and so are the Chinese and Japanese, making formulas like "Indo-European" and "Sino-Japanese" apply not only to languages. Another aspect, pointed out by Sarkar[79], is a *circulation of castes*, in the order *kshatriya-brahmin-vaishya-shudra*. The *kshatriya* create law and order after the *shudra* have had their say; but are so primitive culturally that the *brahmins* enter to restore culture; but they are economically so amateurish that the *vaishya* have to put the economy in order; but are so exploitative that the *shudra*, people, make revolts again, and the *kshatriya* are called upon, etc.

Table 7: Non-Manual and Manual Castes: Four Systems

	Europe	India	China	Japan
First	clergy	brahmin clergy	shi'h bureaucrats, intellectuals	shi (samurai) bureaucrats, intellectuals
Second	aristocracy	kshatriya warriors	nung farmers	no farmers
Third	merchants	vaishya merchants	kung artisans	ko artisans
Fourth	workers	shudra workers	shang merchants	sho merchants
Fifth	outcasts *women children*	outcasts *women children*	outcasts *women children*	outcasts *women children*

At this point solid vertical distinctions between elites and people have emerged. Alpha structures, mainly local, are being fully articulated. Modernity brings that process further in Alpha *stricto sensu*: country-wide--transportation-communication permitting--with a well-defined specificity in social relations written into contracts; and a universalism making positions in the structure available when well-defined explicit qualifiers are met. Diffuse, particularist relations are weeded from the Alpha gardens that ultimately look like the orderly French Versailles style gardens that emerged at about the same time. They were not baroque. For Beta relations, please use time after working hours, and weekends. During working hours Alpha prevails.

As Alpha becomes more dominant, Beta not only becomes recessive, but even starts disintegrating. One reason is simple: individual time budgets. Alpha requires full attention, because the jobs provided are full time jobs, and because the occupants of Alpha positions are not supposed to think Beta thoughts. Some Beta structures have to go, starting with such old structures as extended families and traditional villages: contracting families to the nucleus, sacrificing villages.

Cities are to Alpha what villages are to Beta: liberating people from the stranglehold of the very tight human relations in a village; then suspending them in thin urban anonymity air. Cities provide more space

for Beta structures than villages for modern Alpha structures, and those Beta structures decreasingly relate to work and increasingly to leisure. Hence the well-known pattern in many modernized countries today: villages are "gentrified", converted from sites of agricultural production to sites of weekend leisure; and to some primary and tertiary sector production, like plantations and tourism for far-away buyers, and art galleries and concerts for old and new inhabitants.

We now have to introduce a thesis, or an hypothesis rather, important for the following: *Beta structures are natural to the point of being indispensable for human development*. Only Beta type relations cater to the whole person range of basic needs, and produce a sense of belongingness. This should not be confused with identity, or sense of meaning of life; that can be enjoyed also in an Alpha structure, even in a post-modern non-structure like Formation IV. To belong is to have a home, somebody to relate to, somebody who knows more of the person's life narrative than any bureaucracy can digest, not even secret police. The argument does not favor joint or nuclear families, different or same sex unions, with or without children. The argument favors *some* Beta unit, thick-and-small, with more holistic relations.

Objection: if Beta is the natural structural environment, how is so much Alpha expansion at the expense of Beta possible?

Answer: because Alpha has so much to offer. For those on top Alpha offers the material fruits of exploitation, power, challenges. For those lower down a job, a paycheck, some security; gains that easily turn into losses, but the costs of Alpha exclusion may be even higher.

The Alpha lure, *you are in it!*, even as a peon in the post office in a village in East Bihar, or as a second class, no speed, EU member, matters. For Alpha holds out a reward for good behavior unavailable to Beta: *upward mobility*, if not for you, then maybe for your offspring. In Beta there is always room for improving the quality of the relation, becoming a better friend, a better neighbor. But if the attraction of Beta is precisely its horizontality, then there is no way up. Nor is there any way down. But there is a way out: exclusion if you do not behave. The problems, and the attractions, in Alpha are vertical. In Beta they are horizontal: belongingness versus loneliness.

One formula often used for modern society is *Alpha for production, Beta for reproduction*. From Alpha the work output may be considerable. But in Beta human beings are conceived, born, raised, repaired, maintained, sustained; the core of development in Human space.

Formation I would show high levels of stability, keeping humans intact, leaving soft footprints on nature as the work output is negligible and the consumption of natural resources likewise.

Formation II leaves more traces. There will be monuments to the glory of the upper castes: temples (mosques, churches) for the clergy, forts for the warriors, market places, banks etc. for the merchants, universities, and much poverty for the people; all wrapped together in cities. But even if human beings are exploited and repressed, they still belong in some Beta. They are sustained, repaired, reproduced.

In formation III, however, production starts outstripping reproduction. The output is phenomenal. Alphas of all kinds get deeper roots and expand geographically and socially, covering ever larger territories, not only countries governed by states, but empires governed by mega-states. Again, transportation-communication permitting.

The production of goods and bads and (dis)services now outstrips what anyone might have imagined. And so does Betas disintegration and not only of the extended family and the traditional villages. Even the nuclear family splits, and not only along the husband-wife divide, but also parents-children, siblings-siblings. Neighborhoods break down when people move too frequently to sustain vicinity relations. And the same for friendship and affinity: neither can survive so much social mobility sideward, upward, downward as in modern society. Worship under the same God may still remain, but God may also disintegrate (see Chapter 8).

The transition from primitive to traditional was *the agricultural revolution*, breeding (not hunting) cattle, growing (not gathering), plants in a sedentary but Beta way. The transition from traditional to modern was *the scientific revolution*, the knowledge to produce, *the industrial revolution* producing the goods, and *the transporta-tion-communication revolution* making Alpha's reach global.

But what makes the transition from modern to post-modern possible? Anything removing human beings from direct inter-action would count. Key word is *tele*, distance. Direct interaction is multisensorial, but telecommunication stops at the auditive and visual. Interaction is still there, but trimmed down, more naked. As anyone talking over the tele-phone without watching facial expression and body language will know, information gets lost in the process, as it does comparing tele-fax or e-mail to tele-phone: the tone of voice may say more than words. Tele-vision adds the visual, and yet there is something remote.

The term "information revolution" will not be used, not because of the disinformation, but because of *de-information* when so much is lost. Information googled is not information from a loving parent or concerned teacher. But Alpha and Beta information do not exclude each other.

We prefer the term *the digital revolution* from modern to postmodern. "Tele" is implicit. There has always been symbolic interaction, direct[80] or as bureaucracy, from edicts from emperors and popes to messages built into automation-robotization. Alpha was always there. But direct Beta relations have today less salience.[81]

An image of the outcome: *Los Angeles, 1992*. Parts of the great city are wastelands. There are streets and buildings, even shops. But waste is piling up all over, buildings are derelict, shops barricaded. More importantly, they are all detached from each other. There is not even a concept of neighborhood. Nobody knows who is next door, nor do they care. People come, peddling goods-services, and disappear. At night everything is locked up, dark, desolate.

And that is when the marauding gangs take over. The new nomads with the city-scape is their resource, like the landscape for the old. Unable to survive in nature they know the tricks as hunter-gatherers in the urban wastelands: hunting cars, gathering the contents. They are the products of Formation IV, crystallized as a new Formation I, preying on the wasteland, fighting rival tribes, including a police tribe hunting and gathering gangs, LAPD.[82] Strong Beta structures are re-emerging. Readying humanity for a second I-II-III-IV cycle?

There is a logic to this. Alpha has not disappeared, but has become very lean and mean, stripped of human content. There is work output, but much quality is lost in this dehumanization process.

Much more disturbing is the question often raised by the ultimate stage of dehumanization: not only is the interaction digital rather than direct, but the receiver, and sometimes also the sender, is often a non-human, tape-recorded robot. Robots do not crave for Beta sustenance; they are custom-tailored, even ideal, for a high Alpha life expectancy.

The disturbing question is obvious: if robots do so much better, for what purpose should we have messy human beings at all?

The first answer is also obvious: even if robots are better at production, humans are better at consumption. In fact, the whole purpose of robots is to liberate human beings from dirty and dangerous, humiliating and boring work, leaving all of that to robots so that human beings can concentrate on creative and non-programmable tasks. And enjoy the fruits, as consumers and producers, provided by the robots.

The second answer would be more reflective, taking into account that robots also have to be reproduced, sustained, with energy and spare part inputs, perhaps also be reprogrammed. The total cost-benefit analysis may actually turn out to be less attractive for the robots when the total destructuration bill is presented. Will the robots unite?

The third answer may be that not so much is lost anyhow. Given the digital revolution, production can be carried out in loneliness, and so can consumption. There is a neat isomorphism between assembly line production, in series, and bureaucratic production in parallel, and a magazine circulating in an office in series, and a family consuming TV programs next to each other in parallel. All four cases are based on action, like turning nuts in assembly lines, writing edicts, circulating magazines and zapping TV at home; but in no need of any interaction.

The sum total is perverted Alpha. If the thesis of a human need for Beta as something natural is correct, Beta should be sprouting. But what kind of Beta? Alpha supplies goods and services, leaving little space for Beta production? Wrong! But if Alpha is dehumanized Alpha-baiting is necessary, not sufficient. Why not simply learn to produce the Beta way, using the equiarchy structure as a horizontal production landscape? Making Formation IV more equiarchy, not only anarchy?[83]

Let us summarize some of the points made:

Table 8: Formation Structural Dynamics: Some Basic Factors

	Primitive	Traditional	Modern	Post-modern
Alpha	weak	strong	strong	Weak
Beta	strong	strong	weak	Weak
Growth	low	high	high	Low
Exploitation	low	high	high	Low
Alienation	low	low	high	High

Why do human beings engage in such problematic exercises? Because the grass is greener on the other side. We are fascinated by what is missing and take what we have for granted; assuming it will remain there forever and not be eroded by the relentless search for the new. Till we end up with one more bad deal, missing what we had.

Of course Primitive Man became fascinated with the growth and the glory of traditional society. So, as Ibn Khaldun points out, the desert tribes knocked down the gates and stormed the city where the power and the glory inspiring greatness had worn out with their lack of *asabiyah*, solidarity.[84] The spirit was gone, Alpha had become routinized, self-benefit had taken over. The fall of the West Roman Empire.

And in the same vein Traditional Man becomes fascinated with the tremendous growth and power, within national, regional, even global reach, achieved by Modern society. He no longer knocks down any gates, but joins as humble immigrant at the bottom of the host country's Alpha structures, contributing to destructuration both places. He came from reproduction bad at production and enters production bad at reproduction and builds *The Wealth of Nations* at the expense of *The Moral Sentiments*; the point-counterpoint in Adam Smith's two-volume brilliant reflections; only that the second was forgotten.

To which we now turn; noting that the transition from modern to post-modern has not been explored as the postmodern is mainly future.

8 | A Macro-Historical Perspective: Cultural Transformations

Let us now try the same story from a cultural point of view, focussing on binding normative culture, and particularly on the source of normative culture, religion and such secular successors as national-ism, state-ism, capital-ism, science-ism. Religion contrasts the sacred and the secular; the awe-inspiring, that which cannot be touched, with the ordinary, the profane. In many religions there is also a third category: the evil, to be feared, to be avoided, and if possible, crushed. Obviously, people are not born with, but into, a religion. There may be a basis in the physiology of the brain and elsewhere. But details have to be learnt, memorized, recited.

What would correspond to Alpha and Beta? We shall use the theological distinction between the sacred as *immanent*, inside human beings and nature, and as *transcendent*, like in a god residing outside the planet, as a Mother god like in Japan, or a Father god. In the Occident--as defined by the abrahamic religions judaism-christianity-islam--there is a Father-Sky, the Father in the Sky. The contrast would be with Mother-Earth; the Earth that sustains our livelihood, the Earth that nourishes us, and ultimately receives us upon death.

Immanent religion with god dwelling inside us is more horizontal, Beta, transcendent religion more vertical, Alpha. Religions are not immanent or transcendent, but have immanent and transcendent aspects. In the abrahamic religions the transcendent aspect is dominant. In addition there is Evil, presided over by Satan--the deposed arch-angel Lucifer--partly transcendent, below, partly dwelling in us as Evil.

In transcendent religions *prayer*, and submission, are adequate approaches to the god above. In immanent religions *meditation,* and compassion, may play similar roles. Different practices, indeed.

Immanent religion has a dark side: the sacred nature of Other may apply to the in-group only, not to the out-group. The message of transcendent religions like christianity and islam (but not juda-ism and shinto) would be that we are all in it, all protected, even chosen, from above. The criterion is that we submit, and pray.

Figure 3: Human Social (Trans)formations: Cultural Macrohistory

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                    ┌─────────────────────┬─────────────────────┐
                    │ II. Traditional     │ III. Modern         │
 Transcendent       │      Society        │       Society       │
 strong             │      ┌──────────────┼──────────────┐      │
                    │      ║              │              ║      │
 Submission         │      ║              │              ║      │
                    ├──────║──────────────┼──────────────║──────┤
                    │      ║              │              ║      │
 Transcendent       │ I. Primitive║      │ IV. Postmodern║     │
 weak               │      Society        │       Society       │
                    └─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┘
                      Immanent strong        Immanent weak
                               Compassion
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
The story, then, would run approximately as follows.

Primitive society would be protected by strong ingroup norms, being tight and cooperative. Outgroups may prove friendly, but also may not; so any notion of the sacred would not *a priori* extend to Other. They would have to prove themselves, not by submitting to the same Father-Sky, but by relating cooperatively. They become human by being accepted as parts of the same social network, *exist = interact*, not by any abstract human-ness. That universalizing idea may be more Occidental.

Traditional society might also need some transcendent deities, particularly protective of the upper layers of society, and more accessible by them than by common people. Religious relations have to mirror social relations. But the social unit believing is still small.

Transcendence and immanence can now be combined. There is transcendence in immanence, like raising one's own group to divine levels, and immanence in transcendence, as all being God's children.

Modern society is almost inconceivable without transcendent religion, sacred or secular, the *deus* in the *rex gratia dei*. There has to be an authority beyond the apex of the social Alpha pyra-mid as there is so much power to legitimize. Father-Sky supplies that authority, less so Mother-Earth, maybe because she is too close to everybody. And just as imperialism established the first global super-Alphas, imperial rule and trade companies, mission-arism established the homologue, the supremacy of universal, transcendent religion. This holds for islamic imperialism (622-1492), as well as for christian imperialism (1492+).

Immanent religion was considered pagan and particularist, standing in the way of a universal god calling on more than willing missionaries and colonizers to convey the message. Imperialism and transcendent religion traveled hand-in-hand, one as the condition for the other.

Indigenous Beta societies, and immanent religions, could then be eliminated, even exterminated, as pagan, archaic.[85]

Objection: how about the enlightenment, and secularism in general; does this picture not paint the Occident too religious?

Answer: islamic colonialism-missionarism started right after the inception of islam in 622, and had the foundation of the Sultanate in Delhi in 1192 as one crowning achievement, like the British Empire later. From there it went eastward, to (so far) the southern end of the Philippines. Christian imperialism--the Roman Empire was not Christian in its expansionist period--started for real in the 1490s, westward (Columbus) and eastward (Vasco da Gama). The pattern was set under religious auspices. Enlighten-ment, a world view based on Caesar rather than God, came to the West much later. The empires were based on a universal, overarching Allah, and then on God, binding on all believing imperial subjects. Faith and submission became synonymous.

Enlightenment and secularization in the West stimulated the transition from Formation II to Formation III. Religions with Chosen Peoples--judaism, and christianity with the point of gravity moving from the catholic to the protestant--still defined sacred reality, and hence deep culture (Chapter 10). But "universally valid" science now made a claim on secular truth, and scientists became the new Chosen People as ultimate authority. World Alphas could emerge in the name of the three modernizations carried by state-, capital- and ratio- logic,[86] as substitutes for religion. Ratio, rationality, was the overriding theme. That project is still on, e.g. as "development assistance".

But what happened to the universal, "catholic", Church as Alpha prototype, as representative of an omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient God? Secular omnipotence went to State, omnipresence to Capital as Market, and omniscience to Science in the modern formation, leaving the sacred to a shrinking Church, perhaps still with a hold on 2 of the 168 hours of a week, like Sunday 11 am to 1 pm. Cornered.

A new ethos then took shape, *nationalism*, commanding absolute allegiance, providing large parts of the world with national statism, national capitalism (national socialism, bolshevism, and nazism, for a period in Russia and Germany) and national media to propagate "truth".

New priesthoods emerged: jurists for the State, economists for Capital, experts for established Truths, and journalists for Media. This process has lasted centuries, and we are still parts of it. The secular faith of modernity was as holistic as the sacred faith of traditionality it was replacing, and like it cut through by contra-dictions. Posited against State and Capital came Civil Society, with a contract, rule of law, democracy and human rights with the State; but not with Capital,

Science, Nation. Themes for postmodernity?

The structure of a transcendent God, chosen by people as object of worship in return for being a Chosen People by that god, remained, *with God = Nation*, as Father Land or Mother Land (Nation). The nation's history defined the sacred times and sacred places. Independence competed with Salvation, anthems with psalms. Submission stayed; hats off or cover your head. The USA combines the sacred and the secular in its puritanism-based civic religion; Saudi Arabia and others in a wahhabism-based islamism. Both command an allegiance often referred to as fundamentalist; today pitted against each other.

For top positions in Alpha faith in the human ratio and in professions like jurisprudence and economics[87], under an overarching nationalism is needed. And in the virtual reality images produced by national Media. Modernity has now labored under this for centuries.

Missionary activities by the religions of imperial powers almost killed immanent religions. A second project, secularism, undermined transcendent religion, depriving humans of Father-Sky, with no Mother-Earth as alternative. Only small groups (quakers, buddhists, sufis) insisted on the sacred nature of human life. Secularism and humanism did so far not manage to produce norms binding on human behavior.

Why shall you not commit adultery, kill, steal and lie when other humans are mere objects, and there is no accountability to higher forces, neither transcendent, nor immanent, anyhow? The *anomie* leaves us with egocentric cost-benefit guidance rather than socially binding norms, a culturelessness that added to the *atomie* of structurelessness produces the absurd Formation IV, postmodernity; forces so powerful that they will dialectically produce counterforces.[88]

What counterforces is among the topics of the next two chapters. For relations to the "true development" of Part I, see Parts IV-V.

9 | From Nomadism to Monadism-Atomie-Anomie

The *modernization* project launched by the West two centuries ago was based on the State-, Capital- and Ratio logics, as formulated by Montesquieu (France), Smith (UK) and Kant (Germany). The logic of the State implied centralization of coercive power, tempered by democracy. The logic of Capital implied market forces for economic power, tempered by anti-monopoly clauses. The logic of Ratio implied secularization for normative power, tempered by nothing. The result was bureaucracies, corporations and universities as carriers of the triple logic all over.

All colored by Western deep culture, with its focus on dominion over nature; a body-spirit division mirrored in a hierarchy with cler-gy catering to the spirit, merchants to the body, and aristocracy pro-tecting them both with *ultima ratio regis*, the final argument, force.

The result was social atomism with vertical organization of people; epistemological atomism and vertical, deductive organization of ideas; a dualist-manichean world view in terms of Good and Evil; and religions and ideologies seen as singularist and universalist, the only Truth valid for the whole world. Like *economism*, growth, as the key program.

Much naiveté is needed to believe this can happen without enorm-ous social costs for the slow but thorough modernization of the West and the more superficial, but quicker, Westernization of the Rest:
destructuration, or *atomie*, weakening of direct interaction,
deculturation, or *anomie*, weakening of compelling norms.
Result: mutually isolated monads steered by egocentric cost-benefits.

Atomie-anomie then open for major increases in violence to nature, to self and the family at the micro-level, to social groups at the meso level and across faultlines at the macro-mega levels. But, as nations today command more allegiance than states, there may be less violence in the waning state-system and more in the vexing nation-system.

Here is a typology with ten types of direct violence:
1. Violence against Nature (ecological crimes)
2. Violence against Self (alcohol/drugs/tobacco, stress, suicide)
3. Violence against Family (child abuse, physical-verbal violence)
4. Violence against Individuals (robbery, assault, rape, homicide)
5. Violence against Organizations (corruption)
6. Violence against Groups (inter-gender, -class, -nation violence)
7. Violence State-Citizen (revolution, tyrannocide, capital punishment)
8. Violence against Countries (inter-state violence)

9. Violence against Regions (inter-region, inter-civilization violence)
10. Violence against other Worlds (inter-planetary fiction)
Types 3, 4 and 5 are today referred to as crimes[89], and types 6 and 7 as wars. For a peace researcher they are all violence.

The arenas differ from one type to the other: Nature all over, at home, on the streets, in the offices, within a country as internal wars, within a country as executions, within the world as external wars, between worlds so far only as science fiction. The net result is the same for all ten: life is being caused to suffer, to be hurt and harmed and traumatized, even to cease. By perpetrators in uniform or not.[90]

All over the world people are in shock reading, listening, viewing, the news. The world seems to be coming off its hinges. Weapons of all kinds see, to be available everywhere for state and non-state terrorism.

Once again, *how did we get into this mess*? From the equiarchy of Formation I, to use the terminology of Chapter 4, via the polyarchy of Formation II to the hierarchy of Formation III, is understandable. But how come we are stumbling into the anarchy of Formation IV?

Small is beautiful[91] has been a mantra for some time, modified by Alexander King adding *but some big is necessary*[92]. Even if many agree that states and super-states, and corporations and super-corporations, have become alpha monsters, and that beta is eroding fast through ahuman interaction, there is the hope that Ratio, the third modernization pillar, seen by the West as universal, will find a way out. And this book is itself an effort in that direction.

The problem is not only that Ratio may be more Western than universal, but that Ratio is good on *is*, not on *ought*. Ratio may be a part of the problem, not of the solution. If the structure is the message is the structure, then the Ratio message is institutionalized Alpha submission to logic, not internalized Beta compassion.

The synergy between the structure and culture trajectories heading for *atomie* and *anomie* enters. Schooling teaches Ratio in super-Alpha primary, and secondary, and tertiary education, in the European Union standardized through the americanizing Bologna process. But once again, Ratio does not deliver binding norms, only knowledge of norms.

But binding norms seem to become rooted in human beings through Beta, through G. H. Mead's *significant Others*, particularly the mother. If Betas crumble all over the world, leaving much raising of children to the school and the media, parking them in front of TV-DVD etc., then it would be a miracle if binding positive norms are internalized. The pathological media[93] focus on the negative and violent makes it worse.

For the "advanced countries"[94] the hypothesis of synchrony between processes of Alpha dehumanization and Beta evaporation seems tena-

ble. We would expect the pessimism we found in the 10-nation study *Images of the World in the Year 2000*[95] (see Ch. 3): The more advanced the country, the more pessimistic, in general terms, the inhabitants.

How would we expect people to react? As indicated by the hypotheses introducing Chapter 6 above: *revolt and apathy, boiling and freezing*. However, humankind should have learnt from the 20th century that a revolution substituting one Alpha for the other and a priesthood for the next, may not change much. Governments prefer apathy to revolt, and may get that when no hope fuels action, no vision, only bailout for Alpha Wall Street, and little stimulus for small Betas on Main Street?

So much for social space, how about world space?

One hope for peace has been a world system catching up with the best social systems in controlling violence through binding rule-of-law. But such rules are not easily internalized in systems with states guided by non-negotiable "national interests" and no nursing mother around.[96]

People may develop Beta and Alpha structures across borders. But the inter-state structures are thin, hence anarchy; and vertical with Big Powers, hence hierarchy. Is the UN structure also too big? With members and ambassadors in the 190s the structure is not larger than what many individuals handles with address and telephone lists. But, being thin and vertical, the UN Alpha structure will add more actors, like NGOs and TNCs, or the many (2000?) nations of the world, normalizing them into Alpha. The UN hardly qualifies as an extended family with permanent Security Council members *in loco parentum*.

Nor are laws easily institutionalized. There are mutual rights and obligations, but if A's rights become B's obligations, and there is no reciprocity, such mechanisms for handling conflicts as the Security Council and the World Court operate in thin air. Neither rewards nor punishment are impressive. Alternative: intervention by big powers.

But there is another exit: regional Beta structures, small, thick webs with no veto verticality. Societies have too many citizens and the UN too many members for Beta to prevail, but in regions all member states can interact with all others, directly.[97] And regions are few.

The basic point is that far from the world system catching up with the better social systems they are "catching down" to the world system, Formation IV. The consequence is obvious: instead of peaceful conflict solution efforts, violence is overused, respecting neither common values, nor any inner voice of conscience, nor the threat of punishment.

We then return, once again, to *how did we get into this mess*? Which were the *forces motrices*, the driving forces, the pulls toward post-modernity, and the pushes away from modernity?

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For whom is the anarchy of post-modernity attractive? Mainly for the strong, active, and evil in the sense of only thinking of self-benefit. For them institutionalized structures and internalized cult-ures only stand in the way. Post-modernity offers freedom, greedily exercised before, during and after the "financial crisis" of September 2008. To work mainly for self-benefit is ubiquitous, but most actors are weak and-or passive, much in need of Alpha guidance-sub-mission and Beta protection-compassion. Not so for Big-Active-Evil.

We shall divide the forces pushing away from modernity into structural and cultural; given here, in no order of priority:

Structural forces behind disintegration: Capitalism, socialism, division of labor, economic growth, industrialization, urbanization, migration, globalization, means of production-destruction-transportation-communica-tion (internet etc), patriarchy. 10 forces.

Cultural forces behind disintegration: Economism, Roman Law, human rights, democracy, literacy, secularization, science, health. 8 forces.

None of these forces will be totally denounced. The focus is on yin-yang, on side-effects, unexpected negative consequences, even if often actually foreseeable. The general logic of the exercise is to explore to what extent the factor mentioned can be said to strengthen Alpha and-or weaken Beta. That would bring us from traditional into modern society, but more is needed to qualify for post-modern society. Weakening Beta is already dehumanizing, by definition. But if in addition Alpha is dehumanizing, we are on the way to postmodernity.

All 18 forces above are associated with development as usually conceived of. But here they are also associated with de-development. They are holistically-dialectically related; with de-development vexing.

Take *capitalism* as an example. The point is exploitation, and modern capitalist substitutability as opposed to traditional producer-consumer, and seller-buyer, relations. Direct buying from the farmer, who grew exactly those vegetables, is very different from super-market buying where everything is substitutable: the vegetables, the grower, the seller-cashier, the buyer, anonymous even when carrying a name-tag. Compare that to the pattern still found many places in muslim countries and in the countryside: sitting down, drinking tea, getting to know each other, discussing the goods-services, and the deal. This is also how bankers treat "good customers", measured in number of 0's. For continuation see socialism.

Socialism in socialist or social-democratic countries may have had a distributive effect, particularly in the sense of meeting basic needs of the most needy. But the point here is super-Alpha planning, and a possibly benevolent decision from some Planner high up, with no direct

Planner-Planned relation, both substitutable, anonymous even when carrying a name-tag. For continuation see capitalism.

Eastern Europe has traveled from capitalism to socialism and back again, and has much to report about the differences between the systems. Being genuine children of modernity there would also be similarities. And the argument in favor of Alpha for both is clear: *large scale*. Super-markets and super-plans can handle orders of magnitude more deals and decisions than Mom & Pop shops and local authorities, with less economic costs, and at lower prices to the end consumer.

But the counter-argument is equally clear: that may be so, but only if one fails to include the social and mental costs of having no-body to talk with, of depersonalization = dehumanization, of the cor-rupttion, fraud and violence that come more easily with anonymity.

Take the fat cluster *division of labor-economic growth-industrialization-urbanization-migration-globalization-poverty.* Division of labor is seen as a basic condition for economic efficiency and hence for growth and industrialization (Smith). But the point here is the division of personality, the segmentation. When only a small segment of a human being--be that in the body, mind or spirit--is activated, dehumanization is already there. Turning a nut at the assembly line has served as a proverbial warning metaphor, but the pattern continues unabated. With overuse, of one faculty, other faculties may be underused and lost, by the "use'm or lose'm" logic.

Generally division of labor moves from manual to mental labor, sometimes even to spiritual, creative, innovative for the strong and active. But this leaves the bodily strong but mentally weaker behind, without social niches in the division of labor, with violence for the boys and prostitution for the girls often being the only alternatives. Increased disintegration comes as a major cost of increased division.

Urbanization is more ambiguous. No doubt it offers protection from an excessive Beta in some villages, and many possibilities of building one's own Beta structures. But maybe that is the point? Maybe it became too easy to move rather than solving the many problems in the dense interaction in a small community.[98] Maybe both Alpha and Beta became depersonalized with growing urbanization, a reason why those who can manage now tend to migrate back to village type habitats.

But migration may actually weaken both Alpha and Beta, both at the place of departure and of arrival. The emigrant leaves interaction gaps in the structures he leaves behind, and as immigrant is not easily inserted in new structures. More migration, more rootlessness; more destructuration, more *atomie*; more deculturation, more *anomie.*

If *globalization* stands for global mobility of production factors and

products, with world standardization of structures and cultures, then the consequence is to speed up the transition into Formations III and IV. Larger domains for structures and cultural meanings imply thinner scopes and more reliance on least common denominators, with structural and cultural specifics receding into the background. Given the variety of languages World Super-super-Alphas with truly global reach will have to be based on mathematics, computer language, etc. Or based on body language, using sport as a universal idiom, or concrete objects like people with no common language pointing and touching in super-markets. "Here are no Greeks, no Jews; no women no men: we are all one in Coca-Cola" is Alpha culture, not a bad joke or blasphemy.

The same goes for structures: no cohesive Alpha has emerged covering soon 7 billion human beings except global television. There are two layers: one sender, billions of receivers, no feed-back, no horizontal TV interaction. They relate only by having watched the same.

Will this structure endure? Probably not. Sooner or later it will go the way of all Alphas: small Beta groups take shape. Beta guerrillas will relate, unite and revolt against Alpha armies. The condition is their ability, underestimated by Marx, to overcome structural, cultural and geographical divides. The structure will be Beta fighting Alpha.

But the global market prophets may also underestimate globalized workers trade unions, and consumers movements. *Consumers all over the world, unite!* may be a reincarnation of an old mantra. Consumer sovereignty, if exercised on a truly global basis, may become a major force at the same time as nation-state democracies crumble under the weight of global forces beyond their control. That would be Alpha fighting Alpha, and aided by the smaller Beta groups just mentioned.

Actually, globalization may also run into another problem of an equally or more serious nature. Competition has kept capitalism innovative; not only meso-competition from other firms in the same branch (BMW vs Mercedes), nor macro-competition from another country (Germany vs UK, Japan-China vs USA), but mega-competition from other civilizations with other capitalisms (buddhist-confucian vs judeo-christian; Chapter 10). Globalization will serve as an arena for mega competition. Anglo-Americans pushing globalization so eagerly may try to switch the global economy from real to financial, their specialty.

This would imply a severe reduction of the Toynbee factor of challenge followed by the creative response that presumably keeps minorities in power. And Alpha is, by the very definition built into its pyramidal shape, run by a small minority relative to the other and lower layers, hence in need of constant renewal of personnel and ideas.

Globalization may imply a business mono-culture, less diversity, less symbiosis, hence less resilience. However, we are far from there yet.

But that is not the basic point in our context. The capacity for being human to other humans was spread thinner with the transition from villages via towns to cities. How about the transition from countries via regions to the world? Answer: there is not necessarily any pressure to have more interaction partners, but they will live further away, even very far apart. With limited capacity this spells more indirect, less really human interaction. But the situation is not unambiguous.

Thus, skype with eye contact will help. And the step from an internet relation to a direct one is made easier every day with cheap travel--for some. The argument could also be that global communication opens broader domains for choosing partners, and global transportation can translate that into numerous global Betas.

Then, *poverty*. Of course poverty, and particularly misery, is a major development problem in all formations, focusing on basic human needs and their satisfaction when instead of looking at structures and cultures. From a structural point of view poverty does not necessarily lead to *atomie*. It could also lead to tightly woven Beta groups fighting poverty together. And it does not necessarily lead to *anomie*. It could also lead to the famous culture of poverty of the *favela*, which may sustain rather than negate poverty, but also make it more bearable.[99] The worst poverty would be needs-deprivation combined with *atomie* and *anomie*, in other words to the poverty of Formation IV: nobody cares. And this may very well be the condition under which Los Angeles 1992 is no longer a metaphor, but increasingly a world reality.

Another, updated, perspective on poverty might bring in the jobless growth characteristic of the present world economy. The distinction between employed and unemployed is too sharp, however. More typical is not only underemployment, but underpayment. The concept of breadwinners feeding whole families, one job-one family, is rapidly disappearing. In fact, the idea of a "job" is disappearing in favor of a time-limited contract with firing and hiring at any time built into it.

In principle this should force a number of people, in a family or other kinship units, or in a neighborhood, into a commune joining their incomes so that all can live from it, fostering beta restructuration and solidarity. One job, even under very exploitative capitalism, once fed a family unit with thick interaction although usually with patriarchal verticality. Several contracts, pooled together, under the same capitalism, could feed a Beta commune, this time horizontal. In short, with creative responses poverty may have applaudable side-effects.

Take the *means of production-destruction-transportation-*

communication cluster; producing the most incredible products, spreading death and disaster anywhere, displacing anything at incredible speed, and permitting simultaneity, "anytime, real time" presence. Again, the efficiency is not disputed. But with that production of things human action by necessity also becomes more thing- and less human-oriented. Watching TV together, in parallel, two I-it relations, is no substitute for talking together in one I-Thou relation (Buber). Talking about the TV program afterwards, in series, helps, as mentioned, and the same argument applies to books. The problem is whether people read books.

With short distance weapons direct fighting, looking the enemy into the eyes, kill or be killed, was actually the Beta violence contract: "I have only the right to kill you if I take the risk of you killing me". A deplorable, but highly human, direct, relation. Killing from a drone is a totally alienated, super-Alpha violent form of cowardice, from some office very far away, behind a computer. Combining the means of destruction, transportation and communication Marx somehow left out, relating small and big numbers through the thin scope of killing.

Last but certainly not least *patriarchy*, now waning all over the world. In German there is the expression *das Alpha-Tier*, the alpha animal, a male, at the apex of Alpha. If women feel more at home in Beta, and men in Alpha, then the waning of patriarchy could bring in more Beta. But gender is also a social construction, and university training for Alpha may change women as much as male participation in housework may change them. Natural affluence 5-6,000 years ago made matriarchy and parity flourish, then came drought playing up to the slight physical superiority of men.[100] Now mental capability is played up, possibly in favor of parity, possibly with more Beta.

Switching to cultural factors, take the cluster, *economism, Roman Law,*[101] *human rights, democracy, literacy*. Different, but what do they have in common? Answer: constructing humans as separate individuals:
• by providing goods-services focused on individual pain-pleasure;
• entitled to own private individual property;
• with individual rights in the UN-Members States human rights pact;
• entitled to cast votes as individuals every four years;
• by providing literacy as individual capability.
The individual is the ultimate recipient of all five, with huge individual freedom of choice guided by individual cost-benefit analysis. But the dark side of that medal is that it also opens for huge Alpha structures for the flow of the good and services. No need for Beta.

Thus, where is compassion? Reduced to administration. Where is *homo faber*, the Maker of things? Reduced to consumer choices. Where

is democratic dialogue? Reduced to ballot box behavior. Where is the oralcy with listeners dialoguing with a walking library, a depositary of collective memory? He is made redundant. Individual reading has been substituted for collective listening, with no both-and in-between.

Take the *secularization, Western science, health* cluster. What do they have in common? In one answer: soullessness. Secularism was a world view without a personal God, delegitimizing ancient Alpha figures. But that also threw out spiritualism, the sense of relating something out there, beyond individual humans, to something inside us.[102] Alpha was weakened, but so was Beta in the sense of that little group, the net linking individual knots to something beyond them: that group, that net.

Western science does the same, constructing deductive pyramids linking theses, like Alpha links positions, giving the apex axiom a position similar to a CEO, or even to God; the point from which ultimate Truth radiates. And only recently has health recovered some of the soul through the psycho-somatic bridging formula.

What should be done? *Clearly, recreate Beta, and rehumanize Alpha*.

Recreation of Beta: the efforts to abolish assembly-lines in favor of teams assembling the products together build on clear potentials for Beta growth and some Alpha decline. The same applies to modern office landscapes with a high level of mutual visibility, easily organized around tasks, grouping together those who should work together; as opposed to one person-one office structure, with the CEO in a corner.

At the universities this would point to the *colloquium* as a fine Beta structure, for professors, for students, and for both; choosing topics, going into depth together, above all supporting each other. In the USA such intellectual encounters are remarkably infrequent, partly because full individual course calandars are so incompatible.

In banking this points to the interesting lead by the *Grameen* Bank as originally introduced in Bangla Desh before it was Alpha-coopted. Really poor people do not have any equity for bank loans; if they did the loan might not have been needed. Instead ten persons guaranteed one tenth each, together constituting a Beta group around the debtor.

This reminds us of the famous *Zehnergruppen* in DDR: groups of ten people working together, introduced in economic organizations to increase production and productivity. As such they may have failed, but as Beta groups they seem to be much missed as a focus for (n)ostalgia.

Another interesting Beta innovation is what in German is called the *Wohngemeinschaft*, the "commune" of like-minded people living, and partly consuming, together, sharing all the work of the household. An

extended family without kinship, arising from a longing for Beta in a society where even nuclear families collapse. It should not be judged by the basis of whether members stay together as long as "real" families do. The socio-logic is different, for conviviality, not for longevity.

Rehumanization of Alpha: as an example, ban automated responses, let people have a chance to put their questions to a human being and get human answers. The social costs of not doing so will by far outweigh the economic costs of employing more people in answering services. Moreover, such positions do not have to be full time jobs, and can be relayed to India. Needed is human use of human beings (Wiener).

For religion see *Globalizing God*, with a focus on soft religions.

And that brings us to the end of this nomadism-monadism narrative, with an excursion into a very uncertain future. With structural and cultural ties dissolving the most economically-technically developed have become the humanly-socially least developed, or *de-developed*. We are not talking about social services per 1,000 inhabitants, but of something more basic: destructuration and deculturation. Alpha style social services may be part of the problem rather than of the solution.

With *atomie-anomie* being the social price paid for modernization the more and most developed became the less and least developed. Adam Smith's two books again: too many took for granted that society is structurally-culturally solid, and can be drawn upon for any purpose,

Does that mean that the economically-technically least developed societies are the socially most developed? Not necessarily. They could suffer the costs without the benefits; ravaged by unspeakable violence between classes, nations and clans, with the rest of the world often siding with one against the others. The costs are unloaded on them.

But some Formations I and II are still intact, in Southern and Eastern more than in Northwestern Europe, in Central and South more than in North America. One day the "First" world may ask the "Third" world for advise about social development or undoing de-development rather. And Formation IV may escape anarchy and become a mix of the other three.

10 | The Four Worlds and the Rise of Northwest and Southeast

Capitalism and the Spirit of Max Weber

The preceding chapters gave a structural context for development in terms of the Alpha pyramid and the Beta circle, and their relations over macro-*time*, meaning macro-history. This chapter deals with macro-historical variety in macro-*space*, today's concrete world, based on the structural, and particularly cultural, parameters in Chapters 7-9.

The chapter title invokes the spirit of Max Weber, who wrote[103]:

"The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been fully developed in the mo-dern culture area. It is obviously not a question of deeming the Chinese 'naturally ungifted for the demands of capitalism. But compared to the Occident, the varied conditions which externally favored the origin of capitalism in China did not suffice to create it".

Not only a bad prediction based on book knowledge, but a highly eurocentric way of thinking. Let us postulate that *capitalism=hard work+saving+greed+inconsideration*[104]; the first two celebrated, the latter not. Weber worries less about the latter two but asks where it all comes from. The conditions are found in "the modern culture area" of which China has little and Japan even less. Within "modern culture" Weber lands on protestantism--one of three christianities, in turn one of three abrahamic religions--and more particularly on calvinism.

Why? Salvation anxiety, and the need for some premonition, market success being a positive indicator. There is a relation between religion and economy, but in our view less far-fetched than that one, and not a monopoly of the West. Nor of protestantism, as Amintore Fanfani and Kurt Samuelson argue[105]. But Weber's highly applauded theory not only accorded to the protestant West economic leadership, but also implicitly endorsed missionarism so that others can catch up. The West explained the West and the Rest. Missing: two different capitalisms, see below.

Cosmology and the Spirit of Protestantism and Capitalism

What went wrong? The old story of Eurocentrism, of Europe as the human essence and European history as universal history some centuries earlier? Maybe, but more interesting than how Weber thought is how he might have thought. Two changes would have made huge differences. An other Weber could have used "common factor analysis" rather than "causal analysis", and applied the findings to Europe, to

Japan, and to China.

Common factor rather than causal analysis. Since Weber nobody can argue no relation between religious R and economic E attitude-behavior. But, what is the mechanism between R and E? Arrows are drawn: R->E, E->R, R and E cause each other. *Or*, is there a common factor, T?

That last perspective might see protestantism and capitalism emerging in early modern Europe from a common root, as expressions of a deeper world view, a cosmology. Cultures have a basement, *sous-sol*, in the collective sub-conscious; and if this is *sous-sol I*, there is a *sous-sol II* underneath, with even deeper, more general, assumptions.

In this hypothetical cosmology some factors are postulated, with religious and economic manifestations, articulations. To the left is the cosmology, then the protestant and then the Capitalist articulations. Three stories can be told here, using these terms: a religious and an economic narrative, and a general, archetypal narrative about the West. *The religious narrative would run about as follows*:

The purpose of life is to be fully accepted by God. Each individual comes equipped with a personal soul, the seat of the free will. The life task is to improve that soul by exercising that will, making the right choices. In the end that soul, not only separate but also unperishable, is accountable (the Day of Reckoning), the judgment being dichotomous: salvation or damnation. Watch out, access to Paradise is scarce. Hard work is needed, and much self-control.

There is a warning in this: save the merits you have accumulated, do not squander them. And there is a positive aspect: expand the domain of the faith. Inspire others, in words, in deeds, so that they may also be true believers, embark upon the same road, reach the same goals, in the same ways. It comes back to you as accumulated merits, so do not worry if some others also gain access.

The economic narrative would run about as follows:

The purpose of life is to be fully accepted by the market. Each individual enters the market equipped with private property and the right to use private property to acquire more private property. The life task is to process that private property to higher levels. The whole exercise is accountable (the Day of Reckoning; once a year, once a quarter), the judgment being dichotomous, solvency or bankruptcy.

Table 9: Cosmology (=Deep Culture) and Two of Its Manifestations

Cosmology	Protestantism	Capitalism
Prime Mover	God	Market
Individualism	Individual soul	Individual property
Progress	Improvement, Merit	Processing, Profit
Responsibility	Accountability	Accountability
Benefit	Salvation by Merit	Solvency by Profit
Risk	Damnation	Bankruptcy
Selection	Access scarce	Success scarce
Hard work	Hard work	Hard work
Self-control	Self-control	Self-control
Saving	For the after-life	For the future
Expansion	Mission, Evangelism	Trade, Marketing

Success is a scarce commodity; hard work and self-control are needed. Do not squander profits; postpone gratification. Inspire others to market and trade. It comes back as accumulated earnings, so do not worry if some others also have success, making some profit.

These two stories are isomorphic, the map being the dictionary. Whoever has learnt one narrative will easily understand the other. Used by the human mind isomorphism is known as pattern recognition. *Cosmology is that isomorphism which in turn is the common factor*.

Basic to that isomorphism is the I-cultures in protestantism--maybe less so in judaism and catholicism--in secularism and capitalism; as against the we-cultures in orthodox christianity and islam and further East. As we shall see for Japan-China, we-cultures do not exclude economic growth, but the underlying modes of production are different.

In protestantism souls are individual with no collective souls like for congregations; and in capitalism property is individual, not collective[106] like in co-operatives; not sticky, molecular. Individuals are free like the unconnected atoms of inert, *noble*, gases.

The rest of the story is *the story of progress*. The three sets carry rankings: better and worse individuals, better and worse souls, more or

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less property. Inputs of hard work and self-control will improve the soul and add to the property if the Prime Mover so wishes. Access is scarce, risks are heavy, and failure may spell disaster.

Individuals move upwards improving soul and-or property, for an afterlife in God and an earthly life in the Market. Weber's use of Calvin's use of market success as God's sign of predestination for salvation, with equal rank in economic life and religious afterlife, is only on homology among several, and blasphe-mous.[107] The isomorphism between individual soul and property is much richer. Think one and you think the other. Which one developed first? A chicken-egg problem: together, from a common root, one inspiring the other. Like genuine siblings they were condemned to grow up together, on the same soil.

In English even some basic terminology is identical.

Thus, there is *accountability* to the Prime Movers, God and Market, drawing their conclusions based on the accumulation of merit and profit. And there is *saving*, of merits-profits, leading to salvation-solvency.

The Four Worlds and the Rise of the World Northwest

Let us use this to arrive at an image of the Rise of the Northwest in a global context. The world is then divided into four quadrants following the compass, and the "rise" process is divided according to four types of power, cultural, economic, political and military (See Figure 4 on the next page).

This story can be told in many ways; here based on some primacy of culture, indicated by the numerals in the world Northwest and Southeast. The protestant revolution in early 16th century changed the character of capitalism. But had that not been followed by trade and colonialism, the other power domains, almost three centuries later at the end of the 18th century, there would have been no "Rise of the Northwest". The story is holistic, not based on culture alone. More-over, the rise of the West was not that quick. Catholic im-perialism stagnated; Spain went into the *decadencia*. The real rise was in the 19th century and is little over two centuries old, a short pe-riod in history. And what rises may decline and fall, as did colo-nialism and the North European and US protestant imperialisms. And nazism, a member of the same family, trying to colonize Eastern Europe.

Figure 4: The Four Worlds and the Rise of the North-West

	West	East

North	I Jewish-Protestant-Catholic Europe, later also the USA and Protestant Pacific
	
	       [3] Political
	
	[2] Economic [4] Military
	
	       [1] Cultural
		II Orthodox Europe
		       Muslim Europe

South	III Catholic America
	      Christian-Animist Africa
	      Muslim Africa
	      Muslim Asia
	      Hindu Asia
	      Buddhist Asia
	      Poly-, Micro-, Melanesia
		IV Buddhist-Confucian Asia
		
		      [3] Political
		
		[2] Economic [4] Military
		
		      [1] Cultural

[1] *The cultural factor*: based on the isomorphism between the religious and the economic narratives. A new christianity made individualized theory and practice of the life cycle, with afterlife at the same time both more dependent on individual exertion, and on the grace of God as *causa sui*. The two factors are independent of each other. Their coincidence is what makes for salvation.

Less important, even standing in the way, was the collective exercise of ritual in the congregations, and the intercession by the clergy. Even the intercession by the Mother, Maria, was excluded. Individuals were left alone, naked in front of a *causa sui* God whose ways are inscrutable, cannot be influenced, except negatively through sins. Virtue was demoted from close to a sufficient to at most a necessary factor. Left alone was an individual exerting himself to the utmost vis-a-vis the Undescribable who holds the ba-lance for Eternity in His hands, and may exercise His Grace, as God.

[2] *The economic factor*. The equation God = Market belongs to the genius coincidences in history. An individual entrepreneur, alone on the Market groping for its favors, does the extraordinary, the risky. But the ways of the market can never be fully known, being inscrutable. Its ways may be studied, but basically the market is also *causa sui*. Economists are to theologians like Market to God, may record its

external manifestations, but never fully comprehend its inner core. There the Market, like God, is alone with itself, deciding who is heading for eternal salvation, and who for damnation. As mystery.

The Catholic version would be more collectivist, family more than individualist entrepreneurial, more ritualistic, less risk-taking, and more intercessionist; by Protestants seen as corruption. Possibly also less inclined to punish the bankrupt if he confesses (Article 11).

[3] *The political factor*. This new approach to the economy catapulted new people into economic power. A rank disequilibrium arose between an increasingly wealthy, but less powerful bourgeoisie, and a very powerful clergy-aristocracy, certainly with property but not with liquid capital that could move and cause miracles in far-away places. Wanted was political power commensurate with the economic power. What stood in the way was that access to power was through birth alone. Wanted was a perspective seeing humans in terms of merits, achievement rather than attributes ascribed at birth by the family of origin. The shift from rights by birth to rights by achievement, from caste to class, enshrined in "human and citizen rights" (1789), was linked to decision-making less by the King and upper castes and more by citizens according to a *One Man, One Vote* formula. The two upper layers being in the minority, the outcome of voting was clear. Clever.

But the bourgeoisie had to be on guard against the proletariat, the workers on the land and in the towns, outcasts, women, etc.. This was done by limiting voting to those with proven achievement in terms of own education and-or property. By paying workers close to reproduction minimum, or below, by denying outcasts and women education and the right to have independent property, those above were able to control those below for about a century. Once again, clever.

[4] *The military factor*. The power of the stick was added; the power of values being in the new ways of conceiving of religion, the power of the carrot in the new ways of conceiving of economy, and the power of decisions in the new class, the bourgeoisie. But there were threats from above (Vendée), from below (Paris Commune), and from the outside (England, Germany). The first two were overcome, but the third tamed the Revolution, at Waterloo in 1815 and Versailles I in 1871.

A new way of conceiving of the military had come into being. The homologue of the One Man, One Vote formula was *One Man, One Soldier*. The incentive was to die for the New Order, for the nation rather than the King; the negative incentive being execution as a deserter. The transition (1793) from mercenaries to conscripts made soldiers "cheap as dirt" (Napoléon); and the power of the military to kill for a cause, as opposed to gain, catapulted a military no longer based

on aristocrat greed to the level of gods who decide over life and death.

The net result was not the military campaigns of Napoléon; that was short-lived and came to an abrupt end in 1815. More important was his *mission civilisatrice*, bulldozing transition roads into modernity in major parts of Europe. But a discrepancy still existed between the new economy, polity and military in secular and protestant Europe, and their absence in catholic and orthodox Europe. The Iberian peninsula only caught up politically in the late 1970s and orthodox Europe only, maybe, in the 1990s. But the economic peak in the Northwest is still the protestant spine in European geography, Midlands-Rhine, with gradients sloping into impoverished catholic and orthodox peripheries.[108]

Let us now do some counter-factual history, trying to think away, one after the other of the four power factors.

Without that particular cultural factor it is hard to see the whole process taking off. Why should people be working that hard and saving so much, taking so many risks? The answer, simply in order to make money, to become rich, is not good enough. Why should they, when the overwhelming concern still was the afterlife, not this life? If wealth could be acquired without any visible effort on this side of that watershed, through birth and inheritance of title and deeds, so much the better. But that is not what individual merit and profit are about.

Feudalism and the caste system have the function of making transfer of wealth in this world automatic and effortless so that all visible behavior could focus on the afterlife. The legitimate alternative was acquisition as a side-effect of conquests made in the honor of God, like the first Crusades. Or colonization to evangelize, with some material enrichment as a side-line activity.

Catholics also knew how to conquer and evangelize. But Protestants knew better how to make use of the conquest: an even more brutal[109] exploitation and extermination of indigenous and slaves, with steep gradients and divisions of labor between the Center motherland and the Periphery colonies. Spain and Portugal exhausted themselves producing clones overseas; England prospered, exhausting the colonies instead. The imprint of Spain and Portugal in Latin America was deep and broad; of England and France in Africa much less so.

Let us then think away the political factor. The result is obvious: the social stifling of an energetic new class. There might be something to learn from Indian history here. That caste, the *vaishya*, is number 3 in the classical ranking, below *brahmins* and *kshatriya*. The ranking is the same as in classical Europe, but there is a tremendous difference: no discontinuity brought about by any French style revolution. Until recently India has probably never been so dominated by money-people

as Protestant-Catholic Europe in the 20th century. Entrepreneurialism was there, but more subordinated to religious and political-military values, more like catholic Europe, less like major protestant countries, England, Germany (protestant parts) and the USA.

Now, 21st century, political-military power in India have opened the gates for money power, including direct foreign investment, but not for real sharing with the people, the *shudra*, the *dalits*.

If we think away the military factor German protestantism would hardly have survived the counter-reformation, England might not have survived the attack by catholic Felipe II of Spain against protestant Elizabeth I, France would hardly have survived the counterrevolution, Napoléon would not have "modernized" great parts of Europe in his short spans between triumph and defeat, and USA would have been disciplined. The last point is important not because of difference in religion and economy, but in social structure. The USA was, and still is, a society of plebeians, of escapees from the rule of clergy, aristocracy and merchants, building their own steep class gradients around education and the Almighty Dollar, proving that common people can scale that gradient.

So the conclusion is again the conjunction of these power factors, within a limited region of space and through an interval of time sufficient for the synergies to work out. But what about the suggested order of the factors, would any permutation also have worked?

Probably not. The primacy of culture in this image of the "Rise of the Northwest" is not only in terms of causal weight, but in terms of temporal priority. The new way of conceiving of God-Human relations had to penetrate. A strong military could always have been built and been used for conquest, as did the Vikings, the Mongols. But they left nothing behind apart from memories of their cruelty and barbarity. Society might have loosened up, giving more space to the money people and the people with goods and services. But if they themselves did not have the golden (gold-making) touch, then to what avail?

There is no other order except possibly doing politics, meaning human rights, elections and democracy first, and then the economic job. The Russian, not the Chinese approach; but right now the Chinese are leading, having more cultural adequacy than the Russians.[110]

The Non-rise of the World Northeast and Southwest

If this is the story in the Northwest, how about the other quadrants? In the second quadrant, the world Northeast, formerly socialist, the orthodox factor, a very deeply rooted christianity, may still matter. And in the third quadrant, today's Third world, neither christian-animist, nor

muslim, nor hindu-buddhist religions would today stimulate processes like those explored, for the reasons mentioned in the counter-factual excursions. That is no reason why they could not set in motion other processes leading to spectacular economic growth, as will be argued below for the fourth quadrant. But if processing of the soul translates into processing of natural resources in manufacture and industry, and non-processing corresponds to extraction of natural resources, then we would expect resource based economies like the gas and oil economy of early 21st century Russia, and the Third world, to last for decades, centuries. Not all is due to Northwest dominance.

They were stability-oriented, traditional, sedentary societies with some caste-formation on top, laboring under an awesome god or party, watching their smallest step. The basic concern was not to make mistakes. But that attitude, in the economy as also in science and politics, does not promote the excursions into the unknown that are conditions for basic change, for the good as well as for the bad.

Luther's inscrutable god opened for sectarian experiments to find something to His liking, like science studying miracles of His Creation. The Catholic god seemed closed to experiments.

One bridging element to we-cultures was the Chosen People, with worldly success, economic, political and-or military, interpreted as being to God's, or History's liking, being collectively on the way to salvation. What else would be the meaning of being chosen? Crucial.

The Rise of the World Southeast

And that brings us to the fourth quadrant, the world Southeast. The focus is on the four *mahayana buddhist-confucian* countries, Japan-China-Korea-Viêt Nam. There are also other countries in the region, in ASEAN, and the Pacific Islands, including Australia and New Zealand. But the 10 ASEAN countries are very ambiguous in this regard:

Singapore: Chinese (majority) + muslim Malay + hindu Tamil
Malaysia: Chinese (minority) + muslim Malay + hindu Tamil
Thailand: Hinayana buddhist + muslim
Indonesia: Muslim + hindu-buddhist (Bali)
Brunei: Muslim
Philippines: Catholic + muslim
Myanmar: Hinayana buddhist
Cambodia: Hinayana buddhist
Laos: Hinayana buddhist
Viêt Nam: Mahayana buddhist

If there is such a thing as an East Asian factor that applies to China, then that factor should also be operating in Singapore in a dramatic way, with very high growth, and less so in Malaysia. Chinese majority vs Chinese minority makes a difference, even given sufficient access to political power and not eliminated as was, to a large extent, the case in Indonesia. For the others third quadrant comments apply.

Then there are the Pacific Islands. Given the protestant character of the former British possessions, Australia and New Zealand, one might have expected something more dazzling. However, even if the cultural factor may be (close to) necessary, it is not sufficient. These were periphery territories. Their periphery tasks were assigned to them: extraction of raw materials, meat, wool. When ultimately time came to rise above this, after the Second world war and the loosening up of the ties to the mother country, the protestant spirit had probably been so eroded by secularism that there was no religious narrative left to be translated into an economic narrative. Secularism is less commanding; there is no supporting narrative, economism has to be its own support.

[1] *The cultural factor*. In Japan the *content* of shinto, *and* mahayana buddhism, *and* confucianism, *and* that *eclecticism* produced a *both-and* culture as opposed to the *either-or* culture of the Occident: judaism, *or* christianity, *or* islam. Occidental truth is unitary and consistent, not a fluid (con)federation of disparate perspectives and truths,[111] looking around, trained to learn and absorb anything new.

Mahayana buddhism and confucianism are secular insofar as the focus is on Self-improvement, with a collective ethical budget: what I do of good or wrong comes to all in our group (a company-ministry-university) and vice versa. And this is compatible with a vertical, ethical system of rights and duties, *confucianism*, with old, learned, males on top.

Together they counteract the contradiction emphasized in the West between managers and workers. An organic solidarity with collective ethical budget, and an ethics emphasizing rights *and* duties, of high *and* low, bridge that faultline. The economy of the Southeast has faultlines where no organic collectivity defines a common ethical budget: men and women as groups, large and small enterprises, Japanese and foreigners. But Japan has a third world view, *shinto*, for such contradictions among Japanese, not with foreigners. Japan was condemned to succeed.[112]

As was China, with the subtlety of daoism with its never-ending dialectic predisposing the Chinese for changing emphases in the distribution vs growth, State vs Capital balance (see Chapter 14).

But even if mahayana buddhism and confucianism are present in all four, the third component in the East Asian mixes could isolate them.

The Japanese may be over-united when there is no threat. Struggles against foreign domination have had that cementing function: a host of foreigners for China, the French-Japanese-Americans-Chinese for Viêt Nam, and the Japanese-Americans-Soviets in the case of Korea.[113]

[2] *The economic factor*. The economic Rise of the Southeast happened more quickly than the Rise of the Northwest. They learnt, but then the cultural formula was also more adequate. Less time was wasted on class struggle and State-Capital contradiction than in the West.

[3] *The political factor*. More problematic. Merchants were lowest in the Chinese-Japanese caste systems, the *shi'h-nung-kung-shang* and *shi-no-ko-sho* systems. For economic growth either the merchants, the *shang-sho*, have to higher up, or be very friendly to the shi'h-shi top. In Japan the formula was a *mariage de convenance* between the *shi* (aka *samurai*) and the *sho*, the *shi-sho alliance*. The formula paved the way for Japanese style State-Capital cooperation. Farmers (*no*) and workers (*ko*) came second relative to that alliance.

[4] *The military factor*. The army came quickly with conscription and legitimation by state shinto, used to expand the reach of Tokyo: Taiwan-Formosa 1894-94, Korea 1910-11, Manchuria 1931, China 1936 and then 1931-1945. The *shi-sho* became a seesaw: military (1894-1911), economic (1911-1931), military (1931-1945), economic (1945-?).

Conclusion

One way of summarizing would be individualist *and* collectivist entrepreneurialism, opening for private combines *and* state enterprises, in Japan *and* China. Privatization in China comes with formulas for the social character of economic enterprises in the long run (Chapter 19. But, are they strong enough to counteract the forces of de-development?

The Northwestern inability to understand other roads to growth and alternative development models is amazing. Blinded by their dominance they assumed that theirs was the only road, and used mirrors to identify similar profiles to issue take-off certificates. Western provincialism, Weber being an example, impedes borderless, globalized, knowledge.

Part Three

DE-DEVELOPMENT AS IMPERIALISM

11 | Why Study De-Development as Imperialism?

Development studies usually focus on deficits relative to certain goals, and on how to make up. Resources can be made available, like capital through savings, grants, loans, investment; human capital through education-skills, health, modern values; fixed capital through tech-nical assistance, infrastructure, etc. One interesting formula is *Deve-lopment = Education-skills + Infrastructure*.[114] There are others.

Given the development crisis, however, another perspective may also be appropriate. "Development" is positive, carrying an "idea of progress" perspective. How about also learning from "de-develop-ment", a negative, regress perspective, with decline and fall? As a minimum it might be useful to know how and why things went wrong, trying to draw some conclusions about what *not* to do. A focus on positive outcomes is needed. But we should also focus on negative outcomes, on *what should not be done, not come about*, backed by data and theory. Falsification is also easier than verification.

Economists and macro-historians like Edward Gibbon (1963), Carlo M. Cipolla (1970), Mancur Olson (1982), Paul Kennedy (1987) and Partha Dasgupta (1995) have made material and hypotheses-theories available. Their books can be mined for insights in de-development, and their findings can be related to general studies of factors conditioning development.

After looking at about 30 cases, ten cases were selected: West Rome, East Rome (Byzantium), Arab Empires, Spain/*la decadencia*, Italian city-states, the Ottoman Empire, the Ch'ing dynasty, the British empire, the Soviet empire (socialist), and the US empire (capitalist). The mini-studies are superficial, mainly based on Cipolla's work.

But there is sufficient basis to propose a theory of de-development which can then be used as an additional approach, complementing positive development theory.

This brings us to the decline, fall and possible afterlife of empires, our case studies. That empires and dynasties decline and in the end fall, can be seen as a special case of the more general "law" or principle that *nothing lasts forever*. Everything is subject to the "Law of Change". But if that is so, this should also be the case for that Law. Its validity should not be "forever". Looking at the list of the ten empires, their creators certainly did not think of their *projet* as existing on a limited lease of time only. The presumed viability was *forever*. Their project

was irreversible. They thought they had created an End of History through a new reality. Reality, however, put an end to their project. Why? How?

One answer: "because of dialectics". *Actio* creates *reactio*. Push long enough and counter-forces arise. Empire-building without "pushing" is difficult, to put it mildly. To grow economically some "pushing" is also needed. A single counter-force may not tear down what has been built, being too weak. But at the margin of the system these forces will accumulate and their synergies may ultimately lead to decline and fall as the system exhausts itself fighting, or in general trying to control the disruptive forces.

The dialectics is not always based on exogenous, external forces, like "ecological decay", or "the barbarians crashing the gates" (Ibn Khaldun), hammering at the Roman Empire in synergistic ways. The dialectic can also be endogenous, like Marx' theory of rupture[115] when the mode of production no longer is adequate for the means of production. Or Sorokin's "principle of limits": any system will satisfy only a limited range of the broad spectrum of human needs; sooner or later accumulated frustration from the needs left unattended will lead to major upheavals.

And a third possibility: sheer stupidity, the March of Folly.[116]

Such theories are far-reaching, but too general for a theory focusing mainly on the economics of de-development. The range of factors behind the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, for instance, spans far beyond economics, even with a broad definition of that field, into any field of inquiry, like lead-poisoning from the pipe-lines in the Roman water system.

There is much to be gleaned from general dialectics, however, starting by asking a question: "what would a diagram of decline and fall look like?" People usually draw single-peaked curves with *birth-growth-peak/maturity-decline-fall/death*. The model is human biography. But that should make us pause and think. Is the single-peaked life not a social construction like in "he reached the high point of his career"? Could we not have multi-peaked lives-empires? How about shifting the achievement criterion, like an engineer-businessman becoming a scholar in the history of his own specialty later on in life? How about empires doing the same?

Moreover, how do we reject any afterlife after death, neither in the form of eternal life "up there" or "down under", nor in the form of reincarnation, nor in the form of rebirth of certain aspects? Is an empire that disappeared but left behind strong memorials and memories, even

to the point of becoming archetypal like the Roman Empire, really dead? Do reincarnations like the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation", or Mussolini's short-lived effort, not imply that something was still alive? The Roman Empire was a more or less successfully imitated archetype in all the other nine cases. Is that not some kind of rebirth, and in that case is it christian (forever), hindu (intermittent) or buddhist (fragmented)? We shall return to this question of after-life, under such headings as sustainability, acceptable death, and euthanasia.

12 | Toward a Theory of Development: Seven Factors

Critics of contemporary theories of development generally take the line that "economics is not everything", let alone "the only thing", and charge development theory and practice with "economism". The present author is among them, and this opens for a chance to explore some limitations of that critical approach.

Usually the critique of economics in the development process takes two different forms:

When economics is used as consequence, effect: the critique would be that the goal is not a well-functioning economy, in the black, at household, company, country levels, with high and robust growth rates to ensure that it stays that way. The goal is not rich countries, companies, families, but humanly rich individuals. The goal is *human* development, with *nature* development (ecological balance as a minimum), *social* development and *world* development.

Homo mensura, humans are the measures of all things, not something else like an economic system abstracted from human beings. We could expand that concept to include nature development, with a focus on *life*, *vita mensura*. Even Protagoras can be improved upon.

When economics is used as condition, cause: the critique points to many other factors conditioning development, also when development is conceived of in a narrow, economic, sense. Nature with its limits, is certainly one; so is the motivation structure in the human self, in turn conditioned by culture. The location of individuals, households, companies, countries in social and world structures matters. None of these factors, or syndromes of factors, is sufficient. But they are all necessary conditions, meaning that economic development may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for development.

If E is a set of necessary economic conditions for development, D; then this means that D implies E. But then we also have that -E (the negation of any one of the conditions in E) implies -D, and the negation of D is what we mean by "de-development"[117]. What we have to do is evidently to try to identify some of these factors or components in E, leaning on reasonable accounts of the decline and fall of economies, even very big economies.

This is not a return to any primacy of economics, dear to liberal-conservative and marxist development schools. But economic factors must be taken explicitly into account. In the eagerness to show that

economics is neither everything nor the only thing, many critics read as if economics is nothing. The cut between necessary and sufficient becomes too sharp, like much of cartesian-aristotelian logic. But it points in the right direction.

In that case, following the logic above, all we need is a list of economic factors that play at least a subsidiary, contributing, role to development. We can then hypothesize that the negation of any factor, singly or combined, on that list, would cause de-development. No doubt this is one approach.

Below is an exercise for seven factors found useful in develop-ment studies, four of them non-economic, and three economic.

Generally, however, this is not the way out. We are always dealing with syndromes of factors. The above logic is too simple. The negation of one factor may be inconsequential if there is enough momentum from the remaining factors. But the negation of a whole syndrome matters as empirical studies, like our mini-studies, may tell. Moreover, by studying de-development we may benefit from other discourses that include non-economic factors, and that may have some impact on the positive study of development.

Let us then have a look at how seven factors[118]--hard work, savings, greed, inconsiderateness, and Q/P, C/N, F/R explained below--work their crooked ways through this messy field.

Hard work. If production factors are hard to arrive at, the processing difficult, and the distribution costly, then hard work is needed, at least for economic development. But if the factors are easily available, processing is unnecessary, and consumption is on the spot or nearby, where is the necessity for hard work? Or, is development defined so that the necessity of "hard work" is a tautology, making foggy British Isles rather than sunny South Pacific Islands "normal"? Is development theory and practice conditioned by the British Isles? If so, is that not driving imperialism too far? Why should the wrong people and only they develop development theory?

No doubt Kant worked hard to produce his master-pieces, so did Beethoven. But could it be that we define as an indicator of development only that which has "hard work" as a price? That distributive kindness, for instance, that seems to come more easily to women than to men, and could be seen as a criterion of real human development, does not count because it may come easily, naturally?

Savings. If we live on the margin, savings serve as a hedge against such calamities as hunger and disease, and for investment to grow further. But imagine a gentle nature or welfare state with neither hunger nor disease, nor with any compulsion to grow further. Then, why

savings? Do we de-develop without them? No, their absence is only a sufficient condition for de-development if we want more development, or to remove worries. The argument would be that "savings", like "hard work", fit the wet, cold, foggy British Isles with little or no welfare state better than a South Pacific island with mutual rights and obligations intact, and a generous nature.

Greed. Economic activity steered by need rather than greed leads to a replacement rather than to a growth economy. The element of greed guarantees a continued search for higher growth. But greed may also come about as a consequence rather than as a condition for hard work and savings. *Greed* answers the question, why do I continue working so hard, and saving so much, when I actually have all I *need*?

We can choose to see this like the former US President Reagan once did, "greed and corruption are the price we pay for a free society". Or we can see it as de-development. Only by defining development as economic growth, and not as satisfaction, do we escape a de-development conclusion. In that case we would look at people becoming less greedy as an indicator of coming crisis. And again, only if we prefer a rich society with nasty people in it, to a poor society with nice people. Do we really?

Inconsiderateness. Economic activity, like medical activity, has side-effects and side-causes, *externalities*. Some of them are negative, like the greed just mentioned. To go ahead with growth-oriented economic activity a certain blindness to these negative externalities is needed, with shallow justifications like "the good end justifies the bad means", "eggs must be cracked to make an omelette", or "this will sort itself out in the longer run".

The argument might be that if we really should take into account all negative side-effects, then we would never do anything but resign ourselves to our miserable fate. That argument is, of course, a *non sequitur*: externalities should be taken into consideration from the very beginning, as is done today routinely with some ecological externalities ("consequence analysis"). Potentially this would yield more, not less development. The problem is, however, that economists admit only a very narrow range of externalities.

Q/P, the ratio of quality to price for a product. The higher *Q/P*, the higher the probability of a deal. And, the more deals, the more growth. But does it follow that if we decrease quality and-or increase prices, then we are on the road to de-development? Can anything be gained by decreasing the quality, meaning by that functional adequacy, cultural adequacy, and sustainability? There is planned obsolescence (low sustainability) as a strategy to sustain production, and with that

employment. In the same vein, increasing prices can also be seen as a strategy to decrease market activity to cool the economy. The answer is not so simple, it all depends. On what? That also depends, but in general Q/P is a good guide.

C/N, the ratio of culture to nature in a product, degree of processing. Is a product mainly culture, like a CD; or matter, like blueberries? The higher the better; with more revenue at higher levels of *C/N*. Does that mean that a move downward ushers in de-development? Or, could there be something positive in "back to nature", correcting for too much culture[119]? It all depends. On what? That also depends, but in general *C/N* is a good guide.

F/R, the ratio of finance economy (growth) to real economy (growth). It should be neither too high, nor too low. Does that mean that shifts toward finance economy, as speculation, or toward real economy as a subsistence economy, is catastrophic? Probably not in the short term. But to live in pure speculation or pure subsistence in the long run is a different matter. It all depends.

The conclusion is not clear. But the first four are indicative of a development theory seriously biased by a hard geography, and by a hard bourgeoisie insensitive to the suffering of the inner and outer proletariat and nature. The next three--quality, culture and balance--however, particularly when combined, are crucial in any economy.

13 | Toward a Theory of De-Development: Twenty Factors

De-Development theory is easier because falsification is easier than verification. We could proceed inductively, extracting factors from each of the ten cases, or deductively, presenting a scheme of such factors, using them to comment on the cases. The author started inductively to identify factors, and proceeded deductively to present the findings. We are dealing with post-, not pre-dictions anyhow.

We first divided the world into two parts, *the "country in a process of de-development"* vs "*foreign countries-abroad-the context*"; *Self* vs *Others*. They relate to each other economically, and also militarily, politically, culturally.

And then we cut into the countries in six different ways:

- *humans vs environment*, a rather key interface;
- *natives vs foreigners*, as foreigners may play a crucial role both for development and de-development;
- *center-elites vs periphery-people*, roughly in terms of power-- normative-contractual-coercive--and privilege;
- *primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of economic activity*, meaning extraction (from nature), processing and distribution, adding to the tertiary sector professional-cultural activities;
- *production factors: nature, labor, capital, technology, management*, (N, L; C, T, M), and their availability;
- *deep culture, cosmology*, for motivation patterns and adequacy.

Given this scheme a necessary condition for development is balance-adequacy for all six divides. But that formula is vacuous if we do not know what that means. In hindsight it is easy to conclude that there was serious imbalance. But at that time it may already be too late. The decline may be self-reinforcing, irreversible. We should be able to tell in advance.

Hence, 20 hypotheses about de-development, decline and fall:

De-development will take place as a consequence of:
First divide, Self vs Other: Bad division of labor
I,1: long-term accumulation of foreign debt
I,2: long-term accumulation of negative externality balances
I,3: excessive military costs to keep other countries at bay
I,4: long-term exploitation of Periphery by political hegemons
I,5: cultural imitation and absence of creativity
Second divide, humans vs environment: Imbalance
II,6: depletion from extraction
II,7: pollution from processing, distribution, and consumption
II,8: general deterioration of diversity-symbiosis, of maturity

Third divide, natives vs foreigners: Bad division of labor
III,9: long term accumulation of debt to foreigners
III,10: long term accumulation of negative externality balances
Fourth divide, elites vs people: Bad division of labor
IV,11: long-term exploitation of the people by the elites
IV,12: excessive military costs to keep other people at bay
Fifth divide, primary-secondary-tertiary sectors: Imbalance
V,13: neglecting one or more sectors
V,14: foreigners controlling one or more sectors
Sixth divide, production factors: Insufficient availability of
VI,15: *nature*, internally, through import, or processed abroad
VI,16: *labor*, internally, foreign workers, or working abroad
VI,17: *capital*, internally, foreign investors, or invested abroad
VI,18: *technology*, endogenous, or imported from abroad
VI,19: *management*, elite, people, or imported from abroad
Seventh divide, deep culture: Inadequate motivation pattern
VII,20: *deep culture*, too expansionist, or too contractive

But how do we know that a country is de-developing, what are the criteria, as distinct from factors-causes-conditions? If the divides above are the independent variables, and these 20 hypo-theses are the mechanisms, then what are the dependent variables?

Here "sustainability", or, better put, "reproducibility" enters: *when the economy is no longer sustainable-reproducible*. A human being can take stock of his-her wellness every morning: am I the same, better off, or worse off, than yesterday morning?, knowing very well that successive "worse-offs" spell illness, decline and fall, possibly impending death. An economy, a company or a country, takes stock at the end of the year or the quarter and arrives at the same conclusion. Thus, "expenses exceed revenues" is not a reason for decline, it is a criterion of decline. "Expansion brought economic benefits but incurred military costs, and the latter exceeded the former" is not a reason either, only a way of spelling out that budget more clearly.

A possible cause might be that the country was too expansionist (hypothesis VII,20 above), incurred heavy resistance, and started too late inquiring more deeply into the reasons why.

Massive migration out of the country, or at least out of the cities, by elites or people, is also a criterion rather than a cause, or rather a reading of how elites or people read the situation: *the system is doomed*. And the same applies to spiritual migration: the body is still in the system, performing its tasks, but half-heartedly since the spirit is somewhere else. Both elites and people are observing rather than participating, drawing conclusions for themselves rather than for society, assessing the right time to leave, to jump the sinking ship. Like the proverbial rats.

Demoralization, in other words. And, as the saying goes, will the last person leaving please turn off the lights...

14 | Ten Case-Studies, Twenty Factors, and Five Reflections

Case 1: The Decline and Fall of the West Roman Empire

The reader will find on the next page (Diagram I) an effort to summarize much of the literature on the Roman Empire, and to go one step further.[120] As the Roman Empire became a model for other empires, at least in the West, its decline also became the archetype for other declines, defining the discourse. One more ex-ample of how the Roman Empire has survived its own demise, do-minating our thinking even about the demise and death of empires.

The diagram is divided into three columns. To the right are five indicators-criteria of decline and fall, break-down, failure to be sustainable-reproducible. As mentioned above, we could also talk about dependent variables. The extreme Other, the barbarians, are increasingly successful militarily. The society militarizes to the point that even the emperors are military men. A strict command-control ethos permeates society with rigidity and lack of creativity, except, possibly, on the battle-field.

People lose interest and faith. The more imaginative ones escape to another habitat, the countryside, building alternative societies like the *villa romana*, thereby also escaping state taxation and the ecological depletion of the soil. Long before that they have become observers rather than participants. What happens in society happens because of "them", never because of "us".

Obviously these five criteria are interrelated in circular loops; they serve as each other's conditions and consequences. These may also be the only five factors visible to the members of society at that time; the deeper causes, and the root causes, being invisible. "Native theory" would cluster around these criteria, to the point of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy about decline.

In the second column, in the middle of Diagram I, the reasons-causes are indicated, but as a hypothetical flow chart, not as a list of factors. The basic divides used are between elites and people (here called proletariat), and between natives and foreigners (here called barbarians). The economic model of society is based on the two answers to one question: how does surplus flow to the materially non-productive elites, engaged in political-military leadership, and in cultural production, only.

DIAGRAM I

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
AN HYPOTHETICAL FLOW CHART

POSITIVE EFFECT
NEGATIVE EFFECT

SUCCESSFUL INVASIONS AND PERIPHERY SELF-RELIANCE

MILITARY CONTROL OF SOCIETY, INCLUDING EMPERORS

"BREAKDOWN OF SPIRIT" ALL METHODS TRIED, FLIGHT TO THE COUNTRYSIDE

LACK OF REAL PARTICIPATION "OBSERVERISM"

ECOLOGICAL BREAKDOWN DEPLETION OF SOIL NEAR AND FAR AWAY

MILITARY CAMPAIGNS

BARBARIAN PROTEST, PRESSURE

MOBILITY

ELITE SUPER-STRUCTURE (NON-PRODUCTIVE)

CIRCENSES

PANEM

PROLETARIZATION PROTEST, REVOLT MOVING INTO TOWNS

INCORPORATION IN STATE ARMY

SURPLUS (TAXES)

social SURPLUS

MOBILITY

INCORPORATION IN STATE CHURCH

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION (CONQUEST, PLUNDER)

SOCIO-ECONOMIC EXPANSION (SLAVE-BASED PRODUCTION)

BARBARIAN COSMOLOGY

CENTRIFUGAL COSMOLOGY EXPANSION, AT LEAST NOT CONTRACTION

CHRISTIAN COSMOLOGY

The two answers are: through territorial expansion, conquest, plunder, exacting taxes from the "external proletariat" (Toynbee), the barbarians; and through slave-based production, paying the slaves little or nothing, living off the added value produced by the slaves, or the internal proletariat in general.

No wonder that barbarians and slaves protested, counter-attacked, revolted. To contain the protests two approaches were used. There were the military campaigns against both. But there were also positive approaches. For the proletariat there was the famous *panem et circenses*, bread and circus, welfare state and entertainment. And for the barbarians co-optation into the elite, the state and the army. In both cases the idea must have been to give them vested interest in the continuation of the Roman Empire. As they were given channels of mobility into the coveted elite, the elite expanded, became more foreign, and more costly to maintain, generating more conquest and exploitation to become sustainable. And more resistance.

The system worked as long as it worked, meaning as long as there was a reasonable balance in the flow chart. The system was remarkably stable, for centuries, and also remarkably fragile, in a state of unstable equilibrium. The implication was that when decline really started it was irreversible. Or so it seemed.

In the first column there is an effort to look for the root causes of the whole phenomenon, locating them in the deep culture of the Roman Empire. The cosmology was centrifugal. That they had not only the right, but even the duty to expand was taken for granted. They saw their own conquest, plunder and exploitation as the best that could happen to the barbarians and the proletariat, probably including the gladiators sacrificed for entertainment purposes. Their whole history from the beginnings around -750 bears testimony to an expansionist or centrifugal mentality, pushing the *limes*, the border, outward; to the British Highlands, the Rhine-Danube and the Euphrates, with an army of 600,000.

In that column there are also two competing cosmologies: barbarian and christian. The "barbarians" were smaller groups, probably more centripetal in their basic orientation. However, exposed to the contagious expansionism of the Roman Empire, including being co-opted, the Carolingians, the Vikings, and the Franks of the Crusades, became no strangers to expansion. And the christians, not only inner-oriented but other world-oriented in their search for a New Kingdom, became converts to expansionism as christianity became the legitimate religion in the Roman Empire (+313). The incorporation succeeded. The christian successor systems were also expansionist, hence also

subject to decline and fall.

And that may be the basic key: expansionism in the deep culture leads to expansion without stop signals leads to counter-forces leads to decline leads to fall after the outer limits have been reached, even transgressed. There are in-between mechanisms as indicated in the second column. But the basic conclusion remains that the cause of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire was its expansionist deep culture itself, never questioning expansionism as such.

From this it does not follow that "contractionism" is the answer. The historical successor to the Roman Empire was the *manorial system*, and then the *feudal system*. Many of the units were very small. The totality, the "medieval system", did not prove sustainable either. Without trade, self-reliant in principle, spending huge amounts of resources on what today would be called ritual--like tournaments, parties, religious ceremonies--they over-used natural resources till the environment could sustain neither itself, nor them. Cultivating the mountainsides did not help much either.

So the serfs left, headed for the city-states, and positions at the bottom of artisanry. Ultimately the knights left too, and became troubadours, robbers and pirates, or artisans, *burghers*.

In retrospect, how could the Western Roman Empire have been saved, have been made sustainable? Here is one formula-answer:
• by exploiting nature in Italy and North Africa less;
• by exploiting the inner proletariat less;
• by conquering and exploiting the barbarians less;
• by keeping a lid on the growth of the elite sector;
• by turning more towards spiritual, and away from material, values.
No doubt this combination would have worked. But then the Roman Empire would not have been the Roman Empire, but like its successor system, just described, in the Middle Ages. A futile speculation.

A more profound question is why the Roman Empire should be made sustainable at all. The answer is probably affirmative for those training their eyes on the elites and their achievements, negative for those more concerned with what happened to nature, the proletariat and the barbarians. There is something to learn from that about the concept of sustainability. What is so great about sustainability, anyhow? Sustainability, for whom? And against whom?

Case 2: The Decline and Fall of the East Roman Empire
This was essentially the Balkans and "Little Asia", Turkey. But they behaved as if they were the Roman Empire after the division was final in +395, and particularly after West Rome fell in +476. They had their

own identity centered on Constantinople, the old Byzants, built by Constantin the Great in +330, and on orthodox christianity. The Great Schism of +1054 between the Western (catholic) and Eastern (orthodox) churches added the religious to the political division, solidifying that faultline through Europe. Losing Asia Minor, and Jerusalem, to the Seljuq Turks gave rise to the Crusades 1095-1291 that also hit East Rome.

Economically the loss of land meant loss of agriculture, making them dependent on food imports from the outside (Diehl, 1970). Having no ships the trade had to be done by others. To the West they had three competitors, Genova, Venezia and Ragusa (Dubrovnik). What remained for East Rome to do was statecraft, playing Genova and Venezia against each other, giving Venezia concessions to import goods free of duty (Diehl, 1970, p. 101). Already in 1347 the situation was so critical that the Emperor conducted his wedding in ceramics, not gold and silver (Diehl, 1970, p. 101).

Finally they were encircled by the Ottomans, and the 1453 conquest by the Ottoman Mohammed II, of Constantinople under Constantin XI Palaeologus, was only the final death blow.

Past capital and prestige may impress satellites, but not the competitors. If the primary sector declines then other sectors have to function well to compensate. But they had neither industry, nor crafts, nor trade; only statecraft. To entrust primary and tertiary sectors not only to foreigners, but to foreign countries, did not work. The miracle is that the empire nonetheless lasted a thousand years, till finally the bells tolled in 1453.

Case 3: The Decline and Fall of the Arab Empires

We are essentially talking of the Caliphate, the rulership of islam by a leader who is both temporal and spiritual. Soon after the death of the Prophet the Caliphate split into the Umayyads, ruling from Damascus, and the Abassids ruling from Baghdad. The Abassids massacred the Umayyads in +750, but some found the way to Spain and continued as the Western Caliphate of Córdoba from +712. The Abassids were massacred in +1258 in Baghdad during the Crusades by an alliance of christians and Genghiz Khan's grandson, Hulaku. Under the Fatimids the center moved to Cairo, taken over by the Abassids in +1171.

In Cairo the Mamelukes, originally slaves brought to Egypt by Fatimid caliphs, were ruling as a warrior caste of landlords with private armies. Economically (Lewis, 1970b) Mameluke sultans, chosen from the ranks of the warriors seem to have been particularly inept.

First, there was the problem of origin, celebrating the rise from

slaves to rulers, enjoying the fruits rather than cultivating them.

Second, the problem of warriors being better at destruction and ruling than at construction and serving, whether the latter is done from the primary, secondary or tertiary sectors of the society.

Being inadequate as farmers and traders, the whole economy suffered a serious decline from a commercial and monetary economy to a subsistence economy (Lewis, 1970b, p. 114).

Local chiefs got feudal rights, meaning they were more interested in squeezing surplus out of their serfs than in economic growth. The Portuguese Vasco da Gama, +1497-99, captured the trade between Africa and India, destroying the Silk Road.

And in 1517 the death blow came when the Ottomans, following their Constantinople success, conquered Cairo. One lesson seems to be never to leave key sectors to foreigners, or-and to the military.

Case 4: The Decline and Fall of Spain (la decadencia)

Few countries have had such access to wealth through theft, after the conquest of most of South-Central America from 1492 onwards, and then wasted it so quickly, as Spain during the *decadencia* 1620-1690.[121] After the genocide on the dominant indigenous peoples, the Aztecs and the Incas, the rest was up for grabs, including precious metals and jewels. The flow into Spain from the Colonies, mainly through Sevilla, was continuous. And yet, by the end of the 17th century little remained. How? Why?

The general explanation seems to be that an economy based on industry and commerce did not fit into an economy based on feudal agriculture and colonialism. The latter two blended easily, being based on the same concepts of *dominio*, ownership, of land for agriculture or mining, and of people, as serfs and slaves. There is no need for innovation beyond control to ensure maximum gain. And no search for markets either as the wealth piled up at the feet of the *hidalgo*, the *grande*, and the church.

This was being and having rather than becoming. Why should a rich Spanish *grande* make anything that could be bought from those who had the skills?[122] With that ethos the Spanish never developed those skills, a fact that benefitted their competitors in the Italian and Low Countries city-states, and in England, enormously. Experts from their competitors were even invited to make cannon balls, and the trade went to such major enemies as the British. The Spanish gladly gave away more challenges than they stole gold. By 1898-1902 the fall was completed by the USA walking into their downtrodden imperial shoes in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

The lesson seems to be never to give away challenging work; if you do you will suffer serious consequences.

Case 5: The Decline and Fall of the Italian City-States

The economic decline of Italy, like for Spain, was during the 17th century. Italy was not the primary beneficiary of Spanish "don't manufacture, buy" policies. The major beneficiaries were England, France and the Low Countries. And the net result at the end of the 17th century was clear and similar to Spain:

> "From being a developed country, mainly importing primary products and exporting manufactured goods and services--banking and shipping--, Italy had become an underdeveloped country, mainly importing manufactured articles and services and exporting primary products".[123]

But not for the Spanish reasons of not paying sufficient attention to Q/P, quality over price. The quality of Italian textiles was still excellent. But there was the problem of price. The Italian prices became too high, for three reasons:[124]

- excessive control by the guilds, tying Italian manufacturers to old-fashioned production and organization
- the pressure of taxation in the Italian states
- labor costs too high relative to other countries

But behind these well-known factors something else was lurking.

Thus, could it be that they were the victims of their own tremendous success in earlier centuries? That they considered themselves to be basically invulnerable, having nothing to learn where production and organization are concerned? Could it be that the city states and labor also felt that way, that the textile industry was so secure that they could easily take on more taxation and still pay higher wages? The result was the end of "her career as a country, once depressed and overpopulated".[125]

The lesson seems to be never to rest on one's laurels, to watch both Q and P, and remember: customers may be very treacherous people. They may vary both Q and P so as to arrive at a better Q/P themselves, and then are no longer customers, but dangerous competitors.

Case 6: The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

There were beginnings before 1453, but the real rise and expansion came after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Having conquered Syria and Egypt, Sultan Selim I also assumed the Caliphate, ruling over major parts of Asia, Europe and Africa. But in the 18th-19th centuries the Ottomans lost to Russia in the Russo-Turkish wars that lasted almost two centuries, and also lost Greece and Egypt. The Balkan wars (1912-13), and World War I (1914-1918), led to the beginning of the end in 1918.

Much of the warfare ended with military defeat; but much of the dynamic was economic. Three basic factors are known to us.[126]

First, the Ottomans created an elite corps of civil servants and military, the Janissaries, based on war captives and abducted christian youths from the Balkans, marched far away from their families, and raised by the Ottoman state. The Janissaries had the power to make and unmake sultans. There were some similarities with the Mamelukes in Egypt, rightly or wrongly suspected of disloyalty. In +1826 the Janissaries were massacred by Sultan Mahmud II in their barracks; fifteen years after the founder of modern Egypt, Mohammed Ali, had done the same to the Mamelukes.

Second, Ottoman society was long on religion, government, war and agriculture, but short on industry and trade.[127] A dangerous formation in a period when European empires develop-ed industry and trade. Consequently the status as industrialist and trader had to be filled by foreigners, among them Armenians.

Jews evicted from Spain had played important roles financing the Ottoman Empire, and in Europe beyond that. When the natives fail to learn and change, the tasks and fruits of modernity accrue to foreigners and foreign countries instead. Classical. And possibly a recipe for disaster.

Case 7: The Decline and Fall of the Chinese Ch'ing Dynasty

The fascinating account by Ping-Ti Ho (1970) will be used in the following, with the usual *caveat* that reliance on one author always is dangerous. His account starts describing the wealth of China at the end of the Ming (1368-1644) and the beginning of the Ch'ing (1644-1912) dynasties, with fabulous accumulation in some families, with long-distance and inter-regional trade, and with guild-halls in commercial centers.

And then came five reasons for decline from the 18th century, culminating in the Taiping-Great Peace rebellion 1850-64:[128]

- the best way to get rich was to buy the privilege of selling staples, like

salt and tea, under government monopoly;

- the profit was not reinvested in commercial and industrial enterprises that were less profitable than money-lending and tax-farming. Rich people preferred to buy official ranks and titles and encouraged their sons to become university degree-holders; in addition conspicuous consumption played a role;
- with no primogeniture wealth was shared within families and clans, meaning that there was no great accumulation at one point;
- Confucian values rewarded the learned and studious, not the hardworking merchant. Philosophy prevailed over technology;
- the most powerful economic control was exercised by the State, giving a choice between bureaucratic capitalism (the solution during the Kuomintang dynasty) and bureaucratic collectivism (the solution during the early communist dynasty).

Lesson: hard work, savings, greed and inconsiderateness on the top led to an economic growth insensitive to stop signals. The Age of Merchants followed by the Age of People as Sarkar predicted, the present communist dynasty, with its challenges--and responses.

Case 8: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire

The UK was the Center and exemplar *par excellence* of archetypi-cal modern Western imperialism modeled on the Roman Empire. On the next page (Diagram II) is an effort to summarize some thinking on the problems of imperialism, and to go one step further. The diagram is similar to Diagram I for the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. Similar phenomena give rise to similar diagrams.

There are some differences relating to "modernization".

The materially nonproductive elite now divide into state bureau-crats, corporation capitalists and intellectuals, all three at national and transnational levels. Modernity differentiates, but also integrates across borders. The native protest against geopolitical expansion, and the inner proletariat protest against capitalist socio-economic expansion, have Roman Empire dimensions. Military and police punishment expeditions in the colonies join with welfare, entertainment and sport strategies to placate the inner proletariat. A costly system, in a precarious balance.

The centrifugal cosmology of the modern West is then held responsible as the root cause, defining expansion as normal and natural. There are challenges from such non-Western cosmologies as buddhism, and to some extent hinduism, both found attractive by less expansionist Westerners, particularly by women. And there are sectarian countertrends within the West, like the Green movement.

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DIAGRAM II   THE DECLINE AND FALL OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM
AN HYPOTHETICAL FLOW CHART

→ POSITIVE EFFECT
--→ NEGATIVE EFFECT

GEO-POLITICAL DECOLONIZATION

PERIPHERY SOCIO-ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE

NATIVE INVASION

INTERNAL WARFARE

AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION

ELITES MOVING TO THE COUNTRYSIDE EXPERIMENTS WITH NEW LIFESTYLES

ANOMIE: GENERAL SOCIAL DISRUPTION, FRAGMENTATION

ALIENATION: MENTAL DISORDER, OBSERVERISM, CLIENTELISM

UNEMPLOYMENT

LEISUREISM

DECREASING PRODUCTIVITY

ECOLOGICAL BREAKDOWN

MILITARY CAMPAIGNS

NATIVE PROTEST

MOBILITY

STATE BUILDING BUREAUCRATS
(1) GOVERNMENTAL
(2) INTER-GOVERN-MENTAL

INTELLECTUALS
(1) NATIONAL
(2) TRANS-NATIONAL

CORPORATION BUILDING CAPITALISTS
(1) NATIONAL
(2) TRANS-NATIONAL

NON-PRODUCTIVE ELITE SUPERSTRUCTURE

POLICE CAMPAIGNS

ENTER-TAINMENT

WELFARE STATE PRACTICES

MOBILITY

PROLETARIZATION INTERNAL/EXTERNAL PROTEST/REVOLT MOVING INTO TOWNS

SURPLUS

WAR

SURPLUS

GEO-POLITICAL EXPANSION (COLONIZATION)
(1) NATIONAL
(2) BEYOND

SOCIO-ECONOMIC EXPANSION (TRADE, MACHINE INDUSTRY)
(1) INTERNAL
(2) EXTERNAL

NON-WESTERN COSMOLOGIES

CENTRIFUGAL COSMOLOGY EXPANSION, AT LEAST NOT CONTRACTION

SECTARIAN COSMOLOGIES

The outcome was inevitable: the system collapsed. By the 1960s colonialism was almost gone. But the British economy made up for lost markets in the EU-ACP system. And the major threat to common people was not the loss of empire, but the possible loss of welfare.

Lesson: do not have empires, also for your own sake. You may get into trouble. But the fall of empire may also be your new beginning.

Case 9: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire

The problem of the Soviet Union may not have been too much planning, but too little. With, say, 400 people in *gosplan* and the socialist planning commissions, planning for 400 million in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, those 400 were obviously over-challenged and the 400 million under-challenged. But even this major externality, *challenge*, did not enter their planning. They had very narrow visions of the economy, just bringing production factors together to produce, with little or no attention given to distribution and consumption. The plans were production plans; Marx wrote about modes of production.

Countless externalities were left unattended, e.g.,

- in *nature*: depletion and pollution, including toxic pollution;
- in *humans*: boredom, withdrawal, apathy, general demoralization;
- in *society*: a top-heavy, centralized, non-participatory society run by the Russian nation controlling other nations, the city controlling the countryside, the bourgeoisie the proletariat; the bourgeoisie having nothing to buy because the C/N of Soviet products was too low;
- in *world*: a confrontational foreign policy run by the Soviet Union controlling and intervening in satellite countries;
- in *time*: a rigidity making social change very difficult;
- in *culture*: linear marxist visions, the *Stufengang*, on rigid narrow tracks, and a basic contradiction between myth and reality.

With such matters left unattended tensions certainly accumulated. The society did not produce enough surplus to bribe everybody, and lost the stalinist nerve to suppress. Due to low level international trade they could not do what capitalism is good at, exporting negative externalities, like toxins, letting others, abroad, suffer.

Accumulated pollution led to diseases, adding to the general demoralization. Topheaviness deprived them of initiative which also was largely forbidden. Confrontations led to a very costly arms race. Rigidity and linearity deprived them of hope. Finally, the fall was imported from other, peripheral, socialist countries.

Lesson: Soviet socialism, good at material basic needs, paid even less attention to externalities, did not export them, and broke down.

Case 10: The Coming Decline and Fall of the US Empire

Let us try the three economic factors on the US economy (see Table 10 on the next page):[129]

Cardinal shortcomings of the mainstream US economy:

Q/P syndrome: inattention to quality of labor; inattention to unem-ployment as reason for labor-intensive, technology-extensive production; GNP does not reflect quality, only quantity of products marketed; economists underestimate the significance of the working class.

C/N syndrome: inattention to degree of processing, "it does not matter whether we make potato-chips or micro-chips"; inattention to spin-off effects; GNP does not reflect degree of processing; overemphasis on free market and trade regardless of product level.

F/R syndrome: inattention to the difference between **F**inance and **R**eal economy; GNP does not reflect difference between F and R; economists over-estimate the significance of economists, and serve their own capitalist class.

Key blocks: class society; greed/inconsiderateness; media power; expansionism; militarism; patriarchy; CEO'ism; serving dividend interests of stock-holders, not of workers; extremist economism.

As the therapies are unacceptable, the prognosis is military and finance economy because Q/P and C/N are too low to compete, crash of finance economy because F/R is too high, recession, depression.

In Chapter 13 *twenty factors* were explored, and in this Chapter 14 *ten mini-studies* have been presented. Table 11 on the next page summarizes the findings by checking which hypotheses are relevant for which cases.

The vertical reading informs us how narrow or broad the causation behind decline and fall was for each mini-study. The horizontal reading informs us about the relative prevalence in the history of empires of the factors. Both readings will be used.

Needless to say all 200 judgments are problematic. Each cell could easily be the subject of one or more books (some of them have already been written). But the focus is on the total pattern more than on any single judgment. The assumption is that even if each judgment is not very robust, conclusions based on patterns may be.

Here are the *five reflections*, with care and reservations:

1. No single factor theory has emerged. No single factor, with score 10, and score 0 for all others, explains the decline and fall. No. 2, "long term accumulation of negative externality balance" has score 10, but it is not alone. The narrowest syndrome, for Italian city-states, has five of the 20 factors operating, and in the broadest syndromes, for the two Roman Empires, 17 and 16 of the 20 factors, respectively, have been recognized.

Table 10: The US Economy: Diagnosis and Therapy

Syndrome	Diagnosis	Therapy
Q/P syndrome	no dignity for workers bad or no trade unions very short term contracts bad pay means no respect bad CEO/worker income ratio low level education disastrous media, TV boring, degrading work bad health, absenteeism **junk workers, junk work**	respect for skilled work company+national unions more life-long contracts higher minimum salary improve the income ratio improve lower education moratorium on some media increase challenge level social security for all **go in for quality in both**
C/N syndrome	profit above challenge low C/N exports (not arms) high C/N imports too much military work too much secrecy L cheap, no T-incentive CEOs C&M- not T-oriented CEOs too much power R&D far from marketing excessively free trade **junk work, junk products**	go in for both increase the level reindustralization liberate R&D from military lift the secrecy make Labor less cheap more engineers as CEO horizontal organization decrease distance selective protectionism **go in for quality in both**
F/R syndrome	CEOs C&M- not T-oriented quarterly reports finance-trading too easy too much speculation money **junk products, junk finance**	moratorium on some CBAs longer time perspectives make it more difficult incentive for production **go in for quality in both**

2. We are not dealing with tautologies. Factor No. 2 may sound close to a tautology, but there is content in "long term", "negative", and "externality". The short term may not be that dangerous. Strong positive effects of economic activity may balance the negative externalities. Implied is also that monetized parts of the economy, internalities like the national account balance, are not the only factors that count.

But a factor like "elite demoralization" present in all of them at some time, would have been a part of the description and definition of decline and fall, and not have explained anything. A tautology.

3. There is a causal syndrome with a clear message-logic. If we draw the line at score 9 four factors (Nos. 2-5-19-20) account for 37.5 of the 200 connections, or 19%; not very high. But if we draw the line at score 8, *a causal syndrome* of eight factors (Nos. 2-5-10-11-13-18-19-20), or 40% of the 20 factors, we can account for 70/118 = 59% of the connections identified.

That syndrome can now be summarized as follows:

- a division of labor whereby foreign countries, and/or foreigners inside one's own country, take over the most challenging and interesting and developing tasks, given the historical situation;
- a deficit in creativity related to a deficit in technology and good management, including foresight and innovation;
- one or several sectors of the economy neglected or lagging;
- with expansionism as cosmology, exploiting foreign countries and/or one's own people inviting negative, destructive reactions.

The combination of economic deficits with expansionist immodesty summarizes this syndrome. If the system "took a sabbatical" and rested to restore itself, then some deficits may be rectified. But if the elites are unable to manage, suppress their own people, leaving important tasks to foreign countries and-or foreigners rather than their own people, then the end must be near. With no internal challenge-response dynamics there is no dynamic for change.

4. The systems vary in the scope of the explanatory basis. Some, like the Roman Empires, have a very broad base; others, like the Italian city-states, a more narrow base. This, however, is also a function of the lore that has developed in the historiography of decline and fall: the more people and disciplines involved, the more factors. And the longer the empire duration, the more factors.

Some appear over-explained: the oldest for the reasons given, and the most recent because they are parts of contemporary debate. Some others falling between these two chairs may be under-explained. There is a methodological danger here: whoever searches long enough for a factor will probably finally identify also that one.

5. The broader the base of factors, the more inevitable an impending death, the narrower the base, the less inevitable.

A sick empire is like a sick human being: the more pathologies, the more inevitable, and hence more acceptable, the death. There is nothing that can be done anyhow. To sustain is to prolong suffering, not vitality. To speed up the decline for the two Roman Empires, giving space for non-empires, appears more rational than artificial longevity.

Table 11: Twenty Factors and Ten Case-Studies: The Findings

	West Ro-me	East Ro-me	Arab Empi-res	Spa-nish deca-den-cia	Ital-ian city sta-tes	Otto-man Em-pire	**Ch'ing** Dyna-sty	Eng-lish Em-pire	Sov-iet Em-pire	USA Em pire	No. Yes
1	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	4
2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
4	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	3
5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y/N	9.5
6	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	2
7	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	3
8	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	2
9	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	3
10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	8
11	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	8
12	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	5
13	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	8
14	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	5
15	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	3
16	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	6
17	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	5
18	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y/N	8.5
19	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	9
20	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	9
No Yes	17	16	13	8	5	15	10	11	11	12	118

YES: *a major issue*, NO: *a minor or no issue*, Y/N: *Yes and No*

Spain and Italy might have been sustained using simple measures: more self-reliance and willingness to take on new challenges for Spain, labor market flexibility and entrepreneurial freedom for Italy; saving millions, and generations, from centuries of decline.

The first conclusion from all of this is obvious: the pathologies have to be nipped in the bud, at an early stage before they spread like metastases. *Sustainability* presupposes sufficient health to be able to resist multiple shocks from syndromes. A high level of immuno-deficiency, inability to resist, is catastrophic.

The second conclusion is equally obvious: the system may have come to a point of no return, being unsustainable regardless of how strong its desire for eternal life, or a more modest lease on eternity. Like for human beings the system may be headed for what is often referred to as *natural death*, close to the concept of "acceptable death". The system has completed its life-curve, single-peaked in the Occident, with no clear successor. And the end is due to a broad syndrome of causes, not one single cause for which a remedy might have been found.

The third conclusion is more problematic. Sustainability is a part of the issue. But is sustainability itself sustainable? Or, is another concept knocking on the door, *euthanasia*, for empires?

15 | Sustainability, Acceptable Death and Euthanasia

These are ten stories of sinking ships, and ships usually harbor rats known to leave sinking ships. But who are the rats, and what do they do after leaving the sinking ship? They probably do not leave to drown, but possibly to find a new ship, and a new life.

The immediate answer would be to find a new ship, although some rats may prefer dignified suicide to a life in the ruins of their own creation. There are exceptions, like the captain of a sinking ship being the last one to leave, at the risk of joining the ship on its way down. Like ship captain, like captain of state ship, the head of state. In principle. But he often prefers escape, and ends up as a monarch in exile with a Swiss bank account, unable to find new ships. Better a life in fading splendor than death or suicide.

But we are thinking of more dynamic rats, not of aristoc-rats or bureauc-rats, but of creative clergy and intellectual rats, and indeed entrepreneurial merchant rats. Each imperial decline creates its *exodus* and its *diaspora*. The question is, what kind of talent left, and where did they go? Regardless of the answer, this is clearly an illustration of buddhist *rebirth* rather than hindu *reincarnation*, let alone christian *eternal life*, spread all over.

The system does not reincarnate with many of its original features intact. By dying the system liberates creative energy, in the form of a *diaspora*, which then starts working somewhere else. The obvious prognosis would be [1] given reasonable conditions they will probably succeed, [2] if or when there is no success they will probably leave the new sinking ship. Once a rat always a rat.

The USA has been a major importer of rats leaving sinking European ships. But the USA may also one day become a net ex-porter if the decline in mini-study 10 broadens and deepens further.

What people can do, countries may also do. Societies are to a large extent center-periphery systems, with the center defining the problems and how to solve them, and the periphery doing the menial tasks of implementing the decisions. And the World is even more a Center-Periphery system, with the Center deciding what to do, giving minor roles to the Periphery countries, e.g. as defined by Ricardo's comparative advantages "theory"--ideology rather--of international trade, almost condemning them to stay with the same factor profile.

But what happens if the center of society, or the Center of the world, declines? The social periphery may decide to leave, and vast caravans,

trains of people, migrants in search of work and more promising conditions elsewhere will accompany the decline. The center minority may try to keep the migration within bonds, by sheer force or by the Toynbee formula, responding creatively to the crisis challenge, with new departures to convince the majority that the elites are still in command of the situation. Maybe they are given three chances. After that, the periphery leaves, if not physically by migrating, then spiritually through lost allegiance, and apathy.

Satellite client countries in the Periphery may do the same. They watch for the signs, and may decide to turn from a former Center to a new Center, like Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union to the EU and the USA. Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand, parts of the UK Center-Periphery system, may look to East Asia for new roles. Norway may change her allegiance from the USA (before that the UK, before that Sweden, before that Denmark) to the European Union; the latter looking better at practicing Toynbee. One Center elite alone may not be able to convince its Periphery, but by pooling together they may come up with a better formula than colonialism, like the Yaoundé-Lomé system for the African-Caribbean-Pacific countries.

Looking at the list of cases it is obvious that there are some genealogies at work. A major function of a dying system is to leave the scene, providing a niche of new economic opportunities to others. Brutal, but "such is life".[130] "Decline and fall" is only one half of the story. The other half, "birth and rise", are the new ships, boarded or not by old, partly recycled, rats.

And thus it was that West Rome yielded to Franks and Gauls, and in the longer run to the Carolingians. Two centuries after the fall the Umayyad Arab empire of Damascus, defeated by the Abassids of Baghdad, changed the Iberian peninsula into the Caliphate of Córdoba (712). A dying Byzants yielded to the triumphant Ottomans, and Spain to the Italian and Low Countries city-states, and to the UK. The Ottomans yielded to Russia, and to the Habsburgs and UK-France. And UK and Russia's successor, the Soviet Empire, yielded to the USA. And to whom will ultimately the USA be yielding? To an expanded EU, to an East Asian Community, or both, or neither?

China has her own logic. The Ch'ing dynasty did not yield to any other country, except for a short while to UK and some others, but to the Kuomintang dynasty, in turn yielding to the communist dynasty; in both cases for much more than economic reasons narrowly defined. Precisely for this reason China has to be conceived of as a diachronic chain of dynasties rather than as a synchronic system of competitors, struggling for niches in the same world space.

This serves to relativize the concepts of decline and fall. A human being falls ill and dies; the family or somebody else fills the space. Societies also have families, inside their territory, or outside. None has a claim to eternal life. The death cause is interesting, among other reasons to know whether euthanasia and midwifery would be the solution. Which is the marxist thesis.

In the marxist proposition Marx projects on world history a hindu cosmology: reincarnation at a higher level, ending in the nirvana of communist society, with no more reincarnation. Marx differs from Ibn Khaldun: on the gates of communist society there will be no barbarians knocking till they fall down, and from Sorokin and Sarkar in having a final stage. Each social formation except communism runs through the cycle of birth-growth-peak-decline-fall-death. But then a new formation is ushered in by endo-genous dialectic and forces. The working classes do no leave, but pave the way for that new, higher level, formation. That idea must have been attractive to Chinese seeing history as a chain of one dy-nasty after the other. And the great Chinese macro-historian Ssu-Ma Chi'en long ago entertained ideas of progress within this chain.

So there is decline and fall, but maybe no death, and what looks like death has its own metaphysics and metaphors. The only religious metaphors that do not fit come from christianity and islam: an eternal afterlife, with two varieties: in heaven and in hell. Translated into empires, what would this mean?

Eternal life in heaven must be what they all probably were hoping for: to become irreversible, never disappearing from Earth, living on as models, archetypes. Eternity was on Earth, implying that they had a mandate from heaven, that they were *gratia dei*.

Eternal life in hell must be the opposite: to have been so reversible as to disappear completely, leaving no traces, condemn-ed to oblivion. The Nazi and Soviet empires? And the USA?

Reality, it seems, is neither one nor the other, but an afterlife after decline and fall, with reincarnation or rebirth, at a higher or lower level, depending on their merits, at the same place, or somewhere else.

Hopefully the reader now emerges with some more understand-ing of how empires come to an end. Below the logic of war-fare and over-extension there is an economic logic. Whoever breaks it does so at considerable risk. The wayside of history is littered with empires, and there is space for new ones as history unfolds.

How does the *sustainability* of the 1990s, in UN documents, in new disciplines and institutes, hold up against such findings? Is the concept of "sustainability", as a mantra, itself sustainable?

The preceding section gives some insight in where the concept

belongs: as one more secular Western effort to eternalize the West. We say "secular", or "modern". Before the "enlightenment" there would probably have been less concern with eternal life on earth, real reality being transcendental anyhow.

If we look at the ten cases in the light of this, the important question is, of course, what would have been gained by making them, and not only their economies, sustainable?

Are we so sure about the idea of mastering the techniques whereby the Roman Empire, West or East, would still be with us? When we remember what that social formation meant for the slaves, the barbarians, the outer peripheries?

Imagine that not only they but the regimes to follow learn the lessons from the 20 hypotheses in Chapter 13 above and bring about a *good division of labor* with foreign countries, with foreigners inside their own lands, between the social classes; and bring about *balance* with the environment and among the sectors of economic activity, and in addition to that ensure that production factors will be available from here to eternity. Would that constitute a better human history than we have had? Probably not, because of the other aspects of human society, and those empires in particular.

A Roman Empire that functioned better ecologically, and economically in general, would still be a Roman Empire, a massive Center-Periphery configuration with flagrant inequities between and within countries-provinces.

There would still be slaves and barbarians, probably even more of them, with *limes* even further out and more exploitation having a more viable Center economy available.

The same applies to all other cases because they have something basic in common, pointed out in connection with the Roman Empire: expansionism in their deep cultures, as military expansion, political hegemony, economic growth at the expense of others from whom surplus is extracted, and-or as cultural *mission civilisatrice*. As they expand they sooner or later hit the ceiling, the outer limits. Problems start accumulating, and decline and fall set in. *Sic transit gloria mundi*.

But China? China is more flexible, actually remarkably non-expansionist given its size. Decline, fall and reincarnation take place, but inside, like for the Egyptian empire, bridged by a dynastic formula creating continuity over time.

To try to make these empires sustainable without changing their code (deep culture) is at best naive, at worst an effort to keep alive what should better decline, and then fall. Did we really want to keep the Soviet Union forever, by solving one of its colossal problems, the

ecological breakdown? We could make sustainability many-dimensional, but are we then not saying that we have found a utopia that should be granted eternal life?

Maybe any social formation has a limited lease on life, like human beings? Maybe gentle euthanasia could sometimes be a better approach than sustainability or acceptable death? Like non-violent gandhism administered to the British and Soviet empires?

What would be the implications of all of this for the ultimate empire, the integrated world economic system, the global market-place, broadening and deepening under the name of "globalization"? The Decline and Fall of the Global Market-place?

Globalization would seem to satisfy the decline syndrome:

- a division of labor whereby foreign countries, and-or foreigners inside one's own country, take over the most challenging and interesting and developing tasks, given the historical situation;
- a deficit in creativity related to a deficit in technology and good management, including foresight and innovation;
- one or several sectors of the economy neglected or lagging;
- and, at the same time, growth and expansionism as ideology-cosmology, exploiting foreign countries and-or one's own people and nature, inviting negative, destructive reactions.

Obviously, the first three points would apply to most non-OECD countries in the world. Foreign OECD countries in general, the West in particular, and traditionally the USA-UK even more particularly, would monopolize the secondary and tertiary sectors of economic activity, meaning technology, and management in a broad sense. But their bridgeheads in the non-OECD periphery would not necessarily be "foreigners". They could be nationals, but for all purposes acting like foreigners, possibly on behalf of a corporation with its center abroad rather than on behalf of a foreign country.

No doubt that the local elites just described will "do well". The gap in acquisitive power will increase, and the livelihood at the bottom deteriorate. The country will be heading not for decline and fall as an empire, not being one, but for the position as a "failed state", and more so the more the focus is on expansion and economic growth as opposed to distribution. The country will have no self-correcting, self-improving capacity, and invite revolts from below. There will be massive emigration from all layers of socie-ty, from impoverished masses to elites afraid of "social unrest".

But how about the OECD, the Western, the USA-UK, and, indeed, the USA Center? There is a certain ambiguity here.

On the one hand they enrich themselves by keeping control of the

economic sectors with the highest value added because se-condary and tertiary sector outputs have more specificity and can demand higher prices whereas primary sector products is "merely" standard nature, with much lower, or no, specificity. Thus, nickel is nickel. Oil varies in quality, but not as much as cars.

On the other hand they may risk destroying the periphery to the point that there is little more to fetch from a depleted-polluted nature and an impoverished, ailing population. And they may also treat their own periphery the way they treat the world periphery, meaning in both cases that they will not have enough purchasing power to buy the products offered on the markets. The result will be overproduction relative to buying capacity, deflation, and a recession that may easily turn into depression.

The basic element in the image of an alternative is a world where each part, down to confederations of neighboring com-munities, is its own center.[131] Concretely, following the conclusion quoted above, this means avoiding any division of labor that gives very important positive externalities to the external and internal "abroad", keeps all three sectors of the economy intact, retains innovative and managerial capacity, and abstains from exploitation of external and internal peripheries. That economy may be short on certain products, but high on satisfaction of basic needs and on sustainability. And less in need of any euthanasia or midwifery.

A number of countries have practiced such policies, including the USA roughly speaking 1850-1900. Problems arise when they deviate from that pattern. This study may serve as a warning.[132]

Part Four

DEVELOPMENT ACROSS CULTURES

16 | Eschatology and Development Visions

Eschatology and Utopia: Some Theses

Development is visionary, but where do visions come from?

A general assumption is that to inspire consensus they have to draw upon old and solidly rooted ideas, like archetypes. That points to religions as a major source, and to other ancient canons of wisdom. Eschatology includes life in the afterlife, offering an existence different from that on earth. But so does utopia, offering a life on earth different from this life, in other words future life. Afterlife and future life serve as projection screens for images of the most desirable societies and forms of human existence; and, negatively, for images of the most abominable ones. As history proceeds, these images of the perfectly good and perfectly bad will change. But, like the collective memory of the lived past throws shadows into the present, dreams and nightmares of the past will throw shadows into the future.

And in doing so they will help shape *willed history*, another word for development. But not all visions are equally good-useful:

• they should be *relational* visions, not the single vision for all;
• they should include *process* visions, not only final state visions;
• they should have *contradictions*, not be non-dialectical visions.

Spelt out: visioning only one, and final, state of affairs, as paradise or utopia, with no vision of the process leading into it, is not very useful. The vision should relate to other visions, not pre-tend to be alone in the world. And, problems in the good society would make paradise and utopia less boring, to put it bluntly.

Religions, however, tend to project into the afterlife one, final and perfect vision; death being the quantum jump giving access. Thus, there are deep similarities between christian-muslim paradise and the communist society, also one, final and perfect; revolution being the quantum jump killing one an giving birth to a new social formation.

Three Eschatologies: Viking, Christian and Muslim

We now turn to three of them, in that order. What were their visions of the afterlife? The latter two are clearly occidental, but the viking vision was non-occidental, "barbarian", pagan. All school children in the Nordic countries read about them, but are also supposed to share the textbook's delight that these pagan superstitious about the afterlife were finally overcome by a triumphant christianity.

But first a word about the negative visions, the hells envisaged.

Temperature plays a major role. It goes without saying that the viking (Nordic) hell is as filled with ice and snow and cold winds as the christian-muslim (West Asia) hells are boilingly hot. Basic problems in day-to-day life are writ large and put into that other place. Correspondingly, the positive visions have agreeable, temperate climates, particularly explicit in the many beautiful references in the Qur'an to paradise as a perfect garden.[133]

Viking Eschatology[134]

In old Nordic mythology the dead could have several souls and several bodies, with contradictory descriptions of paradise and hell, even with a hell inside hell (*Nifhel, in Hel*) for those who die in hell, an icily cold place. There was much circulation with highly complex itineraries. There was process, pluralism and contradiction, but also standard Nordic paradise, *Asgard*, *Valhalla*, with Odin as Lord. What was it like?

A fantastic Viking hall with 640 doors where 960 men could enter and exit side by side. Inside there was fabulous eating and drinking, a permanent party, served by *valkyrier*, beautiful girls, bacon from the pig (*galte*, male pig) *Særimmer*, boiled every day. The goat *Heidrun* was ever ready to be boiled next morning. And the beer, *mjöd*, from a drinking horn occasionally used, was in equally inexhaustible supply. Sustainability was built into the vision.

The rest of the time the inhabitants spend fighting. It looks like dying in battle was a condition for salvation, for coming to Valhalla; and those who do, *einherjene*, then continue the battle in the life thereafter. But this means that friend and enemy in this life somehow are reconciled in the thereafter. They may continue fighting and kill each other every day outside the hall, repeating, presumably with some variations, the event that brought them there. But at dusk they rise, healthy and in a good mood for the party. Enjoying the *valkyrier*, and not only for serving food and *mjöd*, certainly belonged to the picture. Very much a man's place;[135] underlined further by the lordship of the male *Odin*, whereas *Hel* is ruled over by a woman of the same name. Until the final apocalypse, *Ragnarok*, consumes it all, heaven, earth and hell, in fire.

Christian Eschatology[136]

Very different. A theological vision: "Trinitarianism regards God not as a monad, but as a perfect society and finds in the nature of the Godhead itself the heavenly archetype of the family and the state. The idea of the Church and of the communion of saints is therefore of the essence of Christianity. Religion, from the Christian standpoint, is man's approach

to God as a member of a brotherhood, a family of God, a holy Church, in whose fellowship his spiritual life is nourished and perfected."

Christianity makes men members one of another, puts in their mouths a social prayer ("Our, not My, Father"), helps them on their way by social worship and social sacraments, and teaches them to regard the service of man as one with the service of God. Heaven, therefore, as realizing the social ideal, is continually represented in the NT as a perfect society, *city*, or state. All war, violence and danger from enemies external and internal will have ceased, and therefore the gates of the city shall in no way be shut by night, for there shall be no night there. Heaven will be "a sinless society."

However, not only worship is going on in heaven. "Thus, since heaven is a state or city, there will be a scope for faculties of government or administration there."

Moreover, "there will be great scope for the artistic faculties. In heaven there will be beautiful architecture and craftsmanship, beautiful poetry and beautiful music, both vocal and instrumental, or at least some higher reality corresponding to that. Of the cultivation of science and philosophy in heaven we have already spoken...".[137]

Christianity uses a distinction between time and eternity, between becoming and being; process and structure in our terms. Heaven is eternity-being-structure. That has profound implications.

In heaven things are not understood, one at a time, in temporal succession. Everything is "grasped in a single intuition", "seeing all things... as God sees them, *sub specie aeternitatis*, i.e. entire and complete, in all their mutual relations, in one undivided and indivisible mental act. Partial knowledge will be replaced, not by omniscience, but by complete and adequate knowledge of all things. And, there will be a similar unification of the emotional and affective life so that all the affections and emotions will be felt at once."[138] Holism, in other words, but not dialectic holism. The contradiction was not in heaven, but between heaven and hell.

Some words about the angels[139], the carriers of concrete images of life in heaven. Angels were, according to Augustine, incorporeal, "invisibilis, sensibilis, rationalis, intellectualis, immortalis". They were the civil servants of Paradise. But there were also fallen angels like there are corrupt bureaucrats. The most famous was Lucifer who became Satan with his civil servants in hell. They were organized in impressive hierarchies, often in nine orders, like salary scales. The demons had two abodes, there and here. They are both torturers of the damned and "in the air" where they try to "incite men to evil". Each person had a guardian angel "who specially protected him against evil",

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and "chief among the good spirits were the archangels, sometimes four, sometimes seven".[140]

The christian paradise is a "glorious sanctuary in which God's servants worship Him unceasingly with inward purity of heart, and with the outward expression of a magnificent ritual".[141] But, with food and sex absent from an incorporeal life?[142]

Muslim Eschatology[143]

Again very different, much more material, an ideal vision of life in this world rather than a vision of an entirely different transcendent life. Thus, the inhabitants are corporeal, not ethereal. They enter through a cleansing ritual also known to muslims in this life, e.g. after intercourse, and as a result their bodies are soft and mellow, smelling like dates. They enter the red hyacinth gate and the basic image, as mentioned, is paradise as the perfect garden.

The *huris* embrace them, "you are mine, you are my love, you will not be dissatisfied". The women grow ever more beautiful; they are "younging", not aging. And each man has the "force" of one hundred men to eat, to drink, to love. The women become virgins again, and there is no problem of depletion of the resources for all these pleasures, all delights of the senses. Sustainability again.

The water is ever plentiful, the branches of the trees embrace them and render their fruits. And the way they are dressed: each one has 70 robes, each robe changing color 70 times per hour--.

The social organization is simple, almost classless; but there is the hierarchy of angels and djins. There is worship, but not the intellectual-artistic pursuits much emphasized in christianity.

Above all, like in the viking paradise, there is plenty for the highest level of human delight and consumption, material and nonmaterial; all of it like the Qur'an, the *kitab*, the only thing on earth that cannot be depleted, never to be reduced by reading.

The christian and muslim paradises have absence of fighting in common, and the muslim and viking paradises have inexhaustible supplies for somatic, material, satisfaction in common. The viking paradise adds to this fighting as fun. They are all transcendental.

And that makes the contrast with the Orient quite deep.

Some Oriental Utopias

Thus, daoism can be seen as a revolt against dwelling in afterlife, in favor of a "small is beautiful" in this world[144]:

There is a kingdom which is small and sparsely populated.
There are numerous implements, but no one uses them.

The people love their lives and no one wants to move afar. Boats and carriages are available, but no one rides them.

Fine weapons are in their possession, but no one uses them.

They enjoy fine delicacies and are handsome in their dress.

They are happy with their residences and pleased with their traditions. Although the next state is within sight, and the sounds of cocks crowing and dogs barking are heard,

The people live their whole lives without traveling to and fro.

An image of local self-reliance? Or autarchy, rather? Or, a Switzerland of the past? But Chinese thinking also produced the opposite: big can also be not only necessary, but beautiful. Thus, Confucius had an image of the Golden Age exactly to that effect:[145]

"a country administered perfectly by philosopher-kings who had been set up as models of conduct and approved by the common people; a period of plenty in which no citizen wanted for anything and all were happy; an idealized state, with good laws and proper justice for all."

This is very close to conceptions of paradise found, and lost, on earth, although it refers in the thoughts of Confucius to the dynasty in Western China under King Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Chou.

Both are parts of ancient Chinese visions, and we shall explore in Chapter 19 how they throw deep shadows into the present. They prescribe a way of living and of organizing society that will lead to a recreation of the Golden Past, to Paradise regained, through adherence to moral precepts. Basic principles are wisdom, balance, proportion, the golden mean, the middle way, restraint, harmony.

The two utopias relate. They can co-exist and coalesce into one with wisdom at the top, yet self-reliance at the bottom of small communities. And the contradictions provide raw material for much social and personal dialectics.

That this ties in with the yin-yang dialectic thinking of the much older *I Ching* is obvious. They are cosmic forces[146], the *yin* (female, darkness, soft and inactivity) and the *yang* (male, light, hardness and activity); producing physical, mental and social developments from their much praised interplay.

To the Chinese these are forces and principles that can be understood. They are not supernatural, and they are knowable. It is interesting to note the clear sexual interpretation: natural, right, and beautiful, seeing love and the creation of new life as a basic paradigm for understanding the laws of the universe. Around this image very positive visions should in principle emerge.

But the Chinese also emphasize the *family*, the *clan*, as a diachrony tying any individual to past and future in an endless line of ancestors and descendants. The cult of ancestors, and the duty to produce sons,

spin chains through time in which the individual becomes but one element. That chain could then become more real than the individual; in the occident today the individual is more real than the chain. Visions can be spun for the future of the chains.

And this is where the afterlife enters: the more reality that chain attains, the more it can serve eschatological functions. The chain takes on transmigratory aspects: one's own little self lives on in the big Self of the chain, as heritage and inheritance. The Chinese would not believe in a soul that migrates from one body down the chain to the next, but in that of the ancestors living on in the individual and that of the individual in the descendants. Clan ideas are more in line with current biogenetics than with religious soul transmigration.

And Chinese thinking is more in line with the three prerequisites for good visions indicated: relations, processes, contradictions. The prerequisites are met. The orient does better in the art of visioning.

The three other cases, viking-christian-muslim, may be inspiring as visions with no scarcity--material or nonmaterial--but are all so detached from reality--superstitious?--that entry by the quantum jumps of individual death into salvation, or collective revolution killing the old society into the new, are needed. There is not much concrete to draw upon relative to the very practical Chinese visions.

Their images are also compatible with Chinese materialism, or rather agnosticism. The West lost faith in christianity and the eternal soul given eternal life in a perfect paradise about the same time as kinship, lineages, waned in significance. This made Western individuals lonely, with promises of afterlife neither here, nor there, except for elites capable of leading sufficiently non-substitutable lives to enter into the memories of the past for future generations.

Thus, an atheist intellectual may seek afterlife in footnotes, perhaps a rather poor substitute for eternal bliss in the Kingdom of Heaven. This, incidentally, also sheds much doubt on the wisdom at some periods in the current communist dynasty in China with strong efforts to eradicate family and ancestor allegiance.

But the Chinese penchant for vertical relations to government and bureaucracy, more in line with confucianism than with the focus on the small, self-reliant, community, has in fact been balanced both with the People's Communes 1958-1976, and with the present focus on the local community as basic units of development.[147]

A possible conclusion would be that the Chinese do what they do, inspired by millennia of thinking, whereas the West hardly knows what it is doing, having no concrete inspiration. In that vacuum self-serving elites produce realities that combine endless viking warfare, viking-

muslim material affluence, and christian-muslim non-material culture, with some trickling down to the common people.

Conclusion

We stop at this point, not moving further East or South. Hinduism is extremely complex, but nirvana concepts do not offer much in terms of concrete visions of desirable societies in this world: very high entropy, disorder, diversity, possibly symbiosis--but not equity.

Nevertheless, a glimpse into an African eschatology. In his impressive *Death and Eternal Life*, John Hick (1976) gives an example:

"In the Kimbunda country of South-West Africa, souls live on in 'Kalunga', the world where it is a day when it is night here; and with plenty of food and drink and women to serve them, and hunting and dancing for pastime, they lead a life that seems a corrected addition of this." (Hick, 1976, p. 56).

More like viking and muslim visions, less like the christian one.

But then he goes on to describe the Greek *hades* and the Hebrew *sheol*, and we are given entirely negative visions:

"At death the body descends into erebus, or hades, where, whilst recognizable and still bearing its earthly name, it persists as a depleted, joyless entity, a mere bloodless shadow of its former embodied self".[148] And,

"Sheol was thought of as a vast underground cavern or pit--probably the tribal burial place magnified into a dark subterranean world where the dead exist or persist--outside--the ongoing life of the nation in its covenant relationship with Yahweh". (Hick, 1956, p. 59).

The Greeks tried to enjoy life as long as it lasts, and the jewish pessimism moved them suicidally toward the abyss where it ends anyhow?

An understanding of eschatologies is indispensable as source of predictions, of understanding how nations behave, and for prescription, contrary to a cultural relativism seeing all cultures and religions as equally good. In the eyes of the believers, maybe. But our world is not divided into culturally water-tight compartments; they can all be evaluated using the development and vision criteria. In a world of penetration and counter-penetration a *dialogue des civilizations* is indispensable. They are not equally good but good on something and not on something else. They could learn much from each other.[149]

17 | The Buddhist and Islamic Models

With development defined as unfolding of codes, each civilizational code define a possible development models. In *PBPM* six civilizations are explored: Occident I and II--the abrahamic religions in expansion and contraction--Indic, Buddhic, Sinic and Nipponic. In Chapter 5 above they were explored as development models.

Occident II was excluded by excluding itself, depleting nature, overexploiting people, sticking to ritual[150], and was overtaken by a stronger formation in the same niche, Occident I. From that cluster we have included the christian-secular Occident I in two versions, *the Western-liberal* and *the Western-marxist* models. But did the former not die with the finance crisis and is the latter not as dead as medieval feudalism? In the US and Soviet versions, yes, but rumors of their general demise may be premature. They have still much to offer.

Also included from Occident I is *the islamic model.*

Hindu civilization was excluded because of the anti-development of caste, denying lower castes and casteless their unfolding, neither in this life nor in the afterlife. The positive features are also found in *the buddhist model*, which has been included. The present high level economic growth in India can be seen as due to the Occident I overlayer, with extreme greed, and inconsiderateness to the lower majority of the population.

Included are also *the Japanese model*, and *the Chinese model*.

So we land on six codes and their unfolding, exploring their development potentials. Beyond critiquing shortcomings the task is constructive: how could they live up to development as the multi-space maturity spelt out in Chapter 2? What could each of them learn from the others? Could they possibly perfect each other more, and struggle less to be the only one fittest in that big niche, Mother Earth?

The Buddhist Model: Five Points

Is there a buddhist model of development? The Four Noble Truths are a deep philosophy of life, the Eight Noble Paths, the five *pancha shila* (negative precepts) and the five *pancha dhamma* (positive deeds) form a buddhist moral code. *Ahimsa*, nonviolence, to humans and other sentient life in nature, is basic. But do they also address problems of structure and process, of social and world spaces?

The fundamental relevance of buddhism as model is explored below. But even if buddhist thought should not be fully adequate to all prob-

lems of development, many development practices are more compatible with buddhism than with other world views. Besides, Gandhi's[151] *sarvodaya*, and Nyerere's *ujama'a*, are also members of the family.[152]

First, there is the primacy of practicing *the buddhist moral code*. The Buddha might have said, make any social order, as long as your life is inspired by the Four Noble Truths and the Triple Gem[153] the rest will take care of itself. Maybe, but that has to be explored.

Second, *ahimsa, nonviolence*. This rules out harm to any form of sentient life, feeling *dukkha*, suffering, and *sukha*, fulfillment: humans, animals, plants and micro-organisms. Whether it also extends to inanimate nature has to be explored. But it extends to structural violence through the precept of not taking what is not freely offered. A landowner extracting 50-70-90% of the harvest in return for hard labor using the land is not taking something freely offered.

The implications cut through all spaces. It spells peace with nature, reproduction, certainly of life, but also of abiota as their basis. In humans it spells inner peace, and peace in the inner circle. In society it spells peace across faultlines, and buddhism has not been good across gender with the idea that women have too much attachment), In world space it spells a world without war. In principle.

Third: *buddhist eschatology*.[154] Christianity and islam have paradise utopias as projections of the good society. Can anything similar be said for buddhism. Is there a vision of the good society?

Basic in that eschatology are *nirvana* and *rebirth*. If we see nirvana as maximum entropy, extinction, there may not be much to glean for development theory. But if we interpret nirvana as perfect bliss, the happiness of enlightened beings who metaphorically coalesce into a transpersonal Self, then there may be more to be learnt. It spells close togetherness, which in turn spells a *collective ethical budget*, for merits and demerits. A meritable act is shared as a merit to all; and so are demerits. Being part of a social Self inspires meritable act of commission, and impedes demeritable acts of commission *and* of omission, for instance to help your brother-sister in moral distress. Not taking what is not freely given is more than not stealing, it is non-exploiting, and compassion is more than just doing to others what you want them to you. Buddhism has deeply social implications.

Rebirth takes that idea through time. Given *anatta*--the idea of no enduring, separate self--there are no souls transmigrating. Rebirth happens when by merits and demerits are coming to others. We live on in others through our sparks of inspiration and they may pass them on, as waves high on merit and low on demerit, toward enlightenment. Like others live on in us. The life task: that net inspiration is positive.

Fourth: building on these points, what would be the *minimum social order* to facilitate the active pursuit of buddhist values? There has to be *the middle way* policy when it comes to satisfaction of such basic human needs as food, clothing, shelter, health and education. Neither too little, nor too much. Excesses of misery and affluence impede spiritual growth toward enlightenment, because of worries about how to satisfy needs, and worries about losing the satisfiers, e.g. money.

There has to be *individual freedom* of thought, speech and action as a condition for pursuing enlightenment. Any answer given in advance becomes a dogma. Buddhist freedom also includes the freedom not to be a buddhist, inviting non-buddhists to be equally tolerant.

Thirdly, there is the *sangha*--the small, self-reliant community with the temple for spiritual, and the tank for somatic, needs. This implies a *decentralized society*, based on many and small units. The higher the centralization, and the bigger the units, the more that vertical, uniform social order will tend to be on top of the individual rather than leaving the individual free to pursue his and her truths.

There is a two-way process here. Individual buddhist thought, speech and action may inspire economy and politics. And they impact on individual practice and may divert-pervert-convert buddhists to other world views. *Or* challenging buddhists to be more creative.

The more decentralized the society the more sanghas will blossom. Any national fusion of the sacred and the secular into one standard sangha will easily become totalitarian, and easily slide into a state buddhism supporting state power, even with armies and with wars.

The opposite of these three points are well known today.

Social structures easily impede buddhist practice. It may generate so much misery, and so much wealth, that theft from the super-rich to feed a starving family. or prostitution, are the only ways out. Or be so repressive that lying is the only self-defense from prison or death by execution when caught by the state police. Thus, Myanmar is buddhist.

And every inch of space, and second of time may have been planned, "developed" for some material purpose, with no niche where a *sangha*, a community of monks, nuns, believers dedicated to buddhist precepts can be carved out. Communal practice may be impossible, even when individual practice is, like alms, and bowing to the Buddha image.

There are state buddhist societies--like Thailand with its abject poverty and communal strife and a Sri Lanka so intolerant of Tamils-- as there are state christian societies. There are oppositions in both. A major opposition in Thailand, the movement of engaged buddhists[155], stands for a buddhist society, as does Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka and Soka Gakkai in Japan. One day for buddhist values across the *hinayana* individualism and *mahayana* "we are in it together" society-ism gap.

The three socio-political points just made parallel the three examples mentioned above of how social structures might counteract the effort to live as a buddhist. Ruled out are super-capitalist societies based on merciless market "mechanisms" producing accumulation of wealth at the top and misery at the bottom. Ruled out are also repressive societies of any kind; and super-socialist societies planning every single element of individual life, down to speech and thought, within excessively centralized structures; capitalist or socialist, or both. All three are totalitarian, far from a middle way, free, decentralized buddhist model. The question is whether buddhism has enough strength.

Fifth: *pluralism*. Buddhism believes in *pluralism*: "let 64,000 sects blossom", Buddha reputedly said. *The green Wave* is a family of related approaches compatible with buddhist thought, and buddhist thought is adequate for social space development in green directions. This does not spell the end to capitalist or socialist formations, but maybe to their extremist versions, replete with excesses of misery and repression, depletion and pollution.

In more colorful language: neither the "dark blue", nor the "dark red" societies are compatible with buddhism. But soft capitalism and soft socialism might find some space inside tolerant, pluralist buddhist societies, also as partners in the verbal and action dialogues that are indispensable in the quest for development.

But then there are also "dark green" utopias with decentralization into very small units, minimum satisfaction of the most basic human needs, and maximum spiritual search for enlightenment. As one socio-tope like a monastery, fine, as the only one, no. According to the buddhist idea of *anicca* nothing is permanent; everything is dynamic, relational, dialectic, changing, and the dark green vision as *the* final buddhist model does not fit into this buddhist way of thinking about thinking.

That would also apply to the processes in the human mind and body, as well as to the processes in the social body and the "social mind", the collective sub-conscious. A dark green society would not accommodate sufficient interaction with other societies for external dialectic, would freeze the social dialectic by becoming static, nor accommodate sufficient contradiction for the internal dialectic.

Buddhism both implicitly and explicitly favors *diversity*, with dialogue as *symbiosis*, also within buddhism.[156] Social pluralism seems more compatible with buddhist thought, possibly within the green wave family. And that may be a reason why buddhist models seem to inspire so many. They are not etched in steel.

Excluding the three dark colors leaves a broad range of social orders compatible with the basic principles embodied in the middle way for the

satisfaction of basic needs--Gandhi's formula, "there is enough for everybody's need, but not for everybody's greed"--freedom, and decentralization. This points to structures of participation, in a pluralistic, active democracy, in a world of societies without borders, more like countless municipalities than states, linked by Gandhi's "oceanic circles" of equitable exchange. And *ahimsa*.

In short: Buddhism is an ethos in search of concrete social and world structures. The Western models offer social and world structures in search of an ethos. Good reasons for a long lasting dialogue.

The Islamic Model: Five Points[157]

We then turn to islam. For thousand years, say 500 to 1500, *When Asia Was the World*[158], buddhism and islam were running much of the world together. Buddhism reached East Asia and China, and islam much of North Africa, South Asia and East Asia. Together they ran that vast complex of trade routes on land and sea known as the Silk Road, from China via the Middle East to Europe and Africa. They both grew and developed, benefiting from diversity and symbiosis, and not only for trade. This was all put to an end by the Western, e.g. Portuguese, conquests of East Africa--with a Western anchoring point of the Silk Road in Soma-lia--and a process of colonization of Asia, for Western benefit in general and particularly the British, Dutch and the French.

In the Americas there was a similar process putting an end to the Inca and Aztec formations (the Maya formation seems to have expired before that). Major epidemics also plaid a role.

The islamic model is embedded in the five pillars of islam:[159],
- *shahadah*, the declaration of faith in one god and his prophet;
- *salat*, the five daily prayers confirming that faith;
- *zakat*, the sharing with the poor;
- *ramadan*, fasting for discipline and empathy with the poor;
- *hajj*, once in life the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The pillars are prescriptions, not proscriptions. They indicate what has to be done, not what has to be avoided. The first is at a meta level defining relations to the Almighty, the second also at the meso level, as joint prayer, socially defined, the third is at the meso level between haves and have-nots, the fourth at the micro and meso levels, and the fifth at the macro and mega levels, sowing nations and regions together in a shared act. Like christian pilgrimages to Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Santiago de Compostela.

With this as a code, what kind of unfolding, development, would we expect in islamic societies, ideally speaking?

First, *shahada*, confirms the faith in one god, Alla'h, for all,

Mohammed being his prophet, *rasul*--with Musa-Moses and Isa-Jesus also as *nabii*, announcers--with the updated, revealed truth in the Qur'an, and in the *hadith* oral tradition. And then the political truth in a Medina run by Mohammed the politician, a challenge not faced by Jesus as his kingdom was not of this world.[160] *Islam* is submission to the undescribable, omniscient, merciful and benevolent, in the prayer, the *salat*, bonding with the divine and "anybody is either your brother in Islam, the *ummah*, or your brother in humanity" (the khalit Ali).

This excludes a division of society into sacred and secular sectors. In islam there is no giving to God that of God and to Caesar that of Caesar. All are one, in islam. This does not mean that muslims cannot adapt secular and other practices from elsewhere, as long as they are compatible with the revelations.

Second, *zakat*, lifting the poor by sharing wealth so that everybody has access to needs satisfaction and dignity, and society can be less unequal. The West institutionalizes this in the welfare state. The islamic formula is based on individual reflection and duty, meeting needs left unsatisfied at the bottom, and also uniting social layers organically through acts of solidarity.[161]

Third, *ramadan*, here seen as an annual one month dedication to discipline and moderation. Solidarity with the hungry and thirsty in need is stimulated by *zakat*. Basic somatic needs should be met, but nobody should become a slave of incessant satisfaction. The fasting month opens for spiritual deepening, as do the five daily prayers, and the cleansing of the body. As an act the individual is tested, and so is the family as the traditional setting for food and water and sex. All presumably even more appreciated than usual after sun-set, and when the month is over. Abstention does not exclude celebration.

Fourth: *trade as sacrament*, as sacred, not secular activity only for self-benefit. Trade is compatible with the unity under one god, with closeness, sharing, discipline, based on equality and justice.[162] Trade becomes more than willing buyer meeting willing seller, more like members of a family cooperating[163] for mutual benefit, not charging interest for loans, and not lending too high proportions of the family capital. Correct trade will lead to closeness under the Almighty, and that closeness will make trade a sacrament to abide by.

Fifth: *peace*, in the word islam itself, as *dar-al-islam*, the realm of peace. And in the *ummah*, the community of believers in islam, at present the 56 countries members of the OIC, the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Among them peace is more than a social obligation. It derives from the revealed faith, as a conse-quence of being muslim. There are exceptions when other values or interests come first,

maybe like the Iraq-Iran war 1979-1988.

The *hajj* during a lifetime for those who have the money, time and opportunity, is an individual confirmation of that faith, and also a basic glue keeping *dar-al-islam* together.

Next come the peoples of the *kitab*, the book, what the Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an have in common. Islam was the last, and in a better position to define the others as forerunners. But the latter often do not reciprocate by being equally tolerant toward muslims. The concept is not limited to jews and christians, however.

Outside is the *dar-al-harb*, the realm of declared war.

But this is not a sharp dichotomy. There is also the third, *dar-al-ahd*, the realm of agreements, treaties, establishing peaceful relations between the other two realms, as a relation. And all the time open for more peace, according to Sura 8:61 in the Qur'an: "When your enemy inclines toward peace, you shall do the same."

Unfolding all of this, what would we expect in terms of development seen as based on diversity, symbiosis and equity?

The high position given to trade in particular, and exchange in general, based on diversity and complementarity, celebrates symbiosis; and the strong emphasis on justice and equality for its operation spell equity. The focus on unity under the Almighty spells holism, with efforts to bridge at last one major faultline: class, as expressed by having too little. We hear less about having too much, but *zakat* may serve as an equalizer. And the West, unable to handle class but seeing itself as mastering gender given the struggle of women against men for centuries, like the colored against the white, rightly point out that islam is lagging behind. Islamic countries know this, and there is rapid, if uneven, progress.

Zakat addresses health in the human and social spaces, and *islam* addresses peace at the social and world spaces of human constructions. That leaves us with ecological balance in nature space, and the five pillars do not seem to relate directly to that. But there are many sayings and deeds of the prophet and verses in the Qur'an to build on since the whole universe is God's creation.

Another possibly weak point might be the faultlines inside islam. The sunni-shia divide seems at best to be at a stalemate of passive coexistence, like the protestant-catholic faultline in christianity. A search for overarching formulas might move both faiths forward.

Then there is the Arab vs non-Arab faultline between, sometimes within, the 1,560 million believers, and 56 countries. The present point of gravity in the rivals Saudi Arabia and Egypt point to sunni and Arab. But only one country is clearly shia, Iran, and only 22 of the 56 are

Arab. That might point to a sunni and non-Arab country as the next point of gravity, even as hosting the *khalifat*.

18 | The Western Liberal and Marxist Models

Before presenting two sets of five points for these two ideologies within the Western civilization, let us look at that civilization through six pairs of similarities between them. Those twelve points are basic parts of their shared development concept, as a background of similarity against the dissimilarities. Thus, they share:[164]

- *The ideas that liberalism and marxism are mutually exclusive, and exhaustive of the ideological universe*. The next points show that they do not exclude each other, and this Part Four that any Western claim on monopoly on world views for self-celebration is false;
- *The ideas of nature's soullessness, and of society's Naturgesetzlichkeit*, equating laws of society with laws of nature. Nature is there to be controlled and has no volition; and there are basic laws underlying social evolution from lower to higher forms;
- *The ideas of industrial production as primordial, and the role of the economic heroes of history*. Industrial production projects risk-willing entrepreneurs and inventors who change the means of production unto the historical stage;
- *The ideas of nation-states, and of individuals as basic social units*, the nation state as the unit of economic growth and world action *and* the unit where revolutions take place. The individual entrepreneurs and leaders of the proletariat as movers of history.
- *The ideas of social time's arrow: secularism. and ameliorism*. The time dimensions that matter are secular, and they are unidirectional from worse to better, the idea of progress.
- *The ideas of withering away of the state, and of a shared utopia*. The shared utopia is stateless and borderless, like the christian paradise with self-realization in a society where material needs are satisfied automatically and the focus is on spiritual development.

Liberalism and marxism are both children of the 1648 state system and of the secular enlightenment a century later, seen as progressive and inevitable events (even if they turn out to be episodes), coming to other parts of the world sooner or later. Not moral codes, but a meso development model driven by economic change, using states as units of history. In the liberal model State protects Capital, in the marxist model State protects the proletariat. But there are also enough dissimilarities for this book to concede to the West, the self-appointed world center, two different models of development.

The Western Liberal Model: Five Points

First, the point of departure is a strong I-culture and the *liberal individualist and vertical social structure*, with built-in reward and mobile individuals, given equality of opportunity. The achieved status depends on the outcome of *competition*.

Second, the key to progress is *market competition*, aided by abolition of economic monopoly and political autocracy-oligarchy.

Third, the goal of the market is *economic growth* by producing supplies and by stimulating demands, backed up by capital. *And then waiting for the miracle*: a trickling down effect to the most needy.

Fourth, to steer this process there is *political democracy* based on one person-one vote, and *human rights* to protect those abused by autocratic minorities and democratic majorities.[165]

Fifth, this model being universal, *the West has not only the right but the duty to impose-offer the model on-to the whole world*.

We have lived these points for two centuries by now.

Roughly speaking, this lived history was first imposed, as colonialism, as a *mission civilisatrice*, and after that suffered its decline and fall. It was followed by official development assistance, ODA, from more to less developed countries. But we leave that demand- or supply-driven exportability aside, and focus on the model itself.

The model is known to be hard on nature and unable to overcome steep gradients in the level of livelihood in terms of basic needs, material as well as non-material. It is also known to engage in trade patterns that are inequitable and dependency-forming. Moreover, be-ing one model for the whole world diversity is endangered, and with that symbiosis. And it generates violence within and between states, to make and unmake the structural violence of flagrant inequity.

In short, the track record is far from good.

But after this short and bleak report card, let us look at how the model could be improved. One approach would be to learn from its so-called negation, the marxist model, even if limited to the West.

There is no need to jump from Market only to Plan only. There are also the half-half social-democrat, social-capitalist model chosen by many; the neither-nor based on local, green economies chosen by none; and the both-and of Market and Plan, of Japan, now also China, explored in Chapter 19. They could be combined into a Green-Rose-Yellow Rainbow model with high resilience and freedom.

Had states been as pluralist and diverse within as they are without, they could practice several of these models at the same time. What speaks against is the ideology of one state:one system.

In other words, the West is beaten by its own limited horizon, and its

inability to learn from the non-West; more on that later.

But the liberal model is good at sensing new challenges and coming up with new responses; the cutting edge of open societies. Democracy is good at articulating diversity of values and remedies, such as ecological imbalance, high and increasing inequality, and violence within and between countries; sometimes turning findings into mainstream ideology. World problems due to trade and imperialism, however, are not easily articulated within the countries causing them. World democracy and world civil society are still not strong enough as forces. They will become, some day.

Another both-and is cooperatives with employer-employee divides transcended into joint ownership, and with direct relations to consumers for their products. And an alternative to socializing the means of production is to do so with the means of consumption, making such public spaces as streets, plazas *accessible* to all; *affordable*, *functional* and *beautiful*.[166] An open society produces options.

The Western Marxist Model: Five Points

First, overcoming a *capitalist society with bourgeoisie and prole-tariat* through a rupture--facilitated or not by a *revolution*--for social ownership of the means of production. The driving force in history is invention of new means of production, so ride on them.

Second, the key to further progress is *rational planning*, aided by the scientific and technological revolution, STR.

Third, the basic goals are *social growth* and meeting *basic human needs*, starting with the most needy. Mantras: "to all according to needs, from all according to ability" and "from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom".[167] *And then waiting for the miracle*: increased productivity and production.[168]

Fourth, to steer this process there is the *guiding role of the party* with the politburo on top, but possibly with *internal democracy*, keeping social interests and human needs in mind.

Fifth, this model being exportable, *the West has not only the right but the duty to impose-offer the model onto the whole world*.

Roughly speaking, this is also lived history, but for less than a century from the leninist revolution of 1917 till the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall separating the two models, ending the Soviet Empire. The model was exported as revolutionary assistance from socialist to feudal-capitalist countries, partly coinciding with decolonization.

But let us bypass the demand- or supply-driven exportability of revolutions and focus on the model itself. It is hard on nature, and unable to overcome steep differences in material and nonmaterial

power. It is weak on trade with little to offer to weave countries together. Being one model for the whole world diversity will be at risk, and so will symbiosis. And it generates violence within and between states. In short, the track record is far from good.

But after this short and bleak report card let us look at how the model could be improved. One approach would be to learn from its so-called negation, the liberal model, even if limited to the West.

There is no need to jump from Plan only to Market only. There could be the social-democrat compromise chosen by many; the neither-nor of a society based on local, green economies chosen by none, or the both-and of Market and Plan, formerly of Japan, now also China, explored in Chapter 19. They could also be combined into a Green-Rose-Yellow Rainbow model; many options with high resilience. Those three alternatives could also be combined into one, and there would be many arguments in its favor. What would speak against would be the ideological purity appeal of marxist fundamentalism.

Had states been more pluralist, diverse within as without, they could practice several of these models at the same time. What would speak against would be the ideology of one state:one system.

The Cold War East had the same alternatives--Green, Rose, Yellow--as the Cold War West. But that does not mean convergence in social democracy, but that good options were available to both.[169]

But the Soviet model was unable to take on new challenges and expand its agenda. Open society, democracy and civil society, are indispensable to articulate such problems as ecological imbalance, increasing inequality and basic needs deficits, and violence within and between countries. But world problems due to social imperial-ism are not easily handled by the countries causing them, world civil society and world democracy still being weak. That will change.

An attractive both-and would be the cooperative with employer-employee transcended into joint ownership of means of production, with direct relations to consumers for their products. And joint decisions over profit. Was that Gorbachev's alternative?

The liberal model comes out better than the marxist model, and the reason is clear: democracy provides built-in diversity and some symbiosis, if not necessarily equity. And yet country level democracy is not enough. The lack of an overarching democracy for colonizer-colonized, and imperialist-imperialized, made the decline and fall of colonialism and imperialism unnecessarily painful, slow and violent. Interestingly, the Soviet empire collapsed from inside a demoralized center, whereas the US empire, upheld by inside democracy, collapses through resistance from the outside.

The West will soon give up residual imperialism with USA as a pitbull for Western interests. General moves toward welfare state, social-capitalism and social-democracy will slowly include the USA. US grandparents will read tales about imperial grandeur, like in England about the British *raj*. But none of that detracts from the potential of a joint liberal-marxist model, combining liberal open dynamism with marxist genuine concern for basic needs, inspiring, not winding its way through the world by threats and bribes.

They have to give up the twelve similarities mentioned above. They will bridge the mutual exclusiveness and develop much further in processes of mutual learning with the buddhist, islamic, Japanese and Chinese models. The respect for Nature will increase as Nature fights back. The use of "social laws" to justify interest-based policies will yield to choice and creativity. Industry will yield to all sectors, from primary to quaternary, of economic activity. Common people, particularly women, will be seen as equally heroic.

States may yield to local, regional, world systems; secularism will ass spiritualism; ameliorism will not be taken for granted; and the good society will hopefully cater to the spirit, the mind *and* the body. Inspired by the christian, muslim and viking paradises?

19| The Japanese and Chinese Models

In this order, because Japan was first out as a challenger.

The Japanese Model: Five Points

We are talking about yesterday's Japan more than today's with its strong US overlayer, partly by imitation, partly by imposition.

First, there is a sense of being a *Chosen People* (by the Sun Goddess, her divinity being transmitted to her emperor offspring), with a *Promised Land*, the Japanese isles from the Northern Kuriles to, maybe, the Ryu-Kyu Islands (Okinawa). As the former prime minister Mori said (he had to resign right after): "Japan is a divine country centered on the Emperor". Problematic when used as legitimation of imperialism, as it was, less so as a national, *bushido*, ethos obliging Japanese to moral conduct, like buddhists, muslims, christians are.

Second, the overriding value of *social harmony* across faultlines, in inner attitudes and outer behavior, if not in structural reality.

Third, a strong we-culture and a conservative-feudal social structure, *vertical and collectivist*, with education in a stratified education system allocating individuals to their proper place.

Fourth, high ability to overcome some contradictions, like
• between growth and distribution: distribution first
• between growth and no resources: ever increasing processing
• between State and Capital, Plan *and* Market
• between Capital *and* Labor, in companies
• between labor-intensive *and* capital-intensive modes of production
• between managers and employees: lifelong jobs, seniority promotion
Fifth, low ability to overcome other contradictions *abroad*, like:
• with the USA: excessive submissiveness
• with Korea-China: inability to reconcile
• with Third world countries: inability to enter relations of equity
and *in Japan*, like:
• between men and women
• between old and young
• between state-capital and non-profit organizations
• between state-capital and local authorities
• between highly educated and less educated
The development model that follows from this is clear.

The first-second-third points set the tone; the fourth gives us the brilliance of Japanese development, the fifth why it stagnated.

There was from the time Japan emerged from Tokugawa isolation until recently very high levels of national pride and Japan-centrism, and a very steep national pyramid, as a body with the brain in Tokyo, and the emperor's subjects as arms and legs. The extreme opposite of the buddhist model, and also the islamic model above, with the Western liberal model closer to them, and the marxist model closer to the Japan of early Meiji.

Once the goals were set, they were carried through militarily by the conquest of Taiwan 1894-95, Korea 1910-11, and Manchuria 1931 initiating the Pacific war that ended with unconditional capitulation, except for the survival of the emperor on the condition that he denied his divinity. And orders could drizzle down through verticality and collectivism to the very bottom of society.

The formula, then, was to start with distribution of health and education, improving human resources in what followed: high level of processing with much form, culture, imparted on nature, from silk to electronics, at a high level of quality. The State-Capital and Capital-Labor contradictions dividing the West into either-or were transcended through both-and: both working for Japan, both working for the company, with life-long employment and seniority promotion rather than by competitive, divisive, merit, which in turn also was mobilized for Japan. A Japanese Mode of Production, JMP, emerged, making parts in a labor-intensive way, assembling them through automation,[170] and then exposing every unit to very labor-intensive quality control. A condition for this artisanal-industrial combination was mass production to lower the unit cost. But, with China as competitor?

Amazing, except for the contradictions not paid attention to.

We come to that, but first more about the contradictions the Japanese seem to have transcended. To take one: the person combining confucianism and buddhism would also combine, easily, outer-oriented activity and inner-oriented contemplation. In fact, the mature Japanese personality is expected to develop both. There are those who specialize, but in the West the combination is rare, indeed.

To take another one, already alluded to: a Japanese, or a Chinese for that matter, might be more inclined to seek guidance in both liberalism *and* marxism, seeing them as neither mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive. The distance from these abilities to transcend at the ideological and psychological levels to combining the uncombinable at the more structural level seems short, conceptually and theoretically.

Some more detail about the three key examples for development:
1. *Overcoming the contradiction between bureaucracy and corporation*, attitudinally through the shinto-confucianism-buddhism triad; structurally

also through the way elites are trained and woven together in solid networks of cohorts of those who enter the same year. As they rise at approximately the same speed, by seniority more than merit, cohorts will reach power positions at about the same time,[171] facilitating communication in spite of the verticality.

2. *Overcoming the contradiction between labor and capital.* structurally by having company trade unions rather than occupation- geography (district, national) trade unions, and attitudinally through cooperation between labor and capital inside the company, patterns of life-long employment and salary increase, promotion according to seniority, and catering to the total person of the employee.[172] Sharing of profits when things go well and sharing of risks when they go badly;[173] sharing of facilities such as cafeteria, parking place; same working clothes, company songs.[174] And some sharing of power through a pattern of consultation down-up-down-up the company, making proposals for production and having them accepted.[175]

3. *Overcoming the contradiction between labor-intensive and capital-intensive production.* The Japanese strategy for entering the capitalist world market:[176] process some raw material, your own or imported, very well and labor intensively; see to it that the value added comes to Japan and does not accrue to foreign interests; invest the value-added in improving "production capital" (capital goods, means of production) and "human capital" (schooling and medical services); increase the level of processing so as to increase the value-added; pocket the value-added and use it for investment rather than consumption,[177] do that for 100 years and become *ichi-ban*, #1.

To Western enterprises timepieces (watches) and computers have been separated. But Japanese eclecticism also combined computers and timepieces, table organs and computers.[178] The trend will continue, catch Westerners by surprise, and consumers with delight.

Another example of deep culture at work: alienation, generally increasing with mass production between individual workers and the unit product, and between individual workers and individual customers as ties that existed under artisanal modes of production are cut. But the ties between a collectivity of workers producing a set of products for the benefits of a collectivity are not cut. What is alienating in an I-culture may have an integrative function in a we-culture, provided the company is seen as a collectivity and the product is seen as being for consumption by the collectivity,

A high level of worker-management integration (labor-management consultation, *roshi kyogisei*) is essential. It helps that they all share a limited number of family names (Tanaka, Suzuki, etc.) that cuts through the education "degree-ocracy" that is Japan.[179]

The less celebrated part of the ability to overcome contradictions is its limits. Japan became so successful that conflicts were building up.

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The USA imposed "voluntary" quotas; Korea-China started producing the same at lower prices; the Third world felt inundated by industrial rice-cookers etc. driving out their artisanal products, and the artisans with them. Resentment all over.

Inside Japan women, half of society, often limited to pouring tea, postponed marriage and started their own enterprises, refusing to be serving men. Young men closed themselves into their room, *hikikomori*, and committed suicide. And all over Japan civil society, often locally based, with the less educated, blossomed, reducing the power at the top. Unforeseen consequences, indeed.

The Chinese Model: Five Points

We are talking about today's China with this model blossoming against a background of six decades after the 1949 revolution, and some millennia before that. A very old civilization.

First, there is a sense of being a *Chosen People* with a *Promised Land* between the Himalayas, the Gobi desert, the tundra and the sea. Han China was assembled, but inside are also Taiwan, Hong Kong-Macao, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Korea and Viêt Nam. Outside that no economic-military-political-cultural imperialism has been observed.

Second, the overriding value of *social harmony* across faultlines, in inner attitudes and outer behavior if not in structural reality.

Third, I-culture and we-culture, a vertical social structure over complex mixes of individualism and collectivism, with the party, the new mandarinate of the current communist dynasty, on top.

Fourth, an eclectic use of *san fa*, the three Chinese teachings:
- *confucianism*, a moral code and source of wisdom and discipline, vertical, with rights and duties for those high up as well as low down, compatible with growth and big countries
- *buddhism*, a moral code and source of compassion, horizontal, compatible with distribution and small communities
- *daoism*, an epistemology based on a never-ending dialectic between yin and yang, like between growth and distribution, big and small

Fifth, in spite of the first point, and because of daoism, some ability in overcoming contradictions *abroad*, like
- with the USA in a basic trade agreement
- with Third world countries helping in development at the bottom
- with Japan: waiting for Japan to mature enough for reconciliation

and ability in overcoming contradictions *inside China*, like
- gender, mobilizing the other half of humanity
- with Hong Kong, China and Macao, China as parts, yet autonomous
- the "one country, two systems" doctrine opening for Taiwan

but much work remains for Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia
- active co-existence with the Koreas and Viêt Nam

How is this done concretely, in some detail?

Chinese Deep Culture: The *san fa*

What is so extraordinary about China? The way Chinese think, their world views, and how actions flow from their world views.

What is so extraordinary about that? The way three different world views--daoism, confucianism and the late-comer (to China), buddhism--have co-existed.

Some Western modernity, left and right, was then grafted upon a solid base of *san fa*, the Three Teachings.

A very brief summary, trying to capture something essential from the daoist *Dao Deching*, the confucian *Analects* and buddhist texts:

Daoism: reality is a *holon* with *yin-yang* dialectics of contradictions, with the dominant waning and the other vexing till a turning point with some other side dominant, and thus it continues, from one side to the other and from one contradiction to the next. Humankind is a holon, ideally suffering the suffering of others, and enjoying the joy of others;

Confucianism: power flows from the wisdom of educated older males; inspiring high quantity and quality of work, attention to details, taking light things heavily and heavy things lightly, and harmony;

Buddhism: reduce *dukkha*, suffering and increase *sukha*, fulfillment for all; securing for all neither too much nor too little; everything is related to everything in an *engi* of co-arising dependency.

There is a daoist-buddhist epistemology of holism-dialectics[180], different from Western, aristotelian-cartesian, atomism-deductionism. Reality is endowed with an organic inner life as opposed to mutually detached elements held together logically in deductive theories.

This is reflected in an ethics of mutuality as opposed to Western individualism; a collective we-culture as opposed to individual I-culture, ethical budgets. Not always practiced; but both "we" and "I" are deeply embedded in the two cultural codes.

A Theory of Chinese Development

What does this mean for development theory and practice? There is a built-in daoist tension in *san fa*, between a confucianism that elevates some above others and a buddhist focus on equality.

A theory of Chinese development theory must reflect this built-in tension, with turning points between *growth* and *distribution*, between increasing average and decreasing dispersion of distributions of wealth and income (Galtung, 1980d).

Western development theory and practice has oscillated between the two extremes of neo-liberal "growth without distribution", invoking a

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trickling-down, and the old-marxist "distribution without growth", invoking an elusive "liberation of productive forces" effect. In-between we have growth first, then distribution (but time for the latter seems never to be ripe); distribution first, then growth (with take-off problems); and efforts to do both at the same time.

*Chinese development theory is none of the above.*

Enters daoism as philosophy covering human and non-human nature. There is an inner dialectic. There will be turning points. Go for growth only, for distribution only; give animals work only, rest only. Reality will punish your one-sidedness; society will wither away, so will the animals. Rather, respect the turning points, which means keeping the ears close enough to the ground to identify the rumblings signaling that time has come for turning from one to the other.

There may be more than one dialectic at the same time, and more than one holon to attend to dialectically and holistically. Thus, the buddhist idea of neither-too-much-nor-too-little, with too little implying *dukkha*, and too much standing in the way of *sukha*, carries a clear distribution message for economic, i.e. scarce, goods.

Confucianism was compatible with the Chinese feudalism and the *shi'h-nung-kung-shang*--intellectuals/rulers-farmers-artisans/workers-merchants--top-bottom hierarchy--as opposed to the daoist-buddhist countertrend--and with Chinese capitalist growth, rich vs poor and top vs bottom.[181] Hierarchy is as nature-given as harmony mitigation.

The theory hypothesized successive daoism-inspired dialectic turning points between buddhist inspired distribution and confucian inspired growth phases, applied to the holon referred to as "China".

Figure 5: The Chinese Model: Distribution vs Growth Turning Points

```
Growth                      2007 o——————> 2016?
 |                               |
 |                               |
 |                   1989 o——————>o 1998
 |                        |
 |                        |
 |            1967 o——————>o 1976-80
 |                 |
 |                 |
 |     1949 o——————>o 1958
 |_____
   o = Turning point              Distribution
```

A rough sketch of the policies pursued:

1949: deep land reform, cooperatives, up to Peoples' Communes
1958: the Great Leap Forward, iron furnaces, industrialization
1967: the Cultural Revolution of power distribution
1976-80: the great confusion after Mao Zedong's death
1980: Deng Xiaoping's policy of free markets for agricultural goods
1989: brakes on economic growth after the Tian Anmen demonstrations
1998: green light for market economy under Party-State control
2007: full attention to distribution, Hu Jintao at the 17th Congress
2016: hypothesis: more attention to growth *or to a new dialectic*.

A Chinese farmer asked[182] about capitalism vs socialism:

"Capitalism is superb, so dynamic, something happening all the time, but it is terrible, some have too much and become corrupt, many have too little and become criminal, prostitutes. Socialism is superb, everybody has neither too much nor too little, but it is terrible, so static, so boring, nothing happens!"

There are two contradictions at work: dynamic vs static, and equality vs inequality. Pursuit of dynamism leads to inequality and pursuit of equality leads to statism (state-ism!), both unbearable.

The intervals are short and about equal, like *nine years*; with a period of four years 1976-80 with no clear policy at all but the search for one, with mass meetings, debates, posters big and small.

Periods of *ten years* gives 1949-1959-1969-1979-1989-1999-2009, capturing the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution and Tian Anmen, but not the confusion, Deng policy, the directives from the Assembly of 1998, and the 17th Congress. We stick to the nine years hypothesis.

Why *nine*? No idea. The Chinese philosopher Ssu-Ma Ch'ien[183] had a theory of turning points in Chinese history between "bad" and "good" emperors, the repressive, strengthening the top, the good ones being benign to the bottom. We are talking about the time needed to take out the positive aspects of a policy before the negative aspects become so overwhelming that time has come for turning, not 180 degrees, that means backward, but something more like 90 degrees.

The Soviet Union failed to respect the signals and clung to the same course, hoping for the hegelian transition from quantity to quality: who perseveres will be rewarded and communism will be ushered in. The USA is doing the same, maintaining an empire with 700+ bases in 130+ countries, hoping that world hegemony will stay. The Soviet Empire collapsed. So will the US Empire.

Imagine a dimension for the epistemology of change. There is automatic "turning point command" on the one end, and "human command" on the other. Turning, regardless of what humans demand,

and on the other end human will superimposed on what dialectic commands. Daoist philosophy is somewhere in-between. The yin-yang dialectic is a force to be used, surfing on top of it, or it will sooner or later ride on top of us. Some sufficiency added to freedom as insight in necessity. But that necessity, the yin-yang dialectic working its way regardless of human will, will in the longer run have the upper hand.

There is strength in a model with a process perspective with no time limit. The others have mainly a necessary condition to get the process started: buddhism precept practice, islam the five pillars practice, Western liberal the free market, Western marxist the violent or nonviolent revolution, and the Japanese transcendence of some basic contradictions. But, maybe the others can learn, and become better at challenge-response, not only as will, but as "surfing" on forces?

20 | Six Developments Overcoming De-Development?

We started in Part One defining development as unfolding of codes, with sustainability based on diversity, symbiosis and equity.

In Part Two, we explored general macrohistorical trends heading for postmodernity with destructuration and deculturation, *atomie*, *anomie*; the world Northwest and Southeast being up front along many dimensions. The driving forces added to Marx' means of production were means of destruction, transportation-communication, and consumption. With whom do you consume, how? At what speed do you move? With whom can you co-exist in time? Whom can you destroy or be destroyed by?

In Part Three imperialism was the key factor in de-development.

In this Part Four there are six models, five civilizations and one of them with two ideologies, against a general background of how such visions are generated. "*Six*" can be disputed, but is well beyond "*One*", that one with market and democracy ending history.

Table 12 provides an overview. There are many ways to read it.

Starting with the obvious: the first two are religiously based, spanning the buddhism-abrahamism gap; the next two are secular, Western enlightenment-based; and the last two are centered on the Japanese and Chinese cultures. There is Western universalist mystique in its two models. The others challenge this universalism, substituting buddhism, islam, japanism and chinaism, giving Buddha, Alla'h, the Sun Goddess *Amaterasu-o-mikami*, and the Middle Kingdom, *Zhong-guo*, their due.

Again, why was the West not more faithful to the christian god, mining the teachings of Jesus for visions of the good society? Because he said that his kingdom was not of this world. His practice was at the micro more than the meso level. A concrete model, the Jesuit-Paraguay *experimento sagrado* was denounced by the Spanish Crown. And the Ten Commandments are silent on basic needs and nature.

But Occident II was a christian model with spiritually based on monastic communities with Beta strong and Alpha weak? St Francisco, Meister Eckhart?[184] True, but all carried by a social context.[185] The buddhist ecological wisdom might have made miracles, which is why the Green wave uses that for "small is beautiful", not European feudalism.

Table 12: The Five Point Codes for the Six Models

Buddhist	Islamic	Western liberal	Western marxist	Japanese	Chinese
Moral code	Shahada, Salat: moral code	Individualism; Competition	Classes; Revolution	Chosen People	Chosen People
Ahimsa; Nonviolent	Zakat: sharing	Market	Planning	Social harmony	Social harmony
Nirvana; Rebirth	Ramadan: discipline solidarity	Democracy Human rights	Social growth Basic needs	Vertical degree-ocracy	Vertical mandarinate; Party
Middle Way Freedom *Sangha*	Trade as sacrament	Economic growth	Economic distribution	Economic growth & distribution	Economic growth & distribution
Pluralism	Islam= peace	Universal validity	Universal validity	Limits to handling contradictions	*san fa* daoism confucianism buddhism

And Occident I is today the major part of postmodernity, with de-development crying for rescue, but not from a christianity where eight of the ten commandments are negative proscriptions. Not lying, not stealing are good norms, but like the three articles of faith not indicative of positive development.[186] The West switched to secularism.

Let us then focus on the strongest and weakest points in each one, using that as a basis the general theory of diversity-symbiosis-equity.

In buddhism: the pluralism that opens for diversity, symbiosis and equity, also found in the middle way philosophy, at the micro and meso levels. And missing are the social and world philosophies.

In islam: a multi-level approach, with peace at the world level built into the word islam. But nature seems weak, and the problem of, whether the model can accommodate enough diversity for symbiosis.

In Western-liberal: democracy-human rights. But these are also weak points as the Western approach is individualizing both of them.[187]

Another weak point: the unreflected universalism of Matthew 28:18-20.

In Western-marxist: the strongest point is a genuine basic needs orientation, if really for all and not only the industrial proletariat. The weakest point is the lack of democracy, and Western universalism.

In the Japanese model: the strongest point is the creativity in overcoming contradictions and the focus on processing with the sky as the limit, and the weakest point other social and world faultlines.

In the Chinese model: *san fa* eclecticism for diversity-symbiosis, with Chinese daoism, not Japanese shinto. The West is too universalist, but the Chinese and Japanese models are too deep culture particularist. How do they stand on the key development dimensions in Part One?

Table 13: The Six Models and the Four Development Spaces

Space	Buddhist	Islamic	Western liberal	Western Marxist	Japan	China
Nature: ecobalance	+	-	-	-	-	-
Human: Health	+	+	-	+	+	+
Social: diversity symbiosis equity	+ + +	- - +	+ + -	- - -	- - -	+ + -,+
World: peace	+	+	-	-	-	-,+

The buddhist model comes on top of a world before the state system.

The Japanese model comes at the bottom as economic growth is a means, not an end, and Japan's democracy comes with decisions engi-neered by the powerful bureaucracy in advance.[188] There is little diversity inside, hence low symbiosis, but the overriding goal is social harmony.

And then, reading horizontally: *Human and social spaces on top, peace and nature at the bottom*, neglected by religion, and secularism.

Let us change to a more dynamic focus: *mutual learning*. There is the human tragedy, deeply concerned with survival, wellness, options, and meaning, in search of nature, social and world contexts providing all of that sustainably, but failing. The search is steered by codes and no code fully reflects that totality, based on very partial insights.

However, instead of complaining about what is missing, a better

approach is to ask, given these six models, what might happen?

Given the dialectic nobody knows, but we return to the trends toward 8 regions as key actors in the world; will they do better?

More precisely, we seem to move toward a world with 7-8 regions, two "unions", two "associations" and four possible future "communities":

- *the European Union*, which even has the Western-liberal model written into its constitution, hence endangered by too low diversity;[189]
- *the African Union*, torn between the islamic model north and east, the western liberal model as an overlayer and a groundswell of African models, possibly more diversity than they can process symbiotically;
- *SAARC*, Western liberal on top of hindu caste reality, contradictory to the islamic model, also possibly more than can be processed;
- *ASEAN*, torn between the islamic, western liberal and western marxist models, with an underlayer of the buddhist model, possibly also with more diversity than they can process symbiotically;
- *OIC*, an islamic community with the islamic model, low on diversity;
- *an East Asian Community*, probably based on the Japanese and Chinese models coalescing, which would be relatively unproblematic with ancient Chinese civilization and script as common denominators, picking with eclectic talent from both Western liberal and marxist models what they want, with hundreds of millions benefiting from welfare state minimum livelihood, health and education, inspired by Bismarck in the Japanese case and by the Soviet Union in the Chinese case, with the Koreas, Viêt Nam, possibly even Myanmar, in it;
- *the Latin American Community*, based on the Western liberal and the Western marxist models, open market and basic needs, and a groundswell of something historical, indigenous (Inca, Aztec, Guaraní, etc);
- (a possible) *Russian Community*, based on the Western liberal and Western marxist models, on both market and basic needs. In principle.

There is enough dialectic within and between to shame the *End of History* and *Clash of Civilizations*. History goes on, as more than clash.

Civilizations are codes and codes do not clash; regions do; economically, militarily and politically, related to codes unfolding. The major clash was the West *actio* vs the Rest the last 500+ years, now with *reactio* from the Rest, 9/11 being iconic, the US-Israeli wars in the Middle East, West-Central Asia and "on terrorism" being *re-reactio*. Falling empires, super-states, states, nations, regions, civilizations, in a darwinian struggle for survival as fittest in the world niche.[190]

And yet the potentials for kropotkian cooperation, and imanishian creativity to identify and settle in empty or thinly settled niches, are only waiting for a Go! There is only one condition: no world dominion by

any one model. They all have shortcomings and much to offer. So we are left with mutual learning between, and internal development within.

Buddhism could be inspired by islam to a world view, by Western liberal to democracy-human rights fit for mahayana we-cultures, with dialogue and consensus rather than debate and voting, by Western marxist to invent new means of production fitting the buddhist mode, by Japan for state-capital, and by China for state-community cooperation.

Islam could be inspired by buddhism to more nature partnership, by Western liberal to more democracy, dialogue-consensus based, by Western marxist to more social technologies and ownership, by Japan and China to state-capital and state-community cooperation.

The Western liberal model is not used to be inspired by anybody but itself, but would benefit from borrowing some ideas. From buddhism collective ethical budgets as one way of combating atomie-anomie, from islam a world view, from the Western marxist model, the Japanese and the Chinese models, ever new ways of transcending state-capital and capital-labor contradictions.

The Western marxist model could practice its own thesis: if means shape the mode of production, invent socially adequate technologies.

The Japanese and Chinese models have already absorbed much from the others because of the Oriental comparative advan-tage,[191] eclecticism. But they might learn from islamic, Western liberal, Western marxist and their own experiences the danger of imposing any model on others. A world view with and for peace is needed as a part of development, and that world view has to be informed by diversity, symbiosis and equity. Equity is problematic for them both, running against their verticality. Thus, the Chinese were used to others "paying tribute", maybe an act of submission rather than taxation, and the Japanese had similar ideas.

But beyond verticality there is another huge problem that applies to the Japanese and Chinese models: how to relate to others at all.

Japan used the geographical isolation of the archipelago as basis for conquering other islands for incursions into mainland East Asia.

China used the geographical isolation of mountains, the desert, the tundra and the sea to create their dynastic dynasties inside, without incursions outside. China moves through time more than in space.

With changing means of transportation-communication both isolations lose substance, but habits stick. They are in the world, but not of it, and certainly not quite for it. The only sustainable way to relate today is through equity, but that has to be symbiotic to be meaningful, and symbiosis works better when based on diversity.

Whatever can be said about the western liberal model of

development, among most of the European countries it has produced--or not stood in the way of--increasing the union domain from 2 to 27, and increasing scope from coal and steel to anything, from 1950 till today. Superb peace engineering within, and much to learn for the two "splendid isolates" when together they are now shaping an East Asian Community.

So much about the six developments; more in Chapter 25. But two parts of this book have been devoted to the development anti-thesis, de-development or maldevelopment, and malenvironment, producing massive decays in nature and human space. The basic underlying mechanisms are inequities at the social and-or world levels. Any alternatives around?

At the world level the New International Economic Order produced by the Group of 77 was based on sovereignty over natural resources, better terms of trade manufactures/resources, and industrialization. It was international, not national.[192] Decades later the South Commission had another approach[193], like NIEO MDC-LDC exchange-oriented, not much said about the inner changes in the LDCs or the MDCs. They are more about LDC-MDC equity than lifting nature and human beings.

So let us turn to two models dealing with the inside of countries, the *Fundación Bariloche* model focused on better distribution, and the Leopold Kohr model focused on the size of countries and communities.

The Bariloche challenges a major assumption of Western liberal by seeing distribution rather than growth, like in the malthusian book-keeping model *Limits to Growth*) as the key variable and is located in the territory between Western liberal and marxist:

Conclusion[194]

If the policies proposed here are applied, all of humanity could attain an adequate standard of living within a period a little longer than one generation. The satisfaction of the most essential physical and cultural needs--could be fulfilled for most of the countries of the Third World by the end of the century, or in the first years of the next... it is possible to control population growth by raising the general standard of living with relation to basic needs. This equilibrium could be achieved on a global scale well before the earth's capacity to produce food--is fully exploited, even if food production continues to be based on currently available technology.

Needless to say, this excellent work never entered the mainstream liberal model. Limits to growth did, because growth was threatened. What is suggested is some kind of Nordic distribution within and between for the world, an idea whose time may still come (see Chapter 21).

Leopold Kohr, a highly original thinker in the field of development, focuses on size of the units of development in his two major works. We shall quote at some length:

> "This is why already Aristotle warned that 'to the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements', and that '... a great city is not to be confounded with a populous one.' (Ross, 1942). And St Augustine (1984, Book III, Chapter XV) argues that "there should be in the world as many kingdoms as there are families in a city."

Kohr's (1957) vision is not that of the world state[195], but of optimal size small societies in loosely knit federations (Kohr, 1977, pp. 14-15, 16, 18, 19):

> "A larger group would increase variety but hurt constancy. A smaller group would strengthen constancy but curtail variety--a group membership of from 80 to 100 adults (a figure not much different from that of a well functioning club) might therefore be considered as constituting optimum social size".

> "It merely means that one optimum economic society nourishes, let us say, ten optimum convivial societies, *and that convivial societies cannot reach optimum size singly, but severally in the form of a loosely knit federation*." (italics ours).

> "The optimum cultural society will therefore require a membership from perhaps 50,000 to 200,000. The city states of ancient Greece or medieval Italy, Germany, and Flanders produced all the culture the heart could desire and the mind absorb with populations rarely exceeding 100,000. "... this is about the size at which it is large enough to give man everything he expects from it. It gives him taverns symbolizing the convivial function; factories and market places symbolizing the economic function; courts, city halls, memories, symbolizing the political function; and finally theatres, churches, museums, universities, and stadia symbolizing the cultural function--providing man with the supreme content of Aristotle's *summum bonum*, the good life... a society of about 200,000 can be thought to represent the ultimate concept of optimum social size."

Small units, tied together in federations. And he highlights Switzerland as maybe the most sustainable society in the world.[196]

Had the world been wise enough to combine these five approaches to de-development: let empires die one way or the other, NIEO and South Commission for inter-region relations, and Bariloche and Kohr for relations inside countries, then we would not be so badly off.

All six models have important contributions to make to this kind of visions overcoming de-development from the world space and the social space. And it must be like that for a cooperative venture creating new openings to substitute for world dominion struggles.

Starting with Kohr, the small community, this is where the buddhist model has so much to contribute, and also all the local action and global thinking (Henderson) in all parts of the world in recent years. Aspects of the Chinese model also enter.

But they have to be knit together, and the world has about 25 federations with about 40% of humanity as citizens. The experience is there, but it has to be brought together and brought into the development discourse.

Switching to Bariloche, wealth has to be distributed. There is the marxist model inspiring social democracy and social capitalism. But there are also the islamic, Japanese and Chinese models. Western liberal would probably stand in the way of such efforts so major breakthroughs will probably come somewhere else. We shall know when we see where the flow of economic refugees finds its river-beds, maybe more toward China and islamic countries and away from UK-USA?

The basic points from NIEO and the South Commission have to be realized, also against heavy Western liberal resistance. South-South equitable exchange of good and services, student and professors, using regional, non-Western currencies, and a focus on basic needs is overdue. So are better terms of trade. but that problem may also be solved by intra-society and intra-region exchanges with others at the same level, meaning more local, social and regional self-reliance

And for empires there is the euthanasia of boycott.

However important this is, an ethos inspiring it all is needed. That points to the buddhist model--found in the Japanese and the Chinese-- and the islamic models. This may be where the riverbeds for the spiritual refugees are heading, not because popes do not preach justice, but because their words fall on deaf corporate ears. And that, in turn, may serve to invigorate christian spirituality.

Part Five

DEVELOPMENT ACROSS SPACES

21 | Nature Development: Ecological Balance[197]

The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, a founder of deep ecology, produced *A Platform of the deep ecology movement*, in eight points:

1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening.
5. The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
6. Significant change of life conditions for the better requires change in policies. These affect basic economic, technological and ideological structures.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating *life quality* (dwelling in situations of intrinsic value) rather than of adhering to a high standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes.

Basic to Næss' thinking is "intrinsic value" (points 1, 2 and 7), meaning value in itself, not because it serves some other goal. Thus, non-human nature has intrinsic value even regardless of whether there are humans around to sense and enjoy. Nature is not there for us, nature *is* in and by itself. And, in order not to reduce nature's richness and diversity humans should dwell less in quantities extracted from nature, and more in intrinsic qualities.

Moreover, and this is a radical conclusion, a "substantial" de-crease in human population is argued, sufficient for human life and culture, and necessary for non-human life, to flourish. The human species might do well to abdicate from the throne of evolution.[198]

This is not the same as increasing the Resources/Population ratio by controlling population or multiplying resources by technology, RxT/P (where T may even deplete and pollute R further, and pollute P). Næss

does not conceive of nature as "resource" for humans. His point is not that we harm ourselves by harming nature's richness and diversity, but that nature is rapidly worsening through excessive interference.

To Næss it is not the utilitarian Golden Rule "treat Nature well so that we are treated well in return", but more the daoist union of "suffering Nature's suffering and enjoying nature's joy". Underlying his eight points is a life-long love of, for, and with nature. Some may call this ecological fundamentalism, even extremism. But then there is another, and less reversible, mainstream extremism around.

Western reductionism has reduced the human-nonhuman nature interface to a focus on global warming, greenhouse gases and car-bon emission (see Chapter 4 above for a broader perspective). How would we expect a market-oriented West, the USA in particular, to handle that? Of course not by really cutting carbon emission if harmful to business, but by over-emitters buying, and under-emitters selling, emission quotas, by storing carbon deep down, or reforestation and photosynthesis, if the price is right; by pledges at conferences but no "significant change of life conditions."

The experience with other major evils like slavery, colonialism, nuclear weapons, war is not that multilateral conferences are helpful. They give too much power to the laggards who "have to be in it". For slavery that would have meant Portugal-Brazil-USA and for colonialism again Portugal in Brazil and the USA (still hanging on to Hawai'i) and England-France (Northern Ireland and smaller places around the world. Including Kanaky, not that small).

A much better approach is for some countries to show the way. In both cases England was up front and a laggard at the same time. In India Gandhi behaved as if he was free and invited England to follow. A multilateral conference in 1947 would have protected colonialism given it ubiquity with pledges "by the year 2000". And there might even have been quotas, "you are low on slavery-colonialism and we are high, could we get some of your unused quota?". With some reduction of the total, and of course "with all deliberate speed"[199].

Maybe the major Danish contribution 2009 was not to host a conference, but the little island of Samsö between Sjælland and Jylland.[200] They used to import oil for heating by ship, and energy from coal by cable, meaning 11 tons of CO2 per Samsing/year. Eight years later, now, they produce 40% more energy than they need and almost all carbon neutral, from windmills, solar cells, thermal energy from the ground, and from warm, fresh cow's milk (!) etc.

Is this small scale, 4000 inhabitants, island generalizable? With thousands of others being up front in different ways, yes. It reminds us

of small groups in the US South up front in integration, like the Koinonia farm close to Americus, Georgia, a model of the two races living, working together when the rest was segregated. Some have to be up front, experimenting on behalf of humanity.[201]

The two approaches, multilateral and unilateral, do not exclude each other. But more important than pledges, quota tricks and planting forests--good in itself--is concrete reduction of emission through a green revolution; as an enormous challenge to creativity.

As nuclear energy may also be carbon neutral, one might won-der if that is a factor underlying the USA-India nuclear cooperation, two laggards joining each other; one in addition getting a Nobel peace prize for a movie and the other for chairing a panel?

Soon we shall know, and know whether the promising Chinese approach, producing green technology by green means for China, and also for export, maintaining high growth, is solid when coal will still play a major role--and nuclear energy an increasing role?

But underneath all that still another thought is lurking. What is this global warming anyhow? How much is actually human made and how much is a giant cosmic process melting ice all over the last 10-15,000 years, maybe varying with the sun spots?[202] Difficult to tell; and the lack of consensus among "experts" is not reassuring.

Are we really that unhappy about the global warming of the past, followed by the massive *Völkerwanderungen* to settle on dry land? In coming years to Greenland and Siberia-Alaska-Canada? Bad for ice bears, but for humans? Displacement yes, but that can be handled by thermal polluters covering their share of the bill.

The December 2009 conference in Copenhagen did not produce any legally binding agreement, only vague promises for Mexico in 2010. Adding up confirmed pledges would reduce warming by 2050 from 4.8°C to 3.8°C; double the low emission path to 1.9°C.[203].

The pledge of $100 billion per year (inflated dollars?, as development aid?) for climate-damaged countries is from 2020, but the disaster in the world's biggest delta, Bangladesh, is *now*, for all to see. The Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu, etc.

There is a wish to have the world's major polluters, USA and China, in on an agreement. But Obama's problem with the US Congress is more serious than Wen's possible problem with the Party. China is heading for global responsibility, but for the US Senate global warming is far down on the agenda, there is no law yet, they feel above the UN anyhow, and lobbies for the status quo meaning outdated technologies are very strong.

However, instead of lamenting the Copenhagen failure, what kind of

conference would we like to see? Continue *goal* pledging, work for a legally binding accord. *But then, in addition*:

- how about pledges to adopt carbon (and methane) neutral *means*, meaning green technologies, pledging concretely what technologies-- wind, solar, geo- & hydrothermal, waves and tidal water, biomass?
- how about concrete successes and failures and mixes, leading to inspiring conclusions, like Germany boosting renewable energy production from 1% of total output in 1995 to 14% in 2007;[204]
- how about possible new, incipient technologies, including social ways of mitigating the effects of global warming?
- how about praising and prizing those up front in addition to, critiquing those behind in pledges and/or concrete initiatives?
- how about NGOs negotiate the accord governments do not manage?

The Copenhagen conference choreography produced apathy and pessimism, nothing uplifting and inspiring. The focus was on the faultlines among countries, less on the conflict with a nature in search of new equilibria. It was politics as usual, with groups scoring points, with no empathy with Mother Earth, in spite of the many signs of nature in pain, dying. How about a higher level of co-existence, like a forester helping nature to thrive, harvesting what she offers beyond the need for reproduction? Reforestation to absorb carbon and release oxygen for our human good falls short of what nature tells us, if we only knew better to listen. Like President Evo Morales in his heavily applauded speech.[205]

But there is also a different approach: *nonviolent struggle*. We have the same right to a carbon warning as to a warning against smoking; overdue, but better late than never. We have a right not to buy, not to import, to boycott. Facts printed on each unit, like on each barrel of oil (the USA consumes 20 million per day, China 5-6 million). Products can be boycotted, so can laggards.

Inspired by the Næss *Platform of the deep ecology movement*, without oversubscribing to it.

22 | Human Development: A Living Income for Everyone on Earth

1. Introduction[206]

Even though there are enough resources for all on earth to live in dignity, about 125,000 people are dying every day because of hunger and preventable and curable diseases, and many more are living in misery.[207] The present system is a "killing economy" where a small percentage controls the majority of income and wealth, like 2% controlling 50% of world household wealth.[208]. It can and must be replaced by a "life-enhancing economy" (Galtung, 2010b, forthcoming).

A major portion of the world's population is prevented from attaining a dignified standard of living for a number of reasons. These include uneven distribution of profits, unfair trade regimes, and corruption. In addition to these are the policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which emphasize cuts in government spending at the expense of the needs of ordinary citizens who suffer as a result of these policies. Ostensibly, such policies are imposed to eliminate a country's budget deficit, but since they lead to higher unemployment, lack of citizens' purchasing power, bankruptcies of companies and thus lower tax revenue for the government, they actually aggravate the economic crises they are supposed to cure (Stiglitz, 2002).

One example of World Bank and IMF policies and their human impact can be seen in the damage caused by conditionality clauses. In the late 1980s and 1990s, international financial institutions launched their Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa, driven by conditionality, such as cost-sharing or user fees on health and education. The results were disastrous and ongoing.[209] These programs enhanced the private sector while curtailing the public sector. The damage is still there.

The world economy now performs far below its full capacity. Many are unemployed, factories operate below their capacity because people cannot afford their products. A living income will enable many people to buy a small piece of land and produce food for their own family, and for sale. Carbon-dioxide can be pumped into their greenhouses from nearby factories, also reducing global warming. They can buy some initial supply of goods to open a store or other small business, or buy some tools to perform a craft, focused on meeting basic needs. If they

have talent, they can become artisans. Some can offer to teach courses and workshops. Muhammad Yunus (2003) has shown that even small loans can often make a big difference in people's lives. Demand backed up by purchasing power will generate new supply.

The current structure of the world economy is the main cause of suffering and global inequality as it ignores human connections and relations. Therefore, a major shift at the macro-level is required to create a system that can provide for basic needs. For the purpose of this chapter we limit ourselves to material basic needs such as food, housing, clothing, health care and education.

The three other major categories of these wellness basic needs-- survival, freedom and identity[210]--which need to be satisfied by non-monetary means, cannot be guaranteed with a living income alone. They require appropriate social structures and cultures. But the living income will make people able to struggle for their satisfaction, and to benefit from them.

A living income for all should also provide for social growth, grant people the chance to work with dignity. It will rest on the basic ethical value that all human life is equal regardless of geography, economy, race, gender, age or beliefs.

The economic system that will accomplish these goals has a living income as its backbone. A living income is a minimum level of income by which all people can provide for themselves and their dependents the above-mentioned five basic material human needs. This is not a new idea.[211] Many countries provide unemployment insurance and insurance for the handicap-ped. Retired people have received pensions and social security payments in many societies for nearly a century. Dr. Francis E. Townsend, a dentist, observed during the Great Depression in the United States in the early 1930s that many elderly people suffered from hunger and cold, while the country had enough resources. In a letter to the editor in 1933, he outlined what became known as the Townsend Plan for a social security system, in which the government would pay a pension to all the elderly, and all those with jobs would pay a small contribution to support the fund. His idea found widespread popular support and led to legislation for social security. He became an unelected leader, by analyzing a problem, proposing a solution, and persuading others to help implement it (Robert C. Tucker, 1981).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how a living income will be financed, who will receive it, how it will be distributed and whether or not this system will be sustainable.

2. Recipients

The system proposes that all people in the world will be involved and benefit. Under the proposed system, every member of society receives a monetary amount corresponding to the living income of that country. In addition to this amount, every citizen will enjoy the same access to free public health care and free primary education.

Although every citizen will receive the living income, including parents for their children, they will be taxed according to their income, with the wealthy bearing the greatest tax responsibility. In addition, the living income amount will not be cut off after a certain level of income is reached, otherwise there would be a disincentive to work and earn additional income. The system intends to support people while they are striving to improve themselves. Tax systems meeting these conditions will be discussed under point 4 below.

It is important that women receive the same income as men. Women tend to care more about the welfare of their children, while men sometimes spend part of their income on alcohol, tobacco or prostitution (Vollmann, 2006). It would therefore be a mistake to give all of a family's living income to the husband.

3. Calculating Costs

To estimate necessary funds, a new veto-proof organization, the *United Nations Living Income Organization* (UNLIO) should be created. It will oversee the collection of data to estimate the minimum living income on a country by country basis. Financing, by mechanisms described later in this chapter, will be centrally gathered by a veto-proof *United Nations Living Income Bank* (UNLIB). It will take into account the purchasing power parity in each country. This will be achieved through the identification and creation of a "basket" of goods that includes the basic needs (food, housing, clothing, health care, education) of all people. These needs will be identified in a two-fold process, UN analysis, coupled with public identification of needs through monitored surveys.

The domestic cost of the "basket" will then be multiplied by the number of people (including children) living in the country. The United Nations will rely on data from both state and NGO organizations in order to get an accurate count of the number of people in each jurisdiction. Estimated costs will be adjusted on an annual basis to reflect inflation and cost of living increases.

The UNLIO-UNLIB will not replace such organizations as the World Bank and IMF, because individual incomes cannot fully replace financing for projects at local, regional and national levels. However,

the World Bank and the IMF must be reformed in order to pursue more humane and equitable policies.

A rough preliminary estimate of the total costs of a living income scheme can be obtained as follows. The 42 countries considered "low income" by the World Bank (2006), with an average annual per capita income of less than 651 Euro (=US$876), ranging from Burundi with 74 Euro to Ivory Coast with 624 Euro, had a combined population of 2,353 million in 2005 and an average annual per capita income of 431 Euro, largely because of India's population of 1,095 million with an income of 535 Euro. The world's highest annual per capita income, 44,275 Euro, was found in Norway with a population of 4.5 million.

If we assume that 431 Euro--the average annual per capita income of the 42 poorest countries--is sufficient for a living income, and multiply it by the 2005 world population of 6,438 million (World Bank, 2006a, p. 289), we obtain a total amount of 2,774,400 million Euro. This includes about 840 million people who suffer from hunger, but the majority of them survive, with the exception of the about 40 million people, many of them children, who die each year from hunger and preventable diseases.

This implies that some of the people in the 42 poorest countries do not have a sufficient income to meet their basic material needs. But this population also includes a small middle and upper class, which enjoys nonessential luxuries.

On balance, 431 Euro per capita per year may be a reasonable estimate for a global living income, although the minimum will be higher in countries with higher living costs. For the entire world population, this corresponds to 2.7744 trillion Euro, or slightly more than three times the official annual world military spending of 907 billion Euro[212].

If we multiply the 2005 world population of 6,438 million by the average per capita annual world income of 5,191 Euro (=US$6,987, World Bank, 2006a, p. 289) we obtain the annual gross world product of 33,422,000 million Euro (=US$44,982,000, ibid. p. 289).

A living income for everyone on earth would thus cost 8.3 percent of current world output. Given the enormous idle capacity in the world economy, this is something perfectly feasible.

4. Income Taxes

All recipients of the living income who have some additional earnings will be expected to, and able to, pay income taxes. Income tax rates should be progressive, ensuring that the wealthiest citizens pay the highest tax rate. The living income amount itself is tax free.

Care must be taken that higher income before taxes never results in a lower after taxes, as the scheme below ensures. Otherwise, there would be a disincentive to work. In today's welfare schemes, people who earn income often lose their benefits, which implies a 100% tax rate on earned income, and discourages people from seeking work.

A typical tax scheme for Country X, assuming the living income in that country to be 1,000 Euro per year, would be the following:

Table 14: Tax Scheme for Country X

Earned annual income:	Tax (in Euros):
1,000	0
1,001-5,000	5% of (income - 1,000)
5,001-20,000	200 + 10% of (income - 5,000)
20,001-50,000	1,700 + 20% of (income - 20,000)
50,001-100,000	7,700 + 30% of (income - 50,000)
over 100,000	22,700 + 40% of (income - 100,000)

The tax on an annual income of 10,000 Euro would be 700 Euro or 7%. The tax on an annual income of 40,000 Euro would be 5,700 Euro or 14.25%. The tax on an annual income of 80,000 Euro would be 16,700 Euro or 21%. The tax on an annual income of 200,000 Euro would be 62,700 Euro or 31%. For extremely high incomes, the tax rate approaches asymptotically 40% but never reaches it.

5. Accumulating Funds
The following proposals can help generate the necessary funding for the United Nations Living Income Bank (UNLIB) outlined above. All of the revenue accumulated through these initiatives would flow directly to the UNLIB. These revenue sources not only help raise funds, but also serve other useful purposes, such as reducing military spending, reducing pollution, conserving exhaustible natural resources, improving health, meeting basic needs, reducing income inequality, reducing the instability of financial markets and currency exchange rates, etc.

5.1 Decrease of Military Spending

In 2008, the world spent approximately 907'000 million Euro for military purposes (SIPRI Yearbook, 2009). We propose a massive reduction and redistribution of this spending towards the global living income fund. Governments would increasingly commit themselves to reduce their militaries to defense forces only. This step alone would greatly reduce military spending.

A percentage of a state's Gross National Product (GNP) would go towards a UN force, which would be independent of any state and constitute the world's only global reach security/peace force.

Another percentage of GNP would go directly to the UN living income fund. The combined cost would in most cases be lower than the state's current military spending.

As an initial step to win wide acceptance for a standing United Nation Peace Force, which can replace national military forces, Hazel Henderson (2007) has proposed the creation of a "United Nations Security Insurance Agency" (UNSIA). Those countries who join this agency would pay a membership fee, and in return could rely on this global peace force to protect them if they face aggression. Membership would be voluntary. The countries most interested in such an offer would probably initially be small countries hardly able to maintain military forces that can match potential adversaries. As the system proves itself, more and more countries will wish to join, because membership costs will be considerably less than maintaining national defense forces.

This idea exploits the concept of scale economies: For every country to maintain its own defense forces is as wasteful as if every house in a community maintained its own fire engine. Big savings result if each family pays some tax for the maintenance of one fire company to be deployed wherever and whenever needed.

Countries that take extra precautions to avoid war, such as having procedures in place to resolve disputes through mediation or binding arbitration, could get insurance at a reduced rate, in the same way as homes maintaining a fire extinguisher and built with fire-proof materials pay lower fire insurance rates.

In addition to helping protect countries against aggression and maintaining cease-fires in civil wars, this UN Peace Force could also be deployed on short notice to help protect lives in case of natural or industrial disasters.

It would have transport planes, helicopters, medical equipment, food and emergency shelter available in adequate quantities. The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization now does not have its own

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standing force to respond to calls for help and depends on appeals to member governments and voluntary organizations to supply personnel and resources for disaster relief. That can introduce delays, which cost many lives.

A UN Peace Force could also assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in providing temporary food and shelter to refugees from wars, political violence, ecological disasters, or famines. Some of the poorer countries can hardly afford to provide adequate help to refugees or victims of disasters.

5.2 Arms Production and Trade
A high rate of taxation on arms production, as well as their trade, may help reduce the number of arms, and will redirect part of the revenues towards the global living income fund.

5.3 Environmental Depletion Tax
A global system should be introduced that levies taxes on environmental degradation caused by industrial and household pollution.

This tax includes levies on extraction of minerals, destruction of forests and other natural habitats, emissions of carbon dioxide causing global warming, chloro-fluoro-carbons destroying the ozone layer, and other polluting substances. Besides raising funds for a global living income, such taxes also help reduce pollution and conserve natural resources.

Such taxes would also be easier to collect than income taxes. Charging, for example, a carbon tax would be easy to administer. There would be no need to depend on individuals to declare voluntarily how much carbon-dioxide they released during the last year and send in a check--an administrative nightmare with widespread evasion and a large policing effort, making lawyers rich, comparable to the present income tax system. Instead, all that would be required is to observe how much coal is extracted at coal mines, or how much oil is pumped at wells or imported at harbors. The tax could be collected at a few central locations, with permanent inspectors, and it would then work its way automatically through the rest of the economy.

Manufacturers who burn large amounts of fossil fuels would pass on the taxes they paid in the price of their products, and thus collect the tax indirectly from consumers. This would reward consumers who switch to products that use lower quantities of fossil fuels.

Paradoxically, charging a tax on pollutants will not increase overall taxes, but help reduce them. This is easily seen with the following thought experiment: If gasoline were free at the pump, would we pay

less for it? On the contrary, many people would begin to waste gasoline, and in the end, the taxpayers would have to cover the costs anyway. We would end up paying a much higher annual national gasoline bill, divided among all people, regardless of how much gasoline they used.

This is the way in which we generally have dealt with clean air and clean water: by pretending they are free, we have encouraged people to waste them, and have paid a far too high price for them--if not always financially, then certainly with ill health. And that, of course, should be included in the budget. A living income could also be used for preventive therapy.

5.4 Taxes on the Use of Global Commons[213]

Taxes on resources outside the jurisdiction of any national government could be collected by the United Nations Living Income Bank. This could includes, for example, a 25 Euro charge on any international airline ticket, a sum hardly felt by travelers. The US Department of State[214] predicted in 2005 that "According to some estimates, the number of airline passengers worldwide will grow by 4.1 percent a year over the next 15 years, doubling the number of passengers to 7.4 billion by 2020." If we assume that perhaps 20% of those tickets are international, this would contribute 37,000 million Euro to the United Nations Living Income Bank, or 1.19% of the estimated 2,774,400 million Euro for a global living income fund. If this helps ever so slightly to discourage some unnecessary air travel, it also has a beneficial effect on the global environment.

Similar taxes can be collected from passenger cars, trucks and trains that cross borders, and from ships that cruise in international waters; also paying for keeping world space safe.

Another resource outside national jurisdiction is outer space. A certain fee could be assessed by the United Nations Living Income Bank on any satellite launch, for example 10 percent of the costs of the launch and the spacecraft.

To allocate the international radio-wave spectrum, part of that spectrum could be auctioned to the highest bidders, instead of being given away for free as is currently happening, which represents a huge subsidy to the richest people in the world. In 1995, the United States Treasury auctioned off a small portion of the domestic airwaves spectrum for companies planning to offer mobile telephone services, and raised nearly US$8,000 million (six times the annual budget of the United Nations).

Who could conduct an international auction? Certainly not the US Treasury, nor the Russian, French or any other government. No nation

can arrogate to itself the right to sell global resources to others. Only the UN, or the United Nations Living Income Bank on its behalf, would be accepted by all countries as a legitimate and impartial auctioneer for global resources outside any country's jurisdiction. Auctions also ensure that those who can make the most valuable use of these resources will obtain them, and pay for them what they consider them to be worth, helping fund a living income for the less affluent.

As with pollution rights, bandwidth on the international radio spectrum should only be leased on a temporary basis, and no permanent property rights ought to be sold, otherwise we mortgage the rights of future generations. Public property, private use.

Another global resource is the limited number of positions for geostationary satellites, 180. If too close to one another, antennas on the ground cannot distinguish their broadcast signals without interference. These positions used to be issued for free to countries requesting them on a first come, first served basis.

When only 23 positions were left, a US businessman came up with the idea of persuading the Queen of Tonga to claim the rest, renting them to others at a high profit. The International Telecommunications Union faced the dilemma whether or not to grant that request, and if not, on what grounds. It finally decided to grant only 6 spots, to forbid renting them to others, and to claim them back if they were not actually used by Tonga within five years. Giving scarce resources away for free invites frivolous claims, whereas competitive bidding tends to allocate them to the most efficient users and simultaneously raises some revenue.

Developing countries, which cannot yet compete on an equal basis in such auctions, should be given a fair share, for example by allocating 50 percent of global resources according to current population while auctioning the rest.

Another potential source of revenue for a Living Income are auctions of mining rights on the deep seabed outside any country's jurisdiction. Such auctions can also help prevent disputes. Thus, when oil was first discovered in the 19th century in Texas, there were no rules. As soon as anyone found some oil, other companies rushed to the scene and drilled to get a portion of that oil, but they soon realized that they could never make any profit that way. Today they appreciate that the US government grants exclusive drilling rights to the highest bidder for a parcel of territory. They pay something, but in return enjoy the security and peace of mind that they can explore for oil without fear that someone else will come and take it away if they make a discovery. A similar service is needed at the global level to prevent future wars

over global resources--including mineral reserves on the deep seabed--and in addition help finance a living income fund.

Such auctions of global resources also help avoid divisive and difficult negotiations over how much each country should contribute, since the richer countries naturally end up paying a higher share, and they encourage resource conservation.

5.5 Tax Havens

Tax havens are often small enclaves scattered all over the world that provide individuals and-or financial institutions with the opportunity to stash away billions of dollars out of reach of their own national tax authorities.

These inconsistencies in fiscal law across countries represent a major source of potential funding for the global living income. Major banks are involved by having branches in commonly known tax havens such as Liechtenstein, Gibraltar and the Cayman Islands. They should be declared illegal and closed.

5.6 Increasing Tax on Unearned Income

Levying taxes on unearned income is a major means of redistribut-ing wealth within a society. Contrary to current legislation in various countries abolishing inheritance taxes, these should be implemented as a progressive global taxation system to benefit the living income fund.

5.7 Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

TNCs currently enjoy favorable taxation in many countries from which they export. We propose that a uniform global tax rate be imposed on TNCs. This tax rate would be concentrated on profits, thus reducing the incentive of companies to pay low incomes to inflate their profits. Companies will be free to lessen their tax burden by reinvesting in the host country's economy through higher incomes, improvements in infrastructure, health and education, or other investments, however.

A uniform global tax rate is necessary, otherwise countries are tempted to compete in attracting TNCs by offering lower tax rates than other countries. This race to the bottom hurts all countries.

5.8 Financial Derivatives Tax

Currently, financial derivatives, as well as mergers and acquisitions, are not taxed at all. Considering their sizeable market[215], a certain level of taxation could significantly increase the amount available to the global living income fund.

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5.9 Currency Exchange Tax
James Tobin (1974, p. 89) proposed a small tax on every currency exchange, to dampen the high volatility of exchange rates, primarily caused by short-term speculation. Over 90% of currency exchanges are not for imports or exports, but for speculative purposes. Such speculation destabilizes the international currency system, can be detrimental to regional economies, and creates poverty.

The income from this tax can be enormous. According to a 2007 survey of the International Bank for Settlements, an average of 2.37 trillion Euro worth of currencies were exchanged every business day on global markets in 2007, or 600 trillion (= million million) Euro per year[216]. With even a very small tax on this figure, billions of dollars in revenue could be generated every year. For example, a 0.2% tax on currency exchanges, counting 250 business days per year when exchange markets are open, would yield an annual revenue of Euro 1.2 trillion if the amount of currency exchanges remains unchanged. If such a small tax were to lead to a 50% reduction in currency exchanges, the annual yield would still be 600 billion Euro, or 21.6% of the estimated 2.7744 trillion Euro for a global living income fund.

As an additional benefit, greater stability in exchange rates would help increase international trade and investment, which is now discouraged by uncertainty about future exchange rates.

A similar tax on stock market transactions could help reduce the volatility of stock markets, and raise additional funds.

5.10 Value Added Tax
Many governments finance their operations mainly through a value added tax, which is collected from companies, and passed on to consumers. Some also collect sales taxes. Such taxes can also help finance a living income fund.

5.11 Customs Duties
Another major source of government revenue are customs duties on imports and exports. Some import duties protect "infant industries" for some time from rough international competition, until the domestic industry has improved quality and cut costs enough to compete effectively on the world market. Such tariff protection should be gradually phased out, however. If permanent, it rewards inefficiency, without incentive to improve.

5.12 Tobacco and Alcohol Tax

Charging a tax on products that cause ill health and are addictive also serves a dual purpose: not only raising funds for a living income for everyone, but also discouraging the use of such harmful products and thus promoting better health for everyone, including non-smokers who can contract cancer from being forced to inhale other people's smoke. In the future, one may even consider adding a tax on sugar, which contributes to diabetes if consumed excessively, and animal fats, which contribute not only to obesity, but also heart attacks, strokes and cancer.

5.13 Luxury Goods and Services

Nonessential goods and services such as jewelry, designer goods, luxury cars, yachts, first and business class travel, and stays at luxury hotels could be taxed to benefit the global fund.

5.14 Recycled Global Living Income Funds

Funds are made available to every single person; however, money not collected by individuals will be reinvested in the system at the global level. The advantage of this approach would be the creation of an act of "charity through omission", whereby individuals who do not collect their share of the available funds would in effect be donating that money back into the system.

5.15 Special Drawing Rights

From time to time, the IMF issues Special Drawing Rights, a weighted basket of the world's leading currencies, and distributes them to the richest countries. The same mechanism of creating currency could be used to replenish the living income fund. The rich countries, now controlling voting in the IMF due to a weight-ed voting scheme in their favor, would probably oppose this. Hence that rigged voting scheme needs to be changed in favor of voting weights proportional to population, so that all people on earth have the same vote, as the principle of democracy calls for.

Jan Tinbergen (1991) urged the rich countries to do more to reduce the global income gap, if not out of altruism, then at least out of self-interest. If present trends continue, there will inevitably be streams of economic refugees from famine, ecological disasters, and war, to the advanced industrialized countries, and their people will not be able to maintain their current living standards. Therefore, programs to create greater global equality are in the interest of everyone, and, indeed, for their own sake.

5.16 Income Generating Activities Run by Governments

Many countries have nationalized certain industries, especially those representing monopolies whereby a private company could charge monopoly profits, facing little or no competition. This includes railways, electric utilities, telecommunications, oil wells, mining, huge steel plants, etc. Privatizing such industries can give the super-rich a means to exploit the rest of society with high rates of profit. It is often better to let the government operate such industries to keep prices charged to consumers reasonable, and to use the profits generated to fund public services, including a living income for everyone.

Governments also have to provide public goods and services that private industry finds unprofitable, because it is difficult or impossible to exclude non-payers, and costs are independent of the number of users. Typical examples are the construction and main-tenance of roads, public safety, public hygiene etc. Drying up a swamp to eliminate malaria-carrying mosquitoes costs the same regardless of how many will be protected and how many helped pay for it. Such services are not provided by private industry that depends on selling its products, and government must step in.

Care is needed that public enterprises are run efficiently. If the government subsidizes industries that perform badly and collects profits from those that do well, incentives to work hard, innovate, and find out what consumers want are removed (Gorbachev 1987).

In addition to offering micro-credits to help lift people out of poverty, governments should also invest massively in industries that produce goods to meet people's basic needs, and create jops. Such investments will pay for themselves over time by generating sales and additional revenue. For example, the costs of building apart-ments can be recovered from future rent. Investments in renewable energy research and fabrication of devices such as solar collectors, wind mills or bio-gas plants can be recovered in the future in the form of lower energy costs. Improvements in infrastructure for health, education, transportation and communication promote economic activity and help raise living standards.

An example: the ten year campaign to eradicate smallpox by 1977 cost $32 million, and has since saved $17 billion in reduced spending on vaccines and health care, plus 45 million lives around the world (Banerjee, Benabou and Mookhjerjee, Eds., 2006).

Governments or international organizations can fund research to develop pharmaceuticals that can cure various diseases, and make the results generally available. Withholding such life-saving information from people who need it causes thousands of avoidable deaths. It is a

crime to patent and keep secret knowledge necessary to meet people's basic needs and save lives.

5.17 UN Living Income Bank: Summary of Anticipated Revenues
In Section 3, the cost of a living wage for everyone of the 6,438 million inhabitants of the earth was estimated as 2,774,400 million Euro. Table 15 on the next page gives a summary of some of the sources of income that can help generate this amount. Just six of the numerous potential sources of income listed above included in Table 15 yield already more than 100% of the annual income needed to finance a living income for everyone on earth.

6. Distribution
Funds will by accumulated by the UNLIB and then transferred to legitimate regional NGO's who--with regional, state and local actors-- will share information and allocate funds. Certain states lack distribution ability due to logistics deficits, corruption and mistrust. Trusted states with logistical ability could do so under NGO monitoring, and states that lack this ability will be supplemented by NGOs for distribution according to the best method given the geographic and cultural requirements. But NGOs can also be corrupt and must be strictly monitored by the citizens. Total transparency and accountability is essential. "Sunshine is the best disinfectant." Distribution will take place on a quarterly basis, thus taking into account the difficulties affecting some rural inhabitants, nomads, and pastoral people.

   The distribution of the living income could be achieved without monetizing the entire income. Fulfilling basic needs for health care and education does not require money from everybody using the services. The state of the health care and education infrastructure available will determine how the living income is distributed. Satisfying the need for food, clothing and housing could still be monetized, but in some cases could also be provided at lower costs through free canteens, the distribution of free basic clothing, and the provision of shelter for the homeless.

Table 15: Sources of Revenue for a UN Living Income Bank
(in billion = 1'000'000'000 Euro)

Taxed activity	Current annual spending (before tax)	Pro-posed tax rate	Anticipated spending after tax	Expected revenue	Percent of world living income
Military spending	907	50%[217]	453.5	453.5	16.35%
CO2 emissions	29'195 million metric tons[218]	200 Euro/ton	10% reduction	525.5	18.94%
Tobin tax	600'000 (note 215)	.2%	50% reduction	600	21.6%
Stock exchange tax	36'287[219]	1%	50% reduction	181.3	6.54%
Tax on inter-national Flights	1'480 million international flights [214]	25 Euro per flight	10% reduction	33.3	1.19%
Government spending (national and local)	36% of 61'000[220] = 21'960	5%	no reduction	1'098	39.58%
Total				3'171	104.2%

A monitoring and evaluation network will be in place, with annual rotation to prevent abuses and corruption within the NGO- government relationship. States will be required to report to UNLIO on the program's performance. These reports, combined with the monitoring performed by a randomly selected coalition of NGOs and teams of international inspectors, will provide a triple layer of security as the reports generated would be made public.

All distribution bodies would be subject to disciplinary action if the reports found evidence of abuse. All end-users are entitled to a special rapid court from within the UNLIO to protest possible diversion or squandering of funds at any stage of distribution. This would require recipients to be educated about their rights to the global living income so that they can demand accountability within the system. The UNLIO

court would also have the power to investigate and monitor any organization that is involved in either the distribution or monitoring of the fund. Corruption can happen at all levels and within any organization, whether governmental or not. The court would have the power to investigate, collect evidence, try and punish any organization found to be abusing its power or the fund.

7. Sustainability
7.1 Will It Generate Income?
The program will create income assuming certain factors are introduced at the same time. First is the creation of a tax culture. Citizens must be able to afford to pay income tax. People in dire situations currently do not pay taxes because they simply cannot afford it, and their basic needs do not include taxes. If one can pay taxes, and most importantly, feels one is getting something in return for it, one will. We can assume that if people are given a chance, they will climb the economic ladder and become wealthier. If they are involved in this tax culture, they will continue to pay at a higher rate, and the state will have a reliable form of income that can be redistributed.

To end the Great Depression of the early 1930s in the USA, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt initiated the "New Deal". He printed money to finance work projects to build schools, hospitals, roads and electricity networks. This created thousands of jobs and thus increased tax revenue (Fischer, 2007, pp. 189-190). This shows that in times of economic hardship a state is better off investing in people, thus raising tax revenue, rather than cutting spending, which only further restricts production, and contributes to economic decline thus reducing tax revenue, increasing a government deficit instead of eliminating it.

Lifting people out of poverty can benefit everyone. For example, the Marshall Plan, in which the USA donated billions to help rebuild Europe after the destruction it suffered during World War II, helped not only the people of Europe, but also stimulated the US economy through increased demand for exports, and helped increase employment and prosperity in both Europe and the United States. Similarly, it can be expected that a living income for everyone will increase overall economic activity and thus benefit not only the recipients of a living income, but everyone.

With all of humanity living with at least a living income, the world will have many additional consumers and producers. These consumers will not shop for luxuries, but purchase nonetheless. Combined with a greater concentration on regionalization and specialization, this will create a larger and more prosperous regional economy, which creates

more jobs. Perú may not become a major trading partner with South Korea, but its trade with Bolívia may rise substantially. It is such expected developments that will herald the success of the global living income.

7.2 Money Management Education
Distribution bodies should provide money management courses that teach budgeting skills and entrepreneurship. One of the institutions making US agriculture one of the most productive in the world is the Agricultural Extension Service, where retired farmers teach skills and management techniques to young farmers.

8. Conclusion
> "One third of all human deaths--some 18 million people a year or 50,000 daily--are due to poverty-related causes (such as starvation, diarrhoea, pneumonia, tuberculosis, measles, malaria, perinatal and maternal conditions), which could be prevented or cured easily, and increasingly HIV-AIDS, which is still largely untreated among people in poverty. This death toll since the end of the Cold War in 1990 is about 270 million people, a majority women and children, roughly the population of the United States".[221]

Poverty is the cause of millions of deaths every year. Millions more are denied access to education, employment, health care, and the ability to provide for themselves and their families. Poverty takes many forms and its effects are brutal. A global living income is a solution to many of these problems.

Giving people the means to provide for themselves not only reduces the gross injustice of poverty but also creates an economic stimulus from which every citizen of the world could benefit. Billions of dollars are lost each year due to unrealized productivity. The fact of the matter is that people who are starving or struggling simply to survive are neither good producers nor good consumers. The rich nations of the world need to realize this fact, and contribute to solving this problem.

Enormous productive capacity lies idle: unemployment being as high as 80% in some countries. Unemployment is not only a waste of a valuable resource, but also demoralizing, found to be causing depression, divorce, even suicide (Tinbergen and Fischer, 1987). For this reason alone, every effort should be made to employ everybody who is able to work.

Much potential agricultural land remains uncultivated. Amartya Sen (1981) has shown that famines are almost always caused by a lack of

purchasing power of the poor, not by absolute shortages of food. A living income would therefore not lead to inflation, but could liberate enormous productive capacity that currently lies dormant.

One of the most underused resources to produce greater wealth for everyone is knowledge. Unlike many other resources, once new knowledge is discovered, it can be shared without limit, at almost no additional cost. Moreover, using knowledge does not exhaust it but usually adds more knowledge. If the least polluting, and least resource- and energy-intensive production methods known anywhere on earth were made available everywhere, everyone could be much better off.

Increased efficiency of production, especially from automation and robotization, now sometimes increases unemployment. But with better organization of production, this is not necessary. Rather than producing the same quantity of goods and services with fewer workers, it would be entirely possible to increase production, especially production to meet basic needs, while maintaining full employment, or to use environ- mentally sounder production methods, or both. If indeed less work is needed because everyone's needs are satisfied, the necessary work could be distributed more equally so that everyone worked shorter hours, rather than some working over-time and others being unemployed.

A global living income is an ambitious plan and will take years to realize. This does not mean that many of the ideas within the plan could not be implemented now. States must begin to put these ideas into practice, starting social programs of their own. This will reduce the effects of poverty between the present and the time when a comprehensive global living income is realized.

Societies must open their eyes to the fact that we are in a global holocaust. As stated above, millions are dying every year and the deaths are preventable. Creating a living income for all will be a clear NO! to being party to the poverty holocaust.

23 | Social Development: Pluralism Within and Between

Pluralism has in the West been reduced to *cultural pluralism*: different values, world views, ideologies; protected as human right to free thought and free speech, oral or written. But that stops short of the next step, free action: enacting these values, world views, ideologies, like for thought and speech side by side with others doing the same. Enactment means act and interact, and that means patterns of interaction, structure. We are arguing *structural pluralism*, not only between but within countries, as neighbors, cooperating and-or competing, providing citizens with the possibility of designing trajectories passing through several structural alternatives. Not only hunting in the morning ending at night as social critic (Marx' utopia), but living phases of one's life in the six development models in the fourfold Table 16, which can accommodate much pluralism (see Galtung, 1971a).

These are four different social logics, and not the same as the four presented in Chapter 2 as they did not reflect the collectivist-individualist dimension. Thus, in the presentation of the classical Japanese company above we-culture, collectivism, was emphasiz-ed. This seems to be less important in contemporary China, placed, with some doubts, with the Western liberal, vertical with individual freedom to climb. The People's Commune, the antipode, was pure Model III. Horizontality was attempted by job rotation and job reconstruction (the worker-engineer).

We have placed the Western marxist model there; certainly not the Soviet model which was very vertical, forcing collectivism on a very individualist culture--the three brothers Karamasov!--with some Model II characteristics inside the Party.

We have also placed the islamic model there, Bedouin structure being more typical than what came out of encounters with pharaonic Egypt), hindu (India) and western (Gulf?) culture. And we have placed the buddhist model in Model IV, with its great potential for pluralism even if the single *sangha* is more Model III. Individualism makes for diversity and horizontality for mobility including the possibility of enacting diversity.

But by structural pluralism in general we do not only mean within Model IV, but a country where all models, I-II-III-IV, can be found side by side. There would be a Japanese company in one corner, a town seething with Western liberalism in another, rural cooperatives very much Model III inspired and lots of seekers (for truth) of very diverse

persuasions, informed by mutual respect to engage in dialogue, a perfect Model IV all over, as a general umbrella under which the others find shelter.

Table 16: A Guide to Structural Pluralism with the Six Models

	Collectivist Singularist	Individualist Pluralist
Vertical	MODEL I: FEUDAL (The Japanese model)	MODEL II: LIBERAL (The Western liberal) (The Chinese model)
Horizontal	MODEL III: COMMUNAL (The Western marxist) (The Islamic model)	MODEL IV: PLURAL (The Buddhist model)

An islamic community may well be moving through the whole I-II-III-IV cycle. and the Chinese formation my be walking on four legs, one in each Model, even if we have allocated a present point of gravity in Model II.

This author has lived much of this pluralism and loves it. Globalism can mean borderless traffic of all kinds between diverse countries, but could also mean the same inside a country. All models are human, created by, for and with other humans; but the inner human cultural and structural pluralism by far exhausts any one of them. But, maybe not, dwelling in all of them.

24 | World Development: *Weltinnenpolitik*

The mantra *Weltinnenpolitik*, World Domestic Policy (WDP), was coined by the famous German nuclear physicist, philosopher and peace researcher, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who passed on in 2007 at the age of 94. The term caught on. But that is but a word. What does it stand for? The development implications?

Historically the answer is simple. World domestic policy is to the world what state-building was to the feudal system of principalities, duchies, count-ies, then countries, etc. There was even a state system, now fading, in Europe from 24 October 1648, the "peace" of Westphalia after the 30 years of war.

Examples: Garibaldi was the unifier of Italy 1861, the Meiji restoration in 1868 was the unifying event of Japan, and Bismarck the 1870-71 unifier of 44 of 45 German-speaking principalities (number 45 was Liechtenstein and, related to Switzerland, it did not suffer world wars). In all three cases state domestic policies were initiated. And all three of them were then (unsuccessfully) fighting for positions at the top of the state system (World War II), but did not unseat Anglo-America. All three were mono-national, but most states are not. And the world is not, and the point about *Weltinnenpolitik* is world-building.

Like for state-building, world-building will see the world from above. Thus, a helicopter sweep, over time, off the Somali coast, would reveal not only piracy of EU ships, but also theft of fish by Danish and Spanish trawlers. From this WDP point of view this is normal: the world, like a state, is a *holon*, something holistic. And, like any holon cut through by faultlines, by forces and counterforces. That all parties pursue something, that their goals and means are incompatible, is nothing new.

But *Weltinnenpolitik* enters with a rule: some governing body has to listen to all parties, evaluate the legitimacy of goals and means, grievances and policies, giving green light for legitimacy and red for the illegitimacy. But: the illegitimacy of one party does not make the opposed party legitimate; they could be carriers of other crimes. That one pursues freedom from piracy does mean others have no right to protect their major source of livelihood.

That one party pursues freedom from censorship does not mean that another party cannot pursue freedom from verbal hurt, like in the Danish government refusal to have a dialogue over the infamous

Mohammed cartoons--launched by a journalist who once worked in Moscow, was struck by unacceptable levels of self-censorship and therefore did not want to pre-censor even hurtful cartoons.

That one party fights terrorist non-state groups without uniforms who use IEDs--improvised explosive devices--and suicide bombs against women and children, does not exempt state actors in uniform using violence against women and children--by bombing from above, or by drones--from being listed as state terrorists.

The dominant powers in the state-system, and the emerging region-system stand up against piracy, censorship and terrorism. But this stand is partial. A principled WDP stand would also be against theft, humiliation and state terrorism. Even the EU, more enlightened than the USA, falls short of bridging this gap.

Audiatur et altera pars, listen also to the other side, would be the WDP rule for world *holon* faultlines: humans-nature, gender, generation, race, class--economic, military, political, cultural--excluded vs included, nation-culture-civilization, state-region. And that not only inside today's states, but also between them, with man-woman violence reflected in big-small power violence.

So, here they come, from a global domestic policies angle:

Global warming: Bad. But Greenland wants more; Northwest passages open up; Siberia. What is the world interest?

Gender: how will a world domestic policy reflect the world female majority? More focus on reproduction, less on production?

Generation: older people are excluded, retired, refused costly operations, their deaths are assisted--will they one day unite and globally become a force as important as feminism?

Race: maybe a quarter is white, three quarters non-white; a one-person-one-vote world can no longer be ruled mainly by whites.

Class, economic: Millennium Development Goals can be met, and a welfare world[222] with subsidized food, housing, free health, schooling and energy, or a living income for all financed by global commons is possible.

Class, military: outlawing foreign deployment and targeting, and massive global conciliation, mediation and peacebuilding.

Class, political: democracy, by debate-voting-majority rule or dialogue-consensus depending on culture; a UN People's Assembly with one directly elected representative per million; abolition of the undemocratic UN veto; regional assemblies, and a veto-free interregional organization replacing a veto-ridden UN.

Class, cultural: neither intolerance nor tolerance, but dialogue based on respect and curiosity, and *mutuality*, You have a truth missing in my

culture, maybe I have one you are missing?

Included, excluded: there are no chosen peoples, we are all chosen; there are no excluded humans, we are all human in *ubuntu*.

Nation-Culture-Civilization: search for the positive contribution of all of them, each one carries gifts to humanity;

Community-State-Region-World: the principle of subsidiarity: decide and act at the lowest level possible.

The WDP development implications are highly transformative for a sick world where 125,000 die every day from hunger and preventable-curable diseases. But, *Weltinnenpolitik* would have to be on the side of all humans, not only those suffering today. Kto-komy the Russians say, for whom, against whom. Yes, reduce carbon emissions to zero, but much global warming is beyond global, even cosmic reach, so also reap benefits. Yes, meet the Millennium Development Goals with students alphabetizing whole peoples, with polyclinics and generic medicines, expropriating pharmaceutical patents in the name of public interest (like land for an airport or a dam, only much more important), by new ways of growing food, 3-dimensional, multi-cropping. But be aware that some people high up are deeply scared that when people low down come up they will take revenge. Yes, meet human rights, but be aware that the gains for some may be losses for others. And they may have much power.

The unit of good politics--local-national-regional-global--is not a value-interest-right but a conflict-formation. The policy is to transform conflict formations giving all their legitimate due.

WDP can be a potential nightmare when in the hands of those who see politics as status quo, stability, in their interest, and want to freeze it in a pyramid with immense force and laws binding on those lower down more than on themselves. From pax romana, britannica, americana, sovietica, islamica to a pax democratica of certified democracies--by themselves--rivers, oceans of blood have been flowing. What we need is not one more power pyramid, or two or three, but a world state for one nation, humanity, with all relations as equitable, for mutual *and equal* benefit, as possible.

World-builders, like state-builders: watch out. These are difficult waters to navigate. But there is no other choice.

25 | From Development Assistance to Reciprocity[223]

Technical aid, or development assistance, official development assistance, ODA, is the legitimate offspring of an imperialist father and a christian missionary mother. ODA carries the codes of both.[224] Thus, in the latter there is a genuine effort to alleviate suffering by meeting basic needs, in return for conversion to the donor's brand of christianity[225], or democracy-human rights. And in the former we find imperial and neo-colonial, efforts to stabilize world economic "division of labor" with recipient countries still delivering resources; cultural cloning by imposing the Western liberal model[226] (and some clumsy Soviet efforts with their failed model), and political; sometimes also military, allegiance-alliance.

Recently the word "cooperation", with a connotation of equality, has been used. But in development assistance this means cooperation between donor and recipient elites in the administra-tion of projects and programs. Below, education assistance is used as an example.

"Cooperation" has been a fig leaf for the flagrant inequality of development assistance. The LDCs are seen as having problems-deficits and the MDCs as having the solutions, and no problems. The Western solutions will then flow along the gradients from rich to poor, from West to South, from old colonial powers + some others to old colonies + some others. The structure is hierarchi-cal, top-down, reeking with power asymmetries and stale history.

Of course, for this flow to function at all some elite cooperation West-South is indispensable. But the basic fact remains that MDCs are shaping, even planning, LDCs are being shaped, and all of that often under the supervision of Washington DC. Thus, plans are made in the West for the educational systems in the South, not vice versa; focusing on what the LDCs do not have, never on MDC deficits.

And "education" has very often been a fig leaf word for indoctrination, copying at the world level the giant brainfilling that takes place in every school in every society to make the child socially acceptable, e.g. through the 3 Rs, the national idiom in a broad sense, and through ability to count money and time. This habit of highly vertical teaching has then been carried over into the field of adult education, focusing on what the adult does not know, like the focus on illiteracy, not on his-her experience and competence. Of course a child

knows less. But the child wants to find out, together with play-mates--that is what playing is about--and for him-herself. Good pedagogy combines vertical learning with horizontal learning and self-learning. And this applies even more to adults where the recipients can often become donors of skills and wisdom. But illiteracy "campaigns", even "elimination" (notice those military terms) have become archetypical. They have modeled our practice.

Third, on top of vertical planning and teaching comes an equally vertical and destructive economism conceiving of economic growth as the supreme end, and of education as a means. Education has to be justified as an investment in the production factor L for "labor" in a production equation, with growth in L reflected in even higher growth in the economy. As adults have less productive life left educational investment has to yield even higher pay-offs, or be canceled; playing into the hands of those who command the economy.[227]

Together these ideas serve as veils distorting the fact that we live in a world where all people and countries have experiences that can be used by others and other countries. And all have problems.

The first idea is an insult to the LDCs, the second to adults, and the third an insult to all; a threat to human dignity with its cost-benefit analysis reducing humans to economic cog-wheels.

The general way out of these inequalities, the only future for international cooperation, is *reciprocity*. We all have something to teach, and much to learn, from each other. Like learning *Grameen* banking from women in India and Bangladesh. Or regular banking.

Some implications of that perspective for the three problems.

First, organizationally: the OECD sends multi-nation teams of examiners to member countries to give advice about, say, educational system, their economy, their science policy. This could be used at a world level. Why not use experts from Latin America, Africa and Asia to give advice on problems of education in USA, Canada and Sweden; not only vice versa? The objection may be that in the OECD this takes place among equals. And that is exactly the point: using that pattern in our vertical North-South would make us more equal.

Second, all over the world there are conflicts, and all over the world most people, including big power big politicians, are conflict illiterates. There is more wisdom in the Hawai'ian *ho'o pono pono* as a conflict transformation approach than in most Western approaches combined. The Arab *sulcha* and the Somali *sheer* have much to offer, as does the buddhist *co-dependent origination*, *engi* in Japanese. But very few are knowledgeable of all four. Obviously, conflict literacy is badly needed all over, and much flow would be from South to North.

Third, one possible remedy for excessive economism would be continuous and permanent adult education for economists about the nature of nature, of the inner person, of the significance of intact social fabric and intact steering culture, not destroyed by economic growth. With good ideas of what to do. Education must serve all those purposes, and not reflect these holes in the brains of mainstream economists. In return we might accept some equations and diagrams.

The key to the future of development is *reciprocity*. Two-way traffic. Thus, the thesis of this book is not to stop ODA projects and programs because of corruption, inefficiency, inefficacy; all important criteria for evaluating any initiative. If ODA should be stopped it would be because it is one-way and hence a naked power exercise, and an insult by not demanding explicit returns, except as debt burdens[228], but manipulation by demanding returns implicitly. The thesis is to continue--with some changes for sure as indicated in the prologue--but not, to quote some of the usual formulas:

- to make the donor feel good because alleviating pain is right;[229]
- to use it as a bribe for economic-military-political benefits;
- to atone for colonialism-imperialism;
- to occupy an ODA niche lest communists, jihadists, etc. do so;
- to become a member of the club of donors with confirmed MDC status.

The thesis of this book is to continue, but under a new heading: *development reciprocity*. Of course, every country or county will have its own unilateral development exercise, developing them-selves. But then comes bilateral development, two developing each other, reciprocally, for mutual and equal benefits, equitably. And multilateral development, in an equiarchy, not a hierarchy. The terms "MDC more developed"/"LDC less developed" should be banned in favor of "reciprocally developing countries", RDCs, in dyads, triads.

Trade belongs in this family. Diversity is a condition for demand, and hence for symbiosis, mutual benefit. But trade belongs only if the benefits are roughly equal, sidewards, down-wards and upwards in the two pyramids--like states or corpora-tions--trading. So development theory translates directly into trade theory, as explored elsewhere (Galtung, 2010b, forthcoming). And into other types of inter-state relations, like regions at the community, association, or union level of cooperation.

But the question on everybody's mind would be how today's LDCs could become tomorrow's RDCs? What do they have to offer?

There is no society that does not harbor some contradiction, some deep problem that may require structural (and cultural) change difficult to undertake, and there will never be. Like there is no human being who

will not sooner or later be exposed to something beyond own healing capacity, and there will never be. What we do in such cases is to seek the advice of some recognized specialist, or somebody more at our own level, like family, friends.

Like persons, like countries. MDCs readily send delegations of experts on diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, DPT, of countries suffering from development deficits. So, as mentioned, why not invite LDC delegations to DPT for them? They also have experts in the primitive, traditional, modern and postmodern sectors, with more diversity than an average MDC can muster and may see and know more.

A delegation of African experts to do that job in England--invited by the development studies institute at the University of Sussex[230]-- highlighted a festering faultline of racism and pandemic loneliness. The problem was whether England was willing or able to see itself as a carrier of untractable if not untreatable ills seen by somebody they used to see as carrying ills unlimited. That ability was absent under Margaret Thatcher, but such capacities can be nursed and grown over time. Thus, there are African patterns of hospitality and mutuality that might have helped against loneliness.

Who would pay for this? The party in need of DPT normally pays, like we pay honoraria for soma- and psycho-therapy, and sociotherapy for couples and families. But LDCs do not pay MDCs for DPT? Usually not, having little or no money, but some do and they often do via multilateral ODA, for instance through the UN specialized agencies.

One aspect of self-defeating pride is inability to take advice lest it might be seen as lack of faith in the sources of pride.

And yet it would obviously be in the interest of a very proud country like the United States of America to invite a delegation from the Cuban ministry of health for a DPT of the US health system, given Cuba's remarkable achievements--not impeccable--not only at home but all over Latin America, at a very low level of cash flow, even under a regime of sanctions. And it would be in the interest of Cuba to invite a delegation from the USA--not necessarily from Washington DC--well versed in the theory and practice of deep democracy for a DPT of the Cuban decision-making system.

And it would equally obviously be in the interest of the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA to invite a delegation of islamic bankers for a DPT of the US finance economy, with a particular focus on the limits to lending relative to own capital, and in general on lender-borrower relations and seller-buyer relations. As it might be in the interest of those islamic countries to invite a delegation of US bankers for a DPT on the flow and speed of money circulation.

Most MDCs could learn from LDCs how generations live together in a household rather than sending the aged off to old age homes.

Such encounters could be multilateral involving more countries in *RDC development circles*. And their findings, if not deliberations as there may be too much pride involved, should be made public.

An important reservoir of DPT for MDCs are the high numbers of students and fellows from LDCs invited to study, learn and imitate. They are walking storages of MDC insight. The colonized are usually much more knowledgeable about the colonizers than vice versa, who know neither LDC languages nor elementary sociology-anthropology and history. The formerly colonized start without that major handicap.

No doubt the ODA from West to South in "disease control, food production, infrastructure development, water and sanitation, internet connectivity, and the like, to identify practical, proven, low-cost and scalable strategies for the world's poorest people"[231] should continue, *if* what is offered is affordable for the needy.[232]

One counterflow in the field of education would be to globalize people in the West by teaching elementary South culture and history in schools at all levels. Much of this can be, and should be, done by immigrants, receiving curiosity and respect for their background in return for the security and possible employment in the host country, living by its rules. West teaches Western perspectives in its education assistance, so there should be a flow complementing that world view. And the West still takes it for granted that the world embraces its world view when all would be better served by multi-angle perspectives.[233] Thus, religions should be taught by believers[234], in addition to overviews by religion specialists.

"To be rich is glorious", Deng Xiaoping said, and pushed a lever bringing about maybe the quickest economic massive uplift in human history.[235] But "rich" means more than affordable necessities for basic needs--a human right--reasonable normalities, maybe even some luxuries. "Rich" also means to be rich spiritually, with complex cognitions-emotions-spirituality, including capability of responding creatively to challenges. Thus, much reciprocity West-South will be as material flows from West against spiritual flows from South.[236]

In the examples above of RDC dyads included the Western liberal model; possibly the least likely to do so out of arrogance as *the* model and ignorance of others. The five others, the overwhelming human majority, suffer less from that syndrome and hence are more likely to constitute RDC circles. But ideally all six should be included.

Some rules apply for material and spiritual production to be developmental, cutting through all six models:

- nature: to be not only sustained but further developed;
- human: to be sustained and developed with health and education;
- capital: to be protected so as to reflect real value;
- technology-creativity: to develop for ever higher processing;
- management: to be dialogical, within self, and among selves.

For material production the factors nature-human-technology are needed, for spiritual production human-creativity, both with management of self and others. *Capital is not indispensable*. Meet the basic human needs and a Mozart can write piano concertos, and countless people can produce materially whatever is needed. But capital has managed to promote itself as both means and end, making the economy capital-ist, to the exclusion of indispensable means and ends, humans and nature. It has to be balanced with nature-ism, and human-ism. The development school managing this "triple gem" best will prevail. The jury is out, and will be out for a long time. But in the meantime across-model reciprocity will be very useful for all of them, and make them more similar.

One model could say, "I am not bad on nature but know little about capital, am I right that you have the opposite profile? Why not help or assist each other develop...". Like buddhist-islamic dyads, an old tradition *When Asia Was the World*, "the Silk Road" being iconic, involving many times those living by the Western model if we count the buddhist aspect of local level China.

In fact, civilizations may be seen as specializing. The West on capital and technology, the hindu on spirituality, the buddhist on human conviviality, the Chinese on large scale management and sustainability as judged by the survival of China for more than 2,000 years, the Japanese on developing without nature resources, specializing on the other four. *Much complementarity to ride on.*

Some criteria for material and spiritual production:

C/N, *culture over nature*, to be improved, in a micro-chip, or in a buddhist monk. The Kaname Akamatsu Japanese development model:
- develop all factors, and communication-transportation
- always improve the degree of processing, form over matter, C/N
- use value-added to improve all the factors and C/N further
This also applies to spiritual production of truth, beauty, etc.
The Ricardo "comparative advantages" model is anti-development.

Q/P, *quality over price*, always to be improved, meaning
- human-intensive for high quality, with attention to detail
- human-extensive for high quantity, with economies of scale

• human-intensive for factors-finishing and -extensive in-between
as part of the classical Japanese development model. This also holds for
spiritual products; talks, dances, books, art, music.

F/R, *factor (not only finance) economy over real economy*, always to be
watched and balanced lest one of them dominates the process:
• nature, by becoming too sacred; ecologism; too naturist
• human, by absorbing too much of the value-added; too humanist
• capital-finance, absorbing too much of the capital value-added
• technology-creativity, as a goal in itself; too purist
• management by absorbing too much decision-making, too top-heavy
To be self-sustaining the process should balance all five factors.

P/M, *plan over market*, to be watched and balanced by combining three
economies lest one of them dominates the process:
• local: households produce and consume, plan and market
• national: public and private sectors negotiate a mixed economy
• global: State-Plan and Capital-Market cooperate for export, competing
domestically for export globally (Japan, China)
Spiritual production: balance inner projects with outer interest; neither
totally autistic nor totally other-driven.

D/G, *distribution over growth*, to be balanced against growth with no
distribution or distribution with no growth (Western models):
• by first distribution, then switching to growth (Japanese model)
• by trying to do both, incrementally (Western compromise models)
• by first one, then the other, and so on (the Chinese model)
Spiritual production: attention to sharing, not only inner growth.

The thesis is that imbalances will impede development.

To guarantee this: local level for necessities (buddhist model);
public-private-NGO-technical sector cooperation (Chinese model);
sharing (islamic model).

Companies should be trustees-CEO-management-workers-customers-suppliers-community-nature dialogical communities, sharing
positive, cooperating on negative externalities (peace business model).

Much reciprocity is needed. For true globalization.

Epilogue: Development as a Way of Life

The way development has been conceived of in this book goes far beyond a comparison of countries in economic achievement. All kinds of dimensions are considered, economic, military, political, cultural and social = structural and cultural. All spaces are there, nature, human, social, world. And above all an overriding very simple theory: diversity and symbiosis, with equity.

And that translates into a program for development as a way of life, for you, for me. There is a message worth considering: if you want to develop, unfold, then cultivate diverse potentials in yourself. Your selves. Do not go for only one for your whole life, go for many, maybe not for all at the same time. Do not see them as separate compartments in your self, but open the walls between them, let them flow through the walls, let them inspire each other. You love nature, you love running; so run in nature. You are a social scientist, you like writing more literary stuff; so write about the human and social drama. You like travel, you like history, so build your travels around historical themes.

Practice equity in your mind. Conceive of your potentials not as competitive, but as cooperative. Try to avoid seeing any one of your potentials as the one, the single axis around which your life rotates, even if society has defined you that way. Rather, praise them all, see yourself as blessed with potentials in plural, even if only one or two of them earn your bread. See your development as unfolding; as a goal in itself, not a means.

Do so and a richer life will come to you as a ripe fruit. Moreover, its seeds will spread to others around you. The more you are enriched the more you can enrich others. Compete, but with yourself, to improve yourself, not with others to beat them.

Others you should try to enrich, and if they happen to be your partners enrichment may become reciprocal. You will enrich each other, both will get tenfold back. Of course your potential profiles will have similarities and differences, so find a basis for equitable symbiosis across differences, within and between.

Grammar is useful here. "To develop" is in this context not transitive, but intransitive, reflexive, reciprocal. "I develop you", meaning I am the cause of some effect in you, is influence, power, grafting me onto you; not development as you unfolding. "I develop" makes sense, stating the fact that unfolding is going on. "I develop myself" is even better, with my self entering as both subject and object, meaning I work on myself, identifying my potentials, letting them

unfold, dropping some, improving others.

But the best of them all is "we develop each other", meaning mutuality, reciprocity. "I sense some potential in you left un-unfolded; I appeal to it and will watch it unfold, blossom. Do you see some unattended potential in me?" Maybe more generosity, more spirituality, more attention to form not only content in language and body language. There is mutual benefit in enriching each other if not equally at least not flagrantly unequally.

Do this within your own gender, generation, race, class, nation and state and you develop friendship. Cross the gender line and you may enter love or deepen a friendship. Cross the generation line and you build a family. Do all of this and you build a humanly and socially rich community. The more equitable and the more reciprocal the more easily will enrichment resources flow between persons. To accept being inspired by others is easier when you yourself are accepted as a source of inspiration. Mutuality can become highly addictive and contagious.

Like human and community development, so also countries. The same applies to their relations. If development is practiced within oneself, and in the relations to significant others, then it may be easier to understand what works and what not. Thus, one-way "aid" or "assistance" to "catch up" will have to yield to two-way development assistance. All countries have deficits and potentials, all can benefit from advice and help from others. And the time to start is now, two-way, equitably.

Shaping the minds of others implies willingness to be shaped by them; like letting development models--buddhist, islamic, Western liberal, Western marxist, Japanese, Chinese--flow both ways. Using other persons by relating only to one aspect--muscular power, security, money-making, menial services, sex--with no broadening of the relation is anti-development for persons.[237] Like preparing Third World countries for delivering resources only at ever higher quality over price, pitting them against each other in competition, rewarding them for knowing their place in the world, punishing them--by military intervention--if they do not.

The parallels are many, the isomorphism is rich. And the morale of the story: if you are eager to develop something, why not start with yourself, making development your way of life? Like learning to listen to the diverse potentials longing to blossom inside yourself, enriching each other. From developing your own selves proceed to others, at the least not standing in the way. If you want to relate to others through your best insights then others might want the same, beyond being listeners. Like a country wanting "Made In..." to stand for high Q/P and

C/N, high quality and culture, mindful that others might want the same. Make development your way of life; and you will be amply rewarded.

In conclusion, also as a summary, let us spell out some implications of this for the spaces of development, both within them and between them:

Nature. Beyond the obvious implication to protect abiota and biota diversity, and such symbiotic processes as photosynthesis--including putting CO_2 to work in a maximum of greenhouses--comes another implication: exposing nature and humans to new challenges, like in the oceans, in space, rather than waiting for mutations.

Intra-personally this calls for rich, complex, contradictory cognitions and emotions, nursed through rich and complex lives, and a quest for syntheses, tolerance of ambiguity, inner dialogue.

Inter-personally this calls for human diversity, cooperation, harmony, friendship, love-sex, new partnerships with equity across faultlines, like inter-race, inter-class, inter-nation marriages.

Intra-socially this calls for dialogue and equity across faultlines like gender, generation, race, class, included-excluded, nation, state to enhance diversity, cooperation.

Inter-state and inter-nation: this calls for borderless trade and exchange for mutual and equal benefit, enhancing diversity.

Intra-region: this calls for neighboring countries with overlaps in development models because of overlap in codes to come closer together, in veto-free associations, communities, unions, like the European and African unions, the South Asian and Southeast Asian associations and the likely region-nal organizations for Latin American, islamic and East Asian countries[238], based on diversity-symbiosis-equity, and relating to the whole world.

Inter-region and inter-civilization: this calls for a maximum of RDCs, reciprocal development circles, sharing positive, and cooperating on negative, externalities in trade, for global conflict resolution, a veto-free UN, and diversely selecting and eclecting the best from all religions, cultures and models.

Global governance: this calls for a global democracy, not First Past the Post (the winner takes all), but coalition governance and global referenda (Swiss model); UN reform by expanding the Security Council and abolishing the veto, a UN Governmental Assembly, UNGA, for states, a UN People's Assembly, UNPA based on direct elections, and a UN Corporate Assembly, UNCA.

Holism and dialectics: the basic point would be to think, speak *and* act, globally, regionally, nationally *and* locally, for more diversity and new forms of symbiosis with equity. And human, social and world development will reinforce each other mutually.

In short: *Let thousand development flowers unfold*.

Appendix 1:
Development and Its Discontents: 50 Theses

1. There are two types of change: development deliberately steered toward goals; and process, which is not. Development is willed; hence it is politics, hence loaded with conflict as there may be incompatible development goals, held by the same or different actor. That makes the definition of development a key political issue as it is not only a question of goals but of whose goals and whose will.

2. Development, consequently, always poses key political questions: what and why; who and how; when and where; against whom, for whom. What-why is the theory of development (Chapter 2); the others practice: who-how strategy; when-where tactics, and for whom-against whom the political costs and benefits. The MDG prologue above shows that there is an "against whom" side which may cancel any development policy. Development is politics is controversial.

3. Any understanding of development has to be located at the interface between the goals of development and the processes taking place anyhow: they may facilitate development, impede it, both-and, or neither-nor. Part Two in this book deals with exactly that: the macro-historical context explained not from changing means of production, but changing means of transportation-communication.

4. Social processes can be understood as driven by human beings in the interface between nature, structure and culture; with culture defining the standards for good/bad, right/wrong, true/false, beautiful/ugly and sacred/secular; structure being the interaction pattern between human actors, and between collective human actors (e.g, nations, states), and nature being the available resources, threatened because nature's basic needs for diversity and symbiosis (Chapter 2 above) are not met, even insulted.

5. As a general assumption nature is sluggish, changing slowly, culture less so, structure much less so and human action not sluggish at all. Gross features of nature are *permanent*, deep culture is *permanent* for long periods of time, structures are in *process* with upturns, downturns (Kondratiev) and jumps, human actions are *events*. We sense more clearly human action than the slow workings of nature, structure and culture. There are also processes like cycles, in nature, culture, structure, and in action.

6. A powerful explanatory theory is based on *processes impinging on permanents*, leading to a *rupture*. Sufficiently many events in the same direction may break a structure, and a structure in process may break a

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permanent structure, or culture (Marx). Concerted human action by workers, women, LDCs may break a structure; and strong structural processes may break a culture that looks permanent, like economism. Concerted human action may break nature, for bad or for good. Ruptures are dramatic, hence development is dramatic.

7. The deep culture, or cosmology, or code, of a civilization (defined as a macro-culture, a culture extending over vast regions of space and time), has symbolic, like religion and ideology, and material, like social structure and technology, manifestations. True development can be seen as the unfolding or manifestation of the cosmology, in all fields (Chapter 1). Development is the culture realizing itself, including in the structural processes (Part Four).

8. In endogenous development the goals come from the culture itself, development being an accelerated process; in exogenous development the goals come from other cultures and may pervert development into imposition and imitation. If the relation is two way, egalitarian, it could turn into mutual learning, reciprocity.

9. Given the successful expansionist unfolding of Occident I,
• Western culture is seen as the universal culture;
• Western structure is seen as the universal social model;
• Western process is seen as universal history.
As a consequence, development in the West becomes endogenous, and development in the non-West exogenous, in agreement with Western cosmology, denying other cultures their unfolding (see Part Three).

10. Basic assumptions transmitted from the West to the Rest:
• NATURE: Resource asymmetries to be evened out through *trade,* and processing of natural resources, regardless of depletion-pollution;
• CULTURE: Bourgeois Way of Life, BWL, distance from nature in jobs and living; materialist individualism, consumerism, security.
• STRUCTURE: Bureaucracy-Corporation-Intelligentsia, BCI, jointly for state-building, market-expansion and power to intelligentsia.
• PROCESS: Imposing the West code on the Rest, and imitation.

11. Economic growth steered by BCI-integration as condition for BWL.
How much and for how many depends on the level of average and distribution, with several models depending on:
• the average BWL level in the country
• the inequality BWL level in the country
• the existence or not of misery at the bottom
Growth is for and by the top of society, hoping for trickling down.

12. The welfare state aims at misery-elimination, low inequality, and high

average livelihood. Whether a welfare world is possible, given limited resources, is disputed. The other seven combinations can be found, conditioned by and conditioning the country's development style depending on whether development is seen as:

- development of the people (abolishing misery)
- development of the elites (high inequality)
- development of the country (high average)

These development styles do not exclude each other.

13. In general terms:
- the higher the economic growth, the higher the inequality between rich and poor;
- the higher the medical services growth, the higher the life, expectancy inequality in terms of years lived (from 0 to 120?);
- the higher the schooling growth, the higher the schooling inequality in terms of years of schooling (from 0 to PhD).

Unless, that is, *growth is really accompanied by distribution*, whether distribution is simultaneous or intermittent.

14. Involuntary and long-lasting *poverty* means having less; *misery* means having so much less that it harms and hurts, in terms of air, water, nutrition, sleep, excretion, clothing, shelter, access to medical and schooling services and to communication-transportation. Misery-abolition would channel monetary and non-monetary resources to the people suffering in return, or not, for work. The question is how, and here are four approaches:

- money in return for work: *jobs*, depending on the employment level
- money, not in return for work: *charity*, benefits, minimum income
- not monetary, in return for work: *nonformal economy*
- not monetary, not in return for work: *social net, family-friends*

The ability to provide all four is a measure of social development.

15. Generally speaking the world today has two major developmental styles for getting rich (amplified in Chapter 10, Part Two):

- in the judeo-christian corner: individualist, competitive
- in the buddhist-confucian corner: collectivist, cooperative.

16. Both styles are based on the Western Enlightenment logic, with successors to the Almighty's omnipotence, -presence and -science:

- *Staatslogik*, B, accumulation of, and turnover, of power, in *State*
- *Kapitallogik*, C, accumulation and turnover of wealth, in *Capital*
- *Logik*, I, contradiction-free, deductive reasoning, in *Science*

But the state system may be yielding to a regional system; the capital-ist economic system may be fading in favor of the other production factors, to nature-ist, and human-ist, economic systems; and the Western scientific system may be yielding in favor of a more mixed epistemology, open to

daoist holism-dialectics, etc.[239]

17. It took the West about 300 years to achieve a BCI-integration sufficient for concerted development strategies, through
- the transformation of clergy into intelligentsia-professionals;
- the transformation of aristocracy into bureaucrats-capitalists;
- the transformation of merchants into capitalists.

18. It took Japan about 30 years to do the same, using the decline of the *shi* (samurai, bureaucrats, scholars) and the rise of the *sho* (merchants) in late Tokugawa in the *shi-sho* alliance running Japan, and the *see-saw* hypothesis: first the *sho*, then the *shi*, and so on.

19. In general the Japanese developmental style is based on
- overcoming contradiction between state and capital: shintoism
- overcoming contradiction between capital and labor: buddhism
- overcoming contradictions between capital- and labor-intensive production; the Japanese Mode of Production, JMP: confucianism

State-capital cooperation is the king-bolt of the system, through cohorts from top universities; Capital-labor cooperation is done through company unions; and the JMP combines artisanal production of parts with robotization and artisanal finishing of the production.

20. The system was super-efficient, but gave rise to contradictions that contributed to the decline of Japan and to the rise of China:
- with women, young/old, small companies, minorities
- with nature
- with less developed countries (resources, local production)
- with more developed countries (Japan was good on quality/price).

21. Role of culture in development (Peace by Peaceful Means, Part IV):
- Cosmology: expansionist Occident I and Nipponic invading others
- Occident II has been overcome, that was Western history
- Indic accepts others too easily, hence not shaken enough
- Buddhic is based on small units that can be easily penetrated
- Sinic will learn from barbarians but generally be self-reliant
- Nipponic will penetrate the world inner periphery (*dai-to-a*) and use the rest of the world as a resource.

22. Role of structure in development:
Social structure:
- Occident I BCI seen as primordial, hence accepted as "modern"
- Occident II was overcome, it was by definition "traditional", but survived in some Iberic regions in South America
- the Soviet effort of accelerated history never produced BCI

- the Hindu imitation comes too easily but remains upper caste
- the Sinic class structure after Mao produced BI, and then also C
- the Nipponic used "degreeocracy", universities, to generate a BCI

World structure:
- geography still important, hence different world quadrants: Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, Southeast
- because races move and mingle slowly
- because cultures move and mingle slowly
- at present the decline of Northwest and the rise of the Southeast.

23. Economic systems defined by Market and Plan:
Degree of national market, and national plan articulation yield
- Blue: high on Market, low on Plan
- Red: low on Market, high on Plan
- Green: low on Market, low on Plan, local
- Rose: medium on Market, medium on Plan
- Yellow: high on Market, high on Plan
- Rainbow: Green + Rose + Yellow

Thus, there are not only two economic systems, Blue and Red, but also the local, the social democrat, the Japanese and the mix.

24. Economic systems across spaces
Maturity: Rose-Yellow-Rainbow best; Blue-Red worst, no diversity
Nature space: Green best, Blue-Red-Yellow bad, Rose in-between
Human space: Blue for freedom, Red for wellness, Rainbow for all
World space: If we look at how countries interact with each other as a consequence of their development models we find that the best is Green, the worst Blue-Red-Yellow, with Rose in-between.

25. Why are Green and Rose not the favorite development models? Small may be beautiful, but possibly because they are:
- not in the Enlightenment-modernity state-capital-science logic
- not carried by elite-big countries
- useless in today's world to promote powerful elite-big countries
- able to produce happy people, but not glittering elites-countries
- seen as limited to ecological balance and basic human needs.

26. Whatever can be said about development and development discourse the problems of ecological imbalance and misery will remain. To solve them, goals are needed, also from the outside, and structures and cultures will facilitate or impede. Hence, development problems will continue to be with us regardless of what we think of the theories and the discourses. The struggle over development will continue.

27. If we recognize the attainment of a minimum of "bourgeois way of life",

BWL, for all, on top of the satisfaction of basic needs for all, as development, then the question is how to achieve development outside the two poles of development, the judeo-christian and the buddhist-confucian, able to do so through BCI-integration. A general strategy of development is needed, flexible enough to be applicable many places, yet precise enough to be meaningful (see points 41-50 below).

28. No strategy for development will guarantee development as an automatic outcome of structural, cultural or natural processes. Much work is needed, and it has to be facilitated, not impeded.

29. For development to be sustainable there must be human use of human beings (sustaining basic needs) and natural use of nature (sustaining ecological balance). Sustainable development would use and develop further the potential of all human beings and nature.

30. A strategy for sustainable development cannot be based on
- the Blue development model because it is too hard on nature, generates misery in people and countries, and is too uncooperative
- the Red development model because it makes too few people decide over economic cycles relevant for too many
- the Green development model because it is too autarchic
- the Yellow development model for blue and red reasons
- the Rose development model for yellow reasons, although less so

A development strategy has to build on all five, combining elements from them all: multiple models and eclecticism (see Part Four).

31. Why does Africa not develop?[240] A deeply wounded continent by slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism, but very resource rich;
- Culture: A layer of non-indigenous Western culture over African indigenous social codes, fragmented and destroyed, with no African model country like Japan for East Asia; a culture of expecting too much from independence, socialism, and now capitalism; dominated by colonial role-models enriching elites; not hard-working enough;
- Structure: borders between states fragmenting nations and serving as an unending agenda for conflict and violence impeding development, the local chief system too easily co-opted under colonialism and now under neo-colonialism; nomadism less available as safety-valve during natural and social catastrophes; the BCI system well integrated but very small and elitist; transportation-communication infra-structure affordable to all still missing.

32. Why does Latin America not develop?[241] Also a deeply wounded continent exposed to massive genocide and imposition of foreign religion and language, but very resource rich;

- Culture: because Iberian catholicism had social stability, not development as unfolding, but salvation in focus, grafted on such local social codes as the Inca and Aztec cultures. The exception was the Jesuit experiment in Paraguay combining public ownership of land with private use(rship), provided the land was tilled well, making Paraguay the richest country after independence till England mobilized neighbors to crush it when Paraguay started competing;
- Structure: because Iberian *poderes fácticos*--landowners, military, clergy--managed to keep power after independence, lack of land reform, countless military coups, and business with low C/N ratio, exporting products at very low levels of processing; and above all the periphery position as "backyard" to US imperialism.

33. Why do some Asian countries not develop? For the reasons given for Africa and Latin America; but studies of the period +500-+1500 show how a very dynamic development along many dimensions was stifled by Western colonialism, starting with Portuguese attack on the Silk Road trade. But that millennium is strong evidence of the potential, and not only in the sense of economic growth (Part Four for the buddhist, islamic and daoist-confucian-shinto models).

34. Why do the OECD countries not develop further? They have reached the limits to economic growth, partly because they have exhausted their potential, partly because they are overtaken by very costly growth externalities, and mainly because the expansionist code stimulates unfoldings incompatible with a finite world.

35. To whom do the challenges of development experiences accrue?
- in the Blue/Rose model: to the entrepreneur as private property
- in the Red model: to the Planning Commission as their property
- in the Yellow model: to the company or ministry, as property
- in the Green model: ideally as collective-communal property
- in the Third world: to First world corporations-agencies-experts
Thus the enrichment is privatized, kept secret, localized or stolen.

36. Technical-development assistance is not the road to development:
- it means culturocide by grafting a donor's code on the recipient;
- it keeps colonialism by cementing trade across processing gaps;
- it stifles social development by growing elite-people inequality;
- challenge and responsibility accrue mainly to the First World;
- it is habit-forming, addictive, promoting a culture of dependency;
- begging for assistance facilitates bribing for submission;
- it turns the recipient countries into objects for donor steering.
But it may work if of short duration, with functional specificity and genuine recipient-donor cooperation, in planning and in execution.

37. Health as development variable brings in its wake the transitions from one cluster of pathologies to another:
- Cluster I: infectious diseases
- Cluster II: cardiovascular, cancerous and mental diseases
- Cluster III: chronic diseases
- Cluster IV: violence-war at the micro-meso-macro-mega levels

Inequalities in life expectancy call for lifting the bottom up.
Development calls for quality of death, not only quantity of life.
Quality of Death, and its acceptance, may rest on three factors:
- the completion of human unfolding from birth to death, not cut off by direct violence, or worn out by illness or structural violence;
- that the final phase is neither too short to permit a farewell, nor so long as to be a burden for all;
- that the cause of death is multiple, not singular and avoidable.

38. Education as development variable may carry in its wake gross inequalities; priority both to excellence and to lifting the bottom.

39. Ecological balance as development variable may carry in its wake more panda protection than human misery elimination, calling for a both-and, not either-or, and indeed not neither-nor.

40. Development theories should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but as dealing with different aspects of the process. Thus, there is no need to choose between:
- modernization theory, good on BCI complexes, as one condition
- dependency theory, good on mutual Periphery-Center conditioning
- C/N-Q/P-F/R theory, good for the understanding of economic growth
- BWL theory, good for the understanding of shallow development
- basic human needs theory, good for understanding deep development
- exploitation theory, good for understanding inequalities
- externalities theory, good for understanding exploitation

And there are many more that all contribute something.

Concluding Summary: Ten Points on Economic Development
The following summary is an effort to express in few points the experience of this author with the development "problematique", combining green (43-45, 49), blue (46-47), rose and yellow (48) points.

41. For true development, there has to be a new beginning, brought about by a major crisis or a nature-produced trauma; some general social change facilitating a significant redistribution of domestic power.

42. There also has to be a new beginning for some parts of the international system, brought about the same way, with some major redistribution of

international power in harmony with point 41.

43. For the economic base, redistribute the five production factors so that everybody is a potential participant in production:
• nature: public ownership, with private use as trusteeship
• labor: better human quality through health, education, challenges
• capital: easy access to credit solidly backed
• technology: appropriate to nature, human, social and world needs
• management: appropriate to development with equiarchy and dialogue.

44. *First priority*: production for basic needs for the most needy. In practice this means: food, clothes, housing, health, education; if possible by local production avoiding basic needs dependency.

45. *Second priority*: production of production-consumption tools:
• food: walking tractors; pots and pans, stoves, solar energy
• clothes: spinning, weaving tools
• housing: manufacture of bricks, building materials
• health: prevention, polyclinics, generic drugs, barefoot doctors
• education: school houses and material, use of locals, of elders.

46. *Third priority*: production for export, with increasing level of processing, C/N, Culture imprinted on Nature for trade in C, not N.

47. *To get rich*: increase the Q/P ratio, Quality over Price. Keep high savings ratios, invest, reinvest; do no speculate.

48. *To remain rich*: always improve production factors:
• nature: improve, help nature with eco-balance
• labor: ever higher health-education-challenge levels for high Q/P
• capital: watch F/R, Finance economy/Real economy, for synchrony
• technology: invest in the creativity of everybody; for high C/N
• management: for the participation of everybody in equiarchies.

49. *To remain developed*:
• nature space: sustainable local eco-cycles; internalize eco-cycles
• human space: challenge to everybody; internalize challenges
• social space: misery-abolition always as first priority
• world space: country, region economic cycles; share negative and
  positive externalities equally, more cooperation than competition.

50. *If it fails: start again, maybe from the beginning (41 above).*

All other aspects of development are model specific as they are all culture-dependent. But the reader will recognize elements from all six models in this "least common denominator" approach. Thus, there are Western liberal elements but this goes beyond that model.

Appendix 2: Development Indicators[242]

The indicators have to be specific to the model of development, and focus on that model for the nature, human, social, world spaces.

Western liberal model:
• floor but no ceiling for material-somatic needs (USA has no floor)
• spiritual needs unattended
• private ownership of factors of production
• economic growth
• first generation individual civil political human rights
• decision-making by democracy, debate and multi-party voting

Western marxist model:
• floor and ceiling on material-somatic needs
• focus on spiritual needs, particularly on arts and creativity
• social-cooperative ownership of factors of production
• economic distribution
• second generation collective social, economic and cultural rights
• decision-making by a party of committed individuals and voting

Buddhist model:
• nonviolence, no-killing, no-war partnership with all sentient life
• floor and ceiling for material-somatic human needs
• focus on spiritual needs, general well-being, spiritual happiness
• small and diverse local community for production-consumption
• economic distribution
• third generation human rights to peace, development, environment
• decision-making by dialogue toward consensus

Islamic model:
• floor but no ceiling for individual material-somatic needs
• togetherness in a spiritual community for spiritual needs
• individual ownership of factors of production
• sharing as social obligation and individual commitment
• individual and collective human rights
• world peace
• decision-making by dialogue toward consensus

Japanese model:
• floor but no ceiling for individual material-somatic needs
• spiritual needs unattended
• cooperative corporate ownership of factors of production
• economic distribution first, then growth

- individual and collective human rights
- social harmony by handling grievances
- decision-making by dialogue toward consensus

Chinese model:
- floor but no ceiling for individual material-somatic needs
- spiritual needs unattended
- individual, corporate and state ownership of factors of production
- economic distribution, then growth, then distribution, then...
- social harmony by handling grievances
- decision-making by a party of committed individuals and dialogue

We note the inattention to nature and world spaces in the models. Indicators measure if all of this is the case in the world; as Wittgenstein said, *die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist*.

We are not completely through with GNP/capita[243] and GNP/capita growth; they are present both in the Western liberal, the Japanese and the Chinese models. That gives us four cases: GNP/capita low with low vs high growth and GNP/capita high with low vs high growth. Low-low may be unacceptable to the other three models. A low-high lifting is needed to raise above the floor till the system hits the ceiling in the buddhist case; no clear limit in the islamic case. The buddhist model is about avoiding extremes and about equality, the islamic model about avoiding misery. In both, GNP materialism will compete with the spiritual and other concerns. The problem, then, is to identify a GNP/capita level (accepting that as a measure of material wealth) that is satisfactory, neither too low nor too high, *quantum satis*--"lagom" in Swedish, "passe" in Norwegian---with growth for replacement only. The Western liberal model has never been able to identify an adequate GNP/capita level. It has become so addicted to growth that only high-high is acceptable. High-low is seen as a crisis, not asking, "don't we actually have enough?"

One argument for GNP/capita is as a measure of the wealth of a system, as a resource to be used in politically acceptable ways. But then it is a measure of a means, like oil deposits, fish inside the limits, not as an end. There are efforts to come closer to the livelihood of individuals multiplying the GNP/capita by a measure of equality from 0 (total inequality) to 1, or employment from 0 (total unemployment) to 1, or both, thus "correcting" for social evils. But that detracts from GNP as a simple wealth measure.

The effort to measure development made a great step forward with the UNDP Human Development Indicator, HDI, growing out of the debates in the 1970-80s, among many places in Geneva (where this author participated). Demanded was an indicator that would relate to the concrete individual human level (not to a system like "the economy", GNP), would be close to basic human needs (not only an average, like GNP/capita), and feasible, available. "Quality of life" was an important formula, with physical

and spiritual aspects, the latter were ruled out for lack of feasibility. The focus was on the Physical Quality of Life Indicators, PQLI, which eventually led to HDI, with the late Mahbub ul Haq in a leading role.[244]

Launched in 1990[245], there were three components in the index: *Life expectancy*, *Literacy* and *Purchasing Power*. They all measure human individual attributes. Adequacy in food, clothing, housing and health care will show up as high life expectancy, and for No. 5 of *los cinco bienes fundamentales*, education, literacy is a good indicator. More dubious is purchasing power. It provides options in a monetized economy, but that already assumes that a monetized economy is a part of the idea of development.However, it may be argued that by and large the first priority will be for ways of meeting basic needs, letting the people decide which they are. But then it might be corrected for distribution inequality.[246]

In 1990 Japan came out on top and Niger at the bottom of 130 countries. The interesting finding was the low correlation with the still dominant development indicator, GNP/capita. Thus, the USA was No. 2 in GNP/capita and No. 19 on HDI, meaning wealth not converted into human development. Conversely, Costa Rica was No. 28 in HDI in spite of being only No. 77 in GNP/capita. The political economy of both low-high and high-low are not difficult to understand.[247]

This index can be accepted by all six models. But some also focus on spiritual needs: freedom, beyond freedom of expression, as having choices, options, including to create[248]; and identity, on having some meaning-generating anchor in life. We have linked these two needs to structural choice for freedom and cultural choice for identity. Measuring structural and cultural diversity available to the members of a development unit--individual, community, country, region, world--should be feasible. As should individual vs collective ownership of means of production, including power to decide over profits, and the level of realization of individual and collective human rights. The third generation is more problematic.

Even more difficult to measure are the islamic dimensions of togetherness and sharing. A metaphor might be a family, based on exactly those two. How do we measure the quality of a family? Hardly by the frequency of contact, length of togetherness, value of what is shared, in other words numbers, time, and money. Probably more by a sense of safety, that regardless of what happens there is somebody who will share my concerns, suffer my suffering, and enjoy my joy. The five islamic pillars are seen as being about that.

How do we measure a key component of the Japanese and Chinese models, social harmony? Many governments prefer the anti-dialectic "by absence of grievances": nonsense. Above "by handling grievances" is suggested, i.e., by conflict competence. Degree of isomorphism, of self-similarity between levels of organization, might be another approach, closer to the confucian idea. But what *morphe*, structure? Hierarchy or equiarchy? Should we accept hierarchy if so consistent that people are trained to easily

accept whatever comes from above?

Then there is democratic decision-making as criterion in social and world space, as debate-vote or dialogue-consensus; not excluding each other. Democratic decision-making, however done, is neither limited to the national level nor to elections; covered by the Index of Democratization developed by Tatu Vanhanen, based on the product of degree of electoral Participation and the share of the smaller parties and independents of the votes cast, Competition.[249] A key step forward, but we also need an index of how many at what levels in fact are democratic, with family and corporations being crucial. General participation is a part of all models, but the how differs.

But we need more holistic indicators, and the *Gross National Happiness* (GNH) movement and index focus on well-being and happiness. Coming out of buddhist traditions in the small and distant Bhutan, it is inspired by the buddhist model as antipode of the Western liberal.[250] Four international conferences on GNH--first in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan in 2004, second in Nova Scotia, Canada in 2005, third in Thailand 2007, fourth in Thimpu in 2008--and an index emerges. GNH has 4 pillars, economy, culture, environment, governance, 9 domains (one is psychological well-being) and 72 indicators (like prayer-meditation, compassion, *karuna*, loving kindness, *metta*, and nonviolence, *ahimsa*), combined in sums of weighted squared distances from cut-off points. Government programs should be judged not by economic benefit but by the happiness they produce (Seth Mydans, 2009a-c, see www.gnh-movement.org). See also the French *Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*, focussed on households (Michaelis, 2009).

Conclusion: more depth may matter more than more numbers.

Then, all indicators have to pass a basic and problematic test: units of development do not exist in vacuum, they are interactive.

Imagine we w * (to measure the GDP of an Occident II, feudal society, by measuring the GDP of a high castle upon-a-hill, disregarding what happens in the slummy villages below where the serfs are toiling from dawn to dusk, carrying major portions of their harvest on their backs, up the hill.

Everybody would say, you have to look at the total economic system, trade being low so GDP rather than GNP will do.

And some would add, do not compute averages like GDP/capita, the lord up there is given too much weight, go for the median.

And then still some others may add one more reflection. The wealth in the castle depends on the interaction with the villages. But in that interaction the castle receives so much more than it gives, living off its ownership of land. In so doing the villages become less than they could have been, and the castle more. Under what conditions? Paying serfs (much) more for their labor?

Under feudalism the castle gets a plus, E, for exploitation and the village a minus, D, for damage to eco-balance, health, and to local and world structure and culture. We do not assume E=D.

Just as we may not accept counting stolen money in a person's income or fortune, we might subtract E from the castle GDP and add D to the village GDP. We might also penalize the castle further by also subtracting D, like a thief compensating not only for stolen money, but for the economic damage because of lack of liquidity.

Of course, the castle is a metaphor for the Western liberal model's MDCs, the village for the LDCs, paying better for labor may stand for paying better for resources (the Prebisch terms of trade model). But there is a good argument against this reasoning: maybe, but the GDP-GNPs, per capita or not, is what we know we have empirically; make the potential reality empirical and we shall see what we get.

Again, this is more about conceptual clarification than about numbers. It is a matter of keeping in mind not only achievement according to the goals of any one of the models, but *at the expense of whom*. And at this point the assumption would be that:

- the buddhist model is high on self-reliance;
- the islamic model is high on just, equitable trade;
- the Western liberal model is high on **E**(xploitation)&**D**(amage);
- the Western marxist model is high on self-reliance and equity;
- the Japanese model is high on **E&D** globally, not domestically;
- the Chinese model compensates for E through community development.

To what extent this is the case would be for indicators of E and D to measure. A good exercise would be good measures of the E and D of slavery and colonialism, not to subtract from the GNP of colonial countries but to assess colonialism as en economic system. By E and D then we mean net exploitation and damage, not denying that they may be counterflows and positive contributions. Highly controversial although it should be standard, even trivial, work.

Appendix 3: Bivariate Diachronic Analysis

For the empirical study of the development of M countries on N dimensions, here N=1 or N=2, there are basically 4 approaches:

Univariate synchronic analysis, USA: listing the N countries according to one development dimension, usually taken from the Western liberal model, from top to bottom.

Bivariate synchronic analysis, BSA: plotting the N countries on two development dimensions, X and Y, tracing regression curves, calculating the (X,Y) correlation.

Univariate diachronic analysis, UDA: plotting the N countries on the chosen development dimension, with time as independent variable, to follow the trajectories over time: static, monotone increase, monotone decrease, single-peaked, multi-peaked.

Bivariate diachronic analysis, BDA: plotting N countries as trajectories on two development dimensions, X and Y, through time, with time as a parameter (or as a third dimension), to follow the trajectories over time: X first, then Y; Y first, then X; X and Y together, linear or curvilinear, in circle, no pattern at all.

To study the dialectic between the X process and the Y process we need BSA and BDA; BSA for some general, average pattern, BDA to follow the dialectic, similar or different, for each country, not for an abstract average. The two dimensions yield a limited holism, better than one dimension, and open for dialectic analysis.

How would we expect a yin/yang dialectic to show up on a BDA diagram? Imagine we plot for each year, five years, or decade, always the same interval, putting the year on the X,Y point. We would expect change along the X=Y diagonal to slow down, meaning that the observations over time would come closer and closer, while at the same time Y=yang would first remain constant, then pick up and X slows down, slow first, then more quickly.[251]

And that was exactly the case for, for instance, Japan for X=level of education, level of health, level of communication-transportation and Y=economic growth. In other words, what happened was human and social infrastructure first, then economic growth, and then, of course, later, new advances on infra-structure, with new health, education etc. levels. In fact, it took most of the Meiji period 1868-1912 to build the infra-structure, then came the much better known economic growth, with a little dip for the Second World War, and now slow-down.

The BDA essence of the Chinese model, not necessarily the data--hard to get--would be as indicated in Figure 5. The worst Western liberal would have growth only and never the turning point toward distribution, and the worst Western marxist would have distribution only and never the turning point toward growth.

The buddhist and islamic models have different conceptions of distribution, neither too little nor too much for the buddhist, never too little for the islamic. If that has been obtained, system growth may increase, but in the more fundamentalist version of the models the adequate material level may be more like it was at the time of the Enlightened One, or the time of the Prophet. The focus is on distribution, not on GNP/capita and GNP/capita growth, except that the higher they both are, the more they will detract attention from spirituality and togetherness.

Appendix 4: The Cocoyoc Declaration[252]

Adopted by the participants in the UNEP/UNCTAD Symposium on "Patterns of Resource use, Environment and Development Strategies", Cocoyoc, Mexico, October 8-12, 1974 (Document GE.74-10536)

Thirty years have passed since the signing of the United Nations Charter launched the effort to establish a new international order. Today, that order has reached a critical turning point. Its hopes of creating a better life for the whole human family have been largely frustrated. It has proved impossible to meet "the inner limit" of satisfying fundamental human needs. On the contrary, more people are hungry, sick, shelterless and illiterate today than when the United Nations was first set up.

At the same time, new and unforeseen concerns have begun to darken the international prospects. Environmental degradation and the rising pressure on resources raise the question whether "the outer limits" of the planet's physical integrity may not be at risk.

And to these preoccupations must be added the realization that the next thirty years will bring a doubling of world population. Another world on top of this, equal in number, demands and hopes.

But these critical pressures give no reason to despair of the human enterprise, provided we undertake the necessary changes. The first point to be underlined is that the failure of world society to provide "a safe and happy life" for all is not caused by any present lack of physical resources. The problem today is not primarily one of absolute physical shortage but of economic and social maldistribution and misuse; mankind's predicament is rooted primarily in economic and social structures and behaviour within and between countries.

Much of the world has not yet emerged from the historical consequences of almost five centuries of colonial control which concentrated economic power so overwhelmingly in the hands of a small group of nations. To this day, at least three quarters of the world's income, investment, services and almost all of the world's research are in the hands of one quarter of its people.

The solution of these problems cannot be left to the automatic operation of market mechanisms. The traditional market makes resources available to those who can buy them rather than those who need them; it stimulates artificial demands and builds waste into the production process, and even underutilizes resources. In the international system the powerful nations have secured the poor countries' raw materials at low prices--for example, the price of petroleum fell decisively between 1950 and 1970--have engrossed all the value-added from processing the materials and sold the manufactures back, often at monopoly prices.

At the same time, the very cheapness of the materials was one element

in encouraging the industrialized nations to indulge in careless and extravagant use of the imported materials. Once again, energy is the best example. Oil at just over a dollar a barrel stimulated a growth in energy use of between six and eleven per cent a year. In Europe, the annual increase in car registrations reached twenty per cent.

Indeed pre-emption by the rich of a disproportionate share of key resources conflicts directly with the longer term interests of the poor by impairing their ultimate access to resources necessary to their development and by increasing their cost. All the more reason for creating a new system of evaluating resources which takes into account benefits and burdens for the developing countries.

The overall effect of such biased economic relationships can best be seen in the contrast in consumption. A north American or a European child, on average, consumes outrageously more than his Indian or African counterpart--a fact which makes it specious to attribute pressure on world resources entirely to the growth of Third World Population.

Population growth is, of course, one element in the growing pressures on world supplies. The planet is finite and indefinite multiplication of both numbers and claims cannot be endlessly sustained. Moreover, shortages can occur locally long before there is any prospect of a general exhaustion of particular resources. A policy for sane resource conservation and for some forms of management of ultimately scarce resources within the framework of new economic order must soon replace today's careless rapacity. But the point in the existing world situation is that the huge contrasts in per capita consumption between the rich minority and the poor majority have far more effect than their relative numbers on resource use and depletion. We can go further.

Since a lack of resources for full human development is, as the Bucharest Conference on Population clearly recognized, one of the continuing causes of explosive population growth, to deprive nations of the means of development directly exacerbates their demographic problems.

These unequal economic relationships contribute directly environmental pressures. The cheapness of materials has been one factor in increasing pollution and encouraging waste and throwaway economy among the rich. And continued poverty in many developing lands has often compelled the people to cultivate marginal lands at great risk of soil erosion or to migrate to the physically degraded and overcrowded cities.

Nor are the evils which flow from excessive reliance on the market system confined to international relationships. The experi-ence of the last thirty years is that the exclusive pursuit of economic growth, guided by the market and undertaken by and for the powerful elites, has the same destructive effects inside deve-loping countries. The richest 5 percent engross all the gain while the poorest 20 percent can actually grow poorer still. And at the local as at the international level the evils of material

poverty are compounded by the people's lack of participation and human dignity, by their lack of any power to determine their own fate.

Nothing more clearly illustrates both the need to reform the present economic order and the possibility of doing so than the crisis that has arisen in world markets during the last two years. The trebling of the price of food, fertilizers and manufactures in the wake of world inflation has most severely hit the world's poorest peoples. Indeed, this winter the risk of a complete short-fall in supplies threatens the lives of millions in the Third World. But it cannot be called absolute shortage. The grain exists, but it is being eaten elsewhere by very well-fed people. Grain consumption in North America has grown per capita by 350 pounds, largely in meat products, since 1965--to reach 1900 pounds today. Yet this extra 350 pounds is almost equal to an Indian's total annual consumption. North Americans were hardly starving in 1965. The increase since then has contributed to super-consump-tion which even threatens health. Thus, in physical terms, there need be no shortage this winter. It requires only a small release from the 'surplus' of the rich to meet the entire Asian shortfall. There could hardly be a more vivid example of what one might call the over-consumption of the wealthy nations contributing directly to the under-consumption of the world's poor.

The quadrupling of oil prices through the combined action of the oil producers sharply alters the balance of power in world markets and redistributes resources massively to some Third World Countries. Its effect has been to reverse decisively the balance of advantage in the oil trade and to place close to 100 billions a year at the disposal of some Third World Nations. Moreover, in an area critical to the economies of industrialized states, a profound reversal of power exposes them to the condition long familiar in the Third World--lack of control over vital economic decisions.

Nothing could illustrate more clearly the degree to which the world market system which has continuously operated to increase the power and wealth of the rich and maintain the relative deprivation of the poor is rooted not in unchangeable physical circumstance but in political relationships which can, of their very nature, undergo profound reversals and transformations. In a sense, a new economic order is already struggling to be born. The crisis of the old system can also be the opportunity of the new.

It is true that, at present the outlook seems to hold little but confrontation, misunderstanding, threats and angry dispute. But again, we repeat, there is no reason to despair. The crisis can also be a moment of truth from which the nations learn to acknowledge the bankruptcy of the old system and to seek the framework of a new economic order.

The task of a statesmanship is thus to attempt to guide the nations, with all their differences in interest, power and fortune, towards a new

system more capable of meeting the "inner limits" of basic human needs for all the world's people and of doing so without violating the "outer limits" of the planet's resources and environment. It is because we believe this enterprise to be both vital and possible that we set down a number of changes, in the conduct of economic policy, in the direction of development and in planetary conservation, which appear to us to be essential components of the new system.

1. The Purpose of Development

Our first concern is to redefine the whole purpose of development. This should not be to develop things but to develop man. Human beings have basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, health, education. Any process of growth that does not lead to their fulfillment--or, even worse, disrupts them--is a travesty of the idea of development. We are still in a stage where the most important concern of development is the level of satisfaction of basic needs for the poorest sections in each society which can be as high as 40 per cent of the population. The primary purpose of economic growth should be to ensure the improvement of conditions for these groups. A growth process that benefits only the wealthiest minority and maintains or even increases the disparities between and within countries is not development. It is exploitation. And the time for starting the type of true economic growth that leads to better distribution and to the satisfaction of the basic needs for all is today.

We believe that thirty years of experience with the hope that rapid economic growth benefiting the few will "trickle down" to the mass of the people has proved to be illusory. We therefore reject the idea of "growth first, justice in the distribution of benefits later".

Development should not be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs. There are other needs, other goals, and other values. Development includes freedom of expression and impression, the right to give and receive ideas and stimulus. There is a deep social need to participate in shaping the basis of one's own existence, and to make some contribution to the fashioning of the world's future. Above all, development includes the right to work, by which we mean not simply having a job but finding self-realization in work, the right not to be alienated through production processes that use human beings simply as tools.

2. The Diversity of Development

Many of these more than material needs, goals and values, depend on the satisfaction of the basic needs which are our primary concern. There is no consensus today what strategies to pursue in order to arrive at the satisfaction of basic needs. But there are some good examples even among poor countries. They make clear that the point of departure for the development process varies considerably from one country to another, for

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historical, cultural and other reasons. Consequently, we emphasize the need for pursuing many different roads of development. We reject the unilinear view which sees development essentially and inevitably as the effort to initiate the historical model of the countries that for various reasons happen to be rich today. For this reason, we reject the concept of "gaps" in development. The goal is not "to catch up" but to ensure the quality of life for all with a productive base compatible with the needs of future generations.

We have spoken of the minimum satisfaction of basic needs. But there is also a maximum level, there are ceilings as well as floors. Man must eat to live. But he can also over-eat. It does not help us much to produce and consume more and more if the result is an ever increasing need for tranquilizers and mental hospitals. And just as man has a limited capacity to absorb material goods, we know that the biosphere has a finite carrying capacity. Some countries tax it in a way that is far out of proportion with their share in world population. Thus they create environment problems for others as well as for themselves.

Consequently, the world is today not only faced with the anomaly of underdevelopment. We may also talk about overconsumptive types of development that violate the inner limits of man and the outer limits of nature. Seen in this perspective, we are all in need of a redefinition of our goals, of new development strategies, of new life styles, including more modest patterns of consumption among the rich. Even though the first priority goes to securing the minima we shall be looking for those development strategies that also may help the affluent countries, in their enlightened self-interest, in finding more human patterns of life, less exploitative of nature, of others, of oneself.

3. Self-reliance

We believe that one basic strategy of development will have to be increased national self-reliance. It does not mean autarky. It implies mutual benefits from trade and cooperation and a fairer redistribution of resources satisfying the basic needs. It does mean self-confidence, reliance primarily on one's own resources, human and natural, and the capacity for autonomous goal-setting and decision-making. It excludes dependence on outside influences and powers that can be converted into political pressure. It excludes exploitative trade patterns depriving countries of their natural resources for their own development. There is obviously a scope for transfer of technology, but the thrust should be on adaptation and the generation of local technology. It implies decentralization of the world economy and sometimes also of the national economy to enhance the sense of personal participation. But it also implies increased international cooperation for collective self-reliance. Above all, it means trust in people and nations, reliance on the capacity of

people themselves to invent and generate new resour-ces and techniques to increase their capacity to absorb them to put them to socially beneficial use, to take a measure of command over the economy, and to generate their own way of life.

In this process education for full social awareness and participation will play a fundamental role and the extent to which this is compatible with present patterns of schooling will have to be explored.

To arrive at this condition of self-reliance, fundamental, economic, social and political changes of the structure of society will often be necessary. Equally necessary is the development of an international system compatible with and capable of supporting moves towards self-reliance.

Self-reliance at national levels may also imply a temporary detachment from the present economic system; it is impossible to develop self-reliance through full participation in a system that perpetuates economic dependence. Large parts of the world of today consist of a center exploiting a vast periphery and also our common heritage, the biosphere. The ideal we need is a harmonized cooperative world in which each part is a center, living at the expense of nobody else, in partnership with nature and in solidarity with future generations.

There is an international power structure that will resist moves in this direction. Its methods are well known: the purposive maintenance of the built-in bias of the existing international market mechanisms, other forms of economic manipulations, withdrawing or withholding credits, embargoes, economic sanctions, subversive use of intelligence agencies, repression including torture, counter-insurgency operations, even full-scale intervention. To those contemplating the use of such methods we say: "Hands-off. Leave countries to find their own road to a fuller life of their citizens." To those who are the--sometimes unwilling--tools of such designs--scholars, businessmen, police, soldiers and many others--we would say: "refuse to be used for purposes of denying another nations the right to develop itself". To the natural and social scientists, who help design the instruments of oppression we would say: "the world needs your talents for constructive purposes, to develop new technologies that benefit man and do not harm the environment."

4. Suggestions for Action

We call on political leaders, governments, international organizations and the scientific community to use their imagination and resources to elaborate and start implementing, as soon as possible, programs aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the poorest peoples all over the world, including, wherever appropriate, the distribution of goods in kind. These programs should be designed in such a way as to ensure adequate conservation of resources and protection of the environment. We consider

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that the above task could be made easier by instituting a new more cooperative and equitable international economic order.

We are aware that the world system and the national policies cannot be changed overnight. The major changes which are required to answer the critical challenges facing mankind at this turning point of history need some time to mature. But they have to be started immediately, and acquire a growing impetus. The special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and New Economic Order has given the process a right start and we fully endorse it. This, however, is a very preliminary step which should develop into a great tide of international activities.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, proposed by the President of Mexico, Lic. Luis Echeverria, and now under discussion at the United Nations, would be a further important step in the right direction. We urge that it be adopted as early as possible.

In a framework of national sovereignty over natural resources, governments and international institutions should further the management of resources and environment on a global scale. The first aim would be to benefit those who need these resources most and to do so in accordance with the principle of solidarity with future generations.

We support the setting up of strong international regimes for the exploitation of common property resources that do not fall under any national jurisdiction. We especially emphasize the importance of the ocean floor and its subsoil, possibly also the water column above it. An oceans regime has to be established with all countries of the world represented, favoring none and discriminating against none, with jurisdiction over a maximum area of the oceans. Such a regime would gradually develop the type of resource-conserving and environmentally sound technology required to explore, develop, process and distribute ocean resources for the benefit of those who need them most.

The uses of international commons should be taxed for the benefit of the poorest strata of the poor countries. This would be a first step towards the establishment of an international taxation system aimed at providing automatic transfers of an international taxation system aimed at providing automatic transfers of resources to development assistance. Together with the release of funds through disarmament, international taxation should eventually replace traditional assistance programmes. Pending the establishment of these new mechanisms, we strongly recommend that the flow of international resources to Third World countries should be greatly increased and rigorously dedicated to basic needs of the poorest strata of society.

Science and technology must be responsive to the goals we are pursuing. Present research and development patterns do not effectively contribute to them. We call on universities, other institutions of higher learning, research organizations, scientific associations all over the world

to reconsider their priorities. Mindful of the benefits deriving from free and basic research, we underline the fact that there is a reservoir of underutilized creative energy in the whole scientific community of the world, and that it should be more focused on research for the satisfaction of fundamental needs. This research should be done as far as possible in the poor countries and thus help to reverse the brain-drain.

A rejuvenated United Nations system should be used to strengthen the local capabilities for research and technology assessment in the developing countries, to promote cooperation between them, in these areas and to support research in a better and more imaginative utilization of potentially abundant resources for the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of mankind.

At the same time, new approaches to development styles ought to be introduced at the national level. They call for imaginative research into alternative consumption patterns, technological styles, land use strategies as well as the institutional framework and the educational requirement to sustain them. Resource-absorbing and waste creating over-consumption should be restrained while production of essentials for the poorest section of the population is stepped up. Low waste and clean technologies should replace the environmentally disruptive ones. More harmonious networks of human settlements could be evolved to avoid further congestion of metropolitan areas and marginalization of the countryside.

In many developing countries the new development styles would imply a much more rational use of the available labour-force to implement programmes aimed at the conservation of natural resources, enhancement of environment, creation of the necessary infrastructure and services to grow more food as well as the strengthening of domestic industrial capacity to turn out commodities satisfying basic needs.

On the assumption of a more equitable international economic order, some of the problems of resource maldistribution and space use could be taken care of by changing the industrial geography of the world. Energy, resource and environmental considerations add new strength to the legitimate aspirations of the poor countries to see their share in world industrial production considerably increased.

Concrete experiments in the field are also necessary. We consider that the present efforts of the United Nations Environment Programme to design strategies and assist projects for ecologically sound socio-economic development (eco-development) at the local and regional level constitute an important contribution to this task. Conditions should be created for people to learn by themselves through practice how to make the best possible use of the specific resources of the ecosystem in which they live, how to design appropriate technologies, how to organize and educate themselves to this end.

We call on leaders of public opinion, on educators, on all interested

bodies to contribute to an increased public awareness of both the origins and the severity of the critical situations facing mankind today. All people have the right to understand fully the nature of the system of which he is a part, as a producer, as a consumer, as one among the billions populating the earth. He has a right to know who benefits from the fruits of his work, who benefits from what he buys and sells, and the degree to which he enhances or degrades his planetary inheritance.

We call on governments to prepare themselves for action at the 1975 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly so that the dimension and concepts of development are expanded, that the goals of development given their rightful place in the United Nations and the necessary structural changes initiated. We affirm our belief that since the issues of development, environment and resource use are essentially global and concern the wellbeing of all mankind, governments should fully use the mechanisms of the United Nations for their resolution and that the United Nations system should be renewed and strengthen to be capable of its new responsibilities.

5. Epilogue

We recognize the threats to both the "inner limits" of basic human needs and "the outer limits" of the planet's physical resources.

But we also believe that a new sense of respect for fundamental human rights and for the preservation of our planet is growing up behind the angry divisions and confrontations of our day.

We have faith in the future of mankind on this planet. We believe that ways of life and social systems can be evolved that are more just, less arrogant in their material demands, more respectful of the whole planetary environment. The road forward does not lie through the despair of doom-watching nor through the easy optimism of successive technological fixes. It lies through a careful and dispassionate assessment of the "outer limits" through cooperative search for ways to achieve the "inner limits" of fundamental human rights, through the building of social structures to express those rights, and through all the patient work of devising techniques and styles of development which enhance and preserve our planetary inheritance.

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Endnotes

1. "Die Frage der Gewalt, nicht nur der direkten, physischen, sondern auch der heimlichen, symbolischen Gewalt, Gewalt und Hunger, Gewalt und Wirtschaftsinteressen der Grossmächte, Gewalt und Religion, Gewalt und Politik, Gewalt und Rassismus, Gewalt und Sexismus. Der Kampf für den Frieden ist kein Kampf zur Abschaffung oder auch nur Ablehnung der Konflikte, sondern für eine kritische und gerechte Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen. Der Versuch, richtige Lösungen zu finden, ist eine der dringlichsten Aufgaben unserer Zeit. Der Frieden jedoch geht der Gerechtigkeit nicht voraus, und Gerechtigkeit zu schaffen, ist der beste Weg, um für den Frieden zu kämpfen." (Paulo Freire, in Leisinger and Häsle, 1995, p. 109).

2. London: SAGE, 1996, 1998.

3. "But the only answer one really wants to offer when asked what they–in positions of power in the West–can do to eradicate world hunger is to say *nothing. Let them alone. Stop it.* Stay out of other peoples' affairs. Stop sending out your experts whose training suits them only for propos-ing Western-oriented "solutions". Stop forcing your unadapted and usual-ly unadaptable technology on radically different societies. Stop shaping the environment to suit your needs. Stop educating people to think that yours is the only road to "progress". Stop sending the kind of aid which will aid you, in the form of myriad, commercial advantages, a hundred times more than it will ever help the poor. Stop running the multilateral agencies and the UN. Stop giving aid and comfort, political and material support to repressive local elites that have no intention of changing the lot of their people, and give the people a chance. Put a leash on your corporations, your foundations, your universities, your bureaucrats and your banks. So much for utopia." (George, 1976, p. 271). And so much for chewing betel and cocaine to kill hunger pain, we may add.

4. Jayaprakash Narayan, one of Gandhi's successors, makes an important observation in Prasad and Juyal (1966, p. 56): "All of us, who had a socialist bias, always said that as long as there were no land reforms, the development of agriculture was not possible. Later, it was revealed, at least to some, that due to land reforms the managerial skills have remained with those who have parted with the land. This is scientific knowledge".

5. In a letter to Arnold Ruge in 1844 Karl Marx wrote: "Since it is not for us to create a plan for the future that will hold for all time, all the more surely what we contemporaries have to do is the uncompromising critical evaluation of all that exists, uncompromising in the sense that our criticism fears neither its own results, nor the conflict with the powers that

be". He lived up to that, offering almost no concrete image of an alternative, much less any effort to test it out in the small. Spreading general discontent is not good enough, *vide* the Soviet Union.

MDG is today tested in the small, like in Sauri, Kenya, "the first of what is now more than 80 Millennium Villages across Africa, a showcase project that was the dream child of Jeffrey D. Sachs--"; Jeffrey Gettleman, "In Kenya, small is better, so far", *International Herald Tribune*, 9 March 2010.

6. Deep gratitude to James Lovelock for this metaphor, lifting the theory and practice of development to a higher level.

7. See Bernstein (1971).

8. But there is also freedom as choice among development models (including to select and eclect) a freedom far beyond the liberal model, see Part Four; to be developed later. Minoru Kitamura comes out strongly on this theme in "Multiculturalism and Universal Value", in Häyry and Takala, Eds. (2001).

Amartya Sen puts freedom in focus of his view on development: "--the basic idea that enhancement of human freedom is both the main object and the primary means of development. The objective of development relates to the valuation of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the people involved. Individual capabilities crucially depend on, among other things, economic, social, and political arrangements. In making appropriate institutional arrangements, the instrumental roles of distinct types of freedom have to be considered, going well beyond the foundational importance of the overall freedom of individuals." (Sen, 1999, p. 53). How does that differ from what we know from the Western liberal model? Freedom is freedom to convert resources into more resources, like wealth into more wealth, talent into more talent through challenge, etc. The result is inequality converted into more inequality. Hence our focus on equity in the equality-freedom dialectic, and on the choice of development models.

9. Thus, if needs and nature are essential for development women are badly rewarded: half of the human species does 2/3 of the work for 1/10 of the income and 1% of the wealth, worst hit by unemployment, war and as refugees, internally and abroad and badly under-represented in all decision-making bodies except, recently, Nordic parliaments. Says Amartya Sen. "Nothing, arguably, is as important today in the political economy of development as an adequate recognition of political, economic and social participation and leadership of women. This is indeed a crucial aspect of 'development as freedom.' (Sen, 1999, pp. 202-203). For 'development as freedom' in Sen's limiting sense all the other faultlines seem equally important. But for development based on the two pillars of

nature and hu-man basic needs there is certainly the argument that women through repro-duction are closer, more deeply involved and skilled. How robust this relation is to accelerating emancipation into production is another question.

10. See Galtung (2009) Part Two.

11. Galtung (1996), Part IV, pp. 215-16.

12. The title of Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* is well known; less known is the subtitle that carries a racist message: *The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life*. As pointed out by White (1981): "It seems clear to the educated English gentleman that the spread of his race at the expense of other races, although it might be abhorrent to sentimental morality, was in fulfillment of a natural and higher law". As Darwin puts it: "The forms which stands in closest competition with those undergoing modification and improvement will naturally suffer most" (quoted from White, p. 51). Like the aborigines next to the whites.

13. Kropotkin (1902). Notice a factor, not the factor.

14. See Pamela Asquith (1941). Another remarkable Japanese use of nature and its challenges as the key *force motrice* of history--as opposed to the Western focus on interests and values--is Tadao Umesao (2003). The book offers exactly what the title promises, using a division of the world in ecological zones.

15. Gilbert Rist, in the original: "... le 'développement' était semblable à une étoile morte dont on perçoit encore la lumière, même si elle s'est éteinte depuis longtemps, et pour toujours. Ce qui faisait écho à l'affirmation de Wolfgang Sachs: "L'ère du développement touche à son terme. Le temps est venu d'en rédiger l'oraison funèbre." (Wolfgang Sachs, Ed., 1992, p. 1). "Admettons, que nous nous sommes tous deux trompés. Le 'développement' survit encore, même si, au sein des institutions internationales, ses ambitions initiales ont été réduites à la lutte contre la pauvreté ou à la réalisation des objectifs du millénaire. Or, paradoxalement c'est sous l'effet des critiques dont il a été l'objet que le 'développement' est redevenu un objet de débat! Les croyances... ont de la peine à mourir." (Rist, 2007, p. 443).

16. "Truman's project "to develop the 'underdeveloped areas'" now appears as a blunder of planetary proportions. In the 1960s, the Northern countries were 20 times richer than the Southern, in 1980 46 times. Is it an exaggeration to say that the illusion of 'catching up' rivals on a world scale Montezuma's deadly illusion of receiving Cortez with open arms? Of course, most Southern countries stepped on the gas but the North outpaced them by far. The reason is simple: in this kind of race, the rich countries

will always move faster than the rest, for they are geared towards a continuous degradation of what they have to put forth: the most advanced technology. They are world champions in competitive obsolescence." (Wolfgang Sachs, 1992, pp. 2-3).

17. Thus, a German survey of development theories divides them into non-economic and economic. *Non-economic*: Montesquieu, Marx, Huntington, Weber, McClelland, Lerner, Parsons, Levy, Moore, Pye, Eisenstadt, Almond, Coleman, Deutsch, Rostow. *Economic*: Perroux, Singer, Prebisch, Bhagwati, Sunkel, Furtado, Cardoso, dos Santos, Amin, Senghaas, Galtung, Emmanuel. Classification and names can be discussed; but the basic point is development theory focused mainly by Westerners on the Western liberal model only. The rest of the world is absent as object, and mainly also as subject.

18. Of course environment entered the mainstream development concept, but not as self-production. As Wolfgang Sachs points out: "--the Brundtland Report incorporated concern for the environment into the concept of development by erecting 'sustainable development' as the conceptual roof for both violating and healing the environment. Certainly, the new era requires development experts to widen their attention span and to monitor water and soils, air and energy utilization. But develop-ment remains what it always comes down to, an array of interventions for boosting the GNP: 'given expected population growth, a five- to ten-fold increase in world industrial output can be anticipated by the time world population stabilizes sometime in the next century.'" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 15) Brundtland thus ends up suggesting further growth, but not any longer, as in the old days of deve-lopment, in order to achieve the happiness of the greatest number, but to contain the environmental disaster for the generations to come. The threat to the planet's survival looms large. Has there ever been a better pretence for intrusion? New areas of intervention open up, nature becomes a domain of politics, and a new breed of technocrats feels the vocation to steer growth along the edge of the abyss. Sachs, 1992, pp. 29-30.

19. And the code or social cosmology (see, for instance, Galtung, 1996, Part IV, Chapter 1) is a shorthand for the key structural-cultural characteristics.

20. Ellul says it sharply: "We are forced to conclude that our scientists are incapable of any but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialties. [...] When they announce that they will conserve the genetic mutations which appear to them most favorable, and that they propose to modify the very germ cells in order to produce such and such traits; and when we consider the mediocrity of the scientists themselves outside the

confines of their specialties, we can only shudder at the thought of what they will esteem most 'favorable'. None of our wise men ever pose the question of the end of all their marvels. The 'wherefore' is resolutely passed by." (Ellul, 1964, pp. 433-436).

21. That perspective, focused not only on underweight and adequate but also on overweight-obese, is more realistic than unlimited economic growth. Economists could learn from physiologists.

22. Margalef (1975) uses diversity as a key parameter for the understanding of eco-systems. He uses information theory and the usual entropy measure of information as a measure of diversity "with a minimum value, 0, if all individuals belong to the same species, and a maximum value if all individuals belong to a different species". "According to Ashby's law of the requisite variety in cybernetic systems, a system formed by more elements with greater diversity is less subject to fluctuations" (p. 21). "Let's repeat again that the less-organized system feeds the more-organized" (p. 22); and sees "the ecosystem as a channel which projects information in the future" (p. 17), and "organisms are the bearers of huge amounts of information" (p. 4). "The genetic channel has undoubtedly enlarged more rapidly than the ecological channel. Surely the cultural or ethological channel has become tremendously enlarged with the development of higher vertebrates, and its increase reaches the proportions of an explosion with the advent of man. Now, if we project the relative size of the channels back in time...the total channel is like a fan divided into three unequal parts: an ecological channel enlarging negligibly, a genetic channel enlarging considerably, and a cultural channel appearing later but enlarging explosively." (pp. 99-100). "Man is a historical accident, the creator of a stress that cannot be ironed out in the proposed model of succession and evolution. In this sense he is comparable to trees with almost indigestible trunks." (p. 96).

23. The term "symbiosis" is then generalized beyond biota to include, for instance, the photosynthesis of abiota. When two biota or abiota interact they may evolve, be constant, or decay. In symbiosis both evolve, in parasitism one evolves and the other is constant or decaying, in antibiosis that at least one decays. The Western liberal model is compatible with symbiosis for the top, parasitism for the middle and antibiosis for the bottom.

24. An expression attributed to Lenin in 1922, used by Litvinov in the 1930s.

25. Obviously from C. G. Jung, but drawn from a broad base of deep structure and culture carriers, and with no assumption of universality.

26. An example. What in Galtung (1996) is called Occident I sees Evil as a threat from the outside, and society as individualist and competitive, meaning that Pasteur's idea of micro-organisms attacking humans fell on as fertile ground as Darwin's idea of species competing for a niche. Competitive theories had less chance: "During Pasteur's time there was another French scientist Bechamp who proposed a theory exactly opposite that of Pasteur. Bechamp maintained that it was mainly the 'soil' or condition of the host organism at the moment that determined whether or not an individual would fall ill. The world followed Pasteur because his theories appeared more 'logical,' while Bechamp's were rather peculiar and difficult to prove. At this time, allopathic medicine was starting to establish itself as the main therapeutic modality in the world. When pharmaceutical companies joined the battle and exerted their power to influence medical doctors to prescribe their products exclusively, the supremacy of allopathy was virtually ensured. As a consequence, the ambitions and narrow-minded rhetoric of its institutions came to dominate the entire western medical world. It is my belief that in the future the dictums of disease that allopathy imposes will prove not only wrong but disastrous for humanity. History will show that Pasteur, and with him the rest of the world, misinterpreted the phenomena he observed. Today the theories of Bechamp are being re-examined--" (Vithoulkas, 1991, pp. 148-149).

27. These questions are dealt with in some detail in Chapter 22 in *A Theory of Civilizations* (TRANSCEND University Press, 2010 forthcoming, www.transcend.org/tup).

28. In a conversation with General Giap January 1990, easily the leading military genius of the 20th century, winning wars against France in 1954, the USA in 1975, and neither winning nor losing against China, emphasized this as one of three factors explaining those feats. "Each part of Viêt Nam is self-sufficient, there is no way of conquering the country by conquering one city" (the other two were the involvement of the whole population in defending the country, and the training acquired from two millennia of fights with China).

29. For much detail, see Galtung (1996), Part III on Development, especially Chapter 2, "Six Economic Schools", pp. 139-153; the sixth school being the eclectic, "Rainbow" school, combining particularly Green, Rose and Yellow.

30. As a subtitle to Kent's *The Political Economy of Hunger* (1984).

31. In the forceful words of Frank Bracho, quoting Toynbee:
"A materialist and consumerist paradigm, with a blind and self-

destructive faith in unlimited material progress based on unchecked technological advancement. A competitive, individualist and alienating paradigm, in a world, which ironically requires more and more solidarity and cooperation to face the severe common problems which threaten its very survival."

From Arnold Toynbee: "It now seems as the West's ascendancy is going to be as transitory as the previous less than world-wide ascendancies of the Mongols, Arabs, Huns, Romans, Greeks, Persians, Assyrians... Mankind's material power has now increased to a degree at which it could make the biosphere uninhabitable and will, in fact, produce this suicidal result within a foreseeable period of time if the human population of the globe does not now take prompt and vigorous concerted actions to check the pollution and the spoliation that are being inflicted on the biosphere by short-sighted human greed."

"In the final analysis, if we understand health in its correct form as conceived by the World Health Organization, that is: 'Physical, mental and social well-being and not just the absence of disease and physical handicap', health should acquire a primacy before which the other sciences and fields of human endeavor should submit in favour of the supreme objective of human well-being. Heath thus should become the focus of new civilization paradigm." (Bracho, 1992, pp. 13-14, 19-20, 99-100).

32. Marx' theory of capitalist exploitation--extracting surplus value from the workers till they are barely able to reproduce as labor in capitalist production--is a theory of soft exploitation, much too considerate to capitalism. Today's capitalism does not care: there are always reserve armies of labor and if not, capital- and technology-intensive production can be substituted. Poor producers may die, not consumers with acquisitive power.

33. "Dignity" is an important term pointing to humans as sacred, to the Roman *homo res sacra hominibus*--humans sacred to humans--far beyond "security" that also applies to property. The term is used in what was maybe the best UN resolution on development, of 11 December 1969, "Declaration on Social Progress and Development" (adopted by 119 in favor, with 2 abstentions):

Article 1: "All people and all human beings without distinction as to race--(etc)--shall have the right to live in dignity and freedom and to enjoy the fruits of social progress and should, on their part, contribute to it".

During the 1960s the socialist countries had much influence, an other important example being the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights three years earlier, 16 December 1966:

Article 1(2): All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their

material wealth and resources--in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence".

If such principles had been followed the West would have moved from the liberal toward the marxist model in Part Four of this book. and the Big West (USA-UK) certainly did not want that.

34. Daly (1991) made important dents in the economist edifice with statements such as this: "Currently growth in resource use seems to increase environmental costs faster than it increases production benefits".

35. Among the approaches rejected are reliance on scriptures, armchair exercises by philosophers, social scientists etc. There has to be some fresh input of empirical elements. The world is changing, human beings with the world, and basic human needs with them, and vice versa. No lists of needs will ever be final. Dan Gasper of the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague has made an excellent overview (paper presented at the EAEPE conference in Barcelona, 1993). And Hopkins and van der Hoeven (1983) also review a number of such lists. But this chapter is based on simple human physiology and beyond that on dialogues all over the world.

36. For the use of dialogue as a social science tool, see Galtung (1988).

37. This study was carried out when the author directed the GPID--Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development--Project of the United Nations University in Tokyo, 1976-81. The idea was to root development, goals as well as processes in basic human needs--conceiving of the goal of development as *well-being for all*. The idea of identifying basic needs by asking people was at first considered somewhat subversive--do people really know what their needs are? The marxist concept of false consciousness was invoked. As there is something to that objection we decided to use dialogue rather than interview with pre-set answers, and with the possibility of probing, also into depth, starting with the question quoted in the text. This was done in about fifty countries, but in a non-standardized way with no protocols worth preserving.

The findings were as reported, and all I can say is that anyone is free to do studies along this line and be rewarded by the insights "common people" have in their own life situation and the human condition in general. See Galtung (1980c).

38. "The five basic goods", frequently used expression in socialist Cuba, summarizing a basic part of their political program.

39. In the exploration of basic needs mentioned some dialogues about quality of death were added. These three points were often made: *completing the life curve*, a *final phase* neither with too much suffering nor too short to say farewell, and dying from many causes *making death*

unavoidable and hence more acceptable, rather than dying from a single, avoidable cause, like lung cancers due to smoking, or traffic accidents due to bad driving. No doubt quality of death is a part of human space development, but, is it increasing or decreasing?

40. For own protection better disperse the focus of identity over several points on the range from self to God. If one fails there are always others.

41. According to the World Health Organization (2001, p. 28), unipolar depressive disorders is the No. 1 cause of years of lives lived with disability (YLDs), in the 14-44 years old and both genders. In the No. 2-4 positions there are hearing loss, iron-deficiency anemia, and alcohol use disorders. Bipolar affective disorders are No. 9 for both genders all ages; schizophrenia No. 7. A link between unipolar depression and lack of sense of meaning with life does not seem far-fetched, nor seeing depression as a phase on the way to suicide. We are talking about 12% of the world population, 10% of men, 14% of women.

42. The Table includes many on Maslow's classical list, but his hierarchy is rejected: empirically because the priorities depend on person and situation, theoretically because his hierarchy is too judeo-christian to serve as a universal guide--with the somatic as lower and the spiritual as higher--and praxeologically because it may lead to--like in the Soviet Union--satisfying material needs first, and then (when?) come non-material needs.

"--Maslow has adapted the biological-cultural distinction in conceptualizing a succession of levels that is both temporal and ontological in character. Biological needs are the most urgent and must be attended to first, and the others follow suit if society is properly organized so as to permit this to occur. The succession is at the same time ontological; that is, the later stages represent higher states of being, or the more appropriate domains of human-existence as such. Neither the idea of temporal succession nor ontological development is convincing, however." (Leiss, 1978, p. 66).

"As this century has shown, there is not only Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs but also a half-articulated anti-Maslowian logic which says that if freedom can be an ego-defence and not a real substitute for bread, bread too can be an ego-defence and not a real substitute for freedom." (Ashis Nandy, in Mallmann and Nudler, 1986, p. 258).

43. See Ornauer, Sicinski, Wiberg and Galtung, Eds. (1976).

44. Op cit, p. 118.

45. Thus, of the depletion of the most elementary basis for our livelihood, air, water, soil, biodiversity and nutrients in general during the last 300 years, more than half took place during the last 30 years. One tenth of the

time, one half of the negative impact. Today, soon 40 years after Stockholm UNEP 1972, and soon 20 years after Rio UNCED 1992, major conferences both, humans have reacted. How effectively remains to be seen.

46. The gross domestic product is based on the total flow of goods and services produced by the economy over a specified time period, by valuing the output at market prices, excluding all intermediate products, counting only goods used for final consumption (*The Penguin Dictionary of Economics*, 1987, p. 181). Thus, processing and marketing are key constituents.

47. The shallow-deep distinction is taken from the seminal work of the founder of the deep ecology movement, the late Professor Arne Næss; for more see Chapter 21.

48. Thus, is human overpopulation, also known as the population explosion, a form of pollution? From an anthropo-centric point of view not, from a gaia-centric position yes. The population explosion has similarities with the explosive growth of cancer cells in the society of societies of cells that make up, for instance, a human body, including the metastases. Human overpopulation leads to parasitism with humans giving less back to the environment than they take out.

Global warming is seen as thermic pollution. Massive flooding will decrease diversity. That "greenhouse gases" have that effect and that ozone layer holes are caused by CFCs from spray-cans and fridges or from space-ships and rockets burning holes, leaving gases behind, remains to be seen. More simulation experiments at the micro level might be useful.

A distinction is made between decreasing bio-diversity by affecting the number of species and genetic erosion decreasing the variety within a species. Deforestation-desertification are seen as so similar in decreasing photosynthetic capacity that they are combined. Toxic pollution is seen both as a killer of diversity and a destroyer of symbiosis.

49. *Ökologische Selbstverpflichtung - Aufruf zum Handeln*, lists a number of eco-predicaments: acceleration of the problems, that 40 countries soon will not be self-sufficient where water is concerned, that desertification is threatening an area the size of Africa; that eco-catastrophes may show up only 3-40 years after they were predicted, affecting next generation more than ours; that changes may be discontinuous rather than gradual such as the sudden increase in hurricanes; and that the population increase makes us double all our calculations. Thus, today's humankind produces 21 billion tons CO_2 which has to be reduced to 10 billion tons by year 2050, but by that time there will possibly be 10 billion and not 5.3 billion humans on earth, meaning that only 1 ton is permitted per year whereas in

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Germany the production today is 13.7 tons per year. Many such lists of eco-calamities have been produced the last 20 years and they have probably changed our priorities. But the authors of this particular list are so desperate given the lack of action that they promise to act as examples of eco-moral action, by pledging:

- to cut the use of cars by 30% and respect speed limits;
- to cut energy and water consumption by 50% and 30%;
- not to use CFCs, and to cut down on household chemicals;
- to cut meat consumption by 50% and switch to organic food;
- to boycott tropical wood.

See the annual *Jahrbuch Ökologie* (Simonis, 1992).

50. See Weigert (2008). For a concrete use see, e.g., Tortosa (2003).

51. For the first use of the terms alpha and beta, see Galtung (1979).

52. Quite interesting that to name something egalitarian a term had to be coined, for something inegalitarian there was a term readily available, hierarchy.

53. "Thick" and "thin" are the terms used by the late anthropology pioneer Clifford Geertz for descriptions of anything social, similar to the parsonian pattern variable "specific" vs "diffuse".

54. Actually from Weber and Sorokin before Parsons.

55. This is apparently contrary to the liberation of the individual associated with de-structuration. But in a structural vacuum the individual is lonely, like a leibnizian monad. It is inside that monad that Descartes is thinking, coming to the absurd conclusion that *cogito, ergo sum*. But no structure means no links, no relations; and no relations mean social death if we define life in terms of the density of webs of relations. Memory of the deceased may survive biological death, but may also precede it for the lonely, isolated, banished.

56. See, as an example, "The Dominance System", in Galtung (1980a).

57. With Viola Klein (1968).

58. Hans Dembowski, editor of the superb magazine *Development + Cooperation*, highlights "Three Daunting Dimensions" (*D+C Financing Development*, January 2009, pp. II-III): "a prospering economy along with environmental stability and social equity". No problem with the latter two, but "a prospering economy" is a concession to traditionalism. Basic needs enhance human reality as opposed to economic growth that enhances business.

59. But these three dimensions, although not the objects of development

like the four development spaces are basic for theory and practice. How civilizations conceive of Time impacts on sustainability, how they conceive of Episteme impacts on the thinking particularly in terms of such crucial forms of understanding as holism and dialectics, and Transperson impacts on the moral commands to protect and enhance Nature and Humans.

60. This does not apply to Islam, one of the reasons why the islamic development model is more interesting.

61. See Galtung, van der Veer, Hartmann, van den Berg, Diez-Nicolás and Wiberg (2009) for a general exploration of these themes.

62. Thus, that Chinese event was essentially a structural revolution by attacking confucianism as cultural legitimation. They lost the first round, confucianism is more in than ever. In both civilizations, however, the cultural revolution may take the form of more spirituality and so complex multi-dimensional hierarchies that everybody can find a place.

63. "Eco-system", or nature, is used here so as to include the homosphere, humans, and the "man-made environment". The word "environment" is avoided as drawing a misleading line between human and non-human.

64. One of Aristotle's two drama categories, the other being comedy. A very limiting dichotomy. In Appendix 4, *A Tale of Three Countries*, the first story, about Paraguay is certainly a tragedy but the other two are neither tragic nor comic, having in common that they are actually quite inspiring.

65. Thus, sociology is not aggregate psychology, nor aggregate social psychology. The conceptual building block, atom, of sociology is interaction, the *interact*, between at least two actors. The sum total of zillions of patterned interacts are a *structure*, a molecule of interacts often of high complexity; like a protein molecule. Organic chemistry may serve as a metaphor for sociology (see Galtung, 1978b).

These interacts are between concrete human beings in a human society, and with human beings come their personalities, with layers shaping their life with themselves (psychology), and with others (social psychology). Society may generate such structures according to some common mould (like pyramids or circles), referred to as "deep structures".

Human beings are steered to a large extent by the structures in which they are embedded, and by their *culture*, the symbolic, meaning-giving aspect of the human condition, particularly by the normative, valuative part. Values may be conscious or subconscious, and individually or collectively held. The category "collective subconscious" stands for "deep culture", generating conscious and-or individual values.

In sociology as a science "structure" is more emphasized than "culture", as a cursory perusal of a journal of sociology will show. But structural analysis without culture reduces human beings to robots, programmed from the outside, with no consciousness of their programs and no capacity to change them. And cultural analysis without structure elevates human beings to an absolute freedom which is not theirs. Both-and.

66. The term "global problem" is frequently used to call the attention to the gravity of the problem. Three usages:
• "global" as "world-wide", shared by many societies;
• "global" as "world-interconnected" causally across border;
• "global" as "world-system" built into world society as such.
Social disintegration as "global problem" covers all three.

67. "Robert K. Merton argues plausibly that it be defined as a condition of 'breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the... capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them.'" (Josephson and Josephson, Eds., 1965, pp. 12-14).

Disjunction, or disconnect is the key word: there are norm formulations but they do not connect to factual behavior.

"Anomie" was a major research focus of the Swiss Academy for Development under the able leadership of professor Peter Atteslander. Chapters 6-9 are based on "Anomie-Atomie: On the Impact of Secularization/Modernization on Moral Cohesion and Social Tissue", presented at the "intellectual summit" of the UN World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995 (see Galtung, 1995).

68. Leibniz' "monadology" constructs human beings not as individuals in interaction, but as basically self-sufficient units in need of no help from others. The monads are without windows since there is no need for interaction. The strong is in no need of others, and it works out in the best of all possible worlds because of a pre-established harmony (by God). The monads will not collide; they are steered, not by mutual rights and obligations, but from above, like driverless cars or planes on GPS. Very different from Spinoza with friendship as a basic concept, and also from Martin Luther's focus on the strong individual, *hier steh' ich, ich kann nicht anders* (Leibniz was a Catholic). The Scandinavian will be reminded of Strindberg's *ködets lust och själens obotliga ensamhet* (the lust of the flesh and the incurable loneliness of the spirit), although Leibniz seems mainly to pick up the latter point. Two other metaphors may be useful:

The noble gases helium, neon, argon, krypton, xenon, radon are said to be "noble" because they do not connect with other elements into compounds, not being ionized. A set of monads or hermits would be like a

noble gas with no compounds, and far from proteins--compounds of compounds (amino acids)-- that might mirror a society with the amino acid as the family.

Then the human being can be seen as a world of cells, connecting colonies of cells of the same kind, tissues. Cells relate, communicate, e.g. through sodium channels, including committing suicide, offering themselves up to each other, apotheosis, and they die, necrosis. If they do not relate the body would die; the whole body derives life from the in-change within, and the exchange between cells. We also use many expressions drawn from this metaphor, like *le tissu social*.

69. Some recent data on the size of households may be of interest, like 40% of households in Sweden consisting of 1 - one - person, very likely an elderly woman, in an *apart-ment* akin to a Leibnizian monad, with windows not to persons, but to a "view". A single person in an apartment is not self-sufficient, but the paycheck from the welfare state, the neighborhood supermarket and urban services such as water, electricity and sewage, are all dehumanized, not divine, but with no need to meet anybody in direct human interaction.

70. Isolates, not "individuals", only meaningful in a social context of interaction. Individualism in the sense of self-differentiation from others and self-assertion, is meaningful only with others around for comparison and interaction. Collectivism differs from this as the "self" is a collective Self, such as "my group" or "both of us". Isolates neither differentiate, nor assert themselves, nor coalesce in Selves.

71. *Transparency International* in Berlin, is an organization fighting corruption, like *Amnesty International* is fighting for human rights in general, and political prisoners and torture in particular. For an analysis of corruption see Fredrik Galtung, Ed. (1994).

72. The net-knot metaphor is taken from the prolific writings of the Indian-Catalunyan-American philosopher Raimundo Panikkar.

73. For my own first effort to do so, see Galtung (1980b). In that paper, written in Uganda in 1967, I used the term "neo-modern", not "post-modern", as "modernity" extrapolated, like "neo-colonialism", rather than a new paradigm. However, "post-modern" is now so frequently used that it is hard to avoid.

74. If we have N actors--persons in social systems, societies in world systems--then the minimum number of links needed to connect all is N-1. Each actor, except those at the end, is connected to two others in a hierarchy with an apex connecting downwards to two others, or in a chain. There is no limit to size. The pyramid can have any number of layers, the

chain can be endless and even become a circle. But if the rule is that each actor shall relate to everybody else then each actor has N-1 links to manage and the total number of links is N(N-1)/2, in other words N/2 times more):

For N	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Links in Alpha N-1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Links in Beta N(N-1)/2	1	3	6	10	15	21	28	36	45

With increasing size there is no load increase for each actor in Alpha and the total interaction increase is very slow; for each new actor in Beta the total interaction increase is much quicker. Obviously, there is an upper limit to how much interaction a human can handle, a Beta, not an Alpha problem.

75. Another metaphor: an iron strait-jacket at the bottom, a rubber suit to grow and expand in at the top.

76. Two implications of this are very well known.

If relations are thin, break-ups like strikes, lock-outs, firing people, "redundancies" are less costly in human than economic terms, hence social distance employers-employees.

If relations are thick, like marriage, a break-up becomes time-consuming and costly in human more than economic terms.

Obvious strategies to protect oneself against such costs ares self-employment, thick cooperatives, or to make love a thin "affair", a term hinting at business-type relationships.

77. The first publication on this was Galtung (1979).

78. See Robert Redfield's 1953 classic, particularly Chapter 1, and books by V. Gordon Childe for fascinating images.

79. Sarkar (1967); also see Inayatullah (2001).

80. There is human content in a garage owner shouting his orders to a mechanic, sometimes from another nation, but not in a big bureaucracy where problems arrive in In-trays and are transformed at a distance to solutions in Out-trays. To the objection that a really big bureaucracy cannot function like a small garage the answer is two questions: "are you prepared to pay the atomie costs?", and "does it have to be that big?"

81. If we now define human existence not as a body with vital signs, nor spiritually as a soul, but as social networks, as quantity and quality of human interaction, then the conclusion is that Formation IV consists of dying and dead human beings. *Social death = death* by that formula; not a forerunner like in the Western Childhood-Education-Work-Retirement life-cycle, but as the real death. The only comfort is spiritual survival beyond for those who believe in that. The tragedy is that both that belief

and life as social life are eroding at the same time, now.

82. Los Angeles Police Department, of Gates-Rodney King-O.J. Simpson fame.

83. For a concrete model of what this could mean, see Santa Barbara, Dubee and Galtung (2009).

84. Ibn Khaldun (1958, 1986), of *Al Muqadimmah* fame, was an early sociologist and one of the first macro-historians, based on observations made during his extensive travels as a Tunisian diplomat. His general thinking underlies some of this chapter.

85. That extermination project is still on, for instance in the Amazonas, Chiapas, Guatemala.

86. Clearly this refers to Western history and the Enlightenment in particular, adopted by some other civilizations and not imposed as Westernization. But the Western stamp is unmistakable.

87. Both are, like theology, deductively constructed, based on a number of axioms that gives them an apodictic character. But since they were the secular substitutes for religion, dogmatism, as *credo quia absurdum*, is no objection. That also makes their basic credos (rational human beings with knowledge of the law will be law-abiding; rational human beings act so as to maximize their utilities) unfalsifiable, meaning that no empirical evidence can be used to unseat the new high priests. Only a more compelling jurisprudence or economics can do that.

88. Jesus Ballesteros (1989, pp. 9-10) sees postmodernity both as decadence and as resistance: ecumenical, neo-feminist, as equilibrium between anima and animus, as holistic thinking and local action. *Comment*: for strong individuals all of that and more. For the weaker insufficient guidance and support. But this book is on the same line, trying to twist the historical process into postmodernity toward more equiarchy and less anarchy.

89. Type 4 is the classical crime in public space. What people did at homes (type 3) and in organizations (type 5) were seen as private matters to be handled by the family, meaning the *pater familias*, or the organization, meaning the *CEO*, themselves often perpetrators. This is now changing.

90. A more sensible approach would be for terrorists and state terrorists to try to solve the underlying conflicts. For one hundred arguments to that effect, see Galtung (2008a).

91. Schumacher (1973), in the famous book with the same title.

92. King worked for the OECD, a very Alpha organization, and the

combined thesis is not a bad formula. Thus, many want to change the UN, but only very few to abolish it.

93. Figures often repeated in the US press compare the 15,000 hours of schooling with 18,000 hours of television to which an average US 18 years old has been exposed, with on the average one murder--not just some killings--per hour. A major training in direct violence. Added to that come 340,000 commercials, not only at an idiotizing level devoid of any intellectual or moral content, but as training in structural violence. Communication is one-way, no questions asked. The only options are buying-not buying, switching-not switching off.

94. Meaning both advanced in terms of modernization and economic growth, and in an advanced stage of *atomie-anomie*.

95. Ornauer, Wiberg, Sici_ski and Galtung, Eds. (1976), 729 pp.

96. In the self-image of the colonial countries as "mother countries", that may be what they hoped to do. But mothers with that track record would hardly serve as moral models at the social level. And at the world level relations are in addition remote. For some self-reflections of UK colonial officers on colonialism and its demise, see Allen (1980). For an African perspective on the relation, see Thiong'o (1975). Colonialism in Africa lasted about 60-70 years only, about the same as the neo-colonialism of development assistance. The demise of one carries much information for the demise of the other.

97. For a system of regions as an alternative to the US Empire, and to general globalization, see Galtung (2009), Part Two.

98. Many authors see the community as the basic unit, like Elise Boulding (1976, pp. 788-789): "In my projection of the future I have suggested nothing the least bit radical. I have assumed that shifting to a smaller scale of organization for many aspects of daily life, and developing a more intensive utilization of the human resources of both sexes and all ages and ethnic and racial backgrounds in local communities, will also stimulate the fuller development of all individuals and shift us gradually away from the evolutionary detour of a sex-segregated division of labor. On the whole, people like continuity as well as change, and need other people to care about them, whether they are young or old.. why both family-type and commune-type households are likely to continue into the future."

And George Kent (1984, p. 129): "I believe that the basic, natural unit of development is not the individual, the nation, or the world, but rather the community. Ultimately, then, the transformation of consciousness at issue is not merely that of separate individuals. Rather, development means the transformation of community consciousness. Some extremely

valuable things are generated through social interaction, intangible but nevertheless real and important things like enhanced creativity, improved understandings, and mutual support. People become increasingly capable of dealing with the world around them partly through direct experience but, more importantly, by continually testing their own views by comparing them with the views of others. Individuals need those things that only a society can provide if they are to become fully developed. The raising of consciousness rarely occurs to individuals in isolation; it is almost always a social event."

99. This is the major theme of the Oscar Lewis (1969) tradition of *la cultura de pobreza*, today often seen as an obstacle to growth because potential entrepreneurs are locked into Beta type solidarity rather than free buoyancy in Alpha pyramids.

100. Johann Jakob Bachofen, jurist-philologist-sociologist, professor at the University of Basel, 1815-1887, coined the term "patriarchy"--a social formation ruled by men--and drew attention to matriarchal formations 5-6,000 years ago, before desertification (Sahara = sand) and scarcity privileged warring over loving values. He wrote the book *Das Mutterrecht*, 1861, and opened for gender as a key angle in the study of violence and peace, of conflict and its transformation. And Eisler follows: "They will be taught new myths, epic stories in which human beings are good; men are peaceful; and the power of creativity and love--is the governing principle. For in this gylanic world, our drive for justice, equality, and freedom, our thirst for knowledge and spiritual illumination, and our yearning for love and beauty will at last be freed. And after the bloody detour of androcratic history, both women and men will at last find out what being human can mean." (Eisler, 1987, p. 203).

101. Some words about *Roman Law*. In "primitive" peoples there may have been a coupling of two holisms: we, as a whole, use, with care, what we find in nature, as a whole. In Roman Law both holisms yielded to atomism; *humans* subdivided into individuals capable of ownership, with the *pater familias* and the *emperor* as examples, and *nature* subdivided into entities that could be owned, like land, water, minerals, plants, animals, slaves, women, children, peoples, and all of the above as colonies...For this arithmetics and geometry, geology, botany and zoology, and a census had to emerge. But once the subdivisions had been done on both sides of the humans-nature divide a totality can be sewn together the Roman Law way: through a one-one mapping of juridical persons on objects, the *dominio*, private ownership. What before belonged to everybody belonged to nobody; *res communis, res nullius* as "everybody" is not a juridical person. Ownership in the non-Western world could then be

acquired on a "first come, first see, first own" basis, through "discoveries"; the economic aspect of *veni, vidi, vici* (I came, I saw, I won). This, then, became Western law. See, e.g., Justo (1994).

102. A major theme of Galtung and McQueen (2008).

103. Weber (1951, p. 248); for the original see Weber (1963, p. 535). Also see, of course, Weber (1958).

104. The first two, hard work and saving, are picked up in economic texts, the latter two, greed and inconsideration, not. In economic theory they tend to be expressed as "self-interest", often softened by the adjective "enlightened".

105. See Fanfani (1955) and Samuelson (1961). There is also Rodney Stark (2005) who argues strongly the positive role of any christianity, ignoring the differences between the three christianities and non-christian roads to capitalism and success, possibly with freedom more in the collective (from the West) than the individual sense. Stark is unimpressed by Greece and Rome, and very impressed by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas--private property, profit and interest--where our focus is on competitive individual salvation as a model for the market. When today protestant Anglo-American capitalism is declining in relative importance, it is not because it is outcompeted by the other christianities but by non-christianities in Japan and China.

106. This, of course, is a basic assumption in Roman Law, ruling out collective property as nobody's property: *res communis = res nullius*.

107. What kind of god would use market profit to express his favorable inclination?

108. A major thesis in Geiss (1993).

109. The classical, controversial, study comparing Protestant and Catholic colonialism is Tannenbaum (1947). To the Protestants Africans and "Indians" were born inferior as slaves or excluded forever; to the Catholics they were humans with bad luck who could one day become free.

110. See Chapter 19 for Chinese cultural adequacy. The Russians, to the contrary, have been blamed for an entitlement mentality, expecting the state to solve the problems; presumably a carry-over from communism, possibly also from the orthodox conception of a god who will solve problems in the longer run provided rituals are adhered to. After all, Stalin started his career at an orthodox seminary and constructed bolshevism in that image. For a theory of "homo sovieticus" see Chapter 3.1 in Galtung (1984).

111. "The spirit of the West does not seem able to comprehend how a good

and pious man can at the same time be Confucian, a Buddhist, a Taoist and a Christian. European Christians believe this to be wrong and impossible; but thousands of Chinese Christians live it." From Ohm 1959, p. 28). And: "All religions are only potentialities. Therefore none must rise above the others, Christianity not exempted." (Ohm, 1959, p. 31).

112. All that was needed was a Go! from the leadership. And that signal came with the Perry challenge, the apparition in 1854 of "the grey ships" in Tokyo Bay, under the US commander Perry, demanding that Tokugawa Japan "opens up" (note the sexual language).

113. The liberators were Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il Sung. All three had to fight West-USA in struggles the West was doomed to lose. In China the task of unification is almost completed, and the pride of being Chinese enormous. In Viêt Nam the task is completed. In Korea much remains to be done to unify the nation, but when it happens there will be a fervent pride in being Korean. The functional equivalent of shinto will be in place in all three; but Japanese shinto overdoes it.

114. The formula is attributed to Gamani Corea, former director of the Bank of Sri Lanka and former Executive Director of UNCTAD, Geneva.

115. For a general theory of rupture, see Gras (1979). In the typical rupture something permanent, like a twig, breaks when exposed to a process like wet snow accumulating (the clever twig would be elastic and counter process with process, yielding to shake off the snow). And thus we get events, processes and permanents encountering events, processes and permanents in nine combinations called history.

116. The title of Barbara Tuchman's excellent study.

117. In Germanic languages more other expressions come easily by changing the initial particle, "Abwicklung" in German, declining, or "innvikling" and "nedvikling" in Norwegian, hinting at de-developing by turning inward and by declining.

118. For details see Galtung (1996), Part III, "Development", particularly Chapter 4.

119. A Danish couple once told me what impressed them most when camping in their car by a Norwegian water-fall, at night: all the sounds heard were natural, nothing was made by humans. The sound of waves, of water, of wind in the treetops; no cars!

120. Galtung, Heiestad and Rudeng (1980); Part Three in Galtung (2009).

121. I am using Vives (1970).

122. Vicens Vives quotes Núñez de Castro: "Let London manufacture

those fine fabrics of hers to her heart's content; Holland her chambrays; Florence her cloth; the Indies their beaver and vicuña, Milan her brocades, Italy and Flanders their linens... so long as our capital can enjoy them; the only thing it proves is that all nations train journeymen for Madrid, and that Madrid is the queen of Parliaments, for all the world serves her and she serves nobody".

123. Carlo M. Cipolla, "The Economic Decline of Italy", in Cipolla (1970), pp. 196-214 (the quote is from p. 214).

124. Cipolla, *ibid.*, pp. 205ff.

125. Cipolla, *ibid.*, p. 211.

126. The following account draws on Lewis (1970a).

127. Lewis, (1970a, p. 229). He adds: "This apathy of the Ottoman ruling class is the more striking when contrasted with the continuing vigor of their intellectual life" (p. 230).

128. A revolt against the Ch'ing dynasty that captured Nanjing and made it their capital.

129. From my forthcoming book *Economics In Another Key*. L, C, T and M stand for production factors labor, capital, technology and management respectively. Also see Barlett and Steele (1992).

130. Kennedy (1987) gives a brilliant account of exactly this from 1500 to 2000.

131. The UNEP-UNCTAD Cocoyoc Declaration of 1974, Appendix 4.

132. And the follow-up of that warning is in Galtung (2009).

133. For the garden theme there is a beautiful piece by Elise Boulding, "Images of Peace in Human History", prepared for UNESCO 1975.

134. The description is based on Bay (1954, pp. 54-56).

135. The women came to another section of Asgard, Folkvang (Bay, 1954, p. 54).

136. The description is based on the article "State of the Dead (Christian)" in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. II, Edinburgh 1920, pp. 835f.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 835.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 836.

139. *Ibid.*, p. 580; article on "Demons and Spirits (Christian)".

140. *Ibid.*, p. 584.

141. *Ibid.*, p. 835. For a fascinating discussion of "the other place" and its

waning significance in christian thought, see Walker (1964).

142. Not quite that simple. The general idea is that the soul, liberated from the decaying body, goes to heaven for an after-life, if saved. This also ties in with the classical Greek idea of the soul as finer, better than the body.

On the other hand the Articles of Faith talk about *resurrectio carnis*. In Revelation 7:15-17 there is reference to material basic needs: "The one sitting on the throne will shelter them; they will never be hungry again, nor thirsty, and they will be fully protected from the scorching noonday heat. For the Lamb standing in front of the throne will feed them and be their shepherd and lead them to the springs of the water of life. And God will wipe their tears away."

Then again on the other hand this may also be metaphorical and non-material, like "the springs of the water of life". But then Revelation, ch. 21, can be seen as a very concrete description. Compared to the very earthy description of afterlife in Viking and Muslim eschatologies, the Christian afterlife stands out as more ethereal.

143. The description is based on the article "Djanna" (garden) in *Handwörterbuch des Islam* (1941, pp. 111ff) and, of course, the Qur'an, e.g. sura 57.

144. From Chang (1975), Chapter 80.

145. See Feibleman (1977, pp. 224, 87, 89).

146. This is mainly taken from Feibleman (1977), Part Two, especially Ch. XXX, "Some General Observations on Chinese Philosophy" (p. 173).

147. During the cultural revolution the iconic People's Commune was Tachai; now it is Xiaogang, five hours by car northwest of Shanghai. The commune is the development unit, not higher administrative levels, and the slogan is now "Learn from Xiaogang" where Deng's reform started 30 years ago. There are 800 million in these rural communes, and the goal is to double their income by 2020. There are residents' committees in urban communes like Qingyuan south of Beijing. In general, five forces are acting on a commune: the public sector, the private sector, NGOs, technical experts, and the party; the latter presumably for an overall, holistic view with its present strong focus on high level of education in the 70 million membership. See "Der Geist von Xiaogang", *Der Spiegel*, 45/2008, and "Ambivalent Role", *Development + Cooperation*, 2009:7-8. The idea of the commune as the unit can today be found all over the world, one expression being local currencies to stimulate local economies. But the village of Marinaleda in Andalucia in Spain goes much further toward a communist model, with cooperatives for labor-intensive agricultural

products, people building their own houses with interest free mortgages, and "volunteers clean the streets or do odd jobs around the village", "To capitalist folly a Spanish town thumbs its nose", *International Herald Tribune*, 24 April 2009.

148. Hick (1956, p. 58). Also see Plato's *Phaidon*, last chapter.

149. A prophetic statement by a brilliant theoretician-practitioner: "This is why the exploited countries reaffirm their cultural origins, the auto-chthonous ways of cohabitation and of production organization become stronger, the regional peculiarities come out strongly and the spiritual strength like Islamism in the East, Buddhism in Asia and Christianity in Latin America reinforce themselves, without denying the positive Western modernity, in the search for a peaceful and democratic synthesis. The courses of actions are given and visible--the near future of Latin America will be marked by them. (Juan Somavía, in Masini, 1983, pp. 267-268).

150. The classic in this field is Huzinga (1924), complementing Gibbon on the Roman Empire, pp. 100-103 for an analysis of the role of unrealistic chivalry in precipitating the decline.

151. "Looking at Gandhi's approach to life and his encounters with the West can serve us well here. 'Gandhian Development,' as I call it, is based on the same foundations as Buddhist philosophy, for it aims at the reduction of craving, avoidance of violence, and development of the spirit. This kind of true development is in accord with nature and the movements and rhythm of life. For Gandhi, quality of life was both the means and the end of development. He rejected both the production and accumulation of material things as life's aim, emphasizing instead the importance of spirit. He said the less we are dependent on material goods, the greater our freedom of spirit. If we emphasize simple satisfaction, the preservation of traditional values, and gradual progress in matters both physical and spiritual, other values will follow. This helps develop independence and inter-dependence, rather than dependence on outside experts. At the village and national levels, Gandhian Development begins and ends with people who are in a strong position to be moral and courageous in their decision-making." (Sivaraksa, 2009, pp. 35-36).

152. Gandhi's sarvodaya, uplift-of-the-poor villages project is more buddhist than hindu; a reason why it did not catch on. Horizontal caste, eliminating untouchability, giving dignity to the casteless and the lowest caste, the *shudra*, the common worker, was so incompatible with the hindu world view that like buddhism itself it was exported to Sri Lanka where under Ari Yaratne's inspired leadership it found fertile ground.

With the participation of 660 village people the Sarvodaya Movement

has been able to identify ten basic human needs in the rural areas of the island. These are: 1 A clean and beautiful environment, 2 A clean and adequate supply of water, 3 Minimum clothing requirements, 4 A balance diet, 5 A simple house to live in, 6 Basic health care, 7 Simple communication facilities, 8 Minimum energy requirements, 9 Total education, 10 Cultural and spiritual needs.

Nyerere's vision of local village autonomy ran into the centralized post-colonial structure of Tanzania with districts etc. pointing to the pyramid apex in Dar Es Salaam.

153. The *Buddha*, avoiding idolatry, the *dhamma*, the teachings, and the *sangha*, the community of believers.

154. As Kantowsky (1980, p. 211) points out in a book on *sarvodaya*: "Obviously, a correct understanding of the Buddhist answer is more difficult since it starts from the central doctrine of No-Self. The idea of an immortal substance in man or outside, whether it is called Atman, I, Soul, Self or Ego is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. According to Buddhist philosophy what we call a being or an individual is composed of the Five aggregates of Matter, Sensations, Perceptions, Mental Formations and Consciousness. For a Buddhist 'Individual' is only a convenient label given to the combination of these five groups which can never be the same for two consecutive moments. They are in a flux of momentary arising and disappearing."

155. The iconic figure is Sulak Sivaraksa from Siam--he rejects the name "Thailand"--and his excellent journal *Seeds of Peace*. Says Sivaraksa: *Development from the Bottom up*: "There is an old Thai saying, 'In the fields there is rice; in the water there are fish.' Before colonialism, the fertile lands of Southeast Asia, known as the Rice Bowl of Asia—provided food for all its people. Plants grew everywhere, wildlife was plentiful, jungles produced teak and other hardwoods, and the human population was sparse. Communities farmed their own land, wove their own cloth, and were governed and protected by their own institutions, family, community, and a highly developed system of seniority. Production was cooperative and geared toward self-sufficiency and maintaining the balance of nature. Today 60 percent of the children in rural Siam suffer from malnutrition, millions of Indonesian peasants migrate to the slums of Jakarta, thousands of Filipino farmers have left their land to find work in the Middle East and elsewhere, and small fishermen on the Malaysian coast are barely surviving. Colonization by Western powers caused an upheaval in formerly self-sustaining village production systems. When foreign companies took over large tracts of land for rubber, sugar cane, coconut, and banana plantations, the cash economy replaced barter, and

farming for export shifted control of villagers' destinies from within their own communities to distant market forces. Small farms were acquired by local elites, and new classes of tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and farmworkers emerged."   "--The people of my country, although never colonized politically, were colonized intellectually and thus alienated from our Buddhist roots. The Buddhist Kingdom of Siam now has more prostitutes than monks. (Sivaraksa, 2009, pp. 25-26, 31-32).

156. Like between Lhasa in Tibet and Ulan Bator in Mongolia for centuries and centuries ago.

157. Deep gratitude to Abbas Aroua for his advice about this section.

158. By Stewart Gordon (2008), the quotes are from pp. 177-179, 183-184, 189-191.

"The Asian world, 500-1500 was a place of great empires and large capital cities."--"The routes and networks connected a world that went from China across Central Asia, into India and the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, and portions of sub-Saharan Africa."

"The great Asian world benefitted from two major universalizing religions: Islam and Buddhism. Both addressed universal human needs and recruited on the basis of relatively simple personal commitment rather than ethnicity, region, language, or gender. Both required long-distance travel in pursuit of knowledge and training and built institutions that promoted and supported such travel."

"When the Europeans arrived in Asia, they proclaimed themselves traders as well as representatives of kings, directly responsible to their sovereign. This was new and unexpected. No trader in the Asian world represented a king."

"The European traders were also heavily armed. Although Asian traders regularly hired troops to protect caravans of ships, they were rather involved in wars. The Europeans brought the notion of intertwining trade and warfare to Asia from centuries of practice on the European continent and in the Mediterranean. Royal involvement in trade an cannon casting, for example, was seen as a direct practice of profitable politics."

"--Europeans brought with them a sense that they were Portuguese or English and Christian. Indeed, there had been wars over sectarian inter-prettation of Islam and attacks on Buddhist institutions by expanding Islam, but there was nothing like the European definition of *Christian* vs *heathen*."

159. Tariq Ramadan (2010, p. 57) puts the basics in a more Western way: "--the *shari'ah* is not a 'system' nor 'a closed body of Islamic laws' but rather the 'Way to faithfulness to Islam's objectives' (which consist in protecting life, dignity, justice, equality, peace, Nature, etc.)" The relation

between values such as these five or six and the five pillars are indicated in the text.

160. "What alternative must the Christian offer and bear witness to in his life? *There is no doubt that this alternative is Christ*; he is not a sociologist, a politician or even a philosopher , but he proposed to man his own love even to the point of his sacrifice of himself, and he indicates in brotherly love the divine commandment. That is the luminous road which men must take if they want to get out of the blind alley into which selfishness has driven them and find happiness insofar as that is possible in the human condition. How well Abbé Pierre writes when he synthesizes the whole Christian message: "My happiness is not in securing my own happiness but rather that of others." (Gheddo, 1973, p. 141). Again, fine, but not a social model.

161. This may lead to double taxation, as *zakat* and as taxes to the government; an important challenge in contemporary islam. I am indebted to Mohammed Sulthon for this effect of Muslims becoming citizens as well as believers after "the end of the *caliphate* era and the beginning of the modern state era" in a paper at the European Peace University, Stadtschlaining, Austria.

162. "... in Islam these principles/economic welfare and social justice/constitute essential prerequisites, they can free man from poverty and discrimination so that through moral growth and particular evolution, he may freely unfold his inherent divine nature." (Shari'ati, 1980, p. 73). And: "The ideal society of Islam is called the *umma*--the infrastructure is the economy, because 'whoever has no worldly life has no spiritual life'. Its social system is based on equity and justice and ownership by the people--the society of human equality and thus also of brotherhood--the classless society". (Shari'ati, 1979, p. 119).

163. For a discussion of Islam and interest (usury) see Cummings, Askari and Mustafa (1980), particularly pp. 32-34. The argument is roughly that in Islam interest and-or usury tends to lead to "direct wealth into the control of the few", gain is not balanced by being subject to a loss, and that "wealth should be accumulated through personal activity and hard work".

164. For an islamic voice on these similarities: "Both these social systems, capitalism and communism, though they differ in outward configuration, regard man as an economic animal; their differing contours reflect the issue of which of the two will provide more successfully for the needs of this animal" (Shari'ati, 1980, p. 32). And then existentialism as a fallacy: "This is the weak point of existentialism: however much it may turn on the primacy of man and on human freedom, because it denies both God and

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social issues,it leaves man suspended in midair." (Ibid, p. 111).

165. With a big However: the West is weak on promoting the second generation of economic, social and cultural rights, the USA not even ratifying them. In line with the non-hierarchy position taken we are not arguing that the right to nutrition is more or less important than the right to expression, but they are both human rights reflections of basic needs. For the legal approach to the right to nutrition, see Irene Galtung (2010, unpublished).

166. There is hardly any country in the world doing this so well as France, as a legacy of Mitterrand style socialism.

167. Marx' *Reich der Notwendigkeit* and *Reich der Freiheit*. *Notwendigkeit*, necessity, can be interpreted as basic needs. Agnes Heller puts it this way: "Von welchem anderen Ausgangspunkt könnte er dem Reich der materiellen Produktion als *Reich der Notwendigkeit* ein anderes Reich gegenüberstellen, das *Reich* der freien Selbstbestätigung, *der Freiheit*? Wie sonst würde er, immer wieder aufs neue, in einem positiven Zukunftsmodell die für die allseitige Betätigung dienende Freizeit und das Aufwachsen der Arbeit zum Lebensbedürfnis so hochschätzen" (Heller, 1976, p. 41).

168. And the related miracle: that social ownership of the means of production meant the end of alienation, in turn stimulating production by making workers more interested. In the important study by Gordon and Klopov (1975), the four most frequently mentioned after work activities for women were cooking, house-cleaning, shopping and caring; and then came watching television and reading newspapers. Missing from the list: the work. Sounds familiar. But the end of alienation hypothesis still stands. Capitalist ownership and being self-employed will certainly beat state and party ownership in stimulating interest for production After Work.

169. "Humanistic socialism is not a perfect society that removes all causes of human suffering. It resolves only the crucial, most painful social problems. We are not yet even aware of the new riffles and conflicts that would emerge in a new society: those are beyond the horizon of our epoch. Deepest metaphysical doubts, despairs and quests for measuring will always remain with us, as universal constituents of the human existential situation. Consequently, humanistic socialism is not an absolute ideal, an ultimate eschatological end of history. It is only the expression of the optimal historical potential of our epoch. Mihailo Markovi_, in Masini, 1983, pp. 77-78).

170. TIME, 8 December 1980, presented a survey of "Where the Robots

Are" (p. 45), placing 10.000 in Japan, with the USA as number 3 with 3.000, followed by Western Germany with 850. But Japan was not fully aware of the significance of JMP: "the Japanese in the past twenty years or so have developed a cult revering sophisticated, 'big' technology and seem to have lost sight of the meaning of appropriate technology, which was developed so painstakingly by their forefathers"--"no Japanese organization is included in worldwide lists of organizations engaged in the research, development or dissemination of appropriate technology. The paradox here is that Japan, which is the best potential source of appropriate technology in the present world, has so far been the least concerned with its development", from Osamu Muro, "Technical Cooperation Reexamined", *The Wheel Extended*, Spring 1978, p. 13.

171. Promotion by seniority rather than merit preserves cohort cohesion; in the West they may be torn apart by the rapid advance of one and the stand-still of the classmate.

And, whereas in the West the best university graduates often remain in research, the second best go to business and the third grade to government, the Japanese seem to reverse this: the government gets the best and the brightest, then comes business, and the rest stay behind at the university. Stereotypes, yet helpful in explaining why Western intellectuals often are unimpressed with their Japanese colleagues, finding them imitative (see the *OECD Report Social Sciences Policy: Japan*, 1977) and why intergovernmental negotiations often end in Japan's favor.

172. To Sorokin the "familistic" relation was what Parsons would call particularistic and diffuse, and the contractual relation was universalistic and specific. In Japan, as Abegglen conveyed effectively to the West in his classic on the Japanese company, relations may be highly universalistic yet so broad that they cover human concerns in the West only found in families and friendship. See Park (1981).

173. This means parallel income curves for management and employees, and under expansion and contraction. In the West there are many models, like employers absorbing much profit when things go well and maintaining income at both levels but reducing the working force when things go badly (unemployment, firing and "redundancy", pre-pensioning, decreased working hours).

174. This type of egalitarianism in Japan challenges Western business managers used to so many privileges setting them off from workers. On the other hand, the famous "expense accounts" offers some consolation both for Westerners and Japanese.

175. "… the number of suggestions submitted at 400 business enterprises

during 1979 totaled an impressive 13.5 million, or an average of 7.19 suggestions per worker. According to a Ministry of Labor study conducted in July 1977, as many as 74.1 percent of all business enterprises employ suggestion systems", from Inagami (1981).

176. Okita (1989) mentions the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, as having developed this type of theory as early as the 1930s" (p. 1102); "The Flying Geese Development Theory".

177. Here the puritanism factor enters also for Japan; Weber is at work in Japan but not for Weber's reason, and not Japan at work in the West.

178. Casio had an organ of that type that may have been offensive to Westerners associating organs with the church and calculators with the market, even stock exchange.

179. See Galtung (1971b).

180. "The double mistake of abstraction and generalisation has thus led to a departure in thought from the fluid procedure of nature. This narrowing of concepts and processes into hard and rigid outlines, and their rounding off into definite scientific counters temporarily simplified the problems of science and thought, but we have outlived the utility of this procedure, and for further advance we have now to return to the more difficult but more correct view of the natural plasticity and fluidity of natural things and processes. -- "Thus the League of Nations, the chief constructive outcome of the Great War, is but the expression of the deeply-felt aspiration towards a more stable holistic human society. And the faith has been strengthened in me that what has here been called Holism is at work even in the conflicts and confusions of men; that in spite of all appearances to the contrary, eventual victory is serenely and securely waiting, and that the immeasurable sacrifices have not been in vain." (Smuts, 1987, pp. 1-2, 344-345).

"Particularmente en el mundo anglosajón, se entiende como *ciencia* el empleo del método científico y este último es concebido en el sentido estricto de la aplicación del análisis matemático y, más recientemente, de la mecánica estadística. Se comprende, por lo tanto, que hombres de valor como Hicks y Samuelson se hayan empeñado tanto en traducir todo lo que sabemos de la realidad económica al lenguaje del análisis matemático. No es por pedantería, como puede parecer, sino porque están convencidos, siguiendo a Stuart Mill, de la unidad metodológica de todas las ciencias; por lo tanto el progreso de la economía se hace en el sentido de una creciente aplicación del método científico, y éste tiene su paradigma en la ciencia física." (Furtado, 1975, p. 134).

181. Maoism may be seen as an alliance between the poor or under-

privileged at the top three levels--students-landless-workers--against the rulers-landlords-capitalists, and against the bottom, the merchants. Understandably, to many this was an unfinished revolution. Professors and other professionals were logically among the "rulers"; time to take them on came with the cultural revolution.

182. By the author (with an interpreter) while Visiting Professor at Sichuan University, Chengdu, in 1985.

183. See Chapter 2.1, pp. 12-18 on him in Galtung and Inayatullah, Eds. (1997).

184. Francesco d'Assisi has very holistic perspectives on Brother Wolf and Sister Death, and above all on the approach to conflict in *Il Lupo di Gubbio*, the Wolf from Gubbio, a village in the Apennines. Meister Eckhart coined the expression, "God is within, but we are without", like God being immanent but we making him transcendent. Great, but not enough to constitute comprehensive development models.

185. Thus, mono-gender monasteries are not self-reproductive even if highly sustainable through centuries and beyond. An *Anecdote* on that. Close to Györ in Hungary is a famous ancient monastery and István Kende, historian and important communist party member, and this author visited the abbot the elicit the sustainability secret. He said, "of course we radiate a spiritual message, but far from the political center, do not meddle in politics, try to be helpful to people in distress, of any kind. And in addition, be on the top a hill, above the hue and fry, nearer to the Almighty helps a lot. That way we survived feudalism, early capitalism, fascism, the German occupation and--." He stopped, looking at the well known Kende, who said: "And you will survive us to, it is OK, just say it". Silence was the answer. A couple of years later that prediction became history.

186. See the Epilogue in Galtung and McQueen (2009).

187. Besides, is it democracy or parliamentocracy rather, with a democracy window opening one day every four years? Or, not even that, but a partyocracy rather with the parties deciding platforms and candidates? Or, not even that, but party executive-ocracy like the communist party Politburo rather, as they often decide what parties should decide, with a window opening for democracy once a year or so? Of course, paying clans, families, firms, people high up in economy or polity to exercise political influence is corruption. But how about paying the leadership of political parties--from private donations or from public subsidies to keep the machinery going? What if anything is sacred about a party? Galtung and Scott (2008) is an effort to reflect on these topics.

188. I am indebted to the research by Yasumasu Kuroda for this point.

189. The Bologna process, standardizing European universities by grafting upon them a foreign, American model to serve the Western liberal model and make the EU super-competitive, is a major example. See "10 años de un proceso de Bologna orientado hacia el modelo norteamericano", *Current Concerns*, December 2009.

190. With six models we have 15 bilateral relations. How many will carry the "darwinian struggle" as far as to war? Using past experience as a guide, Western liberal has been at war against all of them, and used colonization, intervention and a cold war. Western marxist did the same in the very recent past. The islamic model has a long history of expansion with conquest in the now distant past, and its more extremist versions have ben imposed on others. Occident I at work, in other words.

The buddhist model may have been imposed on others inside buddhist majority countries, but not across international borders, like the Chinese model. The Japanese model came closer to Occident I.

The record is bad. For this to change positive projects have to come up front not "cooperation" to promote one model only but mutuality.

191. Thus, Störig (1958) summarizes Chinese philosophy in 14 points (p. 89): 4. "Both-and is always preferred to either-or" and 6. "A Chinese proverb: 'Three teachings, one family', referring to confucianism, daoism and buddhism".

192. Roy Preiswerk, in Addo (1984, pp. 41-42) had this to say about it:
The probable consequences of NIEO: what might happen?

Let us suppose for a moment that the NIEO is established. Without venturing too far into speculation, one can reasonably assume the following four possibilities:

[1] The international division of labor would be slightly modified, not in its fundamental structure but in the percentage representing the Third World's share of world industrial production.

[2] The raw material – and energy-producing countries would benefit from an increase in export revenue. Probably half of these resources (it is difficult to give a precise figure) are found in the industrialized countries, which would then enjoy advantages comparable to those of the Third World as far as exports are concerned.

[3] Inequalities between states and within states would continue to increase as in the past. Indeed the potential to achieve whatever development is planned varies enormously from one country to another and the necessary resources are very unequally distributed. Note that international inequality will worsen not only between North and South but also between industrialized countries (superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union) and between countries of the Third World.

[4] At the same time we would witness the increased dependence of non-industrialized countries on industrialized countries from the viewpoint of capital, technology and know-how. This dependence would be particularly serious in the case of countries which do not produce either raw materials or energy. But the producers too may fall into dependence. When we speak, sometimes too quickly, of the interdependence of producers and consumers, we forget that the dependence of the seller (Third World) on the buyer can be total, depending on the product and the state of the market. We should speak of interdependence only where there is a perfectly symmetrical relationship, a very rare situation.

We realize that certain states and certain classes within states would gain advantages by the establishment of the NIEO. The major losers would be, as always, the most disinherited social classes in countries which are neither industrialized nor producers of raw materials and energy." In short: not very promising.

193. *A Six-Point Programme for Immediate Action* (South Commission, 1990, pp. 50-51):
• Action to stop the net transfer of resources from South to North,
• The establishment of multilateral arrangements for protecting the global environmental commons and ensuring sustainable development.
• Doubling the volume of concessional resource transfers to developing countries by 1995,
• The establishment of independent international mechanisms for evaluating the requirements of developing countries, the norms and indicators for performance, and the criteria and conditionality appropriate to each country,
• A time table for lifting protectionist barriers that--affect the growth of developing countries' exports to the developed countries,
• The incorporation of contingency provisions in international arrangements with a view to protecting developing countries against excessive fluctuations in international interest rates, exchange rates and terms of trade.
The South must harness all its energies for the following tasks:
• A fundamental reshaping of its economies, polities, and societies leading to international structures and value systems which prize creativity, innovation and a spirit of enterprise as well as a deep concern for social justice.
• The mobilization and enhancement of the potentialities of the people through the pursuit of development strategies and patterns which put the people at the centre and aim at raising the quality of life for all.
• A strong commitment to closing the knowledge gap with the North, through improvements in education and the development of capabilities to

take full advantage of advances in science and technology.

• An effective population policy, based on a vigorous social development strategy.

• A long-term commitment to rational and prudent management of the environment and use of scarce natural resources, particularly land and water.

194. Fundación Bariloche (1976, pp. 107-108). I am deeply indebted to Amilcar Herrera and Carlos Mallman for deep dialogues centered on this pioneering work.

Some more excerpts:

The obstacles that stand in the way of the harmonious development of humanity are not physical or economic but socio-political.--The goals are therefore achieved not by very high economic growth, but by a reduction in nonessential consumption; increased investment; the elimination of socioeconomic and political barriers, which currently hinder the rational use of land, both for food production and for urban planning; the egalitarian distribution of basic goods and services; and, in developing countries, the implementation of an active policy to eliminate deficits in international trade.

The growth rates necessary to achieve these objectives--the basic needs within the current income structure, or the same socioeconomic organization—[would] vary between 10 and nearly 12%, are in fact impossible to attain.

It could be said that this proposal is utopian, and that it would be more realistic to propose solutions that involve less radical modifications to the sociopolitical structure of the world. Those who hold this position should be reminded of the words of John Stuart Mill more than a century ago: "For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it simply does not produce any result at all."

195. Leopold Kohr (1957, pp. 67-68, 215-216): "The ultimate world state will go the road of all other ultimate world states of history. After a period of dazzling vitality, it will spend itself. There will be no war to bring about its end. It will not explode. Like the ageing colossi of the stellar universe, it will gradually collapse internally, leaving as its principal contribution to posterity its fragments, the little state, until the consolidation process of big-power development starts all over again. This is not pleasant to anticipate--history will in all likelihood repeat itself and the world, little and free once more, will experience another of those spells of cultural greatness which characterized the small-state worlds of the Middle Ages and Ancient Greece."

196. Leopold Kohr (1957, pp. 59-60): "Switzerland, so wise in the science

and practice of government, has shown how she solved the problems of minorities by means of creating minority *states* rather than minority *rights*. In spite of the fact that her cantons are already quite minuscule, three of them were subdivided into sovereign halves complete-ly independent from one another when internal differences developed that would have created minority problems and necessitated a greater degree of mutual submission than could be reconciled with the ideals of democratic freedom. Hence, tiny *Unterwalden* was subdivided in *Obwalden* and *Nid-walden* as far back as the thirteenth century, each following and inde-pendent course in Swiss politics ever since. In 1597, under the impact of the Reformation, the canton of *Appenzell*, rather than forcing her hostile groups into a continued but now unwanted unity, divided herself into the Catholic and predominantly pastoral *Inner Rhoden* and the Protestant and mainly industrial *Ausser Rhoden*. Again in 1833, the canton of Basel subdivided itself into the now independent half-cantons of *Basel-City* and *Basel-Land*, after the rural districts had revolted against the undemocratic rule of the urban trade guilds. Division, not union, was the device by which the Swiss preserved their unity and peace, solving at the same time, as one of the few nations to accomplish this, their minority problems."

197. This chapter is written in the spirit of my late friend Arne Næss, and my very live friend Udo Simonis: "Economic growth can lead either to development or to maldevelopment. The task, therefore, is to reduce, and ultimately to minimize the social and environmental costs of economic growth. Readjusting consumption patterns, promoting better use of resources, and making more careful technological and product choices are part and parcel of a strategy for reconciling man and nature. Environmental impact assessment is a necessary and promising method and reflects the increased environmental awareness – and also the need for harmonizing development and environment all over the world." (Simonis, 1990, p. 23).

198. Vandana Shiva has introduced a very useful concept, *biodemocracy*, "[which] involves the recognition of the intrinsic value of all life forms and their inherent right to exit. It also involves the recognition of original contributions and rights of communities which have co-evolved with local biodiversity. Biodemocracy entails that nation states protect these prior rights from erosion by corporate claims to private property in life forms through patents and intellectual property rights." (Shiva, 1992, p. 28). And she elaborates: "Sovereignty in the matter of patent law is essential because it is a matter of survival, especially for the economically weaker sections of our society which have no purchasing power and can be protected only through public interest, not by the profit motive. The choice

is clear. It is protection of life vs the protection of profits." (*Ibid*, p. 33).

199. As the US Supreme Court put it 17 May 1954 for the case of desegregated schooling in the US South.

200. See *Der Spiegel*, 43/2009.

201. When this author visited them in 1959 they had just been fired at during night from rapidly passing cars, the bullets passing close to children sleeping.

202. *Der Spiegel*, 47/2009.

203. *International Herald Tribune*, 19-20 December 2009.

204. See "Where's the Clean Energy?" *The Nation* 7 December 2009.

205. In April 2008 President Evo Morales gave a speech to the VIIth UN Indigenous Forum where he launched a new decalogue:
[1] Drop the capitalist model, North pays its ecological debt.
[2] Put an end to War, invest money saved in the Earth.
[3] Drop imperialism-colonialism, promote dialogue-coexistence.
[4] Water is a human right, and must never be privatized.
[5] Develop clean energies, put an end to waste and agro-fuels.
[6] Respect for Mother Earth, learn from indigenous peoples.
[7] Basic services--education, health, energy, transportation and communication--are human rights, not to be privatized.
[8] Promote local production, end consumerism, waste, luxury.
[9] Promote cultural and economic diversity, include all races.
[10] Build communitarian socialism in harmony with Mother Earth.

206. This paper has a pre-history. In January 2007, during a meeting in New Delhi celebrating the centenary of Gandhi's term *satyagraha* for his nonviolent campaign against the white regime in South Africa, for the rights of the Indian minority, this author was contacted by the late president of Slovenija, Janez Drnovsek. He was interested in a guaranteed minimum income for everybody. The answer is the present chapter, by Dietrich Fischer and myself very ably assisted by a team of master students at the European Peace University, Stadtschlaining, Austria: Pooja Chawda, Francesco Marelli, Paul Schultz, Sandi Shannon and Kathrin Thalhammer. Their input is gratefully acknowledged.

207. Galtung (2006). The 25,000 dying every day from hunger has been official UN figure for some time. The 100'000 for preventable and curable diseases depends on where the line is drawn. Some resources will be required for almost any prevention and cure, but not necessarily money.

208. Davies, James et al. "Press Release." World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2006, UNU and UNU-WIDER.

209. "One of the critical reasons for Africa's inability to respond adequately to the pandemic [AIDS-HIV] can be explained by user fees in health care" (Stephen Lewis, 2005, p. 6).

210. See Chapter 4 of this book.

211. Thus, for a similar plan for the USA, see Shafarman (2008). *Der Spiegel*, 10 August 2009, had an article about BIG, a Basic Income Grant experiment in Namibia 100 km east of Windhoek, in the Otjivero-Omitara area, giving N$100 per person below 60 per month without any condition. People spent it on food, housing schooling and health--and on entrepreneurial activity. The experiment seems to have been successful, but was canceled after two years.

212. See www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed 2 April 2010) where world military spending for 2008 is estimated as US$1'226'000'000'000. At the exchange rate of 0.74 Euro per dollar on 25 February 2010, this amounts to 907'000'000'000 Euro. Actual figures will be higher than those reported by governments.

213. An old idea: see Galtung (1964), based on global commons, and, independently, Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld (1964).

214. "NASA Funds Aircraft Emissions Study", 24 August 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2005&m=August&x=20050824154353lcnirellep0.1378443, accessed 28 May 2007.

215. The average daily trade in over the counter (OTC) derivatives reached 1.716 trillion Euro (US$2.319 trillion) in 2007. See Bank for International Settlements (2007, p. 16).

216. Bank for International Settlements (2007). Table B.1, page 4. lists average daily amounts of traditional currency exchanges as US$3.210 trillion (= million million). Multiplied by 250 business days per year makes US$805 trillion. Converted at the rate of 30 March 2010 of .7452 Euro per US$ yields 599.89 trillion Euro

 (www.bis.org/publ/pfx07t.pdf?noframes=1, accessed 2 April 2010).

217. It is proposed that half of military spending is instead paid into UNLIB.

218. According to the US Department of Energy, world carbon emissions in 2006 were 29,195,420,000 metric tons (www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls, accessed 2 April 2010).

219. According to the World Bank (2006b), stocks traded worldwide in 2006 amounted to US$49'037'783'098'951, equivalent to 36.287 trillion

Euro (www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_sto_tra_tot_val_cur_us-traded-total-value-current-us, accessed 2 April 2010).

220. Average government spending around the world, both national and local, has been estimated as 36% of gross world product. See www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/indicators/C53/ (accessed 24 February 2010).

221. Reality of Aid. "Governance: Reclaiming the Concept from a Human Rights Perspective." Canadian Council of International Co-operation, 2004 (www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_roa_2004_political_chapter, accessed 2 April 2010, p. 3).

222. "In the world as in nations, economic forces left entirely to themselves tend to produce growing inequality. Within nations, public policy has to protect the weaker partners. The time has come to apply this precept to relations between nations within the world community" (Willy Brandt, 1980).

223. The first part of this chapter was given as the concluding speech at UNESCO Fifth International Conference on Adult Education, UNESCO Hamburg, 18 July 1997; chaired by Boutros Boutros Ghali.

224. "There is a dying belief that aid is a form of disinterested international munificence. Those who cling to this view fly in the face of clear evidence of its role as a weapon of the foreign policy of the 'donor' countries. Remarkably little attempt is made to disguise this fact. For instance, President Kennedy said in 1961 that 'foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world, and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist Bloc'." (Teresa Hayter, 1971, p. 5). But there is also the samaritan mother...

225. As a somewhat bizarre example, in a corner of what today is Namibia, Finnish missionaries offered basic needs in return for conversion to evangelical-lutheran protestantism, *in Finnish*, still spoken by some Namibians.

226. Thus, a leading person in this resistance against development assistance, Professor Yash Tandon, encourages a country like Nor-way to cut out the assistance to Africa leaving to Africa to develop an independent economy, *Klassekampen*, 25 January 2010.

227. Thus, education for girls is often seen as instrumental for family planning, steering young women toward careers or at last away from giving birth to children only; thereby also decreasing infant mortality and mother mortality at birth. This may be so, but why cannot education (also) be a goal in itself, for spiritual enrichment?

228. As the loan is in cash so the debt burden, forcing conversion of resources into money, increased monetization, less resources for the population, and so on. That mechanism was also used in colonialism to pay taxes, not in goats and cereals, but in cash, one of the many treasons why "neo-colonialism" describes the situation well.

229. John F. Kennedy: (help to help themselves) "not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes but because it is right".

230. The director was the late Dudley Seers, what is mentioned here is from a private communication.

231. From Jeffrey Sachs (2006), of Bolivia and Russia fame, in a comment to a review of the book by William Easterly (2006). Sachs quotes Easterley as saying (p. 176) however, that "foreign aid likely con-tributed to some notable successes on a global scale", mentioning health and education major achievements. And Easterley adds: "put the focus back where it belongs, get the poorest people in the world such obvious goods as the vaccines, the anti-biotics...". A focus on basic needs is fine, but nothing is so dangerous as dependency on donors for basic needs.

232. And this is the sticky point for much of the critique of the Western liberal model. As an example take the first Norwegian effort in this field: the Indo-Norwegian Pilot Project to modernize fisheries in Kerala. There were two types of goals, growth and distribution. On the one hand mechanization of fishing--based on hand and wind driven big canoes carved out of tree trunks, *wallams*--modern gear, ocean-going trawlers, freezing of the catch, export; more catch, more income. On the other hand more and affordable catch (protein) for the most needy, better livelihood for the poor fishermen, and elimination of middlemen merchants in favor of cooperatives. In addition there was a health project, and the idea that the project would be peace-building between donor Norway and recipient India, and between the communities in Norway contributing expertise and recipient communities--one Hindu, one Catholic--trained by them. By and large the project succeeded for the growth goals and failed for the distribution goals, as was to be expected in a highly vertical Hindu society, with better distribution in the Catholic part. See Klausen (1968) and Galtung (1974, 1980e). More recently the *wallams* are back again, but propelled by strong outboard engines for a fishing economy better fit for the local than export demands (Klausen, private communication).

233. Multi-angular reporting is the great advantage of *AlJazeera* as opposed to the more mono-angular *CNN*, with *BBC World* in-between.

234. A good example is the text widely used in Singapore, *Religions in*

Singapore (2001), with hinduism, judaism, zoroasterism, buddhism, daoism, christianity, islam, sikhism and baha'i faith; all drafted by adherents of the respective religions.

235. "Let some people get rich first". In his excellent "The Great Leap", Christopher Hayes (2010) asks: "How many is 'some', how rich is 'rich', and how long does 'first' last?" For the last question our answer in the section on the Chinese model in Chapter 19 was quite precise, 9 years, then comes distribution, then growth again, and so on. As an hypothesis. He mentions as an example of distribution "passing a labor law with a minimum wage--over the objections--of the US Chamber of Commerce." And he quotes a high level official arguing against democracy by national elections that people who say "I will divide the property of rich people to poor people" will be elected. "It is useless: parity will not solve the problem of economic development. That is why we are making a gradual and step-by-step approach in reform" (p. 15).

236. This is not a way of saying that South (and East) are more spiritual than the West, but since so much development has been within an economistic paradigm, and economism is materialistic, it looks that way. Economism has not yet penetrated the South to the same extent.

237. The implication for trade is obvious, and this is why there is so much emphasis in islam on not treating each other only as buyer and seller, but getting to know each other beyond that.

238. See Galtung (2009), Part Two on regional and global alternatives to imperialism.

239. See Galtung (2008b) for details, particularly Part Two.

240. "[The] conclusion: that African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries." (Rodney, 1978, p. 7).

241. The title says it all: Charles C. Mann (2006), *1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus*. By and large his narrative covers amazing civilizations in the Americas, north-meso-south; but also how they were hit and ravaged by diseases, particularly smallpox, they were unable to control. When Columbus and Pizarro came, Latin America could be compared to Europe after the end of the Second World War, exhausted, hit by all calamities, and an easy prey for the conquerors.

As one great achievement of the indigenous civilizations, Mann highlights in his "Coda: The Great Law of Peace" (p. 369-78) the Haudenosaunee confederation (aka the Iroquois League), "a loose military alliance between the Seneca, Caygua, Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk--

probably the greatest indigenous polity north of the Rio Grande in the two centuries before Columbus and definitely the greatest in the two centuries after"... "brought about by Deganawidah, the Peacemaker" (p. 370). The confederation left much autonomy to the constituent parts, "the league was predicated on the consent of the governed, with power parity for the genders" (p. 372), probably dating from 1142 (p. 372-3). Only the icelandic parliament is older, from 930. The level of equality and individual diversity was baffling and disturbing to the English invaders. The real founder of what later became the USA, John Winthrop, wrote in 1630, when founding Boston, "a citty upon a hill", how "God Almighty-- hath soe disposed that some must be rich, some poore, some high and eminent in power and dignitie, others mean and in submission" (p. 383).

242. "The GPID [Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development] Project, reflecting this concerns of the expert group convoked by the UNU, decided to ask what at truly desirable state of society might be, in other words, what *goal* might be aimed at by developing societies.-- *indicators* should not only measure the distance between existing and desirable societies, but should also monitor the *process* which was to be followed in bringing about desirable societies. Once it became questionable to assume that development could be equated to a process of industrialization-modernization-Westernization, it became necessary to suppose the existence of a variety of alternative paths of development and to compare the *processes* of such alternative developments. In brief GPID as a project was designed by encouraging dialogue among researchers of different schools of thought, to make the development indicators more relevant to the measurement of truly desirable goals, taking into full consideration what were the alternative processes and paths of human and social development (Miles, 1985, pp. VIII-IX).

For a general analysis of indicators of well-being, see *Social Indicators Research*, Vol. 24 No. 1 February 1991.

243. "'People in the West,' Gandhi wrote in the introduction to his para-phrase of Ruskin's essay in 1908, 'generally hold that the whole duty of man is to promote happiness of the majority of mankind, and happiness is supposed to mean only physical happiness and economic prosperity. If the laws of morality are broken in the conquest of this happiness, it does not matter very much. Again, as the object sought to be attained is the happi-ness of the majority, Westerners do not think there is any harm if this is secured by sacrificing a minority. The consequences of this line of think-ing are writ large on the face of European.'" (Kantowsky, 1980, p. 3).

244. Economist, World Bank official and Pakistani finance minister.

245. See the UNDP *World Development*, May 1990, "Special Report: A

New Scale of Progress--Measuring the Human Development Dimension";
and the succession of excellent, by and large annual, *Human Development
Reports* (1990-2009) from Oxford University Press.

246. According to Horn (1993, pp. 92-93) the HDI rationale is as follows:
"Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most
critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to
be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of
living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human
rights and personal self respect..." It appears that health and knowledge
represent the formation of such capabilities, and income the extent of
choice for their application."

247. Dalton Coney (2009) mentions the adjustment of HDI to rich
countries, keeping life expectancy at birth, and then "educational
enrolment and attainment", and "income" as median income for the
working age population. He points out how America was slipping before
the financial crisis of September 2008 due to the lack of health insurance
and "the fact that college completion rates have been flat since the '70s":
"... if we want America to be 'number one', it is more a matter of pulling
up the bottom than of continuing to concentrate gains at the top". HDI
punishes inequality, GNP/capita does not or less so. But for the USA to
change its development model will not be easy.

In the *Human Development Report 1992* (United Nations Development
Program) the focus on inequality was very explicit. The world population
was divided into quintiles, from the richest 20% down to the poorest 20%,
and their proportion of the total world income decreased from 82.7% for
the richest to 1.4% for the poorest quintile: "global economic growth rarely
filters down". The top 20/bottom 20 ratio is a good measure of distribution.

248. A major theorist of freedom, the late Norwegian-Canadian Christian
Bay, critiques the idea of democracy as an embodiment of freedom, with a
heavy focus on the electoral system, and anchors freedom in what he refers
to as Basic Rights, "(1) to stay alive, (2) unmolested, and (3) free to
develop according to inner propensities and potentials" (*Bulletin of Peace
Proposals*, 1971, pp. 270-278).

249. Kurian (1984), "43. Index of Democratization".

250. Thus, if one goes for economic growth and the other for happiness it
may be because they pick up different aspects of development, or because
there is some contradiction between the two. Quoting the *Images of the
World in the Year 2000* study (Ornauer, Wiberg, Sicinski and Galtung,
Eds., 1976) in Chapter 4, a clear trend toward increasing pessimism about
development the higher the GNP/capita was identified. And there is the

so-called Easterlin paradox--can only be a paradox to economists--that higher income did not necessarily mean more happiness. The case of Japan with economic output per person growing more than seven times from 1950 to 1970 with no increase in subjective sense of satisfaction with life. A more recent study by Betsy Stevenson and Justin Wolfers at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, throws doubt on that, showing a correlation between income and happiness. Or, more correctly, with semantic habits where the word "happiness" enters. Obviously, and that is the strong buddhist point: if you have very little you certainly have much to worry about but if you have very much you certainly also have much to worry about like theft, accidents, disasters, depreciation.

251. Using D for delta, then the rate of change for X is DX/dt and for Y DY/dt, and we get DY/dt:DX/dt = DY/DX; the derivative of Y over X. When close to zero there is only X growth, when the turning starts and Y starts picking up then DY/DX starts growing and may stay high-infinite if X has reached a saturation point, preparing the system for Y growth only. But this is not what the yin/yang hypothesis postulates, but, to the contrary, that time will come for X again, meaning a decrease in the derivative toward zero.

252. 8-12 October 1974 a symposium on "Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and Development Strategies" was convened in Cocoyoc, Mexico by the directors of United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Maurice Strong and Gamani Corea. The rapporteurs were Barbara Ward for resource use and the environment and Johan Galtung for development strategies; Points 1, 2 and 3 in the declaration. *The Cocoyoc Declaration* is reproduced here with some sadness: it is as valid today, more than 30 years later; but the situation has in many regards become worse. One response was a three feet long cable to the two directors from the US State Department, rejecting the declaration entirely. Signed: Henry Kissinger.