

Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation

Study and Analysis Carried Out for UNESCO by:

*The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace
and*

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

To date, few Israeli and Palestinian academics, university faculty, researchers in specialized institutions or think-tanks have cooperated in research projects or maintained a sustained working relationship. Over the years an estimated 2% of the Israeli academics have participated in such ventures and approximately 5% of their Palestinian counterparts¹. The vast majority of Israeli academics have either remained indifferent or opposed, concentrating on their own careers and research agendas. In the case of the Palestinians, academics have opposed, passively or actively, establishing such relationships across the divide. Even if the few academics who participated have made substantial contributions to the advancement of peace², their work represents only a small fraction of the potential of this sector of society. Furthermore, those figures, calculated before the outbreak of the al Aqsa Intifada in October 2000, may have been further reduced by the increasing psychological hostility between Israelis and Palestinians due to the widespread use of violence by both communities as well as by the physical limitations, such as checkpoints, the separation wall, and legal statutes, thus restricting contact between the two national groups.

Consequently, in 2004, UNESCO approached the Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development (a Palestinian NGO) and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace (a research institute located at Hebrew University) in regards to a study of the obstacles and promise of establishing a sound basis for academic and intellectual cooperation across the socio-political divide. Panorama and Truman have been involved over the years in a series of projects and have consequently acquired a vast experience in the field of conflict resolution and joint Israeli-Palestinian activity, while developing a close working relationship. This partnership allowed the two institutions to work together under a common

¹ The overall issue of civil society cooperation has been studied in The Role of Civil Society in the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process (with Manuel Hassassian), in Ma'oz M. and Nusseibeh S. Is Oslo Alive?, (Adenauer Foundation, Jerusalem, 1998), pp.115-139. (with Manuel Hassassian) Israeli/Palestinian Peace Builders: Lessons Learnt in Paul van Tangerine (ed.), People Building Peace, (European Center for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, 1999), pp. 112-123.

² See analysis conducted by Paul Scham, in Arab Israeli Research Cooperation 1995-1999", *MERIA – Middle East Review of International Affairs*. Vol 4, no. 3, 2000, pp. 1-16.

umbrella while also working unilaterally within sectors of the Palestinian and Israeli civil societies not currently engaged in bi-national activity.

The ultimate goal of this project is to explore avenues for significantly increasing the percentage of Israeli and Palestinian academics and intellectuals engaged in constructive dialogue for peace. However, we take as our starting point the articulation, establishment and agreement upon shared principles for effective cooperation. To that end, we have submitted a draft text outlining ‘ground rules’ for dialogue, a set of principles or code of ethics, that highlights the necessary conditions for change in bringing a higher number of our Israeli and Palestinian colleagues to join the effort to make dialogue for peace a priority.

1.2 Call to action

This set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation is not meant to be simply an academic exercise outlining common values, such as academic freedom, that intellectuals on both sides share. Rather, the creation of the guiding principles is an active process designed to translate these values into concrete efforts towards transcending obstacles to cooperation across the divide. Such cooperation should focus on pursuing common values, as academics and as human beings, rather than denying the legitimacy of the ‘Other’ by boycotting joint efforts. Furthermore, it should be based on *enacting* these values, encouraging Israeli academics and intellectuals who are informed about Palestinian suffering and lack of justice to move from the level of knowledge to that of acknowledgment. The goal of the project is to *act*-knowledge, that is to acknowledge the ‘Other’ and to act together on the knowledge of a shared reality, and a shared social responsibility in changing the unacceptable situation that Israelis and Palestinians find themselves in.

Unlike many dialogue projects that ‘preach to the converted’ by including only those willing to meet with the ‘Other,’ the process of creating a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation among academics and intellectuals provides a platform for bringing together Palestinians and Israelis representing a wide spectrum of political opinions. Consequently, it is possible to reach not only those committed to dialogue, but also those drawn to the challenge of defining a set of principles that addresses their professional responsibilities in a conflict situation.

This action research project, undertaken under the auspices of UNESCO, aims at providing a better understanding of the underlying difficulties and the potential for change in the current Israeli-Palestinian context. This first year, the research team undertook an in-depth study of the current stance of academics and intellectuals toward Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, and drafted a set of principles that could encourage academic cooperation. The short set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation, currently a work-in-progress, is derived from a series of interviews and focus groups held with Palestinian and Israeli academics and intellectuals. The guiding principles reflect, therefore, mutual understandings that emerged out of frank and open discussions regarding the social responsibilities of academics and intellectuals due to our shared professional commitment to academic freedom.

Our hope is that this project will not end with the mere creation of a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation. Rather, as the term *action* research entails, this report not only diagnoses the current situation and makes a prognosis for the future, but it also suggests concrete actions for creating a climate favorable for dialogue among academics and intellectuals. Eventually, this initiative can transcend the boundaries of university campuses and have a multiplying effect. We hope that by working through a multidisciplinary network, this project will reach academics and intellectuals with a diverse array of professional skills who can then approach a variety of civil society constituencies that we alone would not be able to reach.

2. Action research methodology

2.1 Methodological premises

This research project was conducted based on several hypotheses shared by the Panorama Center and the Truman Institute. A fundamental premise underlying our research was that a set of agreed-upon principles, like a professional code of ethics, has the potential to promote sustained cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics. It would anchor the legitimacy of cooperation in professional motives” and would appear less contrived by using “professional” motives to bolster the legitimacy of cooperation. The value of academic freedom, universally acclaimed, could serve as one such platform for action. Further, we believe that the process of deriving a set of common principles can assist us in clarifying what needs to be done to promote academic dialogue, and can be legitimized through a document accepted by the leadership of

Palestinian and Israeli universities as well as by the majority of faculty. We also hypothesize that an external, neutral party, as represented by UNESCO, can ensure that the focus remain on the implications of dialogue for academic freedom in the context of violent conflict, and differentiate such cooperative efforts from the broader political issues.

Several of our working hypotheses stem from previous work done examining the ethical code of the medical profession, which demonstrates that a professional commitment to serving the needs of all humans, including the ‘Other,’ in life-threatening circumstances can contribute to a dialogue towards peace, regardless of one’s personal political position. A set of existing guidelines, agreed-upon by both parties to the conflict, can help resolve the issues professionals encounter when attempting to establish cooperative projects. A set of guiding principles reminds academics and intellectuals of the ethics underlying their public service and creates a professional obligation to uphold these values in their work. These guiding principles can create a powerful bond between the parties that is based on shared values, such as human and civil rights, democracy, and the legitimacy of the ‘Other.’ Profession-based dialogue among academics and intellectuals can do more than just bridge historical, cultural and political divides within the university setting. It can provide an example for other sectors of civil society (such as human rights NGOs, journalists, etc) of how to cooperate across the divide, and thus promote the involvement of a broad spectrum of civil society organizations in the conflict resolution process.

2.2 Data collection

A systematic review of the literature revealed that the bulk of ethical writings deal with behavioral guidelines *within* a community and do not address ethical mandates for dealing with the ‘Other’ in a situation of conflict. Existing codes of academic ethics focus primarily on issues of plagiarism, academic integrity, and proper methods for citation and documentation of sources. Very little is said regarding the obligation of academics outside of narrowly-defined research standards. While there is a great deal of literature on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, the vast majority fails to raise the ethical issues involved in such endeavors.

Consequently, this process sought to explore how the ‘separate’ topics of professional ethics and cooperation in times of conflict could be bridged through interviewing Palestinian and Israeli academics and intellectuals. Those involved in the focus groups and interviews included

Palestinians and Israelis who had previously been involved in cooperative efforts as well as those who had not. Although we made an effort to speak with academics and intellectuals from diverse geographic, professional, and political perspectives, our pool was restricted to those who were willing to even discuss the prospect of cooperation. Hence, those who dismiss the ‘Other’ as less than human did not participate in our focus groups.

In a preliminary phase, sixteen Palestinians and nine Israelis were using a questionnaire that was drafted jointly in English and then translated into Hebrew and Arabic (see Appendix 1). In addition, uni-national focus groups were held in Jerusalem (25 participants from Hebrew University), Haifa (8 participants from the University of Haifa and the Technion), Beersheva (5 participants from Ben Gurion University). While the researchers were not successful in holding a focus group at Bar-Ilan University, five (5) people responded to a questionnaire that was circulated. On the Palestinian side, 57 people participated in focus groups held in Jerusalem (17 writers and artists); Bethlehem (13 academics and intellectuals); Jenin (15 academics and intellectuals), Gaza (12 academics and intellectuals). In addition, five (5) returned the circulated questionnaire.

Two special focus groups took place on the Israeli side. One, held in Jerusalem, consisted of the Israeli participants of the “Barcelona group,”³ and thereby represented a select group of Israelis already involved in an in-depth encounter with Palestinians. The second was a focus group conducted electronically, in which 39 people took part, that discussed a set of principles based on the value of academic freedom that was then distributed to members of the Hebrew University community in the aftermath of Yom Kippur 2004. The researchers received a great deal of interesting feedback and commentary from those who felt free to speak in a more anonymous forum where they were not seen and heard by their colleagues.

³ The “Barcelona group” consisted of ten Palestinian and ten Israeli academics who gathered for the first time in May 2004 in Barcelona under the auspices of the Center for Contemporary Culture to discuss the social responsibility of academics at times of violent conflict; their contributions were of great relevance to the issues discussed in this project. This group has continued to meet in Jerusalem and expects to meet again soon in Barcelona. The contributions of the participants are to be published in a book and, to a certain extent the group serves as a Track II for exploring ideas that could be also shared with the leadership of Palestinian and Israeli universities.

A unique component to the research methodology was the participation of an external team of evaluators, who met with the research team and monitored the progress and findings on a continual basis. The presence of this evaluation team allowed the researchers to modify and respond to continual feedback as the process moved forward. The team, comprised of one Israeli and one Palestinian, presented evaluations at the midpoint and at the endpoint of the research process. Their findings, which served to increase the value of this research, are included in the latter part of this report.

2.3 Experience in cooperative efforts

The recent history of Israeli-Palestinian cooperative ventures is rocky, with major ups and downs. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, all attempts at dialogue with the “enemy” were seen as acts of treason. After the Six-Day War in 1967 there were some notable exceptions where Palestinians living in the West Bank sought to cooperate with Israelis for the sake of peace. Much of this dialogue was conducted secretly, some of it internationally, as any known attempts were halted by the Palestinian leadership-in-exile. In the 1970s left-wing Israeli activists began meeting with representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). However, in 1986 the Knesset passed an amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 1948 that provided the government with legal means to prevent those meetings that the government felt were undermining the status of the State of Israel.⁴ Contrary to intended results, however, this amendment actually served to legitimize the issue of discussion with the PLO in the public mind, and led lawyers, judges and jurists (due to their concern for civil rights) to vocally support the right of freedom and assembly even if they did not necessarily support the discussions with the PLO. The law was later repealed, in January 1993, after the government of Yitzhak Rabin made the strategic decision to negotiate with the PLO.

During the first Intifada, which began in 1987, joint work groups for information, protest, and dialogue activities proliferated, with thousands of meetings taking place in Israel and the Occupied Territories. These meetings, largely funded by international sources interested in Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, ranged from a few to several hundred participants.⁵ During this

⁴ Keren, M. (2003), pp.27-28.

⁵ Hermann, T. (2002), p.9.

time Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation occurred as well. Many Palestinian universities were shut down during the Intifada, and Palestinian academics began using the library of the Truman Institute at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. These visits led to several examples of joint research. Academics, such as Dr. Ron Pundak and Dr. Yair Hirschfeld were among some of the first people to engage in the secret negotiations that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the beginning of the Oslo Process. Within Palestinian society at this time, 320 academics joined with Dr. Yosef Sayigh in preparing a Palestinian National Development Plan, and 500 academics joined the technical committees that devised the structure of the Palestinian Authority and prepared for the negotiations with Israel.⁶ During the 1990s, hundreds of Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and others worked together to publish joint studies in diverse fields such as economics, environmental and social issues, technology, and security with a view to furthering common goals.⁷ At the end of the 1990s, however, with the stalemate of the peace process and the subsequent outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, many of these contacts were severed, as many Palestinians no longer were willing to cooperate openly, if at all, due to the uprising and also due to their perception that the Israeli peace movement did not take effective action against Israel's occupation practices and policies.⁸ There has also been a movement among many Palestinian and international academics to boycott Israeli academic institutions.⁹ However, some projects do continue, such as the European-backed project on Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, which teams Israeli and Palestinian academics in drafting an economic road map to accompany the political Road Map.¹⁰

2.4 Summary of current Israeli and Palestinian perspectives

The information collected through Israeli and Palestinian focus groups and interviews can be consulted in greater detail in Appendices 2 and 3. Here, we provide a brief summary of our findings as a way of providing the reader with some grounding for our later analysis and conclusions.

⁶ From the summary of Palestinian focus groups, in Appendix 2 to this report.

⁷ Bar-El, R. (2000). For a more in-depth discussion of this, also see Appendix 4.

⁸ Scham, P. (2000) pp 1-16.

⁹ For more discussion on this topic, see Appendix 5.

¹⁰ Interview with Raphael Bar-El, a participant in the project from Ben Gurion University.

Israeli academics were divided between those who felt the role of the academic in society is to be objective and to conduct (apolitical) research, and those who saw the role of the academics as one of social and political responsibility, providing them with a unique position from which they can disseminate ideas and help influence public opinion. Within the Israeli academic community, many who supported the idea of a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation, emphasized that the document should not be a political statement, but should point concretely to the required conditions for cooperation, such as freedom of movement, access to laboratories, etc. The Guiding Principles point to the specifics of the concrete situation rather than copy existing international principles. That said, there was also the sentiment in the Israeli focus groups that the guiding principles should reflect universal principles that cross dividing lines, and that do not leave room for conflicting interpretations. Some Israelis also felt that the guiding principles should not be compulsory for cooperative projects, but should be a basis for voluntary adherence, perhaps consisting of a series of clauses that academics, who tend to be individualists, can feel more or less committed to and endorse at will.

Israelis suggested that the guiding principles should outline rules of behavior for cooperation, and that they should also specify the extreme situations that justify the cessation of such cooperation. The document should be inclusive in nature, and should emphasize both collective and individual responsibilities in a manner which encourages introspection. Project stakeholders should be encouraged to experience the conditions of the 'Other'. Thus, therefore meetings should be encouraged not only in Israel but also in the Palestinian territories, using both Arabic and Hebrew if possible, or a third language, like English, as a bridge. The work should be conducted openly, transparently, in a manner that overcomes institutional, peer, and social objections.

Those Israelis who were against the idea of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation stated that they were concerned with the politicization of cooperation that could result. They suggested that practical projects might be more important than a declaratory document, and that the process of creating such a document might lead to negative reaction that could harm the few meaningful Israeli-Palestinian ties still in existence. Others argued that academic cooperation should grow naturally rather than be artificially stimulated, and that if violence is one of the difficult constraints on cooperation, the real issue is to fight against terror.

Palestinian academics, since the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000, have split into those remaining at universities, those who have left to work for professional NGOs, those who have joined Palestinian political parties as ideologues, and those working for the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). While some of these academics continue to work on Track II activities and proposals for final status issues, others have resigned from serving the public sphere out of frustration. Similar to their Israeli counterparts, Palestinian academics are divided between those who believe it is enough for academics to teach and influence their societies through their research and influence on the young, and those who believe academics have a social and political responsibility to be the vanguards of their people. Most participants, however, were against the creation of a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation as long as the current political situation persists¹¹. Many of these same academics and intellectuals expressed a willingness to explore such a possibility if a Palestinian state was established beside Israel, thereby ending the current asymmetry.

Palestinian participants mentioned many obstacles to dialogue and cooperation stemming from the current political and social situation in the Palestinian Territories. In addition to the Israeli occupation, these obstacles include the crisis of Palestinian identity, the lack of freedom of thought, and the power of militant groups which threatens the personal and professional safety of academics. The university structure itself provides another obstacle, as many Palestinian academics must hold additional employment in order to augment their low salaries, and extreme competition for positions exists between those who have foreign degrees and those educated locally.

However, the Palestinians expressed more specific objections stemming from past experience with dialogue activities. As one participant noted, “We were defeated when we resisted Israel and we were defeated again when we normalized¹² with Israel without good previous preparation.” Others felt that Israeli academics are humanistic Zionists or are against Palestinians, and that their attitudes prevent cooperation. Palestinians also mentioned the campaign to boycott Israeli academics, stating that they could not be against it. They also provided accounts of previous failed efforts at dialogue. Some believe that negotiations and relations across the divide should be left to political decision-makers.

¹¹ Since these focus groups were held, much as-of-yet superficial change has occurred. The degree to which this apparent change is seen and felt on the ground will determine whether and when this position will change.

¹² Appendix 9 provides more information on the normalization issue.

A minority of Palestinians support the idea of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation now, provided that the Israeli academics support the Palestinian peoples' rights to self-determination and statehood. A few are willing to support professional cooperation regardless of political positions, and others only cooperation between "comrades from both sides" (i.e. leftwing academics and intellectuals). Palestinians disagreed as to whether the basis for these guiding principles should be international or national values, but they did agree that such a set of principles should not be a law or a tool for restricting freedom of thought. Further, the guiding principles should include the specific values and norms relevant to joint Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, including the responsibility of academics towards the ability to practice of other academics living on the same land. The guiding principles should emphasize social responsibility, acceptance of diversity, and understanding the needs and positions of the other side. Like their Israeli counterparts, the Palestinian academics stressed the need for transparency, for commitment to a common vision rather than funders' objectives, for working against tendencies to justify violence, and the need to act in a professional and objective manner.

3. Parameters, obstacles and possibilities

3.1 The importance of a professional code of ethics¹³

It is important to distinguish between ethics as a theory of morality (i.e. the philosophical traditions of Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza), and professional ethics, which are a collection of behavioral guidelines applying to members of a given organization (i.e., military ethics, medical ethics and legal ethics). Ethics set forth the general principles of moral behavior, but, unlike professional ethics, do not necessarily define the practical rules governing this behavior. Ethical principles such as 'Thou shalt not kill,' establish universal fundamentals of moral behavior. Professional ethics, in contrast, specify concrete dictates, such as "No public servant shall accept gifts from the people to whom services are provided," that determine the precise moral restrictions on a distinct group of people. By definition, professional ethics limits itself to members of a given group or organization and relates to their unique characteristics. We wish to

¹³ For an overall analysis of the importance of a professional code of ethics and its relevance to the Israeli/Palestinian academics, see the Yonit Levanon's contribution in Appendix 4.

emphasize, however, that the rights and obligations included within professional ethics are not intended to replace the more general rights and moral obligations of professionals as human beings. They add to the professional's moral behavior as a person and should not in any way conflict with these precepts.¹⁴

Professional ethics provide basic principles governing the behavior of a given profession or organization within a democratic society. Professional ethics include principles that are basic and practical, covering the full range of professional activity from the field's most basic assumptions to their most abstract beliefs. Professional ethics, however, are fundamentally practical; they must be drafted so that it is possible to comply with them. Several principles can assist one in developing a workable set of ethical guidelines:

Consistency: The system of ethical guidelines must be developed so that no principles conflict with each other.

Priority: The system must contain a scale of priorities that will help when conflicts arise between obligations in various situations in the "field".

Usability: The ethical guidelines must provide practical answers.

Specificity: Each ethical guideline must indicate the circumstances under which it applies, including who is the subject of the given obligation, who is bound by it, and what concrete behavior(s) are derived from it.

3.2 The role of guiding principles

Similar to professional ethics, a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation serves several functions for professional communities, as well as for societies engaged in protracted conflicts. It sets forth guidelines governing two types of interaction: between members of a given profession and their clients, and among members of the profession. A set of guiding principles both reflects and creates public obligations for the members of a professional group as an expression of respect for their professional activity. As a result, these guiding

¹⁴ See Amal Jadou's report in Appendix 5 for more discussion regarding the various stances on professional codes of ethics.

principles educate new members to the profession by stating objectives, values, and service to society while also enforcing these values through the monitoring of colleagues' behavior.¹⁵

Developing a set of guiding principles is based on the assumption that central and professional dilemmas can be resolved nonviolently if the guidelines are recognized as valid. Such recognition entails more than passive acceptance of the principles; it creates an obligation to actively use the guidelines when determining what is permissible, necessary, desirable, worthwhile, proper or good to do in a given situation.

3.3 Obstacles

Issues of *asymmetry*, *normalization*, and *reciprocity* pose major obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on all levels, including the development and application of a code of ethics for academic cooperation across the divide. Asymmetry, which is inherent in most violent conflicts, is interpreted differently within the Israeli and Palestinian contexts. Palestinians emphasize the unevenness between the Occupied (Palestinians) and the Occupier (Israel) and seek solidarity and efforts to redress the power imbalance. Israelis, however, point to rising anti-Semitism and the fact that Israel is a small country surrounded by what are perceived to be hostile neighbors.¹⁶

Normalization has been defined among Palestinians as “the process of building open and reciprocal relations with Israel in all fields, including the political, economic, social, cultural and educational fields.”¹⁷ Palestinians are divided in their stances vis-à-vis normalization. Its supporters see it as a process to integrate Israel into the Middle East and thereby change the abnormal, damaging relationship. Others, however, are against normalization as it implies a willingness to accept, and perhaps legitimize the injustice they have experienced at the expense of Israel's creation and expansion. This anti-normalization stance leads to Palestinian initiatives such as the boycott of Israeli academics, and also creates a great deal of pressure on those Palestinians willing to cooperate across the divide.

¹⁵ Amir, M. (2000), pp. 91-92.

¹⁶ Kaufman, E. (2004). “The quest for reciprocity in an asymmetric conflict: problems and prospects of Israeli/Palestinian academics' engagement in peacebuilding.” This paper presented at the Barcelona conference.

¹⁷ Salem, W. (September 1994). “Ishkaliat Muwajahat Attatbie'a” Kan'an Magazine, volume 56, pp 15-20.

Reciprocity, the idea of holding both sides of the conflict responsible and accountable for their actions, is frequently the focus of Israeli liberals who are critical of unconditional solidarity efforts with Palestinians. However, reciprocity is often most evident in its negative form, as each side blames the other for beginning the cycle of violence.¹⁸

Asymmetry

Asymmetry exists on many levels within the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Even the narrow use of the term ‘academic’ is problematic, due to the challenging socio-political situation in Palestine. Palestinians are working to create the social, economic, and political infrastructure of a state while continuing their nationalist struggle. The above-mentioned problems of normalization and asymmetry, when combined with this situation, put Palestinians in a difficult position, where they are not always free to express criticism or to cooperate with like-minded Israelis. Not only are Palestinian universities under-funded and lacking in infrastructure (computers, libraries, laboratory equipment, etc), but Palestinian academics are reined in by political factions and societal pressures which keep them from speaking, writing, and acting in cooperation with Israelis. Many academics who wish to cooperate or work with Israelis are hired as consultants by or work directly for Palestinian and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and therefore do not act as traditional academics. In addition, the Israeli Committee of Higher Education does not recognize the qualifications of Palestinian academics trained in many Palestinian universities, such as Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem. Therefore, within Palestinian society, a great deal of creativity, critical thinking and interest in cooperative ventures comes from ‘intellectuals’ outside of the halls of universities.

This represents the first level of asymmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian situation, as Israeli academics come from universities with state-of-the-art resources, technology, libraries and research facilities. Consequently, many Israeli academics are reluctant to partner with Palestinians because they feel it will reduce the quality of their work. Israeli faculty are not subject to passing checkpoints and town or university closures the way Palestinian faculty are. Further, Israeli universities are not dependent on tuition, and therefore receive their salaries and have heat in the winter, unlike in Palestinian universities, which are tuition-driven, resulting in lack of funds for salaries and heating because students are not able to pay their fees. Because of

¹⁸ Kaufman, E. (2004).

all of these factors, some Palestinian university leaders have indicated that it is necessary, as a pre-condition to cooperation, to invest in and build up Palestinian university research and expertise capacity in order for Palestinian academics to be able to cooperate on an even playing field.

Palestinian society is currently in a social, economic and political crisis which leads to a reduced freedom of thought, lack of personal safety for academics and intellectuals, and increased concern for personal survival over collective well-being. Consequently, few academics are willing to take the risk of meeting with Israelis or of teaching new historic and cultural interpretations to their students.

Normalization

As mentioned above, reservations about “normalization” provide an additional obstacle to cooperation. The anti-normalization discourse within Palestinian society includes calls for a boycott of Israeli institutions, including an academic boycott supported by the Palestinian university community. Many Palestinian academics and political activists are extremely disillusioned with what they see as the failure of earlier attempts to work with Israeli academics during the Oslo years and before. They are also upset that Israeli faculty have not spoken out against the restrictions placed on Palestinian academic life, including university closures and checkpoints barring students and faculty from reaching their campuses. For their part, Israelis tend to be professional academics, focusing on the ‘pure science’ of their research rather than on political issues. Many are not willing to make the political statements that many Palestinians demand of them as a pre-condition to cooperation. When Israelis and Palestinians *do* meet, these discussions prove difficult and contentious, with each group often having very different and contrary expectations for the outcomes to the meeting.

Reciprocity

The issue of reciprocity (defined above) is challenging on a variety of physical, political and psychological levels. On a very basic physical level, Palestinians and Israelis have difficulty meeting. Many Palestinians cannot gain entry permits to Israel, including those Palestinians who have never been arrested. Israelis are not allowed to enter Palestinian territories due to security restrictions placed by the Israeli government. As a result, it is very difficult to exchange

information and research materials other than those that can be sent via the internet. Still more seriously, the threat to the lives of those cooperating in activities across the divide proves a major obstacle. Some Palestinians fear that they will be labeled collaborators if they work with Israelis, and others are ideologically opposed to such cooperation. This is compounded by psychological fear and also anger or resentment stemming from terrorist attacks within Israel and military actions within the Palestinian Territories. Both Israelis and Palestinians suffer from victim mentalities, feeling they are weak in comparison to the ‘Other.’ For Palestinians, this weakness stems from the relationship of Occupier to Occupied, the lack of statehood, and the power, and its apparently arbitrary use, of the Israeli army. The Occupation does not affect the daily lives of Israeli academics, while it is present in even the most basic aspects of Palestinian lives, such as whether or not they will be able to cross the checkpoint and get to work on any given day.

As mentioned earlier, however, many Israelis, feel that they live in a small island of Jewish normalcy surrounded by Arab neighbors and threatened by rising anti-Semitism. Such sentiments cause some Israelis to call for reciprocity, or strategies that hold both parties accountable for their actions and reactions. They call attention to civilian deaths in terror attacks and Arafat’s rejection of the 2000 Camp David offer as evidence to support their distrust of Palestinian desires for peace. This group of Israelis argues that if they are expected to speak against Israeli government practices, they want Palestinians to make reciprocal statements expressing their stance against terror and the killing of Israeli civilians. This focus on cause and effect emphasizes past events without recognizing that the intense, constant and widespread suffering of the Palestinians is a *present* hour-to-hour reality. These difficulties make it difficult for Israelis and Palestinians to maintain contact after collaborative projects or dialogue activities are completed, even for those who are involved in coexistence work outside of the academic setting.

Additional obstacles to cooperation

In addition to asymmetry, normalization, and reciprocity, several additional obstacles stand in the way of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. One such challenge arises from the different agendas of Palestinian and Israeli partners to dialogue.¹⁹ Due in part to the asymmetrical socio-

¹⁹ This insight, along with some others in this section, is taken from the external evaluation conducted by Maya Kahanoff and Ata Qaymari which appears later in this report.

political contexts of the two societies, Palestinian academics and intellectuals tended to focus on internal societal development issues rather than on cooperation with Israelis, whereas Israeli focus groups tended to deal with the narrow issue of cooperation with Palestinian academics. Related to this issue is the tension between politics and academia. Palestinians sometimes engage in joint research projects as a means toward a political end and not, like most Israelis, simply for the sake of the research. Cooperation is especially difficult in the humanities and social sciences as in these disciplines, academics' research is more closely connected to the overarching political issues than is the case in the natural sciences. In addition, a great deal of logistical and political maneuvering is required to find ways to meet face-to-face due to the legal, physical and psychological barriers separating Palestinians and Israelis from one another. These obstacles, combined with a general indifference observed on the part of Israeli academics and the Palestinian focus on the national struggle, make it easier for Palestinian and Israeli academics alike to remain isolated in their own communities.

Funding

Funding may inadvertently provide several pitfalls for meaningful cooperation. First, the availability of money for joint projects can lead to instrumental collaboration, whereby dialogue is seen as a means of obtaining research funds, rather than as a means of improving the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. In some instances, Israelis or Palestinians are forced to find a 'partner' from the other side in order to receive much-needed operational funds. They embark on collaborative ventures, not out of a desire to cooperate, but out of a desire to survive (or in some cases, profit) in an increasingly difficult economic situation. 'Partnerships' such as these can sometimes even increase hostilities and distrust between the parties, because when the working relationship encounters difficulties, it is easy to fall back on stereotypes. Many of the joint ventures that mushroomed in the years of the Oslo peace process fell into this trap, and quickly disappeared when the peace process collapsed and the money dried up.

A related issue vis-à-vis funding is the frequent disconnect between the donors' agenda and the needs, interests and goals of Palestinians and Israelis. Limited funds are available for those Israelis and Palestinians working on joint projects, as more money, on an international level, goes towards military and security budgets than toward peace, education and human rights oriented projects. As a result, sometimes cooperative efforts are structured to meet the

requirements of international funders rather than the requirements of the Israelis and Palestinians involved, and therefore face limited chances of success. Others have noted that there is a greater interest in conflict resolution projects from international organizations than from local ones, especially after the rapid dissolution of joint ventures at the end of Oslo left many disillusioned. Currently, during the al-Aqsa *intifada*, donors cannot always find partners willing to cooperate. Some Israeli academics do not see the benefit of working with Palestinians, and are angered by the need to partner with those whom they see as having ‘lower’ credentials and expertise in order to gain research funds. Further, some Israeli academics think that due to the social and political climate, cooperation with Palestinians may negatively affect their chances for academic promotion. At the same time, however, Palestinians have the expectation that Israeli academics have the power to make significant social and political change. Such conflicting expectations of the goal of joint research, compounded with the very arduous work of deciding on a common research strategy and writing process leaves many disillusioned with the prospect of collaboration, even if it is funded.²⁰

3.4 Conditions for Cooperation

Between obstacles and possibilities are conditions. Both Palestinians and Israelis specified certain circumstances, contexts and conditions conducive (and/or necessary) for engaging in dialogue and joint ventures across the divide. One of the major conditions noted is the willingness of both governments to permit joint projects, a factor which is connected to the importance of Israeli and Palestinian meetings within Israel/Palestine, in person, and not by telephone, videoconference or abroad. Cooperative endeavors are successful when participants have both the interest and the motivation to initiate and actively engage in such projects and when there is an outside facilitator to help mediate between the parties. Participants should be committed to common values and ideas and the fundamental belief that the conflict can be solved by peaceful means. Other conditions stated by those involved in the study reflect the diversity of opinion within the subject population. Whereas some state that the cooperation needs to be between researchers who want to develop a shared research program and not between individuals with political ambitions, others argue that the asymmetrical situation does

²⁰ This finding is discussed further in the evaluation report later on in this document.

not allow for equal partnership, and therefore normal relations, between researchers can only occur after the end of the occupation and the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. In any regard, whether cooperation requires Israeli academics to advocate on behalf of the rights of their Palestinian colleagues or not, the political atmosphere must be such that it enables Palestinians and Israelis to engage in cooperative projects, and members of research teams must possess comparable degrees of expertise.

3.5 Possibilities

Despite the many obstacles, there are opportunities for joint Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation. One is the on-going cooperation by a few ‘usual suspects’ who continue to work together, tacitly or overtly, despite the al-Aqsa intifada. Further, even Palestinian academics calling for a boycott of Israeli institutions stress that this does not apply to Israeli academics who stand in solidarity with their Palestinian colleagues and speak against the occupation. These academics, like those who participate in Faculty for Israel-Palestine Peace (FFIPP), distinguish between Israeli institutions (which are part of the military and political establishment) and Israeli academics who may or may not be supportive of government and military policies. Furthermore, the existence of an academic culture, which can help separate academia from politics, can assist in maintaining academic relationships between Israelis and Palestinians.

Joint research, while posing a challenge, also provides an opportunity for Israeli-Palestinian collaboration. Funding contingent on joint projects can seem an artificial or restricting requirement, especially to the Israeli academic. However, the involvement of a neutral external body combined with the joint benefits for both sides from the cooperation can stimulate future joint projects. Guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation for academics are one way to provide a mutually-accepted framework for conducting joint ventures, one that reduces the ‘transaction cost’ of such cooperation and thereby encourages more academics to participate. Academics of both societies overwhelmingly adhere to the goal of strengthening principles of human rights and democracy for both peoples as a necessary condition for functioning societies and their professional freedom. And yet those academics and intellectuals

working together across the divide have been in the past, and even more at present, the exception to the rule.

One promising approach to reciprocity for both sides is demonstrating genuine concern for the grief of the Other. This willingness for attaining a shared victimhood status does not necessarily require erasing the asymmetry of the relationship and the nature of suffering.²¹ Recognizing the humanity of one's adversary does not belittle one's own extreme conditions, but may open up avenues for identification with and understanding of the suffering of both. A clear set of guiding principles for professionals within the social sciences, the humanities and the arts that determines members' roles and responsibilities in a conflict situation might be one way of emphasizing and encouraging cooperation across the divide predicated on common principles of human rights, democracy and peace. These principles would prevail over feelings of denying the legitimacy of the Other. A set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation could also help widen the circle of cooperation by including not only those who promote morality arguments to "do what is right because it is the right thing to do" but also those who prefer to look into peacebuilding as a matter of long-term, enlightened self-interest.

4. Principles for academic cooperation

4.1 Rationale

A set of guiding principles for academic and intellectual cooperation need not start from scratch. Indeed, there are precedents upon which it can build, most notably perhaps the 'Declaration of Principles of Palestinian-Israeli International Cooperation in Scientific and Academic Affairs.' This document, signed in May 2004 by Rectors and Presidents of five Israeli and four Palestinian universities and research institutions lays out an ethical framework for "creat[ing] an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation and to promote joint scientific and academic projects for the interest of all the parties in the Middle East Region."²² While the Rome Declaration (named after its place of signing at the University of Rome La Sapienza) lays out broad universal human values, the rectors agree to specific tenets based on

²¹ For a powerful analysis of the Jewish Israeli sense of self as a victim, see, Neil Caplan, "Victimhood and Identity: Psychological Obstacles to Israeli Reconciliation with the Palestinians," *Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and Literature*, eds. Kamal Abdel-Malek and David Jacobson, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, pages 63-86.

²² For full text of the Rome Declaration, see Appendix 10.

their roles as academics and intellectuals, the first of which is “the creation and preservation of full conditions whereupon no academic institution, scientist or student whatsoever will be discriminated against and all will have full and free access in the pursuit of their academic activities, whether on the national, regional or international level.”

The Rome Declaration, while limited in its aims, signatories, and implementation, provides a basis from which to work, and provides a historical precedent legitimizing our efforts. Further, it joins academics and intellectuals, in this case through their institutional leadership roles, around issues of common interest: academic freedom, the development of young minds, and establishing an environment of tolerance and pluralism. Indeed, the mission statements of many Palestinian and Israeli universities reflect these and additional themes.²³ Perhaps the most common aim articulated in these mission statements is the value of *diversity* and *pluralism* in terms of tolerating, respecting and encouraging a range of intellectual, cultural and artistic expressions. International cooperation and inter-cultural understanding promoting justice and peace are related aims, often expressed in terms of encouraging free and open discussion, engagement with society, and educating students “for leadership, peace, and democratic values; to serve as a voice of reason, conscience and compassion in the region and the world community.”²⁴ A few universities even articulate specifically the important value of “international cooperation,” “mutual understanding and cooperation between the Jewish and Arab populations on and off campus,” and “putting their expertise to work for the peace process ... in joint projects with colleagues from neighboring countries.”²⁵

Other universities lay out the potential for cooperation based on specific academic principles, such as common research interests,²⁶ or upholding the right to education by helping to lift restrictions placed on Palestinian students’ and professors’ mobility and access. In some cases, values of academic freedom, freedom of expression and equality of rights are made contingent on specific political issues such as speaking out against the Israeli occupation or expressing commitment to Zionism.²⁷ This trend reflects the obstacles mentioned earlier, most notably the issues of normalization and reciprocity. The “Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

²³ See Appendix 6 for selected excerpts from university websites and the internet addresses where the full statements can be found.

²⁴ From the mission statement of Al-Quds University (see Appendix 6).

²⁵ Al Quds University; Haifa University; Tel Aviv University (see Appendix 6).

²⁶ For example, Ben Gurion University states the value of “cooperation with countries sharing a similar climate, particularly in the Middle East” (see Appendix 6).

²⁷ See, for example, the mission statements of Birzeit University and Hebrew University (Appendix 6).

International” (FFIPP), for example, includes in its mission statement “the meaningful reconciliation between conflicting ethnic groups and denominations through joint educational and cultural projects” and “conformity with international law including the human right to teach and to learn.” However, the group also calls for “the freedom from military occupation, territorial annexation and incursion,” which keeps many Israeli academics from participating. While the group lays a valuable foundation for Israeli and Palestinian academic cooperation, it reflects the challenges and possibilities for finding common ground.

Using secondary sources, previously existing statements (such as the Rome Declaration) and our own research findings, we drafted a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation (see section 4.3), which can hopefully stimulate further Palestinian-Israeli academic and intellectual cooperation. Special care has been taken to ensure its universal spirit (inspired by internationally and regionally shared norms), consistency (principles that do not conflict with each other) and usability (based on practical ideas). In addition, the principles are an on-going work-in-progress, providing a starting point for discussion, and dialogue, and are open for revision and adaptation as the relationship between Israeli and Palestinian civil societies progresses and changes. The guiding principles are a mechanism for widening the circle of discussants and for developing consensus on other important issues related to the conflict.

4.2. Searching for common ground

The need for a set of guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation becomes even more at the present juncture when Israeli and Palestinian leaders are embarking on the tenuous road toward resuming negotiations and are faced with numerous challenges from their respective publics. The January 2005 election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Palestinian president on a platform of ending Palestinian violence, combined with his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Sharm el-Sheikh, provide a sign of encouragement for those working to promote dialogue. However, this current thawing of relations is threatened by large numbers of Israeli settlers and right-wing supporters (in society and the Israeli government) who are working to block Sharon’s plan to withdraw from Gaza, and by Palestinian militants against the peace process who continue to fire on Israeli targets. It is too early to determine whether the Israeli and Palestinian academic and intellectual communities will respond to this renewed sense of urgency

to create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. Our findings, however, suggest that the potential exists for real change.

The research shows that a sizeable portion of Palestinians and Israelis believe guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation can contribute towards sustaining cooperation in a time of conflict. Further, they agree that having a code is not enough. It must be internalized, acted upon, and monitored by some external body. Many also believe that joint work is essential as it helps humanize the ‘Other’ and gives a face to the ‘enemy,’ and that it is particularly crucial to sustain this work in times of conflict. For Palestinians especially, however, this joint work must be predicated on some kind of mobilization against the occupation and against the circumstances in which they now find themselves. While some Israeli researchers do not want to have to make political statements as a pre-condition to academic cooperation (they would like to interact simply as researchers, as they do with colleagues in Europe or the United States), others are willing to make such statements provided there is reciprocity from their Palestinian counterparts.

Core values affirmed by academics on both sides included mutual respect, granting legitimacy to the other and upholding equal rights to education. Palestinians and Israelis recognized the special responsibility of intellectuals and academics to uphold ethical values and hold their societies accountable for their words and deeds through their access to information, their work with words and ideas, and their instruction of the next generation. As one focus group participant said, “because peace education has to be building on human values and not just the absence of war, it has to be led by philosophers, thinkers, leaders and writers.”²⁸ Academics and intellectuals are, or at least could be, leading opinion-makers. They mold and shape public opinion and are duty-bound to distinguish between just forms of resistance or self-defense and acts of terrorism, and to make those distinctions known. Furthermore, this class of society should develop critical thinking, respect diversity, and promote dialogue and learning. Critical intellectuals, according to Jean-Paul Sartre, must “denounce injustice wherever it occurs.”²⁹

²⁸ CCRR paper, Barcelona Group.

²⁹ From Riad Malki paper for Barcelona (he quotes Sartre 1974: 285).

The role of academics and intellectuals through this set of guiding principles, therefore, is to uphold and advocate social education and human values in addition to and in combination with their discipline-specific teaching. Commitment to the principles does not represent a specific political agreement, but rather lays out a framework for how Palestinian and Israeli academics expect their counterparts to speak about and relate to the ‘other’ when carrying out their teaching and research responsibilities.

4.3 Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation- An instrument for Israeli/Palestinian academic cooperation ³⁰

A. International referential framework

This joint document is inspired by:

1. Our shared endorsement of the right to education, in keeping with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 26, December 10, 1948): *“Whereas education shall be directed to the full development of human personality and the strengthening of respect for human right and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial and religious groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace”*.
2. Our shared commitment to academic freedom as endorsed by the International Association of Universities. The principle of Academic Freedom can be defined as the freedom for members of the academic community - that is scholars, teachers and students - to follow their scholarly activities within a framework determined by that community in respect of ethical rules and international standards, and without outside pressure. Rights confer obligations. These obligations are as much incumbent on the individuals and on the University of which they are part, as they are upon the State and Society.
3. The call of the Constitution of UNESCO adopted in London on 16 November 1945: *“that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world and that the peace must therefore be founded if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”*

B. Preamble

After years of violent conflict, academics and intellectuals globally and in our own societies are expressing the hope that Palestinian and Israeli institutions of higher learning can fulfill their social responsibility and contribute their share towards a just peace (a peaceful solution accepted by the two sides). This hope and sense of responsibility generate the following frame of reference:

1. Cognizant that our special responsibility emanates from our privileged access to higher education, the development of the spirit of inquiry and of independent thinking.
2. Mindful of our universal mission to develop intellectual, cultural and scientific knowledge and progress in accordance with human rights principles.

³⁰ The selection of a title for this instrument was controversial and sensitive. Israelis and Palestinians disagreed on the appropriate title for the statement, and preferences and suggestions included the following terms: code of ethics, set or code of principles, code of conduct, guiding principles, guidelines for cooperation, social responsibility of academics and intellectuals, intellectual responsibility of academics, principles for academic cooperation, statement of principles of ethical behavior, a component of a faculty’s ethics statement.

3. Recognizing that universities can play a major role through research, teaching and service to the community in developing human and cultural understanding between the two peoples, and transfer knowledge, science and technology.
4. Aware that our common cultural heritage, that is the three monotheistic religions of our nations, has been in the past a cradle of civilizations.
5. Understanding that joint cooperation needs to be based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, dignity, tolerance and mutual respect.
6. Accepting that in the pursuit of such principles we should avoid all forms of harassment, exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, and any abuse contrary to ethical commitment and precepts.
7. In recognizing the need to bridge the gap, the ties are to be based not on dominance but on equality, mutual assistance and solidarity. Based on such concern to promote joint scientific and academic projects for the interest of all parties in the Middle East, higher education should be recognized as a major instrument of the fight against inequality among nations, people and groups.
8. Calling upon all academics, scientists and intellectuals to work actively for the creation and the preservation of full conditions whereupon no institution, researcher or student whatsoever will be discriminated against and all will have full and free access in the pursuit of their academic activities, whether on the national, regional or international level.
9. Whereas this set of principles is steeped in the shared values of human rights, democracy and peace as a common denominator, there is a need to translate that dialogue into action in a way that can overcome existing obstacles. While the respect of the following principles may be at this time more relevant to Palestinian and Israelis, we adhere to their universal jurisdiction.

C. Values

The principles for dialogue and cooperation articulated in section D are anchored in the following sets of values:

1. **Academic values.** As academics we are committed to act according to our professional duties, protect freedom of thought, openly share information with each other, and take responsibility for what we say. We are committed to conducting accurate, serious and objective research and engaging in on-going learning. We will stand in solidarity with other academics on the same piece of land in the protection of their academic freedom.
2. **Humanistic values.** We value democracy, equality, and freedom. We value wide participation, social openness, and are willing to cooperate with a diverse range of people

with differing opinions. We are committed to promoting nonviolence within our own society and to reject occupation and dominance.

3. **Relationship values.** We recognize the difficulties in the history of our relationship with each other, and are committed to addressing the problems of asymmetry and reciprocity. We are committed to working towards forgiveness, and express our commitment to working with each other for peace. We are committed to try to understand the needs, concerns and positions of the other side, and to network with each other rather than conduct parallel projects. Furthermore, we will utilize transparent means for resolving our conflicts.
4. **Financial values.** We commit to working for our common goals and not for business. We will not change our vision based on funding availability and will use funds appropriately.

D. Principles

- a) Guarantee the freedom of teaching and speech, cherish the value of tolerance towards divergent opinions, make clear statements against the use of the pretext of freedom of speech for incitement to violence, promote non-violence in the campuses and community and across the divide.
- b) Ensure the freedom of movement of academics, which for years has been curbed both in terms of their participation in international conferences overseas, as well as in their access to any areas within their own countries and the inability to meet with their own peers.
- c) Insist on the respect for the universal right to education. Free access should be respected for students to be able to attend classes without arbitrary permits, thus allowing them to move within and between their homes and universities. Given the delay and the humiliation of permit allocation, the process negatively affects the morale of the students, saps their time and energy and is an affront to human dignity to all.
- d) Insist that the value of academic freedom can best be achieved when institutional autonomy is ensured and when there is no interference from external authorities.
- e) Refrain from closing universities, as this form of collective punishment negatively impacts on both learning and research. Restricting and preventing access to centers of knowledge only increases the level of hatred and exacerbates the conflict.
- f) Protect and welcome academics and students who adhere to the universal respect of human rights who wish to visit each other at their respective campuses.
- g) Stimulate a dialogue about the responsibilities and consequences of a shared adherence to the universal standards of academic freedom as articulated in this document and elsewhere.

5. Follow-up and Conclusion

Israelis and Palestinians alike stated that there must be a joint follow-up committee to work on maintaining and updating the guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation, and that the principles must be actively used and applied for the project to be worthwhile. Several academics stated that they were against the idea of guiding principles if it was just another piece of paper, saying general treatises on ethics, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, already exist but are not sufficiently acted upon. Others, however, did not want the guiding principles to become a law or a tool to impose restrictions on freedom of thought or dole out punishments and rewards. Those who participated in the focus groups and interviews stressed the need to organize around the guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation when it was finalized. Suggested follow-up activities included broad dissemination of the report and instrument, focus groups on the instrument, media campaigns, and uni-national and bi-national working groups to identify ways and means to implement it.

As a result, we hope to generate further dialogue regarding the responsibilities and consequences of adhering to the universal standards of academic freedom articulated here and elsewhere. This involves establishing joint projects and engaging in cooperative efforts between academic institutions and individuals based upon the values of social and professional responsibility, independent thought, equality of participation, acceptance of diversity and commitment to values of peace and justice. Furthermore, such work should endeavor to promote networking rather than parallel projects, continuous self-development, clear and open communication channels, conflict-resolution skills and transparent decision-making in all matters. Israelis and Palestinian involved in our focus groups emphasized the importance of developing an academic network, possibly including an internet website, that would provide information for both Israeli and Palestinian academics who want to be involved in cooperative projects.

Both Palestinians and Israelis see the need to transcend asymmetrical relations while recognizing the existing differences in the resources available to each community. Provided that technology, training and other resource transfer arrangements are conducted in a non-patronizing way that does not institutionalize asymmetry, such obstacles can be overcome. That said, asymmetry should not be used as an excuse for unequal partnership or division of labor. Rather,

the more privileged (in this case the Israeli academics) should help design ways and means to improve the conditions on the other side which may allow for improved performance.

Major roles of academics noted by both Israeli and Palestinian participants include educating the next generation of society, disseminating ideas and influencing public and political opinion. A journalist writing for the major Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* noted recently that, “[i]t is difficult to change a discourse, but the problem is that it is even more difficult to dismantle an occupation's apparatus without dismantling the discourse, the language and myths that justify and perpetuate it.”³¹ Thus, a major result of this project was to begin to dismantle the uni-national discourse by raising the possibility of establishing guiding principles for dialogue and cooperation. Raising the issue at all was a first step toward changing each society's beliefs regarding the academic ‘Other.’ Developing and implementing a shared set of guiding principles could be the next step in providing an alternative discourse to that of separation and violence. Furthermore, the recognition of an academic value system can help separate political stances from professional commitments, and thereby include those academics who believe that politics should be left to elected officials. Adhering to the value of academic freedom and other shared professional principles could assist in maintaining academic relationships between Israelis and Palestinians.

A set of guiding principles for academics could also be one avenue to providing a mutually accepted framework for conducting joint ventures, one that reduces the ‘transaction cost’ of such cooperation and thereby encourages more to participate. Academics of both societies overwhelmingly adhere to the goal of strengthening principles of human rights and democracy for both peoples as a necessary condition for functioning societies and their members’ professional freedom. Maintaining commitment to a set of guiding principles could help these espoused values prevail over feelings that deny the legitimacy and victimhood of the Other. A professional set of principles could also help widen the circle of cooperation by including not only those who promote morality arguments to “do what is right because it is the right thing to do” but also those who prefer to consider peacebuilding as a matter of long-term, enlightened self-interest.

³¹ Lev Greenberg in “Democracy vs. demography” in 9 February 2005 *Haaretz*.

6. Evaluation

An external team of evaluators was engaged in every step of the research process, providing feedback and assisting the researchers in the action learning process. The team, comprised of Dr. Maya Kahanoff and Mr. Ata Qaymari, wrote a mid-term evaluation that was formally submitted to the principal investigators. It also attended staff meetings in order to provide a source of on-going feedback. In this final section of this “Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation” report, this team’s final evaluation of this team is presented. It provides a review, analysis and means of building upon the work done to date.

6.1 Introduction

The project rationale as written in the proposal was: “to try to understand the obstacles and promises for academics and intellectuals to contribute more significantly towards a bottom-up process”. The following question posed was: “How can academics and intellectuals play a leading role in channeling the dialogue towards the advancement of a ‘sectorial peace’, namely to encourage professionals in all disciplines to find the modalities and avenues to contribute towards a peace”. Specifically, the project was meant “to explore the joint drafting of a code of ethics for academics and intellectuals.” This code was expected “to establish the norms that can actually guide the relationship between academics and intellectuals as a partnership towards attaining a dialogue towards peace.”

The goals of the project were defined as follows:

- Putting together a code of ethics that will motivate and guide potential cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli academics. The expected document was to be developed jointly by individuals from societies in conflict who are engaged in an on-going dialogue with each other, thus enabling the creation of a shared agenda for discussing controversial subjects.
- Appealing to a wide audience and not only to those who are already committed to the dialogue.
- Stimulating similar processes in other areas of Palestinian and Israeli societies, as well as providing a model for establishing a social contract, or relevant source of inspiration, to all those involved in peacebuilding in other violent conflicts around the world.

In order to carry out this mandate, the following interim goals were defined:

- Conduct a literature review on the topic of academic cooperation.
- Bring together academics and intellectuals, representing a wide spectrum of political opinions, in order to discuss their personal and professional responsibilities in a violent conflict situation.
- Study in-depth the issue of academic cooperation across the divide, understanding its complexities, and then map out the obstacles to and the conditions necessary for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics.
- On the basis of the findings of this work, write a draft document of guidelines for a code of ethics for academic cooperation.

The project was accompanied by an **action evaluation**, carried out by a Jewish and a Palestinian evaluator. The methodology included: evaluator observation of participants in the inter-group discussions of the core group, in the uni-national meetings, in some of the discussions of the focus groups and in some of the interviews. The evaluators participated in the staff meetings throughout the year and presented their findings in order to stimulate further discussion and clarifications about project goals and unclear issues and to encourage ongoing adjustment of the project's goals and procedures.

This report refers to the period of April/December 2004. It describes the inputs, outputs and process of the project at this stage. It summarizes the potential and the limitations of the project, and provides some recommendations for a possible next stage.

This stage of the project was devoted to carrying out the research among Israeli and Palestinian academics. Subjects included academics and intellectuals who have taken part in cooperative endeavors and could draw on their past experiences, those who have never experienced any cooperation, and those who have reservations or objections to such endeavors.

The rationale for this approach was to get input from as heterogeneous a population as possible, so that the final document would have credibility and relevance for a wide and diverse group on both sides. At the same time this approach was regarded as an opportunity to get as many academics as possible involved in the project.

Activities included the following:

A questionnaire was designed jointly (in English), translated (to Hebrew and Arabic), and adapted to the different populations. It asked about the role of academics and intellectuals in

times of conflict, about attitudes towards cooperation, about past experiences of working together across the divide (difficulties, lessons learnt, recommendations), and about a potential code of ethics for academic cooperation (see Appendix 1). The questionnaire was administered via electronic mail and through personal interviews. The main questions were used also to stimulate in-depth discussions in focus groups (see Appendices 2 and 3). Overall, around 300 people responded to the questions (25 one-on-one interviews, 39 online questionnaire, and 10 focus groups).

A core group of Palestinian and Israeli academics and intellectuals gathered in Barcelona (April, 2004), under the auspices of the Center for Contemporary Culture, to discuss their social responsibility in times of violent conflict. Since this initial conference, the group has met four times in Jerusalem to continue their discussion of issues involved in cooperation and to promote mutual understanding. This group of academics and intellectuals may be regarded as a pilot group for discerning in greater depth and detail the obstacles and possibilities of working together across the divide.

6.2 Evaluation of project implementation

In general, the project staff invested a lot of time and energy in to organizing and carrying out their various tasks. We would like to note especially the efforts and achievements of the Palestinian organizers, who have been working in a hostile environment regarding cooperation with Israelis. The remarkable achievement in this respect is bringing people together to think about these issues and to contribute their ideas about future cooperation despite the prevailing norm of resisting such cooperation.

In terms of cooperation between the two organizations involved in the project, we can say that the work was characterized by real partnership, rooted in mutual respect, throughout the project's various stages: planning, implementation, and evaluation. However, we found an asymmetry in terms of the composition of subject groups and in the agenda understood and advanced by each of the two partners to the project.

First we would like to call attention to the gap between the populations participating in the project in the two civil societies. While on the Israeli side, the participants were academics from established universities, on the Palestinian side, participants were recruited not only from

universities, but also from research institutes, NGOs and the general intellectual community (which included independent writers, artists, poets etc.).

Several explanations from different perspectives illustrate this disparity. From one perspective, this result can be attributed to the organizers' different definitions and preferences, where the Palestinian organizer seems to seek wider participation in order to gain increased credibility for the project in Palestinian society. Following this line of reasoning, the Israeli invitation to academics only is perceived as a limitation, which undermines the opportunity to enlarge the circle of stakeholders. A different perspective focuses on the socio-political context, revealing the existing asymmetry between the two societies. This perspective argues that while it is possible to recruit sufficient numbers of Israeli academics for such a project, it is much more difficult to do so in Palestinian society, especially due to the official Palestinian academic boycott of cooperation with Israelis. Consequently, one could argue that in order to compensate for Palestinian resistance to perceived normalization, the Palestinian organizers also recruited intellectuals from outside the universities.

We may also need to take into account that within Palestinian society as in other developing countries, many relevant academics and intellectuals are not affiliated with universities but are rather active in NGOs and think tanks that carry out some of the research and analysis functions that are not fully available on campuses.

A second aspect of asymmetry stems from analysis of focus group discussions. This analysis points to the somewhat different foci of discussion, or maybe a difference in the agendas put forth in the focus groups on both sides. On the Israeli side, the agenda of the discussions focused on cooperation with Palestinian academics (in these groups, the code of ethics was presented as a means for such activities). In contrast, on the Palestinian side, discussions focused on internal societal issues and the need for an academic code of ethics in that context (i.e., mainly for developing or strengthening a democratic Palestinian society). Palestinian cooperation with Israelis was presented as a more minor topic of discussion, and even so, as something that could happen down the road, in the future.

It is our considered opinion that the reason for this discrepancy in focus group agenda, like the difference in subject populations, has to do with the asymmetry of the social and political contexts in which Palestinian and Israeli academics operate, which generates different needs and concerns in the two societies. While cooperation with Palestinians may be a relevant issue in

Israeli society, Palestinians' main concerns currently focus on internal development, empowerment, and capacity building. In addition, Palestinian intellectuals are often seen, and see themselves, as the spearhead of the struggle against occupation. These differences have to be taken into account when analyzing the emerging definitions of cooperation between academics, as well as when mapping the required conditions for the success of such a project.

The meetings of academics and intellectuals in Barcelona and Jerusalem (referred to hereafter as the pilot, or 'core group') were inspiring. The participants showed a lot of interest, involvement and commitment. Both Israeli and Palestinian noted their satisfaction with the discussions and said they gained new insights as a result. For example, some of the Israeli participants said that they had learned about the importance of expressing solidarity with Palestinian suffering, as well as the need to take concrete action to solve problems such as freedom of movement, which require Israeli academics to step outside of their neutral, sometimes aloof positions. Some of Palestinians said they had learnt more about the role of fear and about the inner struggles within Israeli society. They would all like to continue meeting and to contribute to the establishment of some kind of social contract between academics (or document of principles for such cooperation).

Analysis of our observations of the inter-group meetings, held during the period of April to September 2004, allowed us to identify some basic tensions that surfaced during the discussions (tensions that are very relevant to any effort to establish Palestinian-Israeli academic cooperation). The following issues or dilemmas require special attention and group discussions.

The tension between the political and the academic. We found a tension between some group members who perceive the rationale and agenda for cross-national cooperation to be mainly political (i.e. resisting occupation), while others insist on the separation of politics from academia, feeling that the only agenda for cooperation between academics should be shared research, conferences and joint publications. This tension has surfaced between the groups and within each group. For example, the initiative of some Israeli group members to write a letter addressed to Israeli Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, in which they wanted to express their identification with the murder of professor Salah from Al-Najah University in Nablus and their protest against the policy of the Israeli army, failed because of inner group disagreements. Some Israelis refused to cooperate with what they thought was too political an act, and therefore not

suitable for a group of academics. Some of the academics were also afraid such an action might hurt their status in their academic institutions. Similarly, the initiative of some Palestinian members to compose a reference paper, stating their political conditions, or bases for cooperation, did not get far because of inner group disagreements regarding its justification and content.

The tension between the motivation and identity, that is the motivation of group members to move towards the Other and cooperate as individuals, and their collective identities and loyalties, or the feeling that they must act as representatives of their respective national groups, holds them back.

The tension of symmetry and asymmetry regarding both political and intellectual levels. Palestinian members emphasized the political asymmetry as a point of departure for any discussion and possible action, expected the Israelis to admit this asymmetry and act accordingly, and were frustrated with the other side's indifference to, or denial, of this situation. The Israeli members, on the other hand, felt the lack of symmetry in the group with regard to the academic level, academic interest, or commitment to academic standards, because, while the entire Israeli group consisted of professional academics, the Palestinian group was primarily, in their eyes, a political group with a few academics.

Additional effort needs to be exerted to organize more frequent meetings, in either bi-national or uni-national forums, and to prepare for such meetings so that the agenda focuses on central, sensitive issues and stimulates in-depth discussions on these topics, especially regarding each side's conditions for cooperation. At present, some of the group's difficulties remain unresolved, and no action has yet been advanced within the group's framework.

We suggest that the challenge for the next stage of the project is to discover the unique character of such an academic-intellectual group trying to cooperate in the context of asymmetric conflict, that is finding a middle ground, agreed to by all, as the basis from which to act, and finding ways to cope with the group's asymmetries. Thus, we recommend holding further in-depth discussions on the pre-conditions for such academic cooperation, that focus on that which divides and constitutes a barrier for cooperation (that is not only concentrate on the common ground); as well as on the issue of neutrality vs. taking position.

We further suggest that the lack of such in-depth discussions hindered the production of the reference paper that was supposed to map out the framework for cooperation and the meeting of conditions required by each side in order to sustain such cooperation.

We also note the scarcity of available uni-national forums to further discuss the above issues. We see these forums as an important arena for developing a critical discourse, preparing the ground for such cooperation and gaining legitimacy within each civil society.

It is hoped that priority to these observations will be given on the second phase of this project.

6.3 Project achievements

Several project outputs, or achievements, are worth noting at this stage, despite the obstacles mentioned previously.

1. The project team drafted a document mapping the conditions for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics and intellectuals, including obstacles and possibilities, from both points of view.
2. The researchers initiated an awareness-raising process among academics and intellectuals, motivating them to assume social responsibility with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Tens of people on both sides were involved in creative thinking about the situation and discussed issues of cooperation towards the advancement of peace and social development. This process is remarkable, especially on the Palestinian side. The discussions were reported to have made an essential contribution to internal development, empowerment and raising a greater awareness of the role of academics and intellectuals in building their society. As for the Israelis, the main contribution of these discussions is hopefully initiating movement away from indifference and apathy and towards various degrees of academic and intellectual involvement in changing the prevailing situation.
3. A draft code of ethics or set of principles for academic cooperation has been prepared, and may serve as a basis for both uni-national and bi-national discussions.

6.4 Project limitations

The project aims at advancing cooperation between peoples in the midst of a violent conflict who are in a very asymmetric situation, and this produces constant tension. While, on one side, people are living in an established and organized society, albeit seriously conflicted about what ought to be the nature of its relationship with Palestine, on the other side, the society is in a process of development and is striving to get free of occupation. This asymmetric situation manifests itself in high levels of politicization in the Palestinian society, particularly among academics and intellectuals, and in low levels of involvement in social and political affairs in the Israeli academic community. This imbalance is reflected in different expectations for cooperative endeavors, in different discourses about joint work, and in different norms of behavior.

We would like to draw attention to the reality of people not at all concerned about the same things. They may be concerned with, or needing, very different subjects of discussions. Thus, we suggest that in addition to building understanding and trust between these peoples, ways need to be found to creatively address the content divide, which is further described below.

1. The prevailing attitude among Israeli academics towards cooperation is characterized by an emphasis on commitment to academic standards and an adherence to a stance of objective neutrality. A common statement made by Israeli respondents shying away from political involvement was: “the role of academics is to do research and not to be politically involved”.

One of the most frequent conditions stated by Israeli academics as necessary for successful cooperation deals with a commitment to “common values and ideals, and the belief that there is a way to solve the conflict by peaceful means.” Another frequent requirement emphasizes separation between conflict issues and the research relationship, as in the following statement: “The cooperation needs to be between researchers who want to develop common research and not between individuals who are motivated by political ambitions”. In addition, there was a recurring emphasis on the need for symmetry on an academic level.

Palestinian academics, on the other hand, demonstrate much more social and political involvement stressing their obligation to their society, stating that “academics should help solve political issues.” With regard to expectations from Israeli academics, Palestinian respondents

frequently emphasize a political function, such as the “need to provide human protection for their Palestinian colleagues and to advocate for the Palestinians’ rights.” Many Palestinian respondents posit a strong correlation between cooperation and the political situation on the ground, namely, motivation for cooperation will rise as a function of ending the occupation. Some note that “only when there is an end to the occupation, a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem and the construction of a sovereign Palestinian State can there be normal relations between both sides.” Phrased differently, “there needs to be a political environment which enables both sides to engage in cooperative projects.”

Thus while the expectations of Israelis from academic cooperation focus on professional/academic level, the expectations of Palestinians from such cooperation relate to the political level, towards changing their unlivable socio-political reality.

2. A problem that became apparent among many Israeli academics is what may seem to be lack of motivation, indifference or even apathy. One major explanation given for such an attitude has to do with the prevailing atmosphere in the Israeli society at present, that is the spreading disappointment from, and mistrust of Palestinians as partners for peace (for further discussion see Kaufman’s article in Appendix 8).

Another explanation for this apparent indifference is the Israeli academic institutional context, which discourages faculty members from getting politically involved. In this context, writes one of the Israeli participants, senior faculty members exert strong pressure on young faculty to conform, particularly those without tenure “who are troubled by the political situation and wish to respond publicly to it.”

Other reasons given by the above scholar for the reluctance of Israeli academics to get involved in political affairs, especially in non-official peace initiatives are as follows: “some [Israelis] argue that such initiatives constitute acts of usurpation exercised against the only legitimate power that possesses the authority to negotiate a peace agreement with the Palestinians, that is, the democratically elected Israeli government. Central to this criticism is not only the position that endorses a sharp distinction between politicians and intellectuals, but also a position that supports a full withdrawal of academics and intellectuals from politics.” (from a paper by one of the Barcelona Group participants).

3. Palestinians face other internal problems which inhibit cooperation with Israeli academics. These include disappointment from previous experiences of dialogue (over

the ten-year period of the Oslo process) between Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals, a reluctance to go against the campaign to boycott Israeli academics and fear of yet another defeat and humiliation by Israelis. One respondent said, “we were defeated when we resisted Israel and we were defeated again when we normalized with Israel without good previous preparation.” Therefore, “we [Palestinians] need to prepare ourselves and our agendas very well before working with the Israelis” (as elaborated in Salem’s article in Appendix 9).

4. Palestinians tend to be much more concerned with society building, reform, democracy and national struggle. Social responsibility in the Palestinian side can be seen as excluding cooperation, an understandable premise which causes tension and poses a limitation when trying to establish a framework for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation (for further discussion see Jadou’s article in Appendix 5).
5. Moreover, it became apparent that for many Palestinians, cooperation with Israelis, while the occupation continues, is perceived as a threat to their cultural, national and religious integrity.

Thus we found that Palestinians, when discussing a code of ethics, were actually focusing more on a code to be used within the Palestinian society, for internal development. While this may be a very important, even crucial project, contributing to confidence building and the empowerment necessary for cooperation, we would like to draw attention to the disparity in the discussions and present agenda between the two sides of the project. This disparity appears on all levels. Israeli and Palestinian organizers, participants and respondents are not speaking on the same plane. *The idea of advancing a “code of ethics” does not carry the same meaning for both populations. Rather, the project is interpreted within two very different frames of meaning.*

6.5 Recommendations

1. We recommend holding an urgent discussion within the project team in which the project's goals will be redefined and its strategies for action reconsidered. For example, if the goal is defined as creating a process of awareness-raising in both publics regarding the need for cooperation, and enlarging the circle of academics who cooperate across the divide, then the project organizers should rethink their approach to include a more heterogeneous group of academics and intellectuals (and maybe to renounce political pre-conditionings, thereby embracing those who oppose cooperation as well). If, on the other hand, the goal is defined as building coalitions between the two societies to strengthen joint activities (and produce a document of shared principles for cooperation), then maybe it should be enough to focus on a more homogenous group of academics, committed to cooperation (and willing to take the risk of stating publicly their political positions).
2. In this regard, we recommend developing uni-national forums for discussion in which academics and intellectuals will exert their influence to increase public trust in such cooperation. While the appropriate strategies may differ for the two societies, both need to work on raising awareness and gaining legitimacy within their own publics in order to enlarge the circle of people who will be willing to cooperate in such work.
3. Another related recommendation is to enlarge the circle of academics and intellectuals involved in this project. We suggest making a special effort to recruit more Palestinian academics from established universities, and at the same time widening the Israeli group to include academics from a wide range of the political spectrum, as well as intellectuals outside the university arena. This may ease some of the tensions and may compensate for the current asymmetry between the Palestinian and the Israeli groups by strengthening the professional/academic nature of the Palestinian group and by widening the representation of the Israeli group.
4. We recommend intensifying the discussion within the core group of academics and intellectuals (the Barcelona group). We think that having established good relationships between group members, and a relative secure and open atmosphere in the group discussions, the group is ripe to move to the next stage and hold pointed discussion on issues that divide them (including their different expectations and needs from cooperative endeavors). The group should discuss the difficulties entailed in such cooperation and perhaps come up with creative ideas for cooperation that will satisfy the different requirements posed by the two groups. We would like to suggest that at the heart of these discussions are the issue of 'neutrality vs. taking a political/ moral stance' and the dilemma of cooperation in the context of occupation. In this regard we suggest clarifying the nature and agenda of this group, that is, better determine its goals and objectives. In what areas is it expected to act, and what kind of activities are expected (academic, educational, public/media, political)?

Appendix 1: Interview Questions

1. Did you take part in joint Israeli – Palestinian projects in the past?

If yes:

- a. Please describe your experience (your motivation to participate, the project's development, the joint work experience, successes and failures, difficulties you faced in the joint project, lessons learned, etc.). If the project stopped, what were the reasons?
- b. In your opinion, is there a place to encourage academics of both sides to take a part in joint projects?
- c. In your opinion, are there any special/specific conditions that need to be met/ fulfilled in order for the two sides to cooperate?

If no:

- a. In your opinion, is there a place for Israeli- Palestinian academic cooperation in time of conflict?

If yes:

- a. Suggest ways to encourage and assist cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics: _____
- b. Mention areas for potential Israeli-Palestinian cooperation (joint research, participation in workshops, conferences and other meetings on topics of common interest; joint writing, action in defense of shared principles such as academic freedom, ...etc) _____
- c. In your opinion, what are the attributes of effective Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation? _____
- d. In your opinion, what are the difficulties in Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation?

If no:

- a. Please explain why you do not believe in Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation: _____
- b. Under what conditions would you approve/support Israeli-Palestinian cooperation?

2. To what extent can and should academics separate academic activities from political and social involvement?

3. What is the ideal and actual role played by academics in your society?

4. Do you think that academics are influential people in their society overall?

5. Would you consider the drafting of a shared document regarding principles for Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation a worthwhile effort?

If Yes

- a. Who should be involved in its development, and who should be responsible for updating and ensuring the implementation of the document?
- b. What should be included in the document?

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- c. Should there be one general document for all fields of Palestinian-Israeli academic cooperation, or should a specific document be written for each field (economics, political science, environment, etc.)?
- d. How could the contents of such a document be distributed to Israeli and Palestinian academics?
- e. At a time of violent conflict, can an “ethical code” contribute to advancing Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation? (Describe your first thoughts and feedback to this idea).

Appendix 2: Report on Palestinian Focus Groups

1. The situation of Palestinian intellectuals and academics

The meetings held in Jenin, Bethlehem and Jerusalem discussed this issue in depth. The participants reviewed the role of the Academics and intellectuals as follows:

1967-1976: Intellectuals and academics concentrated on the slogans of national liberation, while the issue of development was completely absent.

1976-1993: The Palestinian universities were established, and played a crucial role in Palestinian development. During this period 320 academics joined Dr. Yosef Sayigh in preparing a Palestinian National Development Plan. Also, 500 Palestinian Academics took part in the technical committees that established the institutional structure for the Palestinian Authority, and prepared for negotiations with Israel.

1993-2000: The role of academics in decision-making deteriorated with the advent of the Palestinian Authority. Academics and intellectuals in this period were divided into groups including: those who continued to work on track II activities; those who resigned from the public sphere out of frustration; those who joined the Palestinian Authority; those who left academia for work with political parties, and those who academia for work with NGOs.

2000-2004: This period witnessed a full collapse in the role of universities in the public sphere and increased “resignation” on the part of academics and intellectuals. During this period the intellectual production of the 1980s and 1990s deteriorated, and academics struggled to ascertain how to revive Palestinian cultural life.

2. The role of the intellectual and the academic

Those participating in the focus groups differed in their interpretation of the academic’s role in society. The first, or minimalist, approach focused on the role of the academic to educate the next generation. The maximalist approach insisted that academics must play a role in leading the Intifada, and a middle approach asserted that academics should develop policies, programs, and plans for nation-building and take a firm stand in defending academic freedom.

3. Challenges for developing a code of ethics

- a. One major challenge is the lack of Palestinian academics and intellectuals to develop a strong political, social and cultural discourse in the current context. Connected to this is the sense that Palestinian academics are isolated from the larger academic community and lack cultural venues, especially in remote areas like Jenin. Because of the lack of resources and connections, they feel they are

only semi-intellectuals, and thus the intellectual must be developed before there can be a code of principles for intellectuals.

- b. An additional challenge stems from the current Palestinian context, which finds Palestinians experiencing a crisis of identity. This crisis extends to the social, economic and political spheres, and is reflected in the lack of freedom of thought and the increasing power of militant groups.
- c. Palestinian universities themselves pose an obstacle, as there are tensions between those educated in the West and those educated in Arab countries, lack of implementation of ethical standards, and very low salaries for their employees.
- d. Most of the participants were against any joint code of ethics with Israeli academics now, but the same majority said that it might become possible if a Palestinian state will be established beside Israel. The reasons for currently refusing such a code included: refusal of normalization; concern that, as one Palestinian noted, “we were defeated when we resisted Israel and we are defeated again when we normalized with Israel without good previous preparation”; needing to support the academic boycott against Israeli academics; sense of lacking any common background with Israeli academics; political and psychological obstacles; a sense that negotiations and relations with Israelis should be left to decision makers, and failure of previous dialogue efforts.

What type of code of ethics?

Those who were open to the possibility of a code of ethics in the future included those supporting an alliance between “comrades from both sides” (i.e. the left wing of Israelis and Palestinians); those willing to ally with Israelis standing in solidarity with Palestinian desire for statehood, and those who were willing to support professional cooperation. Some Palestinians believed a code of ethics should be based on professional norms and values only, while others suggested it should be based on national or international values.

What role for the code of ethics?

Members of the Palestinian focus groups saw the development of a code of ethics as a means of motivating academics and intellectuals to become more socially involved, and to stimulate the production of ethical codes in other professions. The code should not be a law, nor a tool for punishing and rewarding.

3. The second stage of the code of ethics

Participants suggested that once a code was created it should be disseminated widely to academics and intellectuals throughout the West Bank and Gaza, as well as to refugees outside of Palestine. Discussions should be held around the code along with a media campaign that could include an internet website and newsletter.

4. Content of code of ethics for Israeli-Palestinian academics and intellectuals

The code must include the values and norms that are relevant to joint Israeli- Palestinian academic cooperation, and not just any values and norms for academic and intellectual work.

Appendix 3: Brief report on Israeli focus groups

1. The role of academics in society

1. The primary role of academics is undertaking research and development. Academics are not different from other people, in that everybody can use their professional skills to promote cooperation, but academics do belong to the elite strata in society (socially and economically), and because of that, they have an influence within their society. Academics have many opportunities to disseminate their ideas that other people in society do not have.
2. The role of academics regarding the political issues is to analyze the conflict in an objective manner.
3. Academics need to outline the obligations which both sides must fulfill in order to achieve the end-goal of coexistence.
4. Academics have an obligation to their own society to help solve political issues.
5. Academics have an obligation to speak up in public for two reasons: the first is that they are professionals, and therefore they have expertise in various disciplines that most people do not have; the second is that they have the time to think about and develop ideas, and thus they have an obligation to share these insights and conclusions with the public.
6. The role of academics is to research and not to be political—they do not have to lead negotiations.
7. To build a bridge of understanding between both sides, especially concerning social and quality of life issues.

2. Obstacles for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians

The following observations were derived from face-to-face and on-line interviews and focus groups with Israeli academics that took place in Haifa, Jerusalem and Beersheva. The following answers, divided into the categories listed below, were given in response to this principle question: from your experiences, what are the difficulties in cooperating with Palestinian academics?

Technical/Physical

1. There are difficulties in obtaining entry permits for Palestinians. In addition to that, there are difficulties in exchanging information and material that cannot be exchanged through the internet. Furthermore, it is not permitted for Israelis to enter Palestinian territories because of security restrictions.

Psychological

1. There is a difficulty finding Palestinian participants to work with Israelis, as certain Palestinians are ideologically opposed to working with Israelis.

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2. There is a fear for some Palestinians that they will be labeled collaborators if they work with Israelis. In some cases, there is a threat to Palestinians' lives if they engage in such work with the "enemy".
3. Some Palestinians are afraid to speak in public with Israelis when the microphone is on, and are only willing to speak when the microphone is turned off.
4. The people that cooperate with each other from both sides are a small group of people that are often the very same people who partake in other coexistence projects.
5. There is an asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinian academics, in that the Occupation does not affect the everyday lives of the Israelis, while for the Palestinians it is present in every aspect of their daily lives.
6. It is difficult for Israelis and Palestinians to keep in touch after the dialogue projects have finished.

Political

1. Cooperation between both sides is influenced by the fragile political situation.
2. There is an asymmetry regarding how Israelis and Palestinians understand cooperation. In most of the cases, the Israeli is the professional academic and the Palestinian is the political activist. The political leadership in Palestinian society often restricts Palestinian professionals/academics from being involved in joint projects with Israelis. There are a few professional Palestinians involved, but the Palestinian leadership has control over the nature of their involvement. As a result, there is an asymmetry between the professional motivations of the Israelis and the political motivations of the Palestinians.
3. While all people involved in cooperative academic research between Israelis and Palestinians are motivated by political positions, it is easier to promote such academic research when it focuses on the areas of business, technology, and natural sciences, and more difficult when it involves people from the humanities and social sciences. This is so, because in humanities and social sciences, peoples' research is more closely connected to the over-arching political issues.
4. Without dialogue between religious leaders it is very difficult for academics to gain support for their cooperation, because the religious leaders have a lot of influence within both societies.
5. It is important that cooperation comes from both sides and from all levels of society: both from the bottom-up and from the top-down.
6. Some Palestinians see joint research projects as something mainly to be used for their own political objectives, and not for the sake of research.

Academic/Professional

1. Within Israel, academics see little benefit from being involved in joint work with Palestinians, as they do not consider it helpful to their career ambitions. They are afraid in some cases that cooperation may negatively affect their chances for academic promotion.
2. Some Israeli academics claim that the expertise of Palestinian academics is lower than their own. In this way, some Israelis feel they are coming to teach the "natives" on the other side.

3. Often work with Palestinians is arduous and frustrating, and in the end the final product is not of a high academic quality.
4. Often Palestinians expect Israelis to act in a political manner, and not in a purely academic manner. This is a difficulty for Israeli academics who have a specialty in a certain area and do not have the tools to speak up on broader political issues.
5. The Palestinians often have an expectation that Israeli academics have the power to make significant social and political change, but in reality they are unable to fulfill these high expectations.
6. When trying to build relationships with young Palestinian researchers to be trained in Israeli universities, there is a problem concerning their accreditation. For instance, the Israeli Committee of Higher Education does not recognize qualifications obtained from Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem.
7. It is important that there is a real end-goal for cooperation and not for dialogue to be undertaken only for the sake of dialogue. In many instances, cooperation is only undertaken if there is money to be gained from it, and thus if there is no money there is no dialogue.
8. It is really difficult to find Palestinian colleagues in certain areas, such as physics, engineering and other related specialties. Also, there are not many places where academics from both sides can meet each other.
9. There is a difficulty for Israelis and Palestinians to write academic works together. There are only a few academics who are doing so.
10. There is a difficulty in doing joint studies on subjects related to the security of both societies. For example, projects between engineers who are working on initiatives connected to the army and state security.

External Organizations/Funding

1. Often the desire to facilitate cooperation between both sides comes more from parties outside of the region, such as international organizations and governments who want to support conflict resolution both financially and practically, rather than from Palestinians and Israelis themselves.
2. International organizations that supported cooperation between the two sides in the past, now, in the time of the *intifada*, are confronted by an unwillingness on both sides to work with each other.

Cultural

1. Despite the fact that all individuals involved in cooperative projects are academics, from what was observed, there appear to be cultural differences between both societies. For example, there are different expectations about keeping to schedules and being on time. In addition, there are different approaches to what can be said and what should not be said.

3. Conditions for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics

Physical Conditions

1. It is essential for Israelis and Palestinians to be able to meet in person, and preferably in Israel rather than abroad.
2. It is important that individuals have the interest and the motivation to initiate and take part in joint projects.
3. There needs to be a willingness from both governments to allow both sides to engage in joint projects.

External Organizations

1. A source of financial support.
2. Someone that will act as an intermediary between both sides and will help facilitate contact between researchers from both sides who have common interests.

Reciprocal Obligations

1. A commitment to common values and ideals, and the belief that there is a way to solve the conflict by peaceful means.
2. A willingness on both sides to not let the conflict interfere with the research relationship.
3. The cooperation needs to be between researchers who want to develop common research and not between individuals who are motivated by political ambitions.

Political Issues

1. Israeli academics need to provide human protection for their Palestinian colleagues and to advocate for the Palestinians' rights.
2. Only when there is an end to the occupation, a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem and the construction of a sovereign Palestinian state, can there be normal relations between both sides.
3. There needs to be a political atmosphere which enables both sides to engage with cooperative projects.

Academic/Professional

1. It is important that there is an academic network that provides information for both Israeli and Palestinian academics who want to be involved with cooperative projects.
2. There needs to be a similar academic level between researchers working with each other.

Appendix 4: Code of Ethics Fundamentals (Yonit Levanon)

A Code of Ethics for Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation in Times of Conflict³²

1. Introduction

The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 heralded a new era in cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Cooperative ventures were established in a wide variety of areas, such as tourism, employment, medicine, social programs, economics, and programs designed to foster Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Universities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and other similar institutions were all involved in cooperative projects. Within this context, a series of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian academics and intellectuals took place with the purpose of discussing the future relations between the two societies. They claimed that future relationships founded on cooperation in diverse areas and working to the benefit of both peoples would lead to a stable peace, continual development and peace between the two sides (Kelman, H. 1999). However, after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, very few projects continued to operate and some planned projects never got off the ground.

This article will examine the existing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics that continues during times of violent conflict, and, whether a “**Code of Ethics**” can assist in achieving this goal.

A “Code of Ethics” is a written declaration, which addresses the values and principles that are supposed to guide those who belong to the same area. The main goal of the “Code of Ethics” is to outline the desired ideal situation one should strive to attain by addressing the questions of “how” and “why”. The “how” provides more concrete principles of action: “How to reach the desired situation?” The “why” relates to the question: “Why should workers strive to attain a desired situation” and “how should they act towards their co-workers and their clients?” (Kasher, 1998).

The overarching research question is, therefore: Can the “Code of Ethics” between Israeli and Palestinian academics in times of violent conflict assist with existing initiatives of cooperation? And, more specifically:

- What are the means by which it is possible to assist the continuation of joint projects, and, what are the factors that delay cooperation?
- What are the central components of the “Code of Ethics” for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics?
- Who needs the “Code of Ethics” for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics (academic members, the public sector, the private sector, etc.)? Who needs to be involved in the development of the “Code

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of Ethics”? Is it necessary to establish a committee to supervise and follow-up on the implications of the code?

Twenty-two academics from Israel, Palestine and the Mediterranean Basin participated in the initial phase of this research. They completed a questionnaire, which integrated qualitative and quantitative questions, as written in continuation of this paper.

2. Theoretical background

The theoretical background of the research is composed of two main parts:

- **Section A:** literary review of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics from the time of the establishment of the State of Israel through to the present time.
- **Section B:** literary review of the following topics: ethics, professional ethics and the “code of ethics.”

3. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli academics

There were very few cooperative efforts between Israelis and Palestinians from the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 until the 1980’s. Over the past several decades, the international community has made a significant turnabout, and numerous countries around the world have shifted towards promoting peace, cooperation and international economic trade. This new era of peace was reflected in the Middle East when Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1978. As a result, both governments began cooperating in the areas of tourism, trade, agriculture and technology. With the rise of the Rabin government in 1991, Israeli leaders began to negotiate with the Palestinians, and these negotiations reached their peak on September 9, 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

It should be noted that Israeli and Palestinian academics contributed significantly to explore common ground through Track II meetings and more specifically toward the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Oslo. Dr. Ron Pundak³³ and Dr. Yair Hirschfeld³⁴ were the two Israelis who took the initiative to enter into secret negotiations on the Oslo track, which eventually lead to the signature of the Declaration of Principles, legitimized at the White House lawn in September 2003.

The agreement with the PLO opened the door to a peace treaty with Jordan in October 1994, and to cooperation in trade, tourism and industry with the Jordanians. In addition, it further encouraged other Arab countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar and Oman to establish relations with Israel (Midair, 1999).

³³ Dr. Ron Pundak serves as the Director General of the Peres Center for Peace.

³⁴ Dr. Yair Hirschfeld serves as the Executive Director of the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF).

From the beginning of the 1990's it is possible to list five different central types of interaction and dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian academics: joint research in various areas of science and knowledge; exchange visits between institutions; participation in research and meetings; writing addressing historical, identity and cultural aspects in a broad context; Petitions and expressions of opinions (Middy-Weitzman, 2002).

a. **Joint research in various areas of science and knowledge:**

Throughout the seven-year period between the Oslo Accords and the al-Aqsa Intifada, hundreds of Israelis, Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians and citizens of other Arab states, participated in joint research projects. The majority of these projects did not deal with problems relating to the conflict itself. (Middy-Weitzman, 2002).

During this period, Israeli researchers in virtually all fields were able to find Palestinian counterparts. Cooperation with Israelis gave Palestinians the opportunity to learn techniques and research methods, which were otherwise not generally accessible (Herman, 2002). Galia Golan and Zaharia Kamal (1999) express their personal contribution as a result of their cooperative research on the subject of "The Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue": "...we have gradually come to know each other and something about each other's lives; through some very difficult times and bloody crises in our region, we have come to trust and like each other. In a sense, it is as a test of this understanding and friendship that we have undertaken to write together, rather than produce two separate chapters, each from her own point of view. In jointly analyzing and evaluating our experience, we hope to take the dialogue one step further, as a symbol of our commitment to the resolution of the conflict dividing our two peoples". (Golan, Kamal, 1999).

b. **Exchange visits in institutions.**

Many Israeli institutions and research centers afforded the Palestinian researchers a stage throughout the Oslo Accords time period. However, Palestinian academics and institutions in the West Bank and in Gaza did so on rare occasions. Such an example can be seen by looking at the course: "The Palestinians in the twentieth century, an inside view", which was sponsored by the Ford Foundation. The course took place from 1999-2001 in cooperation with the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and The Research Center of the Arabic Society. Within the framework of the course, academics from the Palestinian Authority lectured once a week in front of a group of Israeli academics on subjects relating to the Palestinian society (culture, economy, the status of the woman, society, etc.). As part of the course, the Israeli group (prior to the outbreak of the intifada) visited areas in the Palestinian Authority and met with people of central importance.

c. **Participation in research groups and meetings, which were conducted in informal tracts, and were directly connected to the peace process.**

An example of such can be seen in the International Convention which took place in the year 2000 on the topic of: “Regional cooperation within the global framework”. This conference focused on the following areas: regional cooperation, public policy, economic topics, technology, business ventures, ecology, social areas, and aspects of regional cooperation in security aspects (Bar-El, Benhayoun, 2000).

d Petitions and expressions of opinions.

Petitions and expressions of opinions of Israeli and Palestinian academics were published in newspapers, which were aimed at both the Israeli and Palestinian public. One such example can be seen in a petition published in February 2000. A group of 130 Palestinians – academics, artists and political activists passed on a message to the “Israeli and Jewish public”. In this declaration the group warned that the Oslo process is on its “sick bed”. If far-reaching steps will not be taken in order to resuscitate it, the people of both sides will suffer from the serious ramifications. The Palestinian petition received favorable reactions on the part of approximately two hundred Israeli academics. They, in turn, presented a petition, which was published in the newspapers (Maddy-Weitzman, 2002).

Cooperation and Israeli-Palestinian dialogue for peace at the group, organizational and university levels lost strength and momentum during the second half of the 90s due to the stalemate of the peace process and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada (Hermann, 2002).

4. Factors encouraging joint Israeli-Palestinian academic research

A number of key factors encourage cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians:

- In many cases, it is much easier to secure funding from external bodies for projects in which both parties to the conflict are involved.
- A joint project can serve the interests of both societies. In many cases both parties face the same problem, and therefore cooperation can advance research.
- The existence of an academic culture, which for the most part helps to separate academia from politics, aids in maintaining academic relationships between Israelis and Palestinians.
- Academics are generally influential in society and the impact of the meeting with the “other” may very often extend beyond the participants.
- Due to external financing sources, cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli researchers (in fields such as medicine and technology) presents an opportunity to work under better conditions with more advanced physical and professional surroundings (Scham, 2000)

5. Factors discouraging joint Israeli-Palestinian academic research

A number of key factors discourage cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians:

- An order that bans cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli universities.
- Difficulty in finding research partners.
- Difficulties in face-to-face meetings between Israelis and Palestinians.
- The difference between the definition of “normalization” for Israelis and for the Arab world – Israelis view normalization as a basic strategic objective and encourage cooperation with the Arab world in various areas. To the Arabs, however, normalization with Israel must first begin with the resolution of key political issues.

5. Ethics, Professional Ethics and a Code of Ethics

In this section, I will examine the following concepts: “ethics”, “professional ethics” and a “code of ethics”. This will assist in the examination of the suitability of utilizing the “code of ethics” as an auxiliary tool in the cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics during times of conflicts.

Ethics: The theory of ethics is a theory of morals – a theory of “virtues”. Ethics outline the rules of behavior that are suitable to people in certain positions, in a specified place and in a specified profession. For example, there are ethics, which are related to the framework of the family, ethics regarding holy places, and special ethics for business and various professions (Zamir, 1987).

Professional Ethics: Professional ethics is a professional-moral manner of thinking which expresses constant coping with professional dilemmas, values, and morals within difficult solutions. It reflects loyalty to professional work values on a very high level. Professional ethics limits itself on an a priori level to members of a group or specific organization, while relating to the unique characteristics of such group (Achman, Shefler, 2003).

A “Code of Ethics”: A “Code of Ethics” is a written declaration, which deals with values, and principles, which are meant to guide those who belong to the same area. **It is possible to recognize several designs of a “code of ethics”**: A code, which is a procedure – a kind of catalogue of rules of behavior; a code, which is a procedure and a system of basic rules; a code, which is a package of values from which specific rules and regulations follow and are extracted; a code, which is a system of rules, based upon values, which appear in a planned document in the form of analyzed expressions. Each of these expressions are accompanied by a definition and explanation (Kasher, 1998).

When one proceeds in writing a “Code of Ethics,” there are several basic points to which one must relate (Kasher, 2003):

1. The goals of the process of crystallizing the document.
2. The timing of the writing of the code.
3. The target community to which the “Code of Ethics” is aimed.

4. The depth of the document: which style of code of ethics do we desire to construct: A procedural code is a package of ethics, from which specific rules and regulations are derived. A code, which is system of rules, based upon values.
5. The validity of the document: what is the source of compelling authority of the “Code of Ethics”?
6. The absorption of the “Code of Ethics”: what use will be made of the “Code of Ethics” in order to assimilate its contents into the professional community?
7. An ethical reaction: what will occur when an objection is raised that one of the professional people did not act in accordance with the “Code of Ethics” in a certain situation?

In other words, a “code of ethics” is a written declaration whose values and principles are suppose to guide those who belong to this field. As previously mentioned, there are several points, which must be addressed while formulating a “code of ethics”. Throughout the course of the survey, I examined whether Israeli and Palestinian academics view the code of ethics as a tool that can assist the continuation of the existence of cooperation among academics.

6. Methodology

A combined method of quality and quantity were used in this research. Twenty-two Israeli and Palestinian academics, and academics from the Mediterranean Basin, replied to the questionnaire within the framework of this research. The questionnaire was comprised of three main sections, which included quantitative and qualitative questions:

Section a: open questions regarding the academic’s position regarding the existence of cooperation in a time of conflict.

Section b: questions regarding the construction of the “Code of Ethics” as it relates to Israeli and Palestinian cooperation.

Section c: general questions regarding the very existence of a “Code of Ethics”: Is it necessary? Who needs it? And, who should develop it?

The analysis of the questionnaire will be executed via a quantitative analysis of the closed questions, and a qualitative analysis (an analysis of content) of the open questions.

Research limitations

- The research study included a small sample of participants, which does not represent all of the areas of cooperation among academics.
- Due to the security situation, the only available research tool was the questionnaire. It is possible that if the situation had been different, it would have been possible to conduct individual interviews and a group discussion.

- The research study relates to the writing of a “code of ethics” for cooperation among Israeli and Palestinian academics, which refers to all academic fields as a single unit; thus, there is not a separate code for each field (economics, education, environment, scientific fields, etc.).
- The Israeli and Palestinian participants in this research were either past participants or present participants in joint projects. The research study lacks the vantage point of academics that never participated in cooperative projects. Due to the situation, I was unsuccessful in reaching Palestinian academics that were never involved in cooperative projects. Therefore, I did not pursue this aspect of the research.

7. Findings

1. **The “Code of Ethics” for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics in a time of conflict:** The findings of the research show that a “Code of Ethics” between Israeli and Palestinian academics is essential to assist in sustaining cooperation in a time of conflict. One of the interviewees stated that a “Code of Ethics” is essential in order to prevent a situation where external pressures will prevent the sides from deriving the utmost benefit from cooperation.
2. **The existence of cooperation in a time of conflict:** all of the interviewees stated that it is essential to continue and sustain cooperation in a time of conflict. “Interaction between the two sides decreases the level of conflict and hatred between the two sides, as they are given an opportunity to express themselves in numerous manners”. “Joint projects should be conducted in every field in order to assist in the presentation of the Palestinian and the Israeli as human, and not just as the enemy”.³⁵
3. **Factors encouraging joint research, which arose in the research:** the involvement of a neutral, external body; funds for encouraging joint projects; the emphasis of the benefits for both sides derived from cooperation; the “Code of Ethics” – and lectures for the two sides regarding the topic of ethics.
Factors discouraging joint research, which arose in the research: the closing of the zones, thus preventing Palestinians from leaving these areas; the misuse of professional meetings for political propaganda; the threat of lives of members of one of the partners of cooperation; terrorist attacks in Israel; military actions within the areas of the Palestinian Authority.
4. **The components of the “Code of Ethics”**
The central values which are essentially stated in establishing the guidelines, in accordance with the research: mutual respect, the granting of legitimacy to the other, the guarding of individual and equal rights.
5. **For whom is the “Code of Ethics” essential:** the interviewees stated that a “Code of Ethics is essential for everyone who is interested in cooperation: academic members, private sector and public sector.

³⁵ Excerpts from the questionnaires of Palestinian academics.

The three groups that participated in the research³⁶ stated that it is essential that Israeli and Palestinian academics and intellectuals take part in **developing the code**. The academic group from the Mediterranean Basin and the Palestinians added that an external source should be integrated into the development of the code.

71% of the interviewees stated that it is essential to establish **an Israeli – Palestinian follow-up committee** to deal with the development, implementation, updating and guarding of the maintenance of the code.

An example of sections which can comprise the “Code of Ethics”, as they arose in the research:

- “In a time of state and political conflict, it is essential to encourage the fulfillment of cooperation via an external mediator, in order to guard the neutrality and the legitimate rights of cooperation of the two involved parties.”
- “Academic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians must include both what is unique and what is mutual to the two societies and between the researchers themselves.”
- “Cooperation which leads to professional development and benefit for all sides should continue even when restraints and difficulties exist due to the state and political conditions.”

8. In conclusion

The research shows that the need for constructing a “Code of Ethics” for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics is supported by many of the interviewees, although significant obstacles have to be reckoned with. The most suitable approach for such a joint enterprise is to involve academics from both sides in a working group under the auspices of a neutral, external source. Furthermore, it is great importance to ensure that such a group which will include academics from a range of areas, and is comprised of representatives who are experts in the field of ethics. In this regards, it is essential to examine if a “Code of Ethics” should be constructed for every area where cooperation exists (education, quality of environment, economics, society, public health, etc.).

In the stage of construction of a “Code of Ethics”, it is important to examine how such a code will be used and implemented, in order to assimilate its contents with the values of the professional community’s code. The “Code of Ethics” is likened to a compass: It is not enough for it to exist in order for it to influence the life of the navigator, but rather, the navigator must recognize the compass, understand it, be convinced of its value, know how to use it and make a habit of using it properly. **A professional community, which has a “Code of Ethics”, is**

³⁶ These three groups are: Israeli academics, Palestinian academics, and academics from the Mediterranean Basin.

likened to a navigator who has a compass. In order for the code to influence the lifestyles of the professional community, it must ascertain that all members of the profession recognize the code, understand the concept which is expressed in the code, be convinced of its righteousness, learn how to use it and in time internalize all of its contents. (Kasher, 2003)

This preliminary study is now being continued under auspices of UNESCO and hopefully the understanding of this important issue will be improved in the near future.

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Appendix 5: Towards a Code of Ethics Regime (Amal Jadou)

A Code of Ethics for Palestinian Academics and Intellectuals (Structure)

1. Background:

Codes of ethics are “reflections of the morally permissible standards of conduct which members of a group make binding upon themselves,³⁷” in order to provide guidance to members of their groups in carrying out their tasks. Although they often depend on the general principles of morality adopted by a particular society, codes of ethics generally prioritize commonly conflicted principles that underlie the standards of conduct for a certain profession or an organization³⁸.

I strongly believe that it is essential for any organized group of individuals to have a code of ethics. Such codes serve as essential landmarks for workplace activities, ensuring the rights of both those who conduct the activity and those who are affected by it. By increasing ethical sensitivity, guiding professional judgment, and empowering individuals with moral boldness, codes of ethics create better societies³⁹.

Philosophers, however, have long debated the utility of ethical codes. Here, I will try to summarize the gist of the opposing arguments. One perspective argues that ethics should not be confused with law, and therefore codes of ethics should be both open-ended and reflective. Ladd argues that assuming that different professions need special ethics separates professionals from ordinary people. He believes that all human beings should practice the same ethics within a moral society. No one, in Ladd’s opinion, should be exempt, or have special definitions for how to act morally⁴⁰. Heinz Luegenbiehl, another opponent of such codes, believes that codes of ethics create more moral problems than they resolve. Luegenbiehl criticizes codes of ethics for being internally inconsistent. Like Ladd, he calls for moral autonomy rather than specification. Others, however, argue for the importance of having such codes. Harris argues that when codes

³⁷ Olson, Andrew: "Authoring a Code: Observations on Process and Organization", 1998.
http://www.iit.edu/departments/csep/PublicWWW/codes/coe/Writing_A_Code.html, accessed on October 10th, 2004

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, “Codes of Ethics Online”,
<http://www.iit.edu/departments/csep/PublicWWW/codes/coe/Introduction.html>, accessed in October 2004.

of ethics seem internally inconsistent, one can address this by understanding such codes as “expressions of ethical considerations to bear in mind⁴¹.” They should be observed as frameworks rather than prescribed solutions to problems⁴². On the issue of the autonomy of ethics, Harris et al write.

“If a code's provision can be supported with good reasons, why should a profession not include an affirmation of those provisions as part of what it professes?..This does not preclude individual members from autonomously accepting those provisions and jointly committing themselves to their support. (p. 34)”⁴³

Davis argues that ethical codes should be understood as conventions between professionals. These conventions have benefits for the professionals themselves, to the practice of their profession, and for the society as a whole⁴⁴. Stephen Unger expounds on these benefits, which include:

First, [a code of ethics] can serve as a collective recognition by members of a profession of its responsibilities. Second, it can help create an environment in which ethical behavior is the norm. Third, it can serve as a guide or reminder in specific situations...Fourth, the process of developing and modifying a code of ethics can be valuable for a profession. Fifth, a code can serve as an educational tool, providing a focal point for discussion in classes and professional meetings. Finally, a code can indicate to others that the profession is seriously concerned with responsible, professional conduct (p. 35).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

2. Why A Palestinian Code of Ethics?

My first encounter with the concept of “a code of honor” was when I arrived at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy to begin my Ph.D. program. There, during orientation week, students were given a handbook that introduced the topic of the code of honor. The code of honor is supposed to function as the students’ guiding principle for their entire academic career. The code included rights, duties and codes of conduct. I was fascinated by it, by the academic integrity it fosters, and by the confidence and trust it instills in students. With academic freedom came the responsibility to uphold our honor as members of a scholarly community.

In December 2003, I was shocked to learn that the student Senate of one of our Palestinian universities called on the administration to rid its library of all holdings that presented the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a perspective that contradicted the official Palestinian stance. I feared that now, when politically everything seems to be closing in on us, we were contributing to our mental entrapment as well. I was greatly relieved when I saw an open letter by the president of that university to the students and the faculty, dismissing the Senate’s demand and encouraged the pursuit of academic freedom in thought and research. If we destroy books that hold ideas that contradict our own, this does not mean that the ideas cease to exist. Rather, they not only persist, but we lose our ability to counter and challenge them. For this and many other reasons, including cases of plagiarism, copyright and patent right issues, cases of censored thinking, and terrorization of those who think differently, I call for a Palestinian code of ethics for academicians and intellectuals.

Of course, the requirements for a code of ethics for Palestinian academicians differ from those for a code of ethics for intellectuals in general, although it shares common principles. In this paper, I will focus on presenting guidelines for a code of ethics for Palestinian academicians, but first wish to note that a member of the academic profession serves his/her country in many respects and fills several roles. An academician plays the roles of a responsible and well-informed citizen, a teacher and instructor for thousands of knowledge seekers, a researcher leading inquiries in all walks of life and an employee in an academic institution. In each role that an academician fills, he/she produces outcomes that impact both their immediate community and the broader society. Consequently, a code of ethics for Palestinian academicians needs to

provide guidance to its members in filling each of the four previous roles within the Palestinian context.

The specific environment in which Palestinian academicians operate, therefore, is important for developing a Palestinian code of ethics. The Palestinian people continue to live under a 37-year Israeli occupation, which impacts every aspect of Palestinian life. Academic institutions, and those who work in them, have been a direct target of oppressive Israeli policies that seriously hinder the process of education in general. Restrictions and limitations are imposed on academic research, freedom of expression, curricula and library holdings. Many Palestinian university professors and employees endured several years in Israeli jails as well as harassment and interrogation to put pressure on the way they performed in their classrooms. Thousands of Palestinian students endured imprisonment and hundreds were killed or injured. Many, if not all, Palestinian higher academic institutions have experienced long periods of closure.

During the Oslo process, Palestinian academic institutions enjoyed a degree of development: graduate programs opened in several universities, research centers were established, and there was a movement towards acquiring new and updated literature. The period also witnessed a trend of opening up to the outside world in general and to Israeli academic institutions and intellectuals in particular. It should be emphasized that many universities persisted in their policy of refusing to normalize with Israeli academicians and universities as a means of protesting Israel's continued colonization activities, occupation and control. Some Palestinian academicians and intellectuals, however, sought to impact the Israeli society by reaching out to, and developing good relations with, Israeli academics and think-tanks as a means of positively impacting Israeli decision-makers. They hoped that by forging positive ties with well-connected Israelis, they might influence Israeli practices and policies. Towards the end of the Oslo period, however, Palestinian society generally grew more opposed to what they saw as 'premature normalization' with Israelis at all levels, including the academic one. The horizons of a peaceful settlement were narrowing, and Palestinians saw the fervor of Israeli settlement activity, land confiscation, and the continuation of Israeli occupation in general, which impacted the options available to those who sought contact with Israeli intellectuals. Since the beginning of the current Intifada, many of the relations that were created were severed, due to the intensity of the Israeli reprisal against Palestinian civilians and the reoccupation of all

the Palestinian territories. The silence of the Israeli society in general, and of the academic establishments in particular, encouraged severing such contacts. Of course, some institutions kept their relationships but maintained them undercover. What we are witnessing currently is a revival of such contacts and relationships, especially with Israeli academicians who have come out publicly against Israeli occupation and military practices against Palestinians.

At the same time, however, there has been a movement among many Palestinian and international academicians (led by Davidson and Baker) of initiating a campaign to boycott Israeli academicians and academic institutions. “The Academic Boycott of Israel” seeks to follow in the footsteps of the South African and international boycott of South Africa’s government and institutions in 1980s and 1990s that led to the collapse of the Apartheid regime. Asa Kasher, head of Israel’s Inter-University Committee on Academic Ethics attacked the campaign, basing his argument on ethics but, ironically, intending to silence those protesting academia’s collusion in an unethical occupation. His written response on the campaign puts pressure on the collective leadership of Israeli academic institutions to endorse policies and measures that may, according to Lawrence Davidson, “lead to disciplinary action against those Israeli faculty members who have been publicly identified with the boycott.”⁴⁵ It is worth mentioning here that so far three Israeli faculty have been so targeted: Ilan Pappé, Rachel Giora, and Tanya Rhinehart. As Davidson indicates, the time and energy that Israeli establishment devotes to counter their activities is “truly amazing.”⁴⁶

Palestinian academicians and intellectuals should consider the economic, social and political abyss that the Palestinian live in as they set out to prepare their code of ethics. These circumstances stem from the Israeli occupation but also result from the absence of a clear Palestinian strategy and the chaos of the Palestinian leadership. Raising the subject of such a code as a topic for discussion and debate might actually be an essential step towards changing this environment. Discourse, in my opinion, is a powerful means of setting any national, social, political or economic agenda. Therefore, the first and foremost step towards establishing a code of ethics for Palestinian academicians and intellectuals should be to stimulate interest by organizing workshops and discussion groups tackling the issue.

⁴⁵ [alef] Fwd: [Palmen] Israel’s Academic Establishment Moves Against Boycott Supporters, <http://list.haifa.ac.il/pipermail/alef/2004-July/006929.html>, accessed October 2004.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Academically, as mentioned previously, Palestinian students are not familiar with either codes of ethics or codes of honor. As a result, they do not fully appreciate the importance of integrity to the academic enterprise. Further, students do not fully grasp what research papers entail or how to conduct research, which leads to an increase in plagiarism cases. This situation is compounded by the absence of principles to regulate copyright and patent issues, which leads to chaos. However, for the most part, Palestinian professors and intellectuals study in other countries and, depending on where they study, are exposed to principles underlying codes of ethics. Palestinian academic institutions have in their bylaws what amounts to be the seeds of a code of ethics, such as the Birzeit laws for hiring faculty, which require members of the faculty to enjoy academic integrity and not to be accused and convicted of any offence that violates such honesty⁴⁷. Bethlehem University's handbook has a special section entitled "policy on ethical conduct." The section, in my opinion, can serve as a preliminary outline for a general Palestinian code of ethics that Palestinian universities can discuss, analyze, review and develop. The policy includes a general statement which reads as follows:

Bethlehem University is an educational community, which exists to further the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge and understanding through teaching and scholarship. For this reason, the University aims to ensure a climate on campus of honesty, tolerance and respect for individuals and property.

The University is committed to sustaining an institutional environment that supports and rewards its members on the basis of such relevant factors as work performance and achievement. All forms of harassment, exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, dishonesty and any abuse of teaching or supervisory authority are contrary to this commitment. Therefore, the University has a responsibility to deal effectively, quickly and fairly, at the appropriate level, with any situation involving claims of such harmful and unethical behavior⁴⁸.

The policy also lists the standard ethical responsibilities that call on professors and staff of Bethlehem University to treat "students and colleagues with tolerance and respect, avoiding any

⁴⁷ Phone interview by the author with the Office of the Dean of Academics at Birzeit University, October 2004.

⁴⁸ Bethlehem University, Bethlehem University Handbook, "Policy on Ethical Conduct."

conduct that could reasonably be seen as exploiting, harassing, intimidating or discriminatory.⁴⁹ The policy also calls for adopting the highest standards of academic integrity in carrying out professional obligations. At the same time, the policy includes a section about the rights of the faculty, stressing the right of everyone at Bethlehem University to work in a non-discriminatory environment. A special section clearly defines practices like discrimination, exploitation, harassment, honesty and intimidation, thereby setting a standard.

The first step for Palestinian academicians and intellectuals in establishing their code of ethics is to adopt a statement of intent or several statements based on the topics they want to deal with. Setting a goal, or goals, for any code of ethics is essential for developing and implementing a successful code. In my opinion, a clear statement of intent needs to tackle the four roles of academics, since by so doing it will fulfill the needs of those affected by each role.

Palestinian academics who function as teachers and professors must have the goal of advancing knowledge and must realize that in such capacity their primary responsibility is to seek and state truth as they see it. They also have an everlasting responsibility to continue to develop themselves and their competence. They must practice intellectual honesty and never allow their freedom of inquiry to be compromised by subsidiary interests. As teachers and professors, academicians also have a responsibility to their students which is manifested in encouraging these students to pursue learning freely. They must be good models for their students in following good scholarly and ethical standards, but they must also respect their students. As teachers and professors, they should foster honest academic conduct and they must avoid exploitation, harassment or discrimination. They must ensure an environment that fosters academic freedom for all of its members, including both professors and students. In this capacity academics encourage, respect and defend the free inquiry of their colleagues. They respect others' opinions and must be civil when exchanging criticism. Professors need to strive towards objectivity in their judgment of the findings of their colleagues in the academic community. As employees in academic institutions, teachers and professors must be effective members and must follow the regulations of their institution. As well informed citizens of their societies, professors have an obligation to promote the well-being and advancement of their societies and must engage their communities with the purpose of proliferating freedom of inquiry and integrity and

⁴⁹ Ibid.

honesty of scholarship⁵⁰. These goals are universal and academicians and intellectuals all over the world should pursue them.

Within the Palestinian context, academics must help in setting a Palestinian strategy for both liberation and nation-building and must be active actors in the pursuit and implementation of such a strategy. Following the initial step of raising awareness about the code of ethics by initiating the discourse and developing it through workshops, meetings, seminars and study groups, we will be creating a code of ethics regime. By ‘regime’, we mean a consensually defined set of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area.”⁵¹ This definition illustrates both substantive (principles, norms, rules) and procedural (decision making procedures) components to such a code. An ethical regime will be in place only after enough debates, discussions, and research have been conducted. Why do we want to see a regime created? Simply because “Regimes, ... facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for behavior. A theory of regimes explains why these intermediate arrangements are necessary.”⁵² Such a framework does not measure up to being a law. In creating a code of ethics, we do not want laws, because laws can be easily broken. We need a regime because individuals join such arrangements out of conviction and choice. Regimes are usually created because members choose to join them because of the benefits they provide. The benefits of any regime are represented in reducing cheating and defection and in the distribution of absolute gains. When we see everyone else abides by the code of ethics, we feel bound to do so as well, in order to avoid being shamed and marginalized. Absolute gains of abiding by a code of ethics will be shared by all members and this can be manifested, for example, in the creation of an environment where academic freedom is guaranteed for all members. In creating a code of ethics regime for the Palestinian academicians and intellectuals, we are delving into both societal morality in order to give guidance to individuals within that group on issues that are specific to them and at the same time we establishing new rules, principles and procedures of action that take into

⁵⁰ American Association of University Professors, Statement of Professional Ethics, April 1996, verified on 4/08/1998. <http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Rbethics.htm>

⁵¹ Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983). p. 2

⁵² Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983).p. 153

consideration the evolution of the field of academia. The norms, principles, rules and codes of conduct of the regime will be the culmination of the thinking done within the study groups and workshops that will be formulated by a group of representatives of professors, intellectuals, academic institutions' administrators and experts on ethics. The document then needs to be distributed on the different academic institutions where representatives of the professors and the administrators can review it and make recommendations. Once recommendations are taken into consideration, the Palestinian code of ethics document can be adopted. It is essential to adopt such a code in this manner in a society like the Palestinian where both religious and secular sets of codes exist and work side by side. In order to adopt a code of ethics that represents all Palestinians, there is a need for such a long and detailed process.

In addition to attending to the problem of representation, the content of the Palestinian code of ethics must pay careful attention to the following:

- Who are affected by your group and how are they prioritized? Here the needs and the responsibilities towards students, academic institutions, research centers and think tanks, the local and international community and the national cause and aspirations of the Palestinian people need to be balanced and taken into consideration.
- What are your group's main areas of function?⁵³ Teaching, researching, reviewing, and shaping political, economic and social agendas are the major functions of Palestinian academicians and intellectuals. How can a code of ethics serve and prioritize among all these functions?
- What are the unethical conducts that your code is trying to prevent and how does it plan to do so?⁵⁴ Here we need with topics like discrimination, harassment, efficiency, academic freedom, academic tenure, conducting research for private local and international organizations as well as for government sponsored projects, plagiarism...

⁵³ Carter McNamara, Complete Guide to Ethics Management: An Ethics Toolkit for Managers, <http://www.mapnp.org/library/ethics/ethxgde.htm>, accessed October 2004.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

- Types of ethical issues that the members of your group will most likely have to deal with.⁵⁵ In what way can your code reconcile or settle conflicting principles? One big issue here is how we reconcile the requirement of academic freedom and academic tolerance with the relationship with Israeli intellectuals and academic institutions and also dealing with international research centers and NGOs.

Another important structural component for the Palestinian code of ethics to succeed and persist is the creation of an ethics management body to be called “A Palestinian Ethics Management Group for the Academics.” This body can serve as an overarching framework where complaints will be directed. Its members can be representatives of all Palestinian academic institutions and representatives of intellectuals. Of course creating such a body to provide guidance in ethical dilemmas can be very controversial. It can carry out several functions including⁵⁶:

- Carry out ongoing assessment of ethics requirements
- Raise awareness and increase sensitivity to ethical issues
- Develop organizational roles and responsibilities in managing ethics.
- Design mechanisms to resolving emerging ethical problems.
- Conduct training sessions for Palestinian academics, students and intellectuals.

3. Conclusion

This paper aimed at creating a structural framework for a Code of Ethics for the Palestinian Academics and the Intellectuals. As is observed by the author, the code of ethics for any group delves into societal morality as well as what already exists in local and international codes. Therefore, what a code of ethics usually does is to rubberstamp what already exists. In the areas where there is a need for development and revision, the code institutes new principles for dealing with a changing field.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation

There are special characteristics of the Palestinian context that the paper tried to take into account such as issues of national liberation, interaction with Israeli academic institutions and intellectuals as well as issues of conducting research for local and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The author hopes that this framework should be observed so that a comprehensive, active and effective code of ethics can be created.

Appendix 6: Report on Israeli and Palestinian universities

As part of the research into establishing a “Code of Ethics” for Palestinian and Israeli academics, the following report presents extracts from the websites of Israeli and Palestinian universities that make reference to academic responsibility, regional and international cooperation and a commitment to values of peace, justice and multiculturalism. For the most part, references to these principles and commitments are drawn from the mission statements and other introductory statements that stipulate the orientation and objective of the university.

While every university expresses a commitment to the pursuit of academic excellence and to being an integral part of their country's/nation's development and sustainability, expressed adherence to the abovementioned principles (in italics) are quite varied, with some universities touching upon these principles much more than others. In addition, at the end of the report, included are descriptions (with web links) of a few regional programs of partnership and cooperation that are potentially relevant to the development of this project.

1. Palestinian Universities

Arab American University of Jenin

Our Mission

The faculty, staff, administrators, and students of AAUJ are committed to creating a learning environment which encourages all members of the campus community to expand their intellectual, creative, and social horizons.

We challenge one another to realize our potential, to appreciate and contribute to the enrichment of our diverse community, and to develop a desire for lifelong learning.

To facilitate this mission, we promote academic excellence in the teaching and scholarly activities of our faculty, foster interactions and partnerships with our surrounding communities, and provide opportunities for the intellectual, cultural, and artistic enrichment of the region.

Our Goals

To build the character of each student in creative ways by nurturing his/her ability to do research, analyze, think critically, and to encourage the spirit of innovation and leadership.

To emphasize the importance of scientific research in the major fields of study and to benefit from the experience of local, regional, and international intellectual exchange to transmit knowledge and establish modern technology.

To participate in developing local communities and to interact with social, cultural, scientific, and economic environments so that the university becomes a center for broad interaction and development.

Bethlehem University

Bethlehem University is a vibrant academic community with a unique role, promoting inter-religious and cultural understanding, international cooperation, and justice and peace.

Institute for Community Partnership Mission Statement

The Institute for Community Partnership aims to help the Palestinian people through continuing education, and the advancement, dissemination and utilization of knowledge in a professional manner, and the strengthening of local ties with the region and internationally.

Birzeit University

Committed to firm principles of academic freedom, the University aims to prepare the Palestinian young generation to become responsible leaders and citizens. As it encourages its students along the path of academic excellence, it emphasizes the need for social awareness and national commitment.

Mission Statement

Birzeit University strives to promote excellence in higher education by providing quality academic teaching, training, research and relevant community programs within the context of sustainable development, emphasizing social conscience and democratic values in a free civil Palestinian society.

Major Objectives

- Develop and support community-oriented programs aiming at sustainable development in Palestine.
- Provide advanced educational opportunities along with in-depth studies and specialization in the various fields of knowledge.
- Conduct scientific studies and encourage and promote research.
- Work on the development of literature and arts as well as the advancement of sciences.
- Strengthen the links between Arab and international universities and other scientific bodies.
- Promote liberal education in Palestinian society within the context of Arab culture and in keeping with the emerging global society.
- Develop pluralistic ideals, democratic values and team spirit among the student body.

Right to Education Campaign

<http://right2edu.birzeit.edu>

An international campaign run out of Birzeit that documents and highlights the limitations imposed on Palestinian universities and students by the Israeli government and army. In essence, it is a campaign that advocates for the Palestinian right to education by raising awareness around the world about restrictions of mobility and access.

Islamic University of Gaza

From mission statement:

IUG is a member of four associations: International Association of Universities, Community of Mediterranean Universities, Association of Arab Universities and Association of Islamic Universities. IUG has developed several academic links and signed several agreements of academic cooperation with American, European and Arab Universities. It has also conducted several projects in collaboration with local and international organizations and institutions situated in Palestine and abroad.

Al-Najah National University

We work with diligence toward our people's goal of self determination through establishing a sovereign independent state, and toward a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We fervently pray that this dream will soon be realized. We long to see our flag wave grandly over this state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

International Relations:

Al-Najah has cooperative academic relationships with the following: University of Paris-Sud XI, France; Moscow State Institute, Russia Republic; Slovak University of Technology, Slovak Republic; University of Durban-Westville, South Africa; Politecnico Di Torino, Italy; Université Charles-de- Gaulle Lille 3, France; McGill University-Montreal, Canada; Concordia University-Montreal, Canada; University of Barcelona- Spain; University of Madrid-Spain; University of Nottingham-U.K.; University of Manchester- U.K.; University of Lancaster; University of Oslo-Norway; Oslo College-Norway; University of Sienna; Georgia State University; University of Aveiro; University of Trier-Germany; University of Granada-Granada; University of Ghent; Lille University of Science and Technology-France; International Center for Theoretical Physics-Trieste, Italy; Fachhochschule Aacher-Germany; University of Durham-U.K.; Universitat De Valencia-Spain; University of Pavia-Italy; Navarra University- Spain; University of Florence-Italy.

Hebron University

The University mission:

The University strives to promote excellence by providing quality, academic teaching, training, research and relevant community programs within the context of sustainable development, emphasizing social conscience and democratic values in a free civil Palestinian society. In addition to providing students with the opportunity to realize their educational ambitions, the University aims to empower students to be productive citizens and active members of their community. It is the University policy to promote free expression and interaction between students and the community on campus

Since its establishment, Hebron University has given particular importance to strengthening its relations with the local and international communities with the objective of insuring a better high quality education.

Palestine Polytechnic University

PPU has created an environment where graduates have become successful leaders, reformers, service providers, productive professionals, and supportive family members. They continue to carry on the university's mission to build an advanced society that is enriching and respectful of both the individual and the values shared by the society.

Al-Quds University

Institutional Priorities

To build an institutional climate of respect, collegiality, and equality for all members of the university community-students, faculty, administration

To create a learning environment that integrates rigorous inquiry, creativity and imagination, reflective of engagement with society, and a commitment to generating a more humane and just world

To educate men and women for leadership, peace, and democratic values

Community Growth

- To promote a culture of service throughout the university that encourages the development of personal and community responsibility
- To develop national and international cooperative projects for the improvement of socioeconomic conditions
- To develop programs and centers that respond proactively to the needs of the community and promote an environment free of want and injustice
- To strive for effective communication and responsible decision-making at all levels of society
- To serve as a voice of reason, conscience and compassion in the region and world community

The development of a multi-cultural mindset:

Because of Jerusalem's unique constitution as a mosaic cross-road of different nations, cultures and religions, special emphasis is laid on introducing students especially, but the University community as a whole, to the multi-cultured heritage of human civilization. This is achieved in a number of ways, whether through special courses in human civilizations or human rights, international cooperation, joint educational projects involving faculty and students, lectures and events, foreign scholarships and exchanges, etc. The student is thus encouraged to develop a worldly outlook, an appreciation of and tolerance for the other, and a humanist moral code.

2. Israeli Universities

The University of Haifa

The University's dual mission of first-rate higher education and service to the community at large is manifested in part by providing equal educational opportunities to all sectors of the society. Unique immigrant absorption programs also express this dual commitment. The culturally heterogeneous student body adds to the stimulating intellectual atmosphere on campus. Among community projects initiated by the University are several having as their objective the encouragement of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Jewish and Arab populations on and off campus. The latter is an area in which the University of Haifa has been a pioneer and leader in the cause of peace.

Ben-Gurion University

Established 30 years ago to spearhead development of Israel's southern region. It was David Ben-Gurion's belief that "the talents of Jewish science and research" must be marshaled if Israel was to benefit from the Negev, a desert area that comprises more than sixty percent of the country. Today, BGU has become an internationally recognized institution of higher learning that attracts outstanding faculty and researchers from around the world. True to its original mandate, the University actively promotes hi-tech industry, agriculture, health services and education in the region.

BGU is more than a research center – it is the bridge between academia and industry, Israel and the developing world. The University promotes academic research with commercial applications as the key to economic development in the Negev. Through its pioneering research in arid zone communities, BGU has established a basis for cooperation with countries sharing a similar climate, particularly in the Middle East. The University is committed to the fulfillment of David Ben-Gurion's vision and dream – the dream of the entire nation – for progress, prosperity and peace.

Tel Aviv University

The entire university community is aware of our aspirations: academic excellence together with social responsibility.

The growth of Internet sites at Tel Aviv University has been similar to the development of higher education in Tel Aviv: an abundance of local initiatives gradually woven together into an orderly and sophisticated system.

The university Internet site has been formed - not by chance - from a network of sites of different units: faculties, schools, departments, research institutes, programs and projects. Not by chance, because the university management encourages such initiatives in order to enable the spirit of the Internet to blossom and flourish. This is a spirit of openness, freedom, creativity and individualism - values which have guided Tel Aviv University since its inception.

A Role In The Peace Process

Middle Eastern history, strategic studies, and the search for peace are central concerns for Tel Aviv University researchers. The Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, founded by the Peres Center for Peace, the Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African History, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and the Morris E. Curiel Center for International Studies are respected sources of information for government and private institutions, the press and the public. University scholars are putting their expertise to work for the peace process, participating in Israel's delegations to the peace talks, and in joint projects with colleagues from neighboring countries.

Bar Ilan University

The Bar-Ilan Mission

Bar-Ilan University, Israel's largest academic community of students, scientists and staff (32,000 in total), seeks to produce students of moral and intellectual aptitude; students who adopt the highest standards of excellence in scientific and academic research; and students who bear a deep commitment to Jewish community.

Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

The university offers degrees in science and engineering, and related fields such as architecture, medicine, industrial management and education in an intellectually invigorating environment. Great emphasis is also placed on its humanities and social science programs, the incorporation of which take on ever-increasing importance in today's multi-faceted workplace. But Technion's goals go beyond providing a well-rounded technical education. At the institute, scientific instruction is interwoven with professional ethics, producing leaders sensitive to social and environmental issues.

3. Other relevant associations and programs

Communities of Mediterranean Universities

An association dedicated to scientific research and the pursuit of peace

http://www.iqsnet.it/universita/html/cum_ing.html

Association of Arab Universities

Most of the website is in Arabic, and that which is in English does not describe very much about the objectives and mission of this association. Nevertheless, below is the link to their site.

<http://www.aaru.edu.jo/>

UNESCO program for European-Palestinian Cooperation

The initiative to launch a programme of cooperation with the Palestinian universities – which had been subject to constant harassment, restrictions, and complete closures – was taken in August 1991, at an international solidarity conference convened by several European universities, members of the Coimbra Group. At a ceremony held in Jerusalem, on 1 November 1991, when most Palestinian universities were closed by military order, the rectors and presidents of twelve European universities (Barcelona, Coimbra, Granada, Krakow, Leiden, Leuven, Louvain, Namur, Pisa, Salamanca, Sienna, and Viterbo) and their colleagues from six Palestinian universities (Al-Quds, Al-Najah National, Birzeit, Bethlehem, Gaza Islamic, and Hebron), signed an agreement to officially launch the Programme for Palestinian/European Academic Cooperation in Education (PEACE).

<http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/programmes/peace-palestine/>

Appendix 7: Statement on academic freedom adopted by the International Association of Universities (1998)

Academic Freedom, University Autonomy and Social Responsibility

Recalling that at the International Conference convened by UNESCO in 1950, in Nice, the Universities of the World stipulated three indissociable principles for which every university should stand, namely:

the right to pursue knowledge for its own sake and to follow wherever the search for truth may lead;

the tolerance of divergent opinion and freedom from political interference;

the obligation as social institutions to promote, through teaching and research, the principles of freedom and justice, of human dignity and solidarity, and to develop mutually material and moral aid on an international level.

Recognizing that over the ensuing half century much has changed: new forms of higher education have developed; the numbers of universities, of academic staff, of students and not least the place the University now occupies in Society have evolved; the emergence of a world economy, with its benefits and its dangers, brings with it further responsibilities of a highly practical nature alongside the University's historic and abiding commitment to universalism, pluralism and humanism;

Acknowledging that in the course of the 20th Century, which has seen an unparalleled growth in knowledge, in research and in their diffusion, Society has entrusted to the University immense responsibilities in the common endeavour of human development, social, economic, technical and cultural advance, and in responding to major planetary problems such as the preservation of the environment and the eradication of poverty, violence and social exclusion; and that in its turn the University is, and will remain, vital in meeting Society's evident need to accommodate and steer rapid if not radical, change;

Convinced that human development and the continued extension of knowledge depend upon the freedom to examine, to enquire and to question, and that Academic Freedom and University Autonomy are essential to that end; that moreover the University does not exist for itself or even for the sake of knowledge but for the benefits it brings to Humankind and to Society by virtue and in view of its social utility;

Emphasising that neither Academic Freedom which encompasses the freedom to enquire and to teach as well as the freedom of students to learn, nor University Autonomy are privileges but that they are the basic and inalienable conditions which enable the University as an institution of scholarship and learning, as too its individual members to meet, fully to assume and optimally to fulfill the responsibilities Society confides to both;

Considering that Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 13 and 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulate that "higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit", underlining the importance of the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the maintenance of peace, and that States "undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity";

Observing that the fundamental principles on which universities are founded and which form the basis of their work for the common good have been reiterated by the international academic community on several occasions in the recent past (viz. the Declarations of Sienna 1982, Lima 1988, Bologna 1988, Dar Es Salaam 1990, Kampala 1990, Sinaia 1992, Erfurt 1996) and that they are also specifically highlighted in the Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel, adopted at the 29th Session of the UNESCO General Conference 1997;

We consider it timely, at the occasion of the UNESCO World Conference of Higher Education, to **reaffirm** these principles and to **redefine** their implications within the framework of a new **Social Contract** which sets out mutual responsibilities, rights and obligations between University and Society so that they may meet the challenges of the new Millennium:

1. The principle of Institutional Autonomy can be defined as the necessary degree of independence from external interference that the University requires in respect of its internal organisation and governance, the internal distribution of financial resources and the generation of income from non public sources, the recruitment of its staff, the setting of the conditions of study and, finally, the freedom to conduct teaching and research.
2. The principle of Academic Freedom can be defined as the freedom for members of the academic community - that is scholars, teachers and students - to follow their scholarly activities within a framework determined by that community in respect of ethical rules and international standards, and without outside pressure.
3. Rights confer obligations. These obligations are as much incumbent on the individuals and on the University of which they are part, as they are upon the State and Society.
4. Academic Freedom engages the obligation by each individual member of the academic profession to excellence, to innovation, and to advancing the frontiers of knowledge through research and the diffusion of its results through teaching and publication.
5. Academic Freedom also engages the ethical responsibility of the individual and the academic community in the conduct of research, both in determining the priorities of that research and in taking account of the implications which its results may have for Humanity and Nature.
6. For its part, the University has the obligation to uphold and demonstrate to Society that it stands by its collective obligation to quality and ethics, to fairness and tolerance, to the setting

and the upkeep of standards - academic when applied to research and teaching, administrative when applied to due process, to the rendering of accounts to Society, to self-verification, to institutional review and to transparency in the conduct of institutional self-government.

7. For their part, organising powers and stakeholders public or private, stand equally under the obligation to prevent arbitrary interference, to provide and to ensure those conditions necessary, in compliance with internationally recognised standards, for the exercise of Academic Freedom by individual members of the academic profession and for University Autonomy to be exercised by the institution.

8. In particular, the organising powers and stakeholders public or private, and the interests they represent, should recognise that by its very nature the obligation upon the academic profession to advance knowledge is inseparable from the examination, questioning and testing of accepted ideas and of established wisdom. And that the expression of views which follow from scientific insight or scholarly investigation may often be contrary to popular conviction or judged as unacceptable and intolerable.

9. Hence, agencies which exercise responsibility for the advancement of knowledge as too particular interests which provide support for, or stand in a contractual relationship with, the University for the services it may furnish, must recognise that such expressions of scholarly judgment and scientific inquiry shall not place in jeopardy the career or the existence of the individual expressing them nor leave that individual open to pursuit for *délit d'opinion* on account of such views being expressed.

10. If the free range of inquiry, examination and the advance of knowledge are held to be benefits Society derives from the University, the latter must assume the responsibility for the choices and the priorities it sets freely. Society for its part, must recognise its part in providing means appropriate for the achievement of that end. Resources should be commensurate with expectations - especially those which, like fundamental research, demand a long-term commitment if they are to yield their full benefits.

11. The obligation to transmit and to advance knowledge is the basic purpose for which Academic Freedom and University Autonomy are required and recognised. Since knowledge is universal, so too is this obligation. In practice, however, Universities fulfill this obligation primarily in respect of the Societies in which they are located. And it is these communities, cultural, regional, national and local, which establish with the University the terms by which such responsibilities are to be assumed, who is to assume them and by what means and procedures.

12. Responsibilities met within the setting of 'national' society, extend beyond the physical boundaries of that society. Since its earliest days, the University has professed intellectual and spiritual engagement to the principles of 'universalism' and to 'internationalism' whilst Academic Freedom and University Autonomy evolved within the setting of the historic national community. For Universities to serve a world society requires that Academic Freedom and University Autonomy form the bedrock to a new Social Contract - a contract to uphold values common to Humanity and to meet the expectations of a world where frontiers are rapidly

dissolving.

13. In the context of international cooperation, the exercise of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy by some should not lead to intellectual hegemony over others. It should, on the contrary, be a means of strengthening the principles of pluralism, tolerance and academic solidarity between institutions of higher learning and between individual scholars and students.

14. At a time when the ties, obligations and commitments between Society and the University are becoming more complex, more urgent and more direct, it appears desirable to establish a broadly recognised International Charter of mutual rights and obligations governing the relationship between University and Society, including adequate monitoring mechanisms for its application.

(April 1998)

Appendix 8: The quest for reciprocity in an asymmetric conflict (Edy Kaufman)

Problems and prospects of Israeli/Palestinian academics' engagement in peacebuilding

1. Introductory remarks

One often witnesses with dismay the extent to which, within a violent conflict situation, two different people looking at the same objects perceive two drastically different realities. Admittedly, contending points of view are affected both by the individuals' own objective needs and interests but also through the lens of their subjective feelings. And yet, even when both sides profess to adhere to the shared universal values of human rights, democracy and peace, why is there often such a low level of concern for the "Other?" How is it that my side so easily becomes 'right' and the other 'wrong'? In this article, I examine this discrepancy, which I call the "humanity gap," by exploring two terms--antonyms according to the dictionary-- "asymmetry" and "reciprocity."

Asymmetry is inherent in the nature of most violent conflicts. Both realists and liberals, for different reasons, seek to offset this asymmetry in their quest for equilibrium. The realist is calculating costs and sees at least a minimum level of symmetry acting as a deterrent to violence, and the liberal sees symmetry as an equalizer in power dynamics. From these perspectives, symmetry reduces the motivation to fight aggressively for a change in the status quo. In the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Palestinians often stress the unevenness between Occupied/Occupier, and ask for solidarity with the weak. However, some Israelis also emphasize their own weaker position as a small country surrounded by what are perceived as hostile neighbors and in the context of rising anti-Semitism. From both of these perspectives, the 'underdog' argues for the need to counter the asymmetry. Asymmetries can be acknowledged in terms of *power* (military, economic, popular support, resources, political leadership, etc.) and *losses* (death, disabling injuries, homes demolished, futures denied, professional opportunity, etc).

Reciprocity, rather than asymmetry, is frequently the focus of top-dog Israeli liberals;⁵⁷ from their perspective, unconditional solidarity with the opponent is perceived as naïve, self-

⁵⁷ We use the term "liberal" in the Western sense, as different from "radical," implying a strong commitment to fundamental freedoms, participatory democracy, tolerance, and evolutionary change.

hating and even treasonous. Instead, they support strategies that hold both sides of the conflict responsible and accountable for their actions and reactions. However, the conflict parties' ability to act in a reciprocal manner is stalled by their debate on determining blame for the cycle of violence; this focus on cause and effect brings back the issues of the *past* without acknowledging that the intense, constant and widespread suffering of the Palestinians is a *present* reality. Whereas Tel Avivians—in-between the sporadic yet horrendous suicide bombings—can opt to ignore the daily effects of the conflict, Palestinians' restrictive daily conditions force them to face the current conflict's consequences on their individual and collective well-being in the Occupied Territories.

Can we—as Israelis and Palestinians-- find some common ground in recognizing the importance of both 'asymmetry' and 'reciprocity'? If so, the question becomes how to narrow the "humanity" gap—namely, breaking down ethnocentrism and seeing the "Other" as a human being—in a dyadic situation when the asymmetries of power and losses incurred on are so extreme? The central argument of this article is that reciprocity is a promising force for peacebuilding when it is approached with an awareness of existing asymmetries. In particular, efforts that recognize the status of shared victimhood while acknowledging the asymmetric reality may empower members of civil society on both sides to undertake social responsibility in redressing the situation.

Until now, we have witnessed an unfolding of *negative* reciprocity present in the "spiral of violence;" in this case, reciprocity is actually revenge, retaliation, tit-for-tat. In contrast, we propose a paradigm shift to a *positive* reciprocity that could lead to a "spiral of peace." From this perspective, we are interested in the extent to which a focus on *who* is involved and *how* they behave generates a "spiral of action" that directly challenges apathy, indifference and helplessness.

In order to address these questions, I will look briefly at the Israeli and Palestinian sides together, initially at those who have decision-making power, then at public opinion at-large, and finally within the realm of civil society, with a particular focus on the academic community of which I am a member. Although I will refer to both Palestinian and Israeli university faculty in the spirit of cooperative work, my focus is on the latter to provide a self-critical introspection that may open similar avenues for reflection by my colleagues on the other side of the conflict. Rather than dwelling on mega-theories, I will share personal testimony based on my professional

and voluntary experience, both as Executive Director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University of Jerusalem over the last two decades, and as one of the founders, and later Chairperson, of B'tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. As one of the community of concerned academics, I have observed and participated in multiple interactions with our Palestinian counterparts. Providing reflections at the societal and individual level on the Israeli side, and eliciting the comments and opinions of Palestinian colleagues, can shed some new light on our currently dramatic and deteriorating reality. Rather than blaming the Other, I introduce references to the actions of my neighbors for the purpose of analyzing their impact on my people. I have opted to tackle the issue directly and sincerely, without any intention of being offensive.

2. Leadership

In looking into our crisis situation, we know that much of the solution to our conflict relies on the political leadership. But at the current stage, these leaders are more part of the problem than the solution. Their seeming misperception of reality is related to their value systems, and we can infer that they are not truly socialized into the principles of equality and universality. For instance, if we take the concept of “human rights,” it has been difficult for both Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Chairman Yassir Arafat to even articulate the term as lip service. A content analysis of Israeli leadership discourse from 2000 to the present shows that Sharon is not concerned by violations of Palestinian human rights. His only reference to “human rights” was in his speech in Aqaba, Jordan, when meeting with then Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen and U.S. President George W. Bush.⁵⁸ Similarly, Arafat refers to “rights” for the Palestinians, but does not assert the universality of these rights to all human beings, and notably excludes any explicit reference to Jews and Israelis. Each leader also uses language that seemingly condones the assassination of the Other without acknowledging the tragedy of the resulting deaths. Arafat condemns Palestinian suicide bombing as “not instrumental to our liberation goals;” but his characterization of bombers as “martyrs” perpetuates an image of

⁵⁸ For a full analysis of the issue see E. Kaufman and M. Abu Nimer, “Bridging Conflict Resolution and Human Rights: Lessons from the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process” prepared for Jeff Helsings et al (ed.), Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, forthcoming.

heroic status. On the Israeli side, Sharon's government employs the terminology of "accidental deaths" resulting from "surgically targeted clearance and elimination" to justify and sterilize an act of extra-judicial executions.

When, as now, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships reach a stage in the conflict where both sides have lost all trust with each other, it becomes even more urgent and vital for us to ask what we in civil society can do to redress this trend. Related to the loss of trust, asymmetrical power dynamics further erode motivation for negotiation. The Israeli surplus of financial and military power allows the position that it can dictate the terms of peace; similarly, the weakness of Palestinian political, military and economic power leads their leadership to the conclusion that any negotiated settlement with such a strong opponent would result in terms of surrender and not to a just peace. Asymmetrical losses—which include a disproportionate number of civilian casualties for both sides—further expand the distance both sides must cross to come to a mutually agreed upon conclusion to the conflict.

3. Public opinion

At this stage, which is characterized by profound and widespread mistrust and hatred of the Other, daring leadership and political diplomacy may not be enough. In protracted communal conflicts, civil society peacebuilding is an important factor in preparing for a sustained peace. If the people in power are too far ahead--or too far behind--what the public is prepared to accept or fight for, leader-initiated advances will not be sustainable and leader hesitation will be condemned. No example illustrates this more than the tragic assassination of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist, a tragedy paralleled by the threats of Muslim fanatics on the lives of Arab leaders involved in peace negotiations.

Judging from the results of recurrent polls, vast majorities on both sides are willing to compromise on a long-term, two-state solution. At the same time, however, these majorities also feel that even more high-level violence against the Other is justified.⁵⁹ In terms of the "humanity gap" there is a clear dichotomy in the Israeli public's attitude, which accepts "painful

⁵⁹ The longitudinal public opinion polls conducted by Khalil Shikaki and Yaakov Shamir, whose main findings are presented in the Truman Institute website (<http://truman.huji.ac.il>), are showing this gap between a hard line legitimating the use of violence now and a long-term common ground towards territorial compromise.

concessions” in the long-run but holds a hard-line emotional antagonism to the Palestinians at present. As a taxi-driver told us in Jerusalem: “We will beat them and beat them until they stop hating us!”

This silent majority both in Israel and the Palestinian territories is in a confused state of shock from the devastation of the last four years and is willing to follow daring leadership decisions, such as the overall agreement ending the conflict which might have been reached by Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. The leadership challenge is to shift the public mindsets from their current intransigence to envisioning a “day after” scenario in which they support ending terror/state terror and re-negotiating peace. However, as mentioned previously, the present leadership is both unable and unwilling to make this hoped-for transition.

An additional obstacle within Israeli society is that the opponents to the peace process have been acting in concert--although clear differences can be drawn between those who express a clear adherence to the principles of democracy and the rule of law and those who express their total obedience to the "Rule of God" as an unalterable command for their political action. Even among these opponents, however, we also find an overwhelming majority that clearly rejects the use of violence. The problem stems from a minority of fanatic intransigents in Israel, who, given their high degree of militancy, overpower the larger segment of moderate self-centered liberals. Faced with the urgency that accompanies militancy, the liberal constituency has become more *reactive* than *active*. In the absence of a dominant liberal strategy, extremist groups--particularly those strongly motivated by divine inspiration--set the tone of public discourse, which then becomes a social impediment to the peace process. Evidence of the pitfalls of ideological and religious extremism is also seen within Palestinian society. In spite of their differences and total antagonism, both sides' religious racism is united in their rejection of the peace process. Despite their independent goals, the uncoordinated effect of each side's extremism is a political simultaneity that serves to destroy the difficult peacebuilding process. Sadly enough, what was initially a dispute between two national movements fighting for the same piece of land has now assumed the dimensions of an existential confrontation between two fanatic religious extremes that do not leave room for a dignified presence of the Other.

Even more worrisome is the extent to which this extremism is reflected in a high level of hatred among the youth of both sides--both victims and victimizers. Incitement to hatred and violence—oral and written-- can be found in the education of many of our children and

grandchildren. Over the last years, it has become difficult to recognize the societies we grew up in; as a self-fulfilling prophecy, current suffering and gruesome scenes of death reinforce stereotypes of the ‘enemy Other.’ Consequently, these images of the Other seem to prevail in the eyes of the younger generation in both societies, further feeding the cycle.

The competition for recognition as the sole victim of the conflict is deeply embodied in each side. In order to plan alternative peacebuilding strategies, I think that our Arab friends elsewhere, and Palestinians in particular, need to understand the emotional process that the Israeli public has undergone since the collapse of the Oslo peace process, which is widely explained by our side as Arafat’s rejection to Barak’s “generous offer.”⁶⁰

One main explanatory variable for the fear and resentment that accompanies Israeli suffering is the perception of the enemy’s use of *illegitimate means of violence* (suicide bombers), which touches upon the security and self-preservation needs of the population as a whole. The expressions of support for the *legitimate goals of self-determination* of the Palestinian people are relegated to a later stage. However, this stage is delayed by the preceding period’s abominable attacks, which seem to leave us with no choice but to react forcefully; some even blame the Arabs for compelling “our boys” to engage in abnormal behavior. This dynamic impedes the development of a shared victimhood, as both sides compete for who suffers the most and seek to promote their own version of cause and effect.

We are back to the rather old radical debate advocating that the *ends justify the means*. Derailing the debate—from defining the parameters of a just peace as the desired *end* to delineating the limits of legitimate violence as a *means*—has changed the order of priorities for Israelis. In the current period, the majority has put aside their support for the Palestinian right to self-determination in order to focus on what are the legitimate or illegitimate methods of killing for the sake of national liberation. Most Israelis do not equate the devastation of “collateral damage” with that of “suicide bombs,” regardless of the higher overall number of Palestinian civilian casualties. There is wide consensus in the Israeli public that the terrorists are to be blamed for these unintended casualties due to their strategy of taking shelter in populated areas and using Palestinian civilians as “human shields.” As a means of psychological self-defense, most Israelis overcome their guilty feelings brought on by shocking military actions by retreating

⁶⁰ For a powerful analysis of the Jewish Israeli sense of victimhood, see Caplan, Neil, “Victimhood and Identity: Psychological Obstacles to Israeli Reconciliation with the Palestinians,” *Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and Literature*, eds. Kamal Abdel-Malek and David Jacobson, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, pages 63-86.

to the cause and effect framework. This orientation shapes the discourse by examining who started the most recent outbreak of violence rather than by looking at the longest military occupation in modern times as the underlying reason for rebellion. The theory that Israeli “targeted assassinations” triggered suicide bombings in the early stages of the Oslo peace process was not seen as credible by many Israelis, because Hamas’s use of this weapon was geared at stopping the negotiations and not out of revenge.

Devastating acts of violence have profound consequences on our timid attempts for positive reciprocity within and between each of our societies. Palestinians blowing up civilians in Tel Aviv—including a high number of families, children housewives, and senior citizens—terrorizes the Israeli civilian population. There is no universal code of conduct that condones such acts, and fear is now imported from the remote Palestinian territories to the Israeli “home” front, affecting the most basic acts of daily life (e.g., commuting to work, celebrating family holidays, bussing children to school, sitting in cafes, shopping at the mall). The violence also gives weight to the concern that such abominable acts are specifically geared at frightening Jews, and will eventually cause their eviction from *anywhere* in Israel. At the same time, the Israeli public does not internalize that there is a universal code of conduct that bluntly condemns the Israeli soldiers’ treatment of Palestinian civilians (e.g., assassinating alleged terrorists without due process of law, keeping thousands in prison without respecting international standards, accidentally shooting school children in the street as a pattern of “light” trigger, preventing critical medical cases from receiving emergency care). Just as Palestinian acts have the potential of driving out Israelis through terror, Israel’s policies hold the possibility of making life so miserable and untenable that Palestinians will leave “voluntarily,” through outright deportation, or forced transfer.

We have seen that the dynamic of fear and condemnation can change when violent acts are directed at “targets” that are internationally defined as legitimate. The right to use weapons in rebellions against tyranny is widely accepted, even if the targeted soldiers are the sons and daughters, fathers and husbands of all “average” Israeli citizens. As painful as it might be to witness Palestinian armed groups killing Israeli soldiers in Gaza, such acts place the onus of responsibility on the Israeli leadership, and the question becomes, what are we doing there? Why are we sacrificing our young sons and daughters when we all know that eventually there will be a pullout of troops? Suffering the losses of a large number of Israelis in uniform may cause enough

questioning to potentially generate an Israeli anti-war movement. Recognizing that much of the escalation and retaliation of combat on both sides is justified by the conviction that “the only language that ‘they’ understand is force” (as seen in arguments stating that Hezbollah influenced the pull-out from Lebanon or Operation Defensive Shield destroyed the infrastructure of Palestinian terror), such confined attacks may indeed influence the Israeli decision to get out from Gaza.⁶¹

However, even acts of violence directed toward “legitimate” military targets prove to be impediments to positive reciprocity.⁶² While the issue of killing combatants has been perceived by many in Israel as part of the “rules of the game” in fighting wars and prolonged battles, such consensus is now eroded into contempt through events like when Palestinians captured parts of blown-up soldiers’ bodies in Gaza and showed a head when bargaining for the release of Palestinian prisoners.⁶³ Similarly, the fact that Israel keeps the bodies of many dead Palestinian fighters and suicide bombers without returning them to their families for proper burial⁶⁴ is not mitigated by the fact that those who died were militants. Years ago, Israel understood the rules of war as outlined by the Geneva Conventions, and as applied in their combat against Arab armies in defending our borders. However, to a large extent, Israelis have failed to comprehend the implications of international law dealing with repressing a nation rebelling against occupation.

Given the reciprocal impact of our bleeding and causing to bleed, I have no doubt that the best way to reduce the “humanity gap” - and encourage a constructive reaction from Israeli civil society - is for the Palestinians to embark on a *nonviolent* struggle. Even in the wake of Palestinian-generated violence, the importance of respected and credible Palestinian leaders—whether from the political sphere or civil society—endorsing a national nonviolent strategy has been illustrated by the struggle for freedom in Gandhi’s India. Highly visible and credible

⁶¹ “The escalating violence renewed debate in Israel over its continuing presence in Gaza, where 7,500 Jewish settlers live among 1.3 million Palestinians. Israeli commentators said the violence was increasingly reminiscent of Israel’s guerrilla war in Lebanon that ended with a sudden pullout in 2000.” *Israel Searches for Dead Soldiers’ Remains*, *Associated Press*, 13 May 2004.

⁶² For a dissenting viewpoint see <http://www.counterpunch.org/niva01092003.html>

⁶³ “Officials from the terrorist organizations [Hamas and Islamic Jihad] demanded to enter negotiations with Israel to exchange the body parts [of Israeli soldiers] for Palestinian security prisoners incarcerated in Israel. . . . Al-Jazeera showed Islamic Jihad members holding up the head of one of the soldiers.” *Six soldiers killed in Gaza mine blast*, M. Dudkevitch, *Jerusalem Post*, 11 May 2004.

⁶⁴ “Health Ministry sources say keeping the bodies at the facility [Abu Kabir forensic institute in Jaffa] for such a long time breaks all ethical and moral guidelines. They say Israel would not want their dead or missing to be treated in such a way by the enemy.” *Bodies of 21 Palestinians stored at Abu Kabir*, H. Shadmi, *Haaretz*, 14 September 2004.

commitment to such a strategy draws the admiration of the global community.⁶⁵ In our own context, the overall image and reality of the first Intifada as a non-lethal resistance contributed to the reaction of the Israeli public in eventually replacing the Likud-led coalition with a more moderate alternative in 1992.⁶⁶ With nearly no killings of Israelis on the Israeli-side of the Green Line, the Israeli public accepted the Palestinian right of self-determination in their own state side-by-side with Israel. By again choosing the “weapon” of nonviolent sanctions, Palestinians will equalize the power relationship with Israelis, as compared with the insurmountable military gap in terms of armament and training.

However, Palestinian belief in the potential of nonviolence is directly impacted by its real and perceived results. The daring Palestinian nonviolent demonstration in Rafah this last May—resulting in the deaths of tens of Palestinians, mostly children who were part of a youth group participating in the march—momentarily awakened many in Israeli civil society and elsewhere as to the potential of nonviolent struggle as a powerful alternative to all other forms of violence already tried. But the extremely limited expression of Israeli condemnation, especially from the political leadership, but also from mainstream Israeli society, reinforced the message that even nonviolent resistance is met with brutal, lethal force, and, without widespread condemnation, is seemingly powerless. Unless Palestinian nonviolent acts of resistance receive a visible, clear and effective echo from Israeli society, this strategy will not spread and can not be sustainable. Nonviolence relies on triggering a moral vibration founded on a sense of common humanity; if Palestinians do not see that such a response can be inspired, why would they continue to have civilians take such risks against a ostensibly unfeeling opponent? Although I may be proven wrong, I believe sustained experimentation with such legitimate methods and actions needs to be fully explored.

⁶⁵ G. Sharp, *The Politics of Non-Violent Action*. 3 Vols. P. Sargent, Boston. 1973.

⁶⁶ E. Kaufman, "Limited Violence and the Intifada," *Journal of Arab Studies*, (Fall 1990), (Vol. 9, No. 2), pp. 109-121. E. Kaufman, "Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians' 'Limited Violence' in the Intifada." *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Vol. 3, No. 4, (Winter 1992), pp. 1-38.

4. Academics and Intellectuals

There is no question that the peace movement of today is in a deep crisis. The actions within Israel expressing solidarity with the Palestinian plight include only a few committed Jews, mostly from the radical--or “critical”--left, so named in recognition of its critique of so-called peace activities that focused on Israeli security and neglected justice and human rights concerns. The mainstream Israeli peace movement is aging, and has withdrawn from the public eye except in cases of refusal to serve (in different degrees) in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and in the case of more radical elements demonstrating against the building of Israel’s security fence/wall. Yet, looking back until recently, we can see that massive mobilizations for peace have taken place. Expanding beyond the academic realm to the larger context of civil society as a whole, we observe that at certain crucial times in the history of this conflict, both sides witnessed sporadic massive mobilization in support of positive action. The question therefore becomes, what mechanisms worked to make such mobilizations occur, and were these actions influential and formative events? Examples of such mobilizations within Israeli society follow:

- a) *Protests against Sabra and Shatila massacres:* Although perhaps not as high as the rather mythical number of 400,000, a huge number of Israelis demonstrated in 1982 against the massacres of hundreds of Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Subsequent investigations describe the IDF involvement either as indirect—by omission in not preventing the bloodshed perpetuated by the Lebanese Christian militia—or as complicit by instigation. At that time the liberal Israeli public reacted on a massive scale because they viewed the war as a whole was a “war of choice,” not vital to Israel’s existence. The human suffering of unarmed civilians triggered the pressure for a pullout from most of Lebanon, although our military’s presence in Southern Lebanon continued for 18 more years. By 1990, the large number of more than 600 cumulative casualties among our own Israeli soldiers made the anti-war (as opposed to peacebuilding) movement prevail, influencing then Prime Minister Barak to withdraw the troops to the international border.

- b) *First Palestinian Intifada:* We also need to recognize the powerful impact of the first Intifada--which resulted in of the low figure of 79 Israelis killed over three years in contrast

with over 1,000 Palestinian deaths by Israelis and a similar number killed in intra-factional rivalry--on Israeli society. In the period from 1987 to 1991, we witnessed a mushrooming of human rights organizations in Israel and an active solidarity movement that included a wide political spectrum of Israeli academics, intellectuals, artists and professionals. Without the benefit of a recognized national government, Palestinian community-based organizations in the West Bank and Gaza focused on providing much-needed social welfare services, developing self-sufficiency economic strategies, and supporting transparent and accountable negotiators who truly represented their people.

- c) *Public peace rallies connected with Prime Minister Rabin's assassination:* Because in 1994 Prime Minister Rabin was tragically and ironically assassinated when attending a massive peace demonstration, the Israeli public commemorated his death in the years following with large rallies calling for continued support for a negotiated peace. Initially, his tragic death generated some new public impetus for implementing the Oslo peace process. In the longer run, however, support dwindled for a negotiated, staged solution due to the stalemate in its implementation and the recurrent suicide bombings within Israel.

- d) *Israeli demonstrations calling for pull-out from Gaza:* The most recent experience of massive mobilization has been the May 15, 2004 demonstration at Rabin Square, where 150,000 people called for Israel's pull-out from Gaza and for the leaderships to "start talking." However, this momentum has proven unsustainable, and lately, the weekly Saturday night Peace Now demonstrations outside Prime Minister Sharon's Jerusalem residence draw only around 50 people.

In order to lead to effective change, these sporadic forms of collective action require sustained and active involvement by epistemic communities who share an understanding of current realities. The urgency of the situation calls for awareness on the part of academics and intellectuals regarding their potential peacebuilding role within civil society. However, for the most part, academics on both sides identify strongly with their own nations and do not appreciate the distinctive role they could play in peacebuilding.

Academics and intellectuals are influential actors within civil society and often are expected to apply their wisdom and raise their voices at times of major political crisis. Although no one can deny the responsibility of some of these groups and individuals in generating extreme nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobic feelings among the masses, they also can serve as a major vehicle for advancing democratic values within the context of a vibrant civil society. Common concerns have led more than a few of my Palestinian and Israeli colleagues to become part of an embryonic epistemic community, one which is likely to continue working together in spite of the adverse circumstances facing our goal of strengthening human rights and democracy for both peoples. Academics of both societies overwhelmingly adhere to these principles as necessary conditions for functioning societies and for upholding their professional freedom. Despite these common values, however, those of us working together across the divide have in the past, and even more at present, been the exception to the rule.

This lack of interest in academic cooperation from both sides may reflect some serious malaise, whose causes might be found in similar past and present protracted communal conflicts. In the section that follows, I first look back at how our cross-border ties were forged initially, and then analyze the obstacles for their further development.

5. Brief historic reflection

In retrospect, only in the aftermath of the June 1967 War was the opportunity of face-to-face acquaintance presented to both Israelis and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Prior to that, the 1948 war had generated a rigid frontier between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries. Although most cross-border relations were asymmetrical and characterized by the power relations of occupier/occupied or employer/employee, after the 1967 Six Day War a few daring and curious Palestinian academics were ready to cautiously meet with their Jewish peers. Despite these sincere efforts, the larger picture was dominated by political activism undertaken by the ultra-nationalist and messianic proponents of the Greater Israel, calling for settling all the “liberated” parts of the Promised Land. The “peace camp,” including activist academics, offered a weak response.⁶⁷ While the zealots concentrated on promoting exclusive Jewish rights, the

⁶⁷ "The Intifada and the Peace Camp in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Vol. XVII, 4, Summer 1988), pp. 66-80.

“doves” based their arguments in pragmatic, moral and legal terms. What was needed most from the peace camp, however, was demonstrating that peaceful coexistence with our Palestinian neighbors was a real possibility and could lead to full peace and reconciliation. Academics’ ability to cooperate openly with the former “enemy” could be the proof of such a possibility.

It was not until 1982 that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally endorsed Palestinian contacts with Israelis. In practice, official dialogue with Israelis was only permitted four years later, in 1986, when the seventeenth session of the Palestinian National Conference (PNC) legitimized such activity. Historical realities also served to push Palestinians to conduct dialogue with their Israeli counterparts. The 1982 expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, the Palestinian sense of abandonment by other Arab armies, and the subsequent intra-PLO conflict in Tripoli, all drove home to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories their sobering isolation. The impetus to take their destiny into their own hands, by directly confronting camps of Israeli moderates, certainly existed, although for some this strategy was adopted more out of fear of annihilation than a desire for joint work. Such a sentiment was catalyzed by the first Intifada (1987-1991), which itself forced the Palestinian existence into the consciousness of the Israeli public.

However, by the time of the outbreak of the Intifada, the winds of Israeli politics had shifted to a staunch rightist position with a Likud-led coalition government, which included the Labor party and was piloted by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. This Likud/Labor coalition government promptly outlawed communication with the PLO, labeling it a "terrorist organization." Given that Palestinians in the Diaspora as well as in the occupied West Bank and Gaza maintained a rigid allegiance to the PLO as its "sole representative of the Palestinian people," dialogue on an official level was all but frozen.

Yet by this time it was no longer possible for either side to pretend that the other did not exist. The first Intifada was a time of rich academic dialogue, which empowered our Palestinian counterparts to tell the Israeli public "with stones and with words" about the need for the occupation to end. Academic cooperation was a natural expression of both sides’ implicit desire to acknowledge each other’s existence in the hope that it would end the vicious cycle of violence, fear, repression and insecurity. This interdependence became most clear after the 1991 Gulf War and the beginning of the Oslo process.

The real breakdown of these tenuous academic relationships came with the current Al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000. The precipitation of the breakdown came not only due to the growing restrictions placed on Palestinian colleagues' freedom of movement, but also because of the fatigue of their liberal Israeli counterparts—and most of the peace movement. Increasingly, we are experiencing the sensation that our joint and separate uphill struggles are not leading to results, and that, in fact, we might be losing ground; it might be too late to swim against the current. Exhaustion and discouragement on the part of our peace activists diminishes our overall capacity to stem the tide of ever-increasing bloodshed and suffering on both sides.

6. Obstacles to academic empowerment for peace

The impediments to developing supportive relations as a basis for working together across the divide are visible both at the macro- and micro- level. The lack of a clear definition of 'academic freedom' in terms of Israeli institutional responsibility during times of violent conflict makes official cooperation between universities across the divide even more difficult. On the Palestinian side, the original call for an academic boycott preceded Israel's imposition of intense restrictions on the freedom and mobility of Palestinian faculty and students during the current Intifada. The Palestinian Higher Education Council adopted a majority decision not to "normalize" relations with Israeli universities, although there are notable exceptions to this rule and research ties can still be conducted through NGOs or by including a third-party. Throughout these difficult decades, however, Israeli and Palestinian academics have never actually engaged in dialogue about whether to cooperate or not.

Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinian Ministry of Education joined the short-lived Ministry for Nongovernmental Organizations and reaffirmed the decision to bar academics from participating in joint educational institutional activities with Israeli colleagues.⁶⁸ The Ministry and most university administrations explained that this renewed policy expresses their condemnation of the lack of concrete support from Israeli academic institutions for the educational rights of Palestinians. Until it perceives an adequate response from the Israeli

⁶⁸ An exception was made for organizations that stood up in solidarity with the Palestinian agenda, but as is the case in most places worldwide, the principle of institutional neutrality towards domestic or foreign issues, has been the norm for Israeli universities.

academic community, the Palestinian Authority will uphold this policy. Indeed, there has been little response from the Israeli academic leadership that directly addresses the realities of their Palestinian colleagues. This apathy towards their colleagues' repression is made possible by their unquestioned acceptance of the Israeli establishment's security arguments. And yet, Palestinian university presidents have not appealed to their Israeli counterparts or to the Faculty Senates to adopt a position concerning flagrant violations to Palestinian academic freedom, such as the military closure of university campuses. The lack of Palestinian initiative has enabled the Israeli side to ignore such burning problems.

Unfortunately, the Palestinian boycott and Israeli violations of academic freedom have prevented the full development of potentially beneficial relationships between Israeli and Palestinian academics. Moreover, this separation further shelters Israeli academics from directly witnessing the reality of the occupation's effects on Palestinian academic freedom. Additionally, the boycott has adversely impacted Palestinian universities' access to valuable resources. For example, some NGOs circumvent the boycott by contracting with individual Palestinian academics to work jointly with Israeli universities, which diverts the flow of resources and individuals to these NGOs instead of to enriching Palestinian university infrastructure.

Examining these policies only describes structural impediments to joint cooperation. It does not tell us the rationale for upholding such positions, the psychological states of members in each community, or whether there is genuine effort on behalf of some academics to support peacefully negotiated solutions. Although "liberal" academics are more likely to actively participate in joint efforts, and are over-represented among such groups, in the last decade only a tiny minority has been involved in cooperative projects across the divide⁶⁹ or has maintained sustained personal relations with each other.⁷⁰ While the merits of those committed members should not be forgotten, the fact is that the majority of academics on both sides have rejected, neglected or simply not been interested in developing such ties. This trend became even more acute with the outbreak of the second Intifada.

⁶⁹ See findings of the study conducted by Paul Scham, "Arab-Israeli Research Cooperation, 1995-1999", MERIA Journal, September 2000 (Vol.4, No.2).

⁷⁰ M. Hassassian and E. Kaufman, "Problems and Prospect for Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation" (unpublished study). All in all, the dimensions of Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation should not be exaggerated. A rough estimate of the approximately 7,000 fall term Israeli academics (total 9,000 over the course of the academic year) and the 2,000 Palestinian counterparts, speculates that no more than 200 academics on the Israeli side and about 100 on the Palestinian side are involved in what we shall call peace building initiatives. In terms of percentages, that calculates to 2% Israeli participation, and 5% Palestinian.

Despite the potential contribution to peace by the “usual suspects” within the Israeli academic community, the vast majority of my colleagues are characterized by a lack of motivation to engage in cooperative relationships across the divide with our Palestinian counterparts. In the spirit of self-reflection, I will try to explain to myself and to the reader the reasons for this lack of involvement, the reduction in the level of activism, and the even further desertion that has occurred since the use of high levels of violence by both sides during the current Intifada period.

Many Israeli academics and Middle East experts were closely associated with the Israeli army, intelligence and security community, and therefore Palestinians "may have seen cooperation with them as inconsistent with the privacy of the interaction."⁷¹ Furthermore, former chief of Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence--and later dovish professor--Yehoshafat Harkabi indicted most Israeli intellectuals for their complacency and preference for remaining inconspicuous, rather than for acting as a counterforce to Israeli hard line politicians in order to convince their publics that there is room for a just compromise. Harkabi believed that the Israeli intellectual moderates showed an inability to produce a clear and cohesive message concerning the question of peace with the Arabs. One reason for the intellectuals' failure may be the fact that these moderates did not start from an analysis of Arab positions. Ignorance of these positions led to their inability to counter the popular Likud argument that Arab interests are such that no peace is feasible. Their dovish-ness was mostly derived unilaterally, and had little or nothing to do with Arab positions. In contrast, Israeli academics' views appear to be derived from their inability to consider collaborative discussions productive, a precondition for negotiating with an opponent who also has his or her own basic needs and fears. Consequently, nothing seems to press "moderate" Israeli academics to participate in or initiate joint dialogue.

On the side of Palestinian academics, there has always been a tacit understanding to present a unified front when confronting Israel. This stems from the reality that Palestinians are the disproportionately weaker party. Natural divisions in Palestinian positions are therefore formally overlooked when facing a common enemy, out of a simple fear that their opponent may take advantage of their lack of unity. Expressions of peer disapproval and even intimidation have kept many Palestinian academics "towing the party line," even though individually they may

⁷¹ E. Kaufman, "Israeli-Palestinian Co-authoring: A New Development Towards Peace?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Vol. XXII, 88, No 4, Summer 1993), pp. 32-44.

have been tempted to consider alternative positions more moderate and pragmatic than the group view.

Palestinian academics also find themselves in a curious bind due to the political situation. In order not to overlook or forget that Palestinians are victims of a historic and continued injustice, the Palestinian academic condemns the *status quo* for his people and demands justice. Here justice takes primacy over any contrived desire for peace because it is exactly this lack of justice that is seen as the cause of Palestinian suffering. Peace offers the cessation of violence. However, justice offers the Palestinians not only the possibility for the cessation of violence, but also a sense of acknowledgment that such violence was inflicted unjustly. Justice assuages the pain of military defeat. Peace alone implies a relinquishing of the justice of their cause, and an admission of their military defeat. This rationale is why many Palestinian academics are unable to accept peace without justice, despite the very real benefits promised by the peace process.

The past drive for interaction contrasts sharply with the currently reduced level of intellectual exchange. Such exchanges are made nearly impossible due to physical obstacles such as the Israeli checkpoints and travel permit requirements that limit Palestinian freedom of movement, as well as the psychological obstacles stemming from the anger and frustration of both sides. Those interactions that still occur often take place in foreign countries, such as the workshop organized by the Center for Contemporary Cultural Center in Barcelona (CCCB), which has been the basis of this book.

But not all obstacles are principle-based. Often realism means prioritizing one's selfish concerns for personal professional advancement. "Publish or perish" is much more the accepted norm in competitive Israeli universities than is contribution to the community, not to mention the community of the Other. Especially before tenure, Israeli academics must consider the implications of political action on their career, both in terms of promotion, and in getting positions of responsibility within the university hierarchy. Even projects based on the principles of academic freedom have been hampered by concerns about the resulting image and reality of working with the "enemy." Both institutions and peers may look critically upon activism. Let me illustrate with a couple of personal experiences.

Twice I felt at risk of being expelled from Hebrew University. The first time was in 1988, at the early stages of the first Intifada, when Mubarak Awad, the most prominent Palestinian nonviolent activist, was arrested by the Yitzhak Shamir regime and imprisoned pending

deportation. Awad started his hunger strike in Migrash Harusim/Moskobia, a prison in the center of West Jerusalem, and I declared mine in front of it, in the parking lot facing the prison's wall. Our hunger strikes called for his release and right of residence in Jerusalem—his birthplace—and lasted four and a half days until the Supreme Court agreed to a stay-of-execution order and dealt with the complaint. Ultimately, the Court upheld the deportation decision and the government expelled Mubarak. Later, a sensationalist journalist was working on a story, characterizing the Truman Institute as a “PLO Center.” The journalist sought evidence from the administration to indicate that I was on the university payroll but protesting vis-à-vis my hunger strike instead of performing my duties. Without considering any broader implication, I had earlier requested a “leave of absence” and continued my teaching at Mount Scopus during the short hunger strike. Therefore, the accusations were baseless, and the charges ignored.

This was a close escape, but the following incidents were even more difficult. Around the same Intifada days, Palestinian colleagues felt the urge to communicate their appeal for an end to occupation to the Israeli public at-large and the international community. We at the Truman Institute started monthly Palestinian/Israeli workshops on relevant topics. On one particular occasion our friends suggested conducting a session on the “nonviolent aspects of the Intifada,” and we agreed scrupulously in advance of the session on all details of the workshop. The wide dissemination of personalized invitations brought a massive turnout, making the Faculty Club conference room too small to accommodate all those who came. Instead of restricting the attendance, I made arrangements to use the large auditorium at our own Truman Institute building. As the speakers were being introduced, one of the Palestinian panelists privately asked me to remove the Israeli flags from the podium, given that we had not agree on displaying any national flags. While thinking about how to proceed, the flash of a photographer triggered my decision not to jeopardize the wellbeing of our Palestinian friends with a widespread exposure of their presence at Hebrew University in unfavorable quarters. I tried to remove the four gigantic flags all at once, and they fell to the ground. A couple of academics in the audience shouted “Why are you removing our flag?” and “The flag is not a rug!” I used the microphone to explain to the audience the situation and said that we needed to respect the ground rules, that we had not made prior agreements on the display of flags, and that we needed to respect their wish even if I cherish our flag. Although my explanations were well-received by the majority of the audience, I could sense trouble pending.

The trouble emerged in the form of critical newspaper headlines, accusations by the Likud-controlled Student Union, explanations required by the Standing Committee of the University, requests for a public apology, and parliamentary questions at the Knesset to the Ministry of Education about the university's policy regarding the display of the Israeli flag. This and more culminated, without my knowledge, in a delegation of distinguished professors asking the university president for my resignation. Luckily for me, a no less distinguished group of professors also went to the president to explain the context of my decision and the importance of the work conducted at the Truman Institute. The late president advised me that my opponents were watching closely and that I needed to be careful, but that he wanted to protect me.

A few months later, when the Institute invited Palestinian moderate Hanna Siniora to speak, the result was student union protests as well as threats of “blowing up Truman”—apparently by an extreme non-student group—which were circulated to journalists' boxes at the Government Press Office. The university initially suggested canceling the event. However, our insistence on not allowing intimidation to block academic freedom persuaded the administration to allow the event, provided that we submit ourselves to the instructions of campus security. With armed guards at the top of the adjacent building and barriers checking the identity of all invitees, Hanna was smuggled through the backdoor; eventually we were able to conduct his lecture peacefully in front of a full house. And yet, for not a few at the university, my own image as a troublemaker and that of the Truman Institute as a liability was growing, to our personal and institutional detriment.

Action carries consequences. Relatively speaking, however, Palestinian actions against injustice often result in more severe penalties. The comparatively higher level of academic freedom in our Israeli society should result in Israeli academics assuming more individual and collective responsibility and associated risks. For Israeli universities, ideological radicalism that eschews action is more convenient than the activities of moderate activists. “Walking the talk” is less comfortable than holding a leftist perspective on the situation. For example, a radical colleague told me that he does not need to work with Palestinians because he already knows that “they are right.” Intellectual understanding is fairly meaningless if it does not translate into a commitment to redress wrong-doing. Personally, I have tried as much as possible to remain within the mainstream; I performed my reserve duties in Lebanon and the Syrian enclave and am dedicated to the Jews in Arab countries. But a Jew fasting for an Arab was too much for many

around me to take. My Judaism, instructs us to love our neighbor as ourselves; if I am not for myself, who else will be?

7. Knowledge and act-knowledgment:

Among the key concepts for explaining the failure of Israeli academia to fulfill its social responsibility is its failure at transforming *knowledge* about the situation into *acknowledgment*. Perhaps better put, it represents a failure to *act* on knowledge. We need to transform an internalized perception of injustice into an external, effective behavior. Many Jewish Israeli academics and intellectuals are fully aware of the asymmetric situation between us and Palestinians. In the nineteenth century it was a mostly immigrant Jewish population facing an indigenous Arab population. However, we established our own independence more than half a century ago and our neighbors are still without a Palestinian state. The asymmetry is reflected in the occupiers' heavy control over the lives of the occupied; the high socio-economic gap; our ability to express dissent in a vibrant democracy while our peers across the Green Line face strong elements of autocracy, disorganization, ostracism and intimidation; in the discrepancy between corporate globalization and the lack of technology. As Jews, we can try to ignore the absence of peace by building walls and fences, but the Palestinians are still left with the centrality of the conflict in daily life. Even coming to Barcelona to discuss our mutual social responsibility was almost a "mission impossible" for many of our Palestinian colleagues. West Bank residents cannot receive permits for using the Tel Aviv airport, and their harassment and delay at the Jordan border led the preparations to near collapse.

Hence, the challenge for the Israeli side is to find ways to translate our *knowledge* of what has and continues to happen to the Palestinians as a result of occupation into *acknowledgment*. We must ask ourselves, as academics espousing universal values of equality, what are our duties? What do we demand for our neighbors that we already claim for ourselves?

A denial occurs by creating separate standards on either side of the Green Line and by considering the situation in the Occupied Territories as a temporary evil to be resolved, within the framework of a peace treaty, with the end of occupation. When analyzing this denial,

Stanley Cohen uses the metaphor of having two types of legal systems.⁷² One is a positive system, the result of a consensual agreement to delegate legitimate authority as part of the social contract. This “consensus model” liberal approach is contradicted by the “coercive model,” inspired by the Marxist ideology among others, in which the state is the instrument of the ruling class or elites, and is designed mostly to have the few oppress the masses. Many Israeli academics tend to view the first model as the prevailing system within the Green Line and the second system as the temporary, military regime ruling over the Occupied Territories. By surgically separating these two systems from each other, this dual model fails to understand the results of war and occupation on Israeli society.⁷³ The effect of keeping a nation next door under control without rights is having a steady impact on the deterioration of democratic standards in Israel.

How does denial of the rights of the Other evolve? The early justification for the presence of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza was based on the widespread perception that the 1967 Six-Day War was a legitimate act of self-defense. Consequently, Israeli society accepted the set-up of a dual system in which within Israel there is “rule of law” and in the Occupied Territories “rule by law.”⁷⁴ While in Israel we are allowed to do whatever is not restricted by law, in the Territories Palestinians are not permitted to enjoy freedom unless it is explicitly regulated. When comparing issues of denial and inaction between contemporary Israeli academics and white South African academics under Apartheid, Cohen further stresses the difference between the overall feeling of injustice in South Africa and the departmentalization that has allowed the Israeli consensus to focus on the prevalence of democracy within the Green Line of Israel’s pre-1967 borders. These days, actions resulting in widespread human rights violations cannot but generate cognitive dissonance among liberal Jews. “Emergency” regulations applied to the Territories, codified by the British Mandate as temporary, have been constantly used, making them the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, this view of Israeli democracy ignores the expansionist policies that support settlement growth, a trend which leads logically to the

⁷² S. Cohen, “The Human Rights Movement in Israel and South Africa; Some Paradoxical Comparisons,” Lecture in Memory of Professor Michael Wade, *Occasional Papers* No. 1, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute of the Advancement of Peace.

⁷³ E. Kaufman “The Effect of War and Occupation on the Israeli Society”, in E. Kaufman, S. Abed and R. Rothstein (eds.), *Democracy, Peace and the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1993).

⁷⁴ S. Cohen, “The Human Rights Movement in Israel and South Africa; Some Paradoxical Comparisons,” Lecture in Memory of Professor Michael Wade, *Occasional Papers* No. 1, The Harry S. Truman Research Institute of the Advancement of Peace, p. 4.

permanent occupation of a great part of the Territories. After many years of ‘rule by law’ and the resulting clear cases of gross violations such as structural violence, targeted assassinations, house demolitions, detention without trial, massive humiliation and collective punishment, it is no longer easy to justify such acts as “lawful sanctions.” Yet the question still remains: what paralyzes so many of us, preventing action to redress such crimes?

Facing ourselves in the mirror should reveal the contradiction between avoiding a public posture and our inner voice of alarm. However, our lives go on without our sleep being affected. We all pretend to get used to the banality of evil. Within this context, the issue of asymmetry and reciprocity stands out as needing attention.

Let me end this section by sharing feelings that have erupted in my own peace-focused Institute and within myself. During the early stages of the Al-Aqsa Intifada we were watching on the televised news the daily escalations between Palestinian Tanzim snipers firing towards the Jerusalem settlement of Gilo and the IDF’s return gunfire and tank shelling of the West Bank town of Beit Jala. In a closed-door meeting with Truman Institute researchers and staff I encouraged all to make an extraordinary effort to continue our joint projects with Palestinians and suggested that we find ways for expressing gestures of sympathy and friendship. I gave the example of my own family, which has four friends and their families living in Beit Jala. Knowing that they must be undergoing a horrible ordeal, we prepared four large bags with chocolate and candy for the children and our little granddaughter added a drawing with a peace message. The silence that ensued, which implied that soul-searching was underway, was interrupted by one of the most reasonable and moderate researchers, who asked: “And why did you not bring chocolates to the Jews of Gilo?” I was taken aback and for a few seconds left speechless. I managed to articulate that we have relatives in Gilo, and call them from time to time. But internally I continued asking myself for an answer. I finally came up with what I consider to be at the core of true reciprocity, and told them: If my own neighborhood, the German Colony, is going to be under attack, I would expect my Palestinian friends and colleagues to care for me too!

Since then there have been several attempted and a few actual suicide bombings that exploded in the bus stops and coffee shops of my neighborhood. The reactions of my Palestinian colleagues were few to start and diminishing in returns. When the bombing of Café Hillel spread death and a burning stench throughout our quarter, the countless ambulance sirens and TV

breaking news stories kept my wife and I awake until dawn. I was praying and hoping for some sign of positive reciprocity; disappointingly, no expressions of concern came from my Palestinian colleagues. Three days later, I was among the Israeli faculty who were planning to demonstrate at the Abu Dis campus of Al Quds University against the unscrupulous building of the security wall. I recalled that memories of my previous visit to the campus four years earlier were punctuated by the large green banners of Hamas. I agonized whether I could bear the enthusiastic support for the suicide bomber while we were still grieving our dead. I decided not to go. But following the week-long mourning period—the Shiva—following the Café Hillel tragedy, I saw myself again actively protesting the inhumane and degrading treatment of my neighbors across the Green Line: going south to join the courageous “Checkpoint Watch” women stationed near Hebron and the next day driving north, to the checkpoint at the entrance to Nablus, with B’tselem staff in their white armored jeep.

Our lives in the Holy land are full of dilemmas, leading me to often wonder what is right and wrong, human or superhuman. In the realm of the possible, what can we do?

8. Concluding thoughts and ideas for action

Looking back, we recognize that it is easier to be for peace when our views are shared by our leadership and publics at-large. However, given the current political leadership's lack of reciprocity in its treatment of victims and self-condemnation of violence, civil society has an important duty in seeking, exposing and acting upon common values. In the oft repeated words of Dr. David Suzuki: “If the people will lead, the leaders will follow.”

On the issue of conditionality, should we demand and expect a response from the other side as a pre-condition for doing what is in fact needed in the situation? Or should we act without conditions, independent of the actions and reactions of the other side? If we insist on pre-conditions, who should act first, the stronger or the weaker? Most who have the strength to act independently either attribute the overwhelming responsibility for the current situation to their own society, as with Israelis who see the current situation as the result of a unilaterally imposed occupation that must be unilaterally withdrawn, or are driven by a set of values that dictates redressing unacceptable behavior regardless of the actions of others—such as public opposition by Palestinians of suicide attacks. From the perspective of the weaker side in an asymmetric

relationship, many Palestinians believe their suffering should be recognized unconditionally by the powerful. Indeed, a few among us have shown solidarity with the Other without any expectations of mutuality. Like falling madly in love, it is exceptionally possible to act unilaterally, sustaining oneself on the dream of growing into a reciprocal relationship. I am indeed full of admiration for the uncommon few who are willing to give care without receiving some encouragement in return.

However, the majority in both populations require some sort of reciprocity from the other side, especially if they are to adopt actions that are unpopular in their respective communities. Given human nature, it is nearly impossible to maintain a one-sided relationship in the long run. Even seemingly eternal flames of love usually devolve into resentment, fatigue or disinterest if there is no response from the beloved.

One promising approach to reciprocity is through demonstrating genuine concern for the grief of the Other. This willingness attain a shared victimhood status does not necessarily require erasing the asymmetry of the relationship or the nature of suffering.⁷⁵ Recognizing the humanity of my adversary does not belittle my own extreme conditions, but may open up avenues for identification with and understanding of my suffering. However, under such circumstances, do we have the moral right to be recognized as victims while we are also victimizers? Can we ask and expect concrete forms, or at least symbolic gestures, that acknowledge my suffering? Perhaps a starting point could be the shared assertions that neither sides hands are clean, and that our common enemy is not the Israeli or Palestinian people but injustice and violence.

The feedback effect of reciprocal *positive* action is mutually encouraging, and both sides are able and inclined to participate in narrowing the humanity gap. However, if one side embarks on actions of good will and there is no corresponding resonance from the other side, such deficient feedback can likewise reduce willingness for future risk-taking. One example of a missed opportunity to encourage peacebuilding through reciprocity is the published statement signed by a group of 70 prominent Palestinian politicians and intellectuals, calling on their people not to retaliate with violence after the Israeli targeted assassination of Hamas leader

⁷⁵ For a powerful analysis of the Jewish Israeli sense of self as a victim,, see, Neil Caplan, "Victimhood and Identity: Psychological Obstacles to Israeli Reconciliation with the Palestinians," *Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and Literature*, eds. Kamal Abdel-Malek and David Jacobson, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, pages 63-86.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, no visible response of encouragement came from the Israeli side.

The current reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that there are fewer and fewer “usual suspects” working across the divide. Reaching out and encouraging others to join cooperative efforts is needed more than ever, especially within the academic community. One strategy to enlarge the ranks of partnering academics is in negotiating the conditions of reciprocity. The role of academics and researchers in providing accurate information and evaluation from multiple perspectives is crucial. This is not the time for concentrating only on publications that will sit on our shelves. Now is the time to address, inform and challenge--with all our tools and skills--the general public, through the media, on-campus presentations, and public events.

It may not be credible for academics and intellectuals to call for such powerful joint efforts and mutual understanding without establishing the norms that can actually guide their own partnership relationship. Over the years, there have been many dialogues between both sides, and one can recognize these as a necessary stage in peacebuilding, albeit not sufficient without moves toward concrete actions. Unlike other professions, such as medicine, there is no clear Code of Ethics for professionals within the social sciences, the humanities and the arts that determine members’ roles and responsibilities in a conflict situation. Such a code might emphasize cooperation across the divide predicated on the common principles of human rights, democracy and peace. These principles would prevail over feelings that deny the legitimacy of the Other. Working towards a wide consensus on such a Code of Ethics can be a concrete contribution to laying the foundation for a peacebuilding partnership. This model can also stimulate sectorial-based Israeli and Palestinian cooperation within other professional groups (e.g., social workers, unions, teachers, women organizations, lawyers).

Whereas the Code of Ethics can articulate shared values as a common denominator, we need to translate these philosophical standards realistically so as to overcome existing psychological and physical barriers to cooperative work. Concrete examples of such obstacles are the Israeli authority’s repeated closures of Palestinian universities, innumerable hurdles preventing students from attending classes, curtailment of the freedom to participate in

⁷⁶ To my deepest regret this courageous Palestinian attempt at de-escalation was not met with any significant public answer by Israelis. Often attempts to involve a diverse group of academics to protest the killing of even innocent civilians are fruitless.

professional overseas conferences. Another barrier, however, is the inability (or unwillingness) of Palestinian university authorities to restrain expressions of anti-Jewish racism and incitement to violence against civilians through such incidents such as the burning of a mock bus.

Over the years, it has been my experience that individual responsibility follows a process of personal growth, which moves us from knowledge of the injustice into “act-knowledgement.” My transition was triggered by my disbelief that my own government, let alone my highly respected Supreme Court, would actually sanction the expulsion of Mubarak Awad, mentioned previously as the most renowned Palestinian advocate of non-violence during the first Intifada period. The deportation made even more acute my own sense of personal responsibility when taking into account that Mubarak, a born Jerusalemite, was exiled from his home, and I, an immigrant who came to Israel as a young Zionist with hopes of coexistence, remained.

In defining a course of action that accommodates the needs and aspirations of both sides to the conflict, it is useful to appreciate and find a balance between not only those who promote morality arguments to “do what is right because it is the right thing to do” but also those who prefer to look into peacebuilding as a matter of long-term, enlightened self-interest. This balance is not easily achieved and often the actions advocated by the two perspectives contradict each other. Even for those who seek to balance between personal benefit and benefiting the communities at-large, a strategic outlook is necessary before acting. The reality of peacebuilding is that resolving conflicts often requires the payment of a price (especially in the short run and often disproportionately distributed) to correct historical injustices. Most individuals are willing to go only so far in voluntarily taking on personal suffering, and this individual limit may not be far enough to adequately reach a settlement based on universal principles and the rule of law. This dynamic partially explains the mainstream Israeli peace camp’s apparent withdrawal of support for negotiations in favor of “the military option.” Until now, the peace camp has focused on peace for the sake of Israeli security (self-interest) instead of peace based on addressing human rights for all (morality focus). We can illustrate this point with expressions of moderate Israelis calling for separation because of the “demographic bomb” (forecasting that maintaining the territorial status quo may inexorably lead towards the Palestinians becoming a majority). Using human rights language replaces the focus on “giving up” territories with the emphasis on recognizing Palestinian entitlements as humans. In human rights terms, the disengagement from Gaza is proper, not only because it is religiously not significant to the Jewish nation, but also

because of our adherence to the principle of self-determination, for all nations, and our desire not to enslave others given our own historical experience.

When the second Intifada began with an onslaught of suicide attacks in 2001, the majority within the peace camp maintained its ultimate goal of Israeli security and abandoned the strategy of peace negotiations, viewing it simply as an ineffective vehicle for obtaining that goal. However, Israelis who maintained a call for human rights for all, despite the Palestinian resort to armed resistance, understood better the source of violence. Consequently, this group was not surprised that the structural violence of occupation fueled armed resistance. They held that only a just solution to the conflict would lead to a solution for both and not a peace imposed by the stronger side. In fact, the majority on both sides lost faith that mutual security could be achieved through a negotiated settlement. During the Oslo period, the slow pace of implementation, neglect of the refugee concerns, and continued land seizure and settlement expansion similarly persuaded many Palestinians that force was the only mechanism for achieving their aspirations. However, as with the Israelis, some Palestinians recognize the reciprocal needs of national security, acknowledgement of suffering, and recognition of losses. Neither retaliatory nor preemptive violence can address these basic needs on either side. This mutual respect for each other's fundamental requirements holds the potential for providing a common foundation for joint action and authentic partnership across the divide.

As human beings we have many identities: some are ascribed at birth (ethnicity, age, gender); others, we build ourselves (religion, location, citizenship).⁷⁷ In a protracted conflict situation we are raised to stress the identity that separates us from the enemy. When shooting and mourning, there is no time to ask each other questions; we are seen as either Arab or Jew, friend or foe. Even at abnormal times, we should build on our shared, borderless identity as adherents to democracy, peace and human rights. Most important for both of our academic communities is to understand each others' motives and needs and then to move quickly from understanding to acting accordingly. Comprising an influential part of our respective civil societies, we academics are responsible for becoming a knowledge-based community with a shared understanding of reality and what needs to be done. At the moment, regrettably, the search for such commonalities is a low priority among most of our peers on both sides. The time for change has arrived.

⁷⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, New York, Verso, 2nd edition, 1991).

Appendix 9: The Anti-Normalization Discourse in the Context of Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding (Walid Salem)

1. Introduction

In the Palestinian context, “normalization” (*tatbie’a* in Arabic) has been defined as “the process of building open and reciprocal relations with Israel in all fields, including the political economic, social, cultural, and educational, legal, and security fields.”⁷⁸ Not all Palestinians have the same stance toward normalization, however, and differ even in their willingness to use the word. Some Palestinians say the word *tatbie’a* must not be used because it refers to conducting normal relations with Israel, a current impossibility. Others refuse to use the word because it has bad connotations in the colloquial language, referring to animals.**

The process of normalization is considered to be positive from the point of view of the “normalizers,” because, in their view, it represents the beginning of a process to transform the relationship with Israel from an abnormal one into a normal one that will allow Israel to integrate into the Arab region instead of continuing to look westward and seeking to be part of Europe. Its opponents argue that normalization is a process that Arab countries can have with countries that have not attacked and occupied Arab lands. Israel, however, was built at the expense of the Palestinian people, most of whom were evacuated from their homeland in 1948 by Jewish military groups. Therefore, the opponents ask, how can it be possible to normalize with Israel while it builds its existence at the expense of others, who live either as refugees scattered around the world, under Israeli occupation in West Bank and Gaza Strip, or as unequal citizens within Israel?

For the purpose of this paper, anti-normalization positions will be defined as those positions which do not accept the Other, either as an individual, a group, or a nation. The search for anti-normalization positions will be conducted in both societies, and conclusions regarding

¹Walid Salem “Ishkaliat Muwajahat Attatbie’a Kan’an Magazine, volume 56, September 1994, p 15-20. A Palestinian anti-normalization academic defined normalization to be the process of building an “ordinary (or looking to be ordinary) relationship between two sides who have different powers, in a way that the weaker will be acting on the service of the stronger.” The writer differentiates between “natural” and “ordinary,” stating that the “unnatural” might become ordinary, but it will never become “natural.” The author also turns to the cultural heritage of Great Syria, to show that normalization is a form of domestication, meaning that “the newly emerging behavior will become acceptable by the lord, or the side in power” (Abdel-Sattar Qasim: *Tatbie’a Al-Akadimiyyien*, 2 pages, no date).

what can be done will include suggestions for the two peoples across the divide. However, the paper will begin with an attempt to analyze the different anti-normalization positions within the Arab world in general and within Palestine in particular, to be followed briefly by the issue of normalization within the civil society arena. The paper will then discuss the contradictions within the anti-normalization positions and the social and cultural problems they express, and will end with a discussion of anti-normalization in Israel and the peace movement's strategy regarding this issue.

This paper shows how the anti-normalization discourse sometimes overlaps with, and sometime contradicts the peacebuilding process, especially since an anti-normalization stance does not always mean a rejection of all relations. On the contrary, an anti-normalization position might reject normalcy now, but accept it after the achievement of peace, or it might reject normalcy but accept negotiations (on the official level), or dialogue (on the popular level). The main aim of this paper is to unravel some of this complexity, and to develop some recommendations for the peace movements regarding how to deal with the anti-normalization discourse.

2. Arab anti-normalization positions

The anti-normalization positions in the Arab World fall into four main categories: Islam, Arab Marxism, Arab nationalism, and a mix of different ideological groups who all agree on the importance of resisting so-called "cultural normalization."

The roots of the Islamic anti-normalization position comes from their belief that Palestine is an Islamic waqf (endowment), and that Jews have no rights at all in it. Consequently, Israel's existence is not legitimate, and therefore it is not possible to recognize it.⁷⁹ The stance of Palestinian Islamists is more moderate than this. From the beginning of 1994, the Hamas position was to accept coexistence with Israel without recognition, and without normal relations.⁸⁰

The Marxist position on normalization is inherited from their anti-imperialist stance; therefore, they speak against normalizing with Israel as a part of their anti-normalization towards

⁷⁹ For this position, see for instance: Ghassan Hamdan, Attatbe'a: Istratigiet Al-IKhtiraq Assahioni, Al-Aman publishing house, Beirut, 1989.

⁸⁰ See: Abdel Nasser Asha'er: Amaliyat Alsallam-Alfelestiniyyah-Al-esraeliyyah. Center of Palestine Research Studies, Nablus March 1999

Imperialism. This Marxist anti-normalization propaganda was strong in the Arab World during the 1970s and 1980s, when they practiced their anti-normalization positions through anti-normalization committees such as the Committee for the Defense of the Arab National Culture in Egypt.⁸¹ With the collapse of most of the Arab Marxist groups, the Marxist anti-normalization trend has continued in groups of intellectuals who reject normalization within the broader framework of rejecting both social and cultural consumerism. One such intellectual, for example, wrote that “Amina Rashid (an Egyptian anti-normalization Marxist) is defending Palestine because she is defending Egypt. She reads the cultural independence in the curriculum through the way that foreign languages are taught..... The aim of foreign language education is not to read Rousseau Voltaire, Sartre, and Aragon, but the fulfillment of the need of foreign trade agencies, this is for the simple reason that the dominant cultural policy is dictated and initiated by the Market, and not by an authority that unites practically between the language and the daily needs.”⁸² The Marxists’ argument begins with the premise that consumerism is the product of the market economy; this consumerism finds its way into school curricula and all aspects of a citizen’s daily life. To continue with this line of thinking, the Marxists add that consumerism is a product of imperialism, just as Israel is a product of imperialism, and therefore the struggle against consumerism is at the same time against both Israel and imperialism.

The third anti-normalization position is that of the Arab nationalists, whose position towards Israel has passed through two stages. In the first stage, which lasted until the 1970s, the Arab nationalists considered Israel (which they called ‘the Zionist entity’) to be a threat to Arab national unity, because it geographically separated the Arab East from the Arab West. In the 1970s the Arab nationalists divided into two groups differing in their stance towards normalization. The official Arab position was expressed in a readiness to participate in negotiations with Israel through an international peace conference in Geneva as early as 1973. A second position, held by Arab nationalist intellectuals, rejected negotiations with Israel, even if they did not lead to recognizing--and establishing a normal relationship with--Israel. Arab nationalists viewed Palestine as Arab land, part of the Arab nation, and therefore they saw

⁸¹ Look the references to see their publications

⁸² Faisal Darraj, “Lajnet Addifa’a An Al-thaqafah Al-Qawmiyyah Fi-Maraya Mahdoudah”, Al-Hadaf volume 1181, 13/3/1994, p.34-35

normalization as a process giving undue rights to Israel.⁸³ Arab nationalists also considered normalization to be an act forgiving Israel for its crimes; a process that beautified the face of Israel while severely damaging Palestinian rights and national memory. From their point of view, normalization permits spying and collaboration, gives Israel legitimacy in the Arab world, and abolishes the Arab right to self defense against Israel.⁸⁴

It must be noted that even those Arab nationalists who have taken part in official negotiations with Israel, such as the Syrian regime, differentiate between *negotiating* with Israel and *normalizing* with Israel. When the Syrian regime accepted negotiations with Israel after the beginning of Madrid process, they wanted to maintain only minimal, official relations with Israel with the occasional meeting. Syria wanted to preserve the Arab identity of the region, feeling threatened by the concept of “neighboring nations,” as called by Dr. Hamed Khalil, living parallel to each other rather than united together. This Arab nationalist perspective—that of minimal relations with Israel—is supported by the UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Palestine and the Israeli-Arab conflict, which, despite Israel’s desire, do not call for normalization between Israel and the Arab countries.

The last trend consists of a mixture of groups that all call for the rejection of cultural normalization. Those working against cultural normalization include different religious, national, and Marxist orientations, some of whom believe that fighting against political and economic normalization is not likely to succeed. Therefore, they believe, it is better to concentrate on preserving the last and most important “garrison”: Arabic culture. In demonstrating the threat to Arab culture, some of these intellectuals examine the use of concepts such as “realism,” “international changes,” and “flexibility in a way that supports normalization.”⁸⁵ One of these intellectuals wrote even that “What determines the nature of cultural normalization is its function on settling Israel in the area, and making the Arab mentality accept its existence as a natural phenomenon.”⁸⁶ Another writer went even further, saying that “European Protestant Christianity adopted the concept of the land of Israel and God’s chosen people, and Catholics were obliged in

⁸³ For instance, Jamal Abdel Nasser, previous President of Egypt, described the 1917 Balfour Declaration to be, “A promise given from those who did not possess, to those who did not deserve.”

⁸⁴ Look for Instance: Dr. Hamed Khalil (The Dean of Arts in Damascus University), “Thaqafat Al-Muwajahah wa-thaqafat Attatbie’a”, Al-Hadaf, volume 1196, 24/7*1996,p.32-35

⁸⁵ Hamade Khalil, Ibid.

⁸⁶ Muhamad Jamal Baroot, “Atatbie’a Athaqafi wa Al-Isti’amar Addakhili”, Al-Hadaf, volume 1176 20/1/1994, p.34-35

the mid-20th century to declare that Jews are innocent from the blood of Jesus Christ and to recognize Israel. Now it is the turn of the Arabs and the Eastern Churches.”⁸⁷

3. Palestinian anti-normalization positions

Relatively different from the Islamists in the Arab world, the Palestinian Hamas is willing to accept the existence of Israel following the full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem. The Islamic Jihad has also held this position since the beginning of 2004. Furthermore, Hamas is not completely against any dialogue with Israelis. In fact, some Hamas members (who later split from the group), along with people who are close to Hamas (from the Muslim brotherhood), participated in religious dialogues with Israelis. These individuals include Sheikh Jamil Hamami from the West Bank and Sheikh Imad Falougi from Gaza Strip.

Palestinian radical Marxists (mainly the PFLP) are only willing to consider normalization with the Jewish anti-Zionist groups inside Israel. During the 1970s the PFLP built relations with the Israeli Trotskyist organization Matzpen, and later on developed minimal ties with the Israeli Communist Party. Other Palestinian Marxists (The Palestinian Communist Party, The Palestinian Democratic Union [FIDA], and the DFLP) were more flexible than the PFLP, and accepted normalization not only with the Israeli Communist Party, but also with Israeli peace groups who believed in a two-state solution and who supported the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

The Arab nationalists in Palestine, who represent a minority of Ba’athists, the PFLP General Command, and individual Arab nationalists, have rejected all kinds of normalization with Israel including its political, social, economic, and cultural forms. In 1994 this group formulated the so-called “Committee Against Normalization” in cooperation with some people from the PFLP. This committee tried to confront all aspects of normalization; however, its contradictory agendas led to its collapse less than six months after its formation. These contradictions were not unique to the Palestinian group, it should be noted. Rather, the problems they faced were shared by all the anti-normalization groups in the Arab World⁸⁸ (see later).

⁸⁷ Usama Al-Hindi “Hal Yumkin Al-Fasl Bayn Attaswiyah Wattatbie’a?” Al-Hadaf volume 1187, 8/5/1994, p. 20-21

⁸⁸ See the story of this committee on: Walid Salem “Ishkaliat Muwajahat Attatbie’a?” Kan’an Magazine, volume 56. September 1994, p15-20

Palestine, unlike Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Morocco, did not have a strong group confronting cultural normalization. These latter four countries have always been centers for Arab culture; thus, anti-cultural normalization was strong there. Palestine does not have as rich a cultural history, and therefore its contribution to the anti-cultural normalization was modest, represented by a few individual writers and intellectuals. However, the writings of some Palestinian supporters of cultural normalization were easily used by anti-normalization groups to give credence to their own position. There are hundreds of examples where Palestinian normalizers overstated their point, and were therefore easily attacked by their opponents. For instance, Ali Al-Challis, former editor-in-chief of Al-Ajar newspaper, wrote in 1991 that, “the Palestinian journalist needs a revolution in the terminology. I become hesitant to use the terms of revolution, justice, and rights, and prefer to use expressions such as: reciprocal relationships, joint interests, and memorandums of understanding.”⁸⁹ Al-Khalili certainly does not have to surrender justice and rights for the sake of understanding and joint interests. On the contrary, joint interests and understanding must be built on justice and equal rights for all parties concerned. Regardless of what Al-Khalili said, it is worth noting that Palestinians have taken a relatively more flexible position vis-à-vis normalization with Israel. This may be attributed to the fact that the Palestinians, unlike most Arabs, deal with Israelis on a daily basis, albeit on different levels and by different means.

These four Arab trends have an impact on Palestine, but an important fifth position, that of the Palestinian nationalists, plays a unique role. Although the Palestinian nationalists—led by the main PLO faction of Fatah—are not necessarily against Arab nationalism, they maintain that the liberation of Palestine is primarily a Palestinian responsibility, and that Arab countries should support the Palestinians in their struggle by providing geographical and humanitarian depth. Fatah worked to promote Palestinian interests, which sometimes coincided—and sometimes conflicted—with the interests of the Arab countries. Working for the Palestinian interest led Fatah to work with Israeli groups whenever Fatah felt it would further their goals. Therefore, as a pragmatic movement, Fatah began a normalization process with Israel (both on the official and popular levels), mainly through its upper and middle rank leaders. Fatah’s process towards normalization developed in three stages: The process began during the 1970s via meetings with the Israeli Communist Party, then developed in the 1980s through ‘contacts’ and meetings with

⁸⁹ Alhayat Newspaper, 25/9/1991

the Israeli peace movement, and then peaked with negotiations and the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles.⁹⁰

Although Fatah leaders and middle rank cadres participated in this normalization process, this position was not uniformly shared within the Fatah ranks. Immediately after the Oslo Accords were signed, Fatah members participated in joint projects and dialogue with the youth groups of both the Labor and the Likud party. These projects even continued, albeit at a reduced level, after the failure of the President Clinton-sponsored Camp David talks between Barak and Arafat. All contact collapsed, however, following the siege of Arafat's compound, when, according to one of Fatah Youth member, "we asked our colleagues in the Labor Party to show support for our President; [but] they abstained and this was a complete shock for us, one that led us to stop the contacts with them."⁹¹

After this collapse, some Fatah members have re-evaluated their stance toward Israeli partnerships. Although some middle rank cadres of Fatah are active in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative and the Geneva initiative, members in the lower ranks see the process of developing contacts with Israelis not as one of normalization with Israel, but rather as a process to examine Israeli positions on key issues. This, they say, is important in order to develop Palestinian responses should there be a return to negotiations. These younger Fatah members also provide an alternate interpretation of the past. First, they note that the dialogue was one between 'enemies,' and therefore was not normalization. Second, negotiation by itself is not a normalization process, and will only lead to normalization if an agreement is reached by both sides. Regardless of how one chooses to define 'normalization,' Fatah members are not currently ready to continue their previous joint projects with the Labor and the Likud youth. In addition, a minority within the Fatah leadership views normalization through joint projects as harmful to Palestinian interests, although they approve of negotiations with Israel. In their view, engaging in joint activity prior to arriving at a political agreement might create the false impression that the situation is normal, which might lead to reduced international pressure on Israel for the sake of the Palestinian rights. Palestinians emphasize that this anti-normalization stance is not meant as a personal affront to those in the Israeli peace movement, but that if Palestinians continue to meet with the Israeli peace movement, it might be seen as if the situation

⁹⁰ You can find details of Fatah position on contacts with the Israeli in: Abu Mazen. Lematha hadhehe Al-It - tessallat

⁹¹ Meeting on Hussein Ashiekh office (one of Fatah leaders). 15/7/2003

is satisfactory and there is no need to rush a peace agreement. Of course, many Israelis disagree with this perspective, and their stance will be dealt with in the coming sections. It should be noted, however, that even this new position does not support severing the relationship with those Israeli Solidarity groups who honestly and sincerely join the Palestinians in what they together view as a shared struggle for justice and human rights.*.

4. The political context

The change in the positions of Fatah and other Palestinian peace movements reflected a change in the political environment. During the Oslo period (1993-2000), relations between Israeli and Palestinian activists were considered ‘ordinary’ by the peace groups in both societies. However, when the Camp David negotiations between Arafat and Barak collapsed, the relationship between the activists also collapsed; the Palestinian boycott returned, and both sides held the other responsible for the breakdown. The situation deteriorated into a new Intifada, and the National and Islamic leadership released an anti-normalization statement calling for January 28, 2001 to be a day “To call for resistance of normalization, the activation of activities in this direction, and the support to the popular conference against normalization held in Ramallah, and calling for holding similar conferences in other Governorates.” In addition, February 2nd was allocated for Arabic and Islamic activities against normalization.⁹²

Because relations between peace groups were ‘ordinary’ until the shift in the political situation, one can presume that if the situation changes for the better--on the political level and on the ground--it will likely be possible to return to normal relations between the peace activists from both sides. In this event, the Israeli and Palestinian peace movements can re-commence the process of developing relations between the two peoples.

* Thanks to Mary Schweitzer for this comment

⁹² Markaz Al-Ma'aloumat Al-Watani, <http://www.pnic.gov.ps/Arabic>

5. The impact on civil society

Palestinian civil society has operated, for the most part, on a parallel track to the official politicians. That is to say, that as Palestinian official political positions developed, civil society initiatives developed in similar manner: making contacts with Israelis, engaging in dialogue between enemies, conducting track II negotiations, and normalizing through joint projects. During the 1970s, fragile new civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip adopted the PLO position regarding contact with the other side, while old civil society organizations (mainly the charitable societies, professional organizations and youth clubs) continued to consider themselves non-political. Consequently, these more established groups did not participate in any contact activities or dialogues until the latter part of the 1980s, whereas PLO civil society supporters were involved in these dialogues from the beginning, participating actively in track II initiatives, both before and during the Oslo negotiations.

However, when one examines these groups more closely, one finds that in the 1970s and 1980s Palestinian civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were mostly appendices to Palestinian political parties, and therefore adopted the positions of their parties regarding relations with Israeli society. Put differently, during these two decades Palestinian civil society organizations followed the four main positions towards normalization: Islamic, Marxist, Arab national, and Palestinian national. It is worth noting here that the Marxist leftist position was the stronger in West Bank and Gaza in this period because Fatah was not yet concentrating on building grassroots support, whereas the left (mainly the Communists and DFLP) was. As a result, most civil society contact during that period was with Israeli communists, either through participation in voluntary work camps held in Nazareth, Lod, Kabul and other Palestinian cities inside Israel, or through joint youth activities. Some other minor contacts were made with Israeli Zionist peace movements in the same period. These activities paralleled the political meetings conducted between Israeli and Palestinian leftist political parties at that time.

Two other groups played important--and relatively independent--roles in the development of Israeli-Palestinian contacts during this period. The first group, Palestinian Christians, developed contacts with Israelis in order to convince them of the possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict. The second group, consisting of some Palestinian academics, confronted the official positions of their academic institutions, defied the boycott, and went on to participate

in early track II activities. These discussions, which started in the mid-1970s, developed formulas for a solution to the problem and presented these formulas to the Palestinian leadership for approval.⁹³

With the advent of the 1990s, two contradictory developments took place in regard to the question of normalization in the civil society arena: one was the rise of the first Palestinian - Israeli political formula to legitimize normalization at both the political and the civil society levels. This formula can be discovered in the content of Oslo Declaration of Principles, which includes numerous articles encouraging civil society cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian organizations in all sectors.⁹⁴ Most important for civil society cooperation were Appendix number 3, which established a protocol for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic and development programs (including programs on water, electricity, energy, investment, transportation, trade, industry, social services, human resources development, and the environment), and Appendix number 4, which laid out a protocol for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional development in the field of economic development, housing, and infrastructure.

While this first development was intended to keep civil society organizations under the patronage of Palestinian politicians, the second development—increased professionalism in the work of civil society organizations—led to their greater independence. Moreover, during this period civil society organizations began to better understand their role in establishing new policies and priorities, and worked to influence decision-makers. Thus, instead of being appendices to the political parties, Palestinian civil society organizations began to work with their Israeli counterparts on developing professional solutions to issues like the environment, energy, water, and electricity, and presented their proposed solutions to the political leadership.

Thus developed a new trend in Palestinian-Israeli normalization: one built not on political orientations, but rather upon professional ones. The actors involved in this shift included civil society organizations such as professional organizations, academics and journalists. The international donor community played a major role in this new approach, providing energy and financial support. As a result, there is some debate regarding whether the agenda of these

⁹³ See the results of these academic contacts in *Al-Shira'a Magazine*, volumes of 1980 to 1986

⁹⁴ These articles include: Article 9 (joint review of the military), Article 10 (joint liaison committee), Article 11 (joint economic committee), Article 12 (cooperation with Egypt and Jordan), and Article 16 (cooperation on regional programs).

professional groups was imposed from the outside, but that question lies outside the scope of this paper. A second criticism of this track arose out of fear that it might reach conclusions contradictory to political stances. Nevertheless, this professional approach provides alternative scenarios for the resolution of permanent status issues, for the inclusion of human rights and justice issues in the peace process, and for the joint use of water and energy resources.

6. Who are the Palestinian normalizers and with whom?

When asking who are the Palestinian normalizers, it is important to consider who are their counterparts on the Israeli side. The Islamists of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, have political and faith-based connections with members of the Islamic movement in Israel who hold Israeli citizenship. The same is true regarding the PFLP, who still do not meet with the Zionists, but instead are ‘normalizing’ with Israeli anti-Zionist groups. These two kinds of relations, although they occur across the divide, do not represent normalization between the two peoples because they are built on ideological basis and therefore bring together brothers (in case of the Islamists) and comrades (in case of the Marxists).

The previous point raises a significant characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: that every Palestinian group has its Israeli counterpart, and both together work against other groups which are also found in both societies. Therefore, the question is not who is in favor of normalization, and who is against normalization, but rather, who is normalizing with whom, and who are they working against? For example, the peace movements in both societies are normalizing together, and are working together against both Israeli and Palestinian extremist groups. It is very important to consider this dynamic in order to understand who are the allies and who are their opponents in order to counter the feeling of some Israeli Peaceniks who ask, “I am a peace activist, why they are boycotting me and refusing to coordinate with me?”

7. The contradictions of anti-normalization positions

Based on the above analysis, anti-normalization needs to be re-defined as the position which refuses any kind of normalization with Israeli Zionists--who represent the mainstream in Israel—whether for tactical reasons (until the end of the occupation and the signing of a peace

agreement) or for strategic reasons (such as the minority fanatic belief that the conflict with Israel is a religious or existential one). Based on the previous analysis, it seems clear that if Israel ends the occupation of those Palestinian territories which were occupied in 1967, most Palestinians will establish normal relations with Israel and the other minority will accept co-existence with Israel.

Several other questions and contradictions have been raised regarding the Palestinian and Arab positions vis-à-vis normalization. These questions include:

- Is the peace process a form of normalization? And if so, is it possible to prevent the peace process from succeeding, or is it enough to demonstrate disagreement with it?
- Is it possible to work against all the aspects of normalization? Or should the focus be working against the cultural normalization since the struggle against political and economic normalization cannot succeed?
- Is it possible to separate between negotiations, a peace settlement, and normalization? Or do the meanings of these terms overlap?
- Is it possible to include the supporters of the Madrid process, and the Syrian-Israeli negotiations in the anti-normalization groups?
- Is it possible to work with Israeli anti-Zionists--along with Israeli peace groups--against normalization with Israel on the official level?⁹⁵

In the 1990s, these questions led to a collapse, or at least a marginalization, of the anti-normalization groups in the Arab world. This process was aided by the social contradictions also present within the anti-normalization camp, such as the fact that most of the normalizers were supporters of the undemocratic Arab regimes, and therefore the opposition groups positioned themselves against these normalizers as a part of their stance against the Arab regimes. Another contradiction is the crisis of the intellectuals—both normalizers and anti-normalizers--in their relationship with the people. Those who support the Arab regimes are confronted by people who are against the regimes, those who have western orientations are confronted by peasants and the Bedouin, those professionals who do not fulfill their social responsibilities create a gap between themselves and needy people.

These same contradictions also face Palestinian academics and intellectuals to an extent. However, the Palestinian intellectuals who supported the peace process were not just agents of the Palestinian Authority, but also included independent academics who were deeply involved in the process of developing alternative scenarios for a peaceful solution. These professionals—Israeli as well as Palestinian--were paid well for the work they did, but they failed to influence

⁹⁵ Walid Salem, *Ibid*

their respective decision-makers and public opinions. This lack of impact may reflect a deficit in social responsibility.

An additional dynamic that deserves mention here is the issue of Arab (and Palestinian) culture. Arabic culture was not defined clearly by the anti-normalization groups, although some of them based their conceptions on his/her Islamic, Marxist or nationalist orientations, thereby trying to impose their own ideologies on the definition of Arabic culture. Thus, one must keep in mind that the anti-normalization positions are just as culturally diverse as are the normalization positions. Furthermore, recognizing the right to be different might solve these social contradictions, and in the process increase the openness of Arab culture to universal values as well as to other cultures.

8. The Israeli positions on normalization

When discussing normalization, Israel is often represented as the side looking for peace and open relations with all the Arab countries, while anti-normalization is portrayed as an Arab-only position. This is simply untrue, as there is also deep opposition to normalization on the Israeli side. Outside of the current Israeli official positions, which are primary reasons for the failure to achieve peace with the Palestinians as well as with the Syrians, there are several Israeli anti-normalization positions that should be analyzed in greater depth.

The first position is related to the question of whether Israel considers itself part of the Middle East or part of the Western world. If Israel continues to see itself as a part of the Western world, it will fail to build normal relations with the Arabs of the Middle East. Ironically, this stance mirrors that of Arabs who refuse to integrate Israel into the region.

A second contradiction in Israel's position regarding normalization is that its government seeks normalization with the Arabs more as a means for joining the United States in its domination of the area than as a tool for integrating into the region. It is clear that this form of 'normalization' will not lead to Arab equality with Israel; rather, it would simply further the strategic relations between Israel and the U.S., and lead to the fruition of plans, like those of Shimon Peres, that combine cheap Arab labor with Israeli technology in order "to develop the Middle East to a Paradise."⁹⁶ However, Arab states have not only failed to integrate Israel into

⁹⁶ Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East*, New York: Holt, 1993.

the area, they have also failed to develop a formula for partnership (including economic partnership) with Israel, as an alternative to Israeli-U.S. dominance.

A third contradiction noted by some Arab anti-normalization groups is that Israel wants the Arab countries to establish stronger relations with Israel than those existing between the Arab states. Several writers have commented that the normal relations Arabs have with most countries do not result, for example, in those countries asking for changes in Arab educational curricula or to interference in media policy. Therefore, these authors have concluded that Israel is looking for extra-normal and not simply normal relations with the Arab countries.⁹⁷ Another case in point is the Israeli calls to be invited to Arab summit meetings.* Of course it is the responsibility of Arabs to stop incitement against the Jews in the schools and media, just as it is Israel's responsibility to do the same regarding the messages its media and curricula send against the Arabs.

The fourth contradiction consists of Israel asking the Arabs to do things that Israel itself will not commit to. The primary example here is the issue of disarmament, including nuclear weapons. For instance, Israel wants a Palestinian state free of heavy arms while the State of Israel would maintain the right to possess all kinds of weapons. Israel calls for an Arab world free from weapons of mass destruction, although Israel itself is not prepared to get rid of such weapons. These kinds of contradictions only serve to make it very difficult for the Arabs to deal normally with Israel.

In addition to these general contradictions, other specific contradictions arise from the positions the Israeli settlers and right-wing political groups. The settlers consider the Palestinians to be strangers living in the land of Israel. As one of settler leader told his Dutch visitors in July 2003: "they [the Palestinians] are strangers, inhabitants in Israel but not citizens, therefore they have no rights of the citizens and they must choose either to live as Israel wants and under the Israeli rules, or to leave the country."⁹⁸ Just last month the settlers in Hebron distributed a leaflet calling upon the Palestinians in Hebron to leave the country.⁹⁹ Israeli rightwing parties range from those that call for the exchange of inhabitants with Arab countries

⁹⁷ Look for instance on "Al-Al-Muwajahah", the magazine of the Committee to Defend the Arab National Culture, Volume 11, Cairo, June 1983, and another book published by the same committee: *Thaqafat Al-Muqawamah, wamuwajahat Assahioni'eh*, Cairo. 1990

* Thanks to Ilan Halevi for this comment

⁹⁸ The head of Alon Shavot Settlement Council Interview 16/7/2003

⁹⁹ Al-Quds newspaper, March 2004, and also see B'Tselem reports in the same period.

(Moledet Party), to those who recognize the Palestinian as inhabitants but not as citizens of this land (Likud and other rightwing organizations).

Recognition of the Palestinian people remains a big problem even for those working for Israeli-Palestinian normalization. The post-Oslo Israeli governments, for example, still consider the Palestinian living in the West Bank and Gaza as “residents in areas that are under dispute” (previously considered Jordanian citizens in the West Bank and as persons with un-known citizenship in Gaza). For Jerusalemites, the situation is even worse: Palestinians are still considered by Israel to be “Jordanian citizens residing in Israeli land.” If one does not recognize the citizenship of the other, how can one normalize? When one introduces the issue of the Palestinian refugees, the issue becomes even worse, as Israel continues to officially deny its responsibility in the matter, let alone recognize their right to return.

The Israeli peace movements have their own contradictions. Four problems will be mentioned in this regard. First is the problem that the Israeli peace camp is more effective when working with the Palestinians than they are when they are trying to change Israeli public opinion by convincing them that the Palestinian want peace.* This helps to create the impression that everything is alright between Israel and the Palestinians, especially when the focus is on joint projects done through “political tourism” outside (or business inside), rather than on specific projects that confront the Palestinians’ miserable situation and show solidarity on the ground. This kind of ‘political tourism’ activity only helps to normalize the abnormal.

The second problem arose mainly after the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000, when some of the Israeli peace camp joined the campaign blaming the Palestinians for that failure because they refused Barak's so-called “generous offer.” Later on, when the Intifada erupted, there was relative silence and lack of solidarity on the part of the Israeli Peace Camp, with the voices calling for the end of occupation softening. While part of the Israeli peace camp chose to increase their solidarity with the Palestinians, they failed to develop their constituency within Israeli society. Similarly, Israeli intellectuals and Academia in general, have failed to show their social responsibility by acting on the values, such as the rights of the ‘Other,’ that they teach.

The fourth problem lies with the Israeli civil society organizations, who either chose not to deal with the headache of developing relations with the Palestinians, or who chose to develop business ties rather than engage in political work with their Palestinian counterparts. This

* Thanks to Paul Scham for this comment

includes those organizations and individuals who support peace initiatives but do not take action on the ground to increase the support for these initiatives. All of these contradictions, present across the sectors of Israeli society, encourage the anti-normalization process since these contradictions suggest that a majority of Israelis do not want normal relations with the Palestinians, and in fact, are looking for *separation*—not cooperation--in order to get rid of the Palestinians. This tendency is reflected in the Israeli people's majority support for Sharon's unilateral separation plans.

Finally, it should be noted that the position of the Israeli people, like that of the Palestinians, is influenced by the political context. Therefore, one can see that during the Oslo period (1992-2000), Israeli people were more inclined to cooperate economically with the Palestinians economically, as well as to have friendly social relations with them. The collapse of Camp David in 2000 and the outbreak of the Intifada created a reaction on both societies. Although approximately 70% of Palestinians and Israelis continue to believe in a two-state solution, the same percentage of Israelis also supports revenge against the Palestinians. Even those previously involved in peace activities could be heard saying, “I am fed up with the Palestinians and I do not want to see them.” This attitude was accompanied by increased support for the idea of separation from the Palestinians, which led to the current plans for disengagement and building walls.

Although the words “normalization” and anti-normalization” are not used in Israeli internal discourse, unless the internal and external political situation changes, the trend is clear towards separation and “divorce” with the Palestinians. Within this situation, those Israeli peace activists who continue to work with Palestinians are considered disloyal and are viewed with suspicion.

9. Conclusion: what can be done?

Although the Israeli- Palestinian situation is not normal--and might not become normal because of the occupation and expansion of Israeli settlements* --the previous analysis might

* Thanks to Menahem Klein and Riad Malki for this comment.

conclude that in the Palestinian-Israeli context, Palestinian readiness to normalize with Israel is higher than Israeli readiness to normalize with the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians, people are divided on the issue of normalization, between those currently normalizing with Israel, and those who want to postpone normalization until after the establishment of the Palestinian state. There is, relatively speaking, no problem for Palestinians to accept the 'Other' who shares the same land. Even the minority of Palestinians who do not want normalization with Israel even after the establishment of a Palestinian state, accept the principle of peaceful co-existence with Israel once there is a long term non-belligerent situation.

This situation is opposite in the Israeli side. From the government, which claims that there is no Palestinian partner for peace, to the rightwing mainstream politicians who do not consider the Palestinians to be people, all the policies from the right and the left either consider and deal with the Palestinians as unequal partners, or pretend to cooperate while seeking to dominate them at the same time.

Among the Israelis, there are four positions towards normalization, all of which are problematic in terms of building healthy and normal relations with the Palestinians: first is the position of anti-normalization with the Palestinians, represented not only by the government but also by right wing political groups and a majority of Israelis looking to get rid of the Palestinians. The second position, in contrast, looks for extra normalization with the Arabs and the Palestinians. This position is related to third: normalization with the Arabs and the Palestinians from a hegemonic and patronizing position, where the Israeli side will have more power and hence greater dominance. These two positions are complimentary, because it seems that extra-normalization is needed in order to achieve the hegemony and dominance. These two positions represent the views of the Israeli Labor Party, and even other Israeli peace movements who manage their relations and negotiations with Palestinians in such a way as to promote their own goals. The fourth Israeli position involves normalizing the abnormal. This is evident in the focus of the Israeli peace camp on their relations with the Palestinians while simultaneously failing to change Israeli public opinion, which creates an illusion of normalization between the two peoples that does not exist.

Taking into consideration this asymmetric situation, the question becomes how to convince some Palestinian academics and civil society organizations to deal with the Israeli Zionist peace camp now, even when they cannot see any signs that this will lead to the

recognition of the Palestinian people's rights of self determination. This is especially challenging since many of these individuals and groups already have their own relations with Israeli anti-Zionist and post-Zionist academics and civil society organizations. These groups can and must continue normalizing with the groups they choose. For the sake of pluralism and diversity it is important that each side respects the other's approach to normalizing, and at the same time respects the differences between the two sides. This is the main essence of pluralism and respect for diversity.

As explained previously, every Palestinian group normalizes with certain Israeli groups and does not normalize with others, while the reverse is true from the Israeli side. What is needed now is a formula that enables all the normalization/anti-normalization processes to peacefully coexist, without using violence against each other and without accusing the others of treason, collaboration, or extremism. At the same time, both societies and across the divide need to develop a formula for all these groups to come together to work on shared themes such as combating the wall on Palestinian lands and, most importantly, struggling against occupation as the main evil which creates other evils such as terrorism.

In order to build joint actions, there must be respect for one another's positions. As a result, individuals should not express personal outrages against the positions that they disagree with, but rather make an effort to understand the deeper roots of these positions and to respect them. The other way to deal with these issues (apart from outrage and anger) is to try to convince those who do not deal with oneself to do so. When one does not try to convince the other side of one's view, and does not listen to the view of the other, it can create additional tension. It is important to exchange views and to learn the positions of others, who may provide new and different ways for thinking about normalization. Moreover, since the majority of Palestinians accept normalization with Israel if the occupation ends, it should be emphasized that if the Israeli peace camp strengthens its work against the occupation within Israeli society, it will build trust among Palestinians, which could lead to a willingness to normalize. Another way to change Palestinians' positions is for the Israeli peace camp to show them acts of solidarity in their suffering from the occupation. This, for instance, is the reason why these Palestinians, although against normalization now, accept and build normal relations with the Israeli Ta'ayush group and other Israeli groups that act in solidarity with the Palestinians.

Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation

Those Israelis and Palestinians in the peace camp who are acting together now without waiting for permanent status issues to be resolved need the previously-mentioned tactics and methods for dealing with the opponents of normalization now. However, they also need the following:

- 1) More to work to develop a peace culture and an acceptance of the ‘Other’ in each society.
- 2) More to pressure—in the form of concrete daily activities--on the Israeli government to end the occupation.
- 3) More work with academics and intellectuals on themes that lead them to combine what they think with what they do on the ground.
- 4) More work to invite Palestinians suffering from the occupation to speak to Israeli audiences in order to influence Israeli elections.
- 5) More gradualness in involving people in joint work, starting with getting them to participate in making contacts, to dialogue, and then to joint projects. This is valid in regard to individuals, groups and states.
- 6) More joint political and solidarity work, than joint business projects.
- 7) More use of the professionals’ capacities to develop scenarios for the different issues of the conflict.
- 8) More respect for human rights and the need for justice for both peoples, also including an acknowledgment of both sides’ sufferings.
- 9) More independence from the political leaderships on both sides, so that even if official talks collapse the cooperation will continue.
- 10) More work with the people who left joint work because they lost faith. This should not be through trying to “convince” them, but through attracting them to new creative ideas, and new creative activities.
- 11) More respect to the different peace orientations, and more attempts for coordination between them.
- 12) More work to prevent the illusion that every thing is alright between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
- 13) More work in exchanging experiences between the peace activists in both societies.
- 14) In the Arab world it is important to have more work with those not affiliated with the Arab regimes. In addition, Arab civil society organizations need to build good relations

with each other in addition to building relations with Israel. Why, for example, should Mauritania have to cut its relations with some Arab countries because of establishing relations with Israel? It is very dangerous for Israel to continue to be a factor in the tension between Arab countries. This will not help normalize Arab relations with Israel on either the official or the popular level.

Hopefully this paper has shown that anti-normalization can become normalization with the changing of the political context. Furthermore, the partnership between normalization and anti-normalization groups across the divide must continue to act in peaceful way in order to give health and diversity to the joint life in the land of Palestine/Israel.

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Appendix 10: Rome Declaration



Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"

**DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC AFFAIRS**


We, the Rector of the University of Rome La Sapienza, Rectors and Presidents of Israeli Universities and Rectors and Presidents of Palestinian Universities and research Institutes, have met preliminarily on April 20th in Jerusalem and now on May, 3rd and 4th, 2004 in Rome to discuss academic co-operation among the parties involved. We are all moved by our hope and ambition to contribute to renew a fruitful dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian Universities and research Institutes, to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation and to promote joint scientific and academic projects for the interest of all the parties in the Middle East Region and the Mediterranean basin and other regions of the world as well.

In our joint efforts, we are first of all conscious of our responsibilities and missions as heads of academic and scientific institutions, who are devoted to develop intellectual, cultural and human progress in our societies, according to universal human principles such as:

- a. The emphasis on the predominant place of human beings, their intellectual and professional formation, their honour, their dignity, their rights, their welfare and the sacred integrity and non-violation of their lives.
- b. The promotion of science and rational thinking in every domain, and the development of scientific education among the young generations and all those interested in the advancement of knowledge and the improvement of human life conditions.
- c. The enhancement of comprehensive studies of local, national, regional and international cultures and forms of life.

In virtue of these principles and in light of our academic duties, we agree on the following statements and scientific and educational projects:

- We call upon all academic and scientific institutions to work for the creation and the preservation of full conditions whereupon no academic institution, scientist or student whatsoever will be discriminated against and all will have full and free access in the pursuit of their academic activities, whether on the national, regional or international level.
- We call for the facilitation and renewal of exchange of students and scholars among Palestinian universities and academic institutions. This will facilitate as well such exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian universities and scientific institutions.
- We call upon all the parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to proceed in a sincere, immediate and continuous negotiation and to immediately stop the bloodshed, to achieve a peaceful solution accepted by the two sides.
- We call for the mutual respect and tolerance for the cultural values and beliefs of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, and for a real and prompt reconciliation between the religious, cultural and political leaderships of the two peoples and societies.
- We call upon the Rectors of universities and heads of scientific institutions around the world to support our efforts and to join us in spreading the content of this declaration.





Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"

Attendees

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Riccardo Sessa, Director General
for the Mediterranean and the Middle East

H.E. Amb. Francesco Caruso,
Permanent Representative to UNESCO

UNESCO
H.E. Mounir Bouchenaki,
Assistant Director General

University of Rome "La Sapienza"
Prof. Dino Guerritore
Delegate for International Relations

Dr. Massimo Canova
Assistant to the Delegate

Dionysia International Centre
for Arts and Cultures
Ms. Nicoletta Giada, President

