

**PROJECT**  
**A CASE FOR INNOVATIVE CITIZENS' DIPLOMACY IN SOCIAL DISPUTES**  
**INVOLVING NATIVE COMMUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA:**  
**TOWARDS A CONSENSUS BUILDING INITIATIVE IN THE SOCIAL CONFLICT**  
**BETWEEN AMAZON COMMUNITIES AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF**  
**PERU**

**I. THE CONTEXT**

Most conflicts in Latin America are no longer of an interstate nature (e.g. territorial disputes between two sovereign countries) but of an intrastate one, that is, conflicts occurring within the borders of a country. Several reasons might explain this change in conflict nature. Although a full description and analysis is out of scope of this project, the most important reasons are: 1) the progressive financial and political integration and 2) the impact of multilateral organizations dealing with conflict resolution in the region, such as the Organization of American States (OAS)<sup>1</sup>.

In the case of intrastate conflicts, the issue of national sovereignty becomes the main obstacle for the intervention of any mediating international organization. In addition, the different layers of government (e.g. Central government, National Congress, local governments) are typically part of the problem rather than the solution, intervening too late and managing conflicts poorly with tragic consequences, as it was the case in this year's Peruvian Amazon conflict. Even worse, some political actors—at the local, national, and sometimes, international level— exacerbate these conflicts in hopes of procuring political gains. This is why reaching consensus among different actors within civil society becomes a requirement in Latin American Societies.

Given the poor efficiency shown by governments to manage social conflicts, it is indispensable to implement innovative tools for an effective prevention, management, and transformation of conflicts. These instruments should collaborate in moving beyond an unproductive dialogue towards seeing conflicts as opportunities to make profound changes within society in order to deal with the origins of the problems that have generated, throughout the years, inequality, social fragmentation, and social exclusion. The result would be not only a peaceful and lasting coexistence, but also the progressive formation of a national, plural, tolerant, and inclusive identity. This project looks to provide that innovative set of strategic tools to manage conflicts in Peru, and in other countries within the region.

In the recent years, social conflicts in Peru have occurred so frequently that they have become sort of a natural component of the country's socioeconomic life. Furthermore, in the past months of 2009, there has been an almost simultaneous and consecutive surge of conflicts throughout the country, ranging from claims of national interest (e.g. revocation of national laws) to local issues (e.g. demands for public works). Protest strategies include national strikes, road blockades, seizing public and private property and offices, taking police officers hostages (typically police officers in charge of keeping order during protests), and even killing of civilians and police officers. This project of informal diplomacy suggests getting social actors that have been part of a problem involved in promoting consensus about measures that contribute to looking for lasting solutions to social conflicts.

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<sup>1</sup> A more detailed explanation of the reasons can be found in "Boundaries Disputes in Latin America", by Domínguez, JL, D. Mares, M. Orozco, D. Scott Palmer, F. Rojas Aravena, and A. Serbin, *Peaceworks* N 50, September 2003, USIP.

In June 2009, Peruvians would witness what has been considered the worst political crisis in three years of the current administration. Due to the promulgation of two Executive decrees (ED), necessary to implement the free trade agreement with the USA, members of several Amazon native communities, through its representative organization (Interethnic Peruvian Jungle Development Association, AIDSESP) initiated a protest in Bagua (north west of Peru) against the alleged lack of consultation with their communities about the implications of the mentioned laws. They considered these decrees detrimental to their wellbeing and development. Due to their perception of continued inaction from the National Congress to attend to their demands, the Amazon natives started a road blockade on the main highway that grants access to the western region of the country, generating millions in economic losses, especially to merchants. The governmental response was to send police officers to disperse the protesters. The result of that clash was several police officers and civilians dead and a high number wounded.

This internal social conflict was the result of the confluence of different factors:

- The current deficient system of popular representation in the National Congress. There is an over representation of the urban areas (with a higher population) in comparison to the rural and remote areas with relatively smaller population, such as the Amazon region. In addition, certain political groups within Congress exacerbated protesters against the Central government trying to obtain political gain.
- Deficient, and sometimes, inexistent presence of state institutions in the area in conflict, which has resulted in not only popular discontent (i.e. the population perceive that despite the economic growth experienced in the last years, the “trickle down” economic model has not worked in favor of the impoverished masses<sup>2</sup>), but also in poor management of social conflicts. From the Executive standpoint, attempts to identify and prevent social conflicts through the Prime Minister’s Office of Prevention of Social Conflicts have proved to be evidently inefficient. In general, one could say that the Peruvian state reacts against the population once conflicts start. Another important aspect of this “lack of presence” of the state is the poor knowledge and willingness to use the institutional mechanisms designed to mediate and conduct disputes peacefully available in the country. One of the most important consequences of this situation is the lack of a culture of debate and dialogue through which conflicts could be solved peacefully. Demands are often legitimate and fair, given the unacceptable levels of poverty in several areas in conflict. Furthermore, in the past there have been instances in which social demands have been met by the government as a result of violent protests. This situation has generated the impression that in Peru, demands are better met as a result of violent protests; the more violent you protest, the faster your demands are met. Nevertheless, it is important to mention the role that some organizations and institutions have played in mediating in conflicts, such as the Catholic Church and some NGOs.
- The lack of presence of a Peruvian state that effectively promotes development along with the perception that it only favors elites, results in the appearance of powerful regional and local leadership, such as the Apus (“wise men”). These leaders also share some responsibility in June’s deadly Amazon conflict.
- Lack of sensibility and awareness by the populations of the (more developed) coastal urban areas, especially Lima, towards the reality, culture, and needs of

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<sup>2</sup> Villarán, F. 2009. Reflexiones sobre la crisis Política. En: Espacio compartido 2009

the rest of the country, especially in remote rural areas. As stated before, the majority of representatives in Congress are from coastal urban areas.

- Lack of clear information and apathy from authorities since the beginning of the conflict in 2008, which created an unscrupulous management of certain pieces of information that were half true but were portrayed as totally true (e.g. certain opposition representatives disseminated the information that the state agency in charge of formalizing property was going to evict native communities from their land due to the publication of the Executive decrees.).
- The current political environment in the country has generated that a fragmented opposition constantly seeks to confront the government against the population, polarizing public opinion hoping to obtain political revenue towards the general elections in 2011.

The costs of this bloody social conflict have been:

- Social aspect. This conflict has not put on the agenda anything new. As political analyst Jaime de Althaus<sup>3</sup> says: "...a way to read what happened [i.e. the conflict] is that the indigenous protest has been a push from native communities to be included in the national development plans and to share some of the revenue. The myth of the revolt against the decrees has been only the instrument..." The historical exclusion of the Amazon and Andean peoples is the main reason of conflicts in Peru. This is one of the reasons why it is necessary to change the fragmented nature of the Peruvian society<sup>4</sup>. Otherwise, resorting to violence in order to be heard and obtain answers to social demands could be consolidated in detriment to the rule of law as it seems to have happened in Bolivia where protesters have resorted to mechanisms ranging from long strikes and road blockades to murdering in order to accumulate an uncontrollable social power.
- Economic and International aspects. In addition to the negative impact that road blockades inflict on local economies, at the international level the way that the Peruvian government managed the conflict has made potential foreign investors skeptic about the economic and political stability, as well as the rule of law in Peru.
- Political aspect. Notwithstanding the importance of each of the human lives lost (both from the police officers and the natives), the worst consequence of this conflict has been the grave loss of confidence by the population on its authorities and public institutions. Even worse, this situation has aggravated the perception that democracy as a political system is worthless and that the Peruvian society needs the return of strong rulers that keep social order and stability. In other words, this environment of continued social unrest has generated in certain sectors of the population the perception that maintaining order and the rule of law is more important than a system that champions plurality and freedom (i.e. democracy) . Given the proximity of the 2011 elections, this situation could give way to certain political groups advancing a platform of "order and progress", alleging that democracy is not the best system for Peru. All this could incline the democratic pendulum towards its more authoritarian side once again, deepening social fragmentation. A socially

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<sup>3</sup> El Comercio, June 19th 2009 <http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/impresas/notas/conflicto-amazonico-saludable-cambio-actitud/20090619/302716>

<sup>4</sup> Caravedo, B. 2009. Democracia Directa.

<http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/impresas/notas/resolver-conflictos-sociales-hay-que-mirar-otros/20090629/307177>

fragmented country with large sectors of its society excluded from development and with their needs unmet and their demands suppressed by the government is more prone to resort to violence.

Given such a context, the main contribution of this project would be to build consensus through citizen's diplomacy workshops in order to help institutionalize democratic channels that effectively conduct social demands in a non-violent manner.

*SASE Consultores (SASE) and the Amazon Center of Anthropology and Practical Application (CAAAP) in cooperation with the Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) of the University of Maryland propose to develop a consensus building process among strategic leaders of the Peruvian civil society to search for common ground towards transforming constructively the Amazon conflict. This conflict was triggered by civil society organizations and the challenge of this project is to change their role from part of the problem to become an empowered part of the solution and serve as a model to social disputes in other parts of Peru and in Latin America.*

### **History of the conflict**

The Amazon conflict started in August of 2008 with strikes organized by indigenous peoples on the north east of Peru to protest against the promulgation of 39 complementary Executive decrees between May and June of the same year. This legal package was needed to implement the free trade agreement with the United States. Previously, on May 30, 2008, the Ombudsman office appealed decree 1015 to the Constitutional Tribunal<sup>5</sup>. On June 26, ED 1073 is enacted. The latter modified the number of members needed in peasant and native communities to make decisions regarding land tenure issues<sup>6</sup>. The Ombudsman office was not satisfied with the modification because it changed the land tenure regime without prior consultation with potentially affected communities. Furthermore, it stated that the Executive had exceeded the allowed legislative powers given by Congress to promote private investment in the context of the free trade agreement with the US<sup>7</sup>.

Through its representative organization—the Interethnic Peruvian Jungle Development Association, AIDSESEP—native leaders, also called Apus, stated that their main demand was the termination of all decrees, considered to be detrimental to their wellbeing and development. According to this perspective, the laws would allow the expropriation of their land to allow the exploitation of natural resources. Similarly, the Apus argued that their forests would be predated and their waters polluted. Similar decrees favor the mining industry in other areas of the country, generating similar social conflicts. In addition, the natives argue that they were never consulted about the scope of these laws.

The president of AIDSESEP, Alberto Pizango<sup>8</sup>, announced an indefinite massive protest. Several oil exploitation camps and assets from oil companies were seized by hundreds of natives in various areas of the country. On August 20, all protest events ended prior to the onset of a dialogue process with Congress representatives. Then-house speaker, Javier Velasquez Quesquén<sup>9</sup> signed a letter of agreement with Mr. Pizango. The document ratified Congress' willingness to terminate two decrees. In turn,

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.servindi.org/actualidad/4503>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/DecretosLegislativos/01073.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> <http://indigenaprotesta-peru.blogspot.com/2009/06/cronologia-del-conflicto-amazonico.html>

<sup>8</sup> Currently on political assylum in Nicaragua

<sup>9</sup> Currently Chief of the new Cabinet, which succeeded the Cabinet during the conflict in Bagua

AIDSESEP leaders made a commitment to end the protest started on August 9. On August 22, 2008, Congress terminated ED 1015 and 1073. These laws reduced the amount of votes needed to trade communal land from two thirds to one half. In other words, these decrees made easier for private companies to procure communal land. Nevertheless, other EDs were still valid, such as 1064 and 1090, allowing for the expropriation of communal land. In an unfortunately common strategy, Parliament promised to review these decrees without a real commitment to do so.

### **The escalation of the conflict**

On September 2, 2008, the national government, in an alleged intimidating strategy, sent three investigators to AIDSESEP's offices. Due to this and other intimidating events, the organization decided to end the dialogue with the government. Verbal confrontation continued and was exacerbated by public remarks made by several ministers who called the protesters "an inconspicuous minority", "savages", "Paleolithic peoples", and "selfish", due to their "opposition to national development".

The final report from the Congressional committee in charge of evaluating the decrees and the demands from the natives was postponed until February 2009. On that month, the free trade agreement with the US was fully signed and implemented, but the report was not released. The International Labor Organization (ILO) urges the Peruvian government to follow Treaty 169 by consulting with the indigenous peoples about land tenure issues<sup>10</sup>. Similarly, the Ombudswoman, Beatriz Merino, expressed her concern about the problems facing the indigenous people of Peru, the most important of which is the lack of political will from certain layers of government to meet their needs, along with racism and discrimination. Due to this perception, natives from different indigenous organizations take their protest to the streets once again demanding the termination of ED 1090 towards the end of February. Other organizations join in other parts of the country. On March 12, AIDSESEP sends letters to members of Congress and to the Prime Minister asking for the termination of the conflictive decrees.

In light of these events, President Garcia creates, by executive decree, a permanent dialogue roundtable between state and Amazon indigenous representatives. The table was integrated by members of the Peruvian Confederation of Amazon Nationalities (CONAP) and other native Amazon communities. Nevertheless, AIDSESEP abstained from participating arguing conflict of interest of some organizations. Also, it denounces that the table seeks to weaken the demands from the Amazon indigenous peoples. Despite this situation, the table continues functioning. An inappropriate announcement is made by PERUPETRO<sup>11</sup> that the agency is opening up a bid for new oil and gas exploitation. AIDSESEP considered this announcement a confirmation of the lack of political will from the government to solve the demands of their indigenous constituency and called for a massive protest to press the government to terminate the decrees.

On April 2009, a second national strike starts in several Amazon cities: Bagua (northwest), Yurimaguas (northeast), Iquitos (northeast), Puerto Maldonado (southeast), Quillabamba (southeast), y Pucallpa (east). Alberto Pizango stirs up the conflict even more by accusing the government of humiliating them and not taking their demands seriously. In addition, he argues that the government manipulates certain indigenous groups to divide their cause. On April 9, other leaders from the 1,350

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<sup>10</sup> Treaty 169 ILO: <http://www.prodiversitas.bioetica.org/doc8.htm>  
(pdf): <http://white.oit.org.pe/ipep/documentos/169.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> State petroleum agency

Amazon native communities followed suit and declared an indefinite national strike in all Amazon cities.

After a month since AIDSESEP sent its letters to Congress and the Prime Minister's office, and three months since the former made the commitment to release its final report, and without finding any answers to their demands, the indigenous communities from the Peruvian Amazon start their second "Amazon strike". Using inappropriate remarks, then-Prime Minister Yehude Simon states that the demands are whimsical. Then, the strikers decided to radicalize their protest and seize several oil exploitation camps, air parks, and ports across the Amazon. The Oblate Missioners intervened to ask the government to respect the rights of the native peoples. In yet another inappropriate and confrontational decision, the President offers to concede a new group of oil plots to a foreign petroleum company (Perenco) in areas where some native communities live in voluntary isolation.

On a last attempt to keep order, AIDSESEP met once again with the President of the National Congress (i.e. House Speaker) unsuccessfully. Several bishops from Amazon cities in a public statement expressed their support to the indigenous strike and asked the government to terminate the controversial decrees and to consult with the population when designing new laws that would affect them. In light of the social unrest, the government declares "state of emergency" in several districts of Cuzco (southeast), Ucayali (mideast), Loreto (northeast), and Amazonas (northeast), suspending civil rights and authorizing the use of public force to keep order on the streets. Police officers disperse the protesters and clear the Corral Quemado bridge (Bagua, northeast). In this operation, seven native leaders are detained and four are wounded. In May, Alberto Pizango is charged with rebellion, sedition, and conspiracy against the state for organizing the protests. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the controversial decrees are declared unconstitutional by the Committee on Constitutional affairs, the bill never gets to the floor. Towards the end of May, new protests erupt in several cities of the country supporting the Amazon strike. In early June, the government denounced other indigenous leaders and AIDSESEP got audited again by government experts.

On June 4, more than two thousand natives from the Awajun ethnic group seize the Fernando Belaunde highway, a main access road that communicates large parts of the Amazon with the rest of the country. In this charged environment, several trucks containing produce are strained on both sides of the barricade and police forces stand alert awaiting an order to clear the road. In an astute maneuver, Congress suspends the debate of the bill terminating the controversial decrees until the roundtable between AIDSESEP and the government (which, technically did not exist anymore) reached a verdict. In light of these events, Alberto Pizango called for a national protest on June 11. At five in the morning on June 5, 2009, more than six hundred police and army officers started clearing the blockade of the Fernando Belaunde highway at the "*Curva del Diablo*" ("Devil's Curve") sector in Bagua.

The operation resulted in the death of several police officers and natives. Seeking revenge, a group of natives killed several police officers that were taken hostages days before and burnt several public offices. The official statistics from this clash were: 1) Thirty four people dead (civilians and police officers), 2) Leaders accused of sedition and homicide and Alberto Pizango in political asylum in Nicaragua (currently), 3) Harassed media, 4) Declaration of state of emergency in several cities across the country, and 5) A forced installation of a new Cabinet to avoid impeachment.

## II. WORKPLAN

### GENERAL OBJECTIVE

Promote a Citizens' Diplomacy consensus building between strategic civil representative's leaders of both sides (Uruguay and Argentina) to develop common ground that will aim to transform constructively the **Amazon conflict** and serve as a model to other social conflicts in Peru and in Latin America.

### SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

- Develop a consensus proposal that can “trickle up” to the on going track I political process generating options of conflict transformation through common exploration of key issues leading to a paradigm shift as to the mutual understanding of their respective national interests. Once common ground is reached, the longer-term challenge will be a shared commitment to implement at different levels their agreement in the respective countries.
- Promote mutual understanding between civil society leaders and economic groups in Peru, changing attitudes among their peers through shaping a less adversarial media and public opinion
- Disseminate lessons learned as a successful case study to contribute to the management of ethnic and native disputes in Latin America

## III. METHODOLOGY

The “partners in conflict” model is intended to underline a common identify among participants with the purpose of building bridges across wide divisions and tensions. It also means to develop “epistemic community” a group of individual who share collective understanding relating to their own issues and problems. Emphasizing commonalties and a shared identity while acknowledging basic differences encourages the establishment of a solid link between the two groups. Often ignores in the peace process, which is negotiated by diplomats and politicians in the capitals, these citizens on the boarders can play a major role in the consolidation of a lasting peace. The training of these groups of Peruvian partners will be carried out with the tools of Citizen Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation<sup>12</sup>. Briefly, “Citizens' Diplomacy,” is the term preferred particularly by Latin American colleagues and activists who use these techniques to empower them both in generating advice for the decision makers and for engaging in grassroots-level dispute resolution. The suggested practice for inter-state disputes outlined here is to conduct innovative problem solving workshops, designed to facilitate resolution of a conflict based on transformation of the parties' perceptions and attitudes, and on addressing not only potential elements for settlement of the present dispute but also its underlying causes through a reconstruction of the relationship between the parties. Often and alternative or a complement to government-led efforts, second track or citizens' diplomacy is considered an effective mean also for newly arising fluctuating disputes. Such learning is condensed in four distinct and sequential stages:

- 1) **TRUSTBUILDING**, includes getting to know each other, ‘icebreakers’ the place and the program, the role of facilitation; establishing the ground rules for the project in terms of long term goals and short term objectives, externalizing the expectations

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<sup>12</sup> John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, (eds.), *Second Track/Citizens Diplomacy- Concepts and Techniques of Conflict Transformation*, (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). A short manual covering the Partners in Conflict Technique has been published by the Latin American Studies Center of the University of Maryland and is available electronically.

- of the participants; introducing the concepts of action evaluation' and socializing activities to improve inter-personal relations..
- 2) **SKILLS BUILDING:** training in individual (can be used unilaterally) and group skills. The first category includes inter-personal communications (exercises in nonviolent communication in terms of phrases, words, *body* language and alternative methods of active listening), prejudice and stereotype reduction, the perception of the image of the other, and overcoming discrimination). Group skills involve training in de-escalation, creativity and brainstorming, critical thinking, and the search of common ground through vision statements.
  - 3) **CONSENSUS BUILDING** Stage three experiments with alternative models of problem solving workshops, focusing on methods for the micro (inter-personal mediation), meso (communal peacebuilding) and macro (the ARIA method described below), finding 'minimal denominators' and 'unilateral best offers'.
  - 4) **RE-ENTRY:** the need to translate the consensus document into implementation when back from workshops to daily environment. Networking and ensuring sustained contacts. Development of an Action Plan and a joint project that will keep the stakeholders united with a shared purpose.

#### IV. TIMETABLE

##### PHASE I: *PREPARATION- 3 months*

##### Activities:

- a) **Conflict Analysis** :
  - Further collection of formal information (legislation, press clippings, geographical information, etc.)
  - Interviews with local and national key stakeholders
- b) **Participants' Selection:**

Identification of relevant stakeholders: objective criteria: decision power, representative level, expert legitimacy and willingness to participate in a dialogue initiative. The main criteria that will determine who participates in the process is the recommendation of the actors interviewed during the conflict assessment. In order to ensure that each actor does not suggest only his or her allies, questions in the individual interviews seeking information on those who have very different perceptions from the interviewee will be included. Some key participants would include:

- AAUPI (Organización Estudiantil)
- Jesuit Bishop from the Jaen Vicariate, Monsignor Santiago García de la Rasilla
- Representatives from AIDSESEP
- Representatives from the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples of Peru (COPPIP)
- Representatives of the media
- Representatives from the Ombudsman's Office.
- Representatives from the Trade Chamber of Lima
- Representatives from Peru's Exporters Association (ADEX)
- Representatives from NGOs involved in the promotion of peasants' rights and indigenous development (e.g. Paz y Esperanza, Centro para la Investigación, Educación, y Desarrollo (CIED), Centro de Promoción de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (PROPME), No Poverty-No Pobreza, Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social, etc.)
- Representatives from Indigenous College Student Associations.



Although the Group should be as ample as possible, the selection criteria will focus on those “in favor” of development plants based on the exploitation of natural resources with an export and entrepreneurial mentality (i.e. capitalism) and those against such an approach. The preliminary group should be no larger than twenty people equally distributed between both sides. The starting point would be selecting those involved in the conflict that despite their differences, wish to coexist peacefully in a plural society that respects these differences.

**Product:**

A summary draft conflict analysis document with interests listed by stakeholder group for circulation and commentary. The document will also contain recommendations on, stakeholder needs (training, information, specialist advice, etc.), and process design

**Process Design**

- Final specification of stakeholders, conveners, agendas, and specific objectives of the process
- Final definition of the ground rules regarding the Planning process. Rules include the norms governing access to information, the roles to be played by various actors and their responsibilities, decision-making procedures, confidentiality regarding private information, behavior during the meetings, the relationship with and responsibilities of the facilitators as well as agreements regarding the group’s interactions with the press. Having clear rules from the outset, approved by all the stakeholders, greatly increases the likelihood of success of the process.
- Definition of the meetings’ agendas, structures and format
- Training or information provided to relevant stakeholders according to the recommendations in the draft summary document

**Products:**

- Two training workshops delivered.
- Stakeholder comments and suggestions incorporated into the assessment document
- NGO coalition validation of process design
- Final draft of the assessment and design document circulated
- Two representatives from each side trained as facilitators that will in turn train their peers

**PHASE II Facilitated Workshops- 8 months**

**Activities:**

- Implement process design
- Identification and understanding of the problems and issues
- Creation of options for conflict transformation through common exploration of key issues: monitored system, environmental impacts, tourism and economic local and national Interests
- Evaluation and pre-selection of options.
- Consensus-building around the proposed options and selection of the final sets of options. Creation of the final document

**Products:**

- Three facilitated meetings held
- A final consensus based document
- Bilateral meetings continued

### **PHASE III: Monitoring and Evaluation 4 months**

Finally, the last stage is the move from discussion to action, implementing and monitoring the agreements reached during the previous stage. Stakeholders will recognize their own interests in the plan, fully aware of the need to meet the greatest degree of stakeholder interests possible, and therefore participate in its implementation. Ultimately, the results of the process should translate into presenting the findings to the authorities, and subsequently a media outreach. Such campaign, by the nature of the process by which it was developed, may have a greater likelihood of being implemented and enforced by the responsible government agencies.

#### **Activities:**

- Creation of a follow-up monitoring group of stakeholders to verify the implementation of the agreements
  - Establishment of indicators of implementation
  - Establishment of protocol and contingency plans in the case of non-implementation
- SASE/CAAAP follow-up and initial facilitation (as necessary) of the monitoring group
- Follow-up meetings with stakeholder groups

#### **Products:**

- Follow up monitor group ongoing
- Use as leading case for similar environmental inter-state conflicts in Latin America :
  - Ssharing the experience with other potential users of such process in the region through written training material in Spanish, the evaluation findings and training
  - Internationally academic and policy relevant articles in English

#### **Evaluation**

There will be three complementary elements in the evaluation strategy:

1. Action evaluation, tracking the evolving needs and objectives of the stakeholders;
2. Monitoring Project outputs (exchange visits, materials, workshops, study tours, etc.);
3. Evaluating Project outcomes, including the impact on participant learning and behavior and impact on related organizations and communities.

**1. Action Evaluation (AE):** This state-of-the-art process facilitates the integration of research and evaluation into the work itself in ways that support rather than limit the work. CIDCM has made extensive use of this methodology<sup>13</sup> around the world. The process includes a *baseline stage* that involves cooperative goal setting, team building, and participatory decision making within and among project stakeholder groups; a *formative stage*, during which participants review and refine their goals in light of experience and the evolving political context, to make them more actionable; and a *summative stage*, when participants take stock of their overall progress, using their evolved goals to establish criteria for retrospective assessment.

The project will have key participants from the Amazon communities and the

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<sup>13</sup> Jay Rothman and Victor Friedman “Action Evaluation for Conflict Management Organizations and Projects,” in John Davies and Edy Kaufman *Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy* (cited above), pp. 285-97.

entrepreneurial sector to be trained in this field. The trainees will become familiarized in this cooperative process, gaining needed flexibility in the design and articulation of workshops to adapt to evolving demands and opportunities, while always keeping in mind the major objectives of the project. Thus we incorporate new stakeholders into a democratic process, learning responsible citizenship, dialogue and respect for others' needs as the evaluations themselves become a useful tool to expand learning.

The baseline evaluation will be made in the first two months as part of orientation and planning after all key project personnel are in place. Formative evaluations will occur every 6-10 months, depending on the timing of exchange visits and new developments, and a final summative evaluation as needed for end-of-project evaluation and follow-up planning.

**2. Monitoring Project Outputs:** Comparing performance with projected deliverables to be agreed upon by the participants at the early stages of the project.

- i. Planning and fundraising efforts to ensure the implementation of the planned development project and the continuity of activities beyond the grant period;
- ii. Completion of evaluation process and required reports.

**3. Evaluating Project Outcomes:** Outcomes address the impact of the project on participants and their institutions and communities. They should be specified as far as practical in advance; measurable; attainable within a reasonable timeframe; and results-oriented. There are four levels of outcome for this project, broadly specified as follows:

1. Participant satisfaction with program;
2. Participant learning, including new knowledge & skills, improved mutual understanding, changed perceptions and attitudes toward other groups/sects in the community and region
3. Participant behavior, including actions to apply new knowledge & skills in institutions or communities, greater civic participation, and continued contacts among participants;
4. Institutional or community changes, including new collaboration and partnerships, new programming, organizational improvements, expanding contacts and networking.

#### **IV. DISSEMINATION STRATEGY**

SASE, CAAAP, and CIDCM plans to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience through:

- Use as leading case for similar environmental inter-state conflicts in Latin America in workshops simulations in the University of Maryland, SASE trainings, CAAAP classes, etc.
- Throughout Peru, SASE and CAAAP will participate in conferences; make presentations at postgraduate programs at universities linked to the subject and in different areas of knowledge and experience interchange in an effort to spread the work methodology and the systematized experience throughout the project.
- Disseminate the leading case experience to NGOs, international donor agencies, and to SASE's, CAAAP, and CIDCM broad network of contacts in Latin America. Those contacts include various programs on local development, conflict resolution, and environmental policy at several universities where they teach or have institutional information-sharing agreements, including: the Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru, Universidad de Piura (Peru), Universidad de la Sabana (Colombia) the Universidad de Cuenca, the Universidad del Salvador (Argentina), the Universidad Nacional de San Martín (Argentina), the Universidad de Valparaíso (Chile), Universidad de

la Loja (Ecuador), Universidad de los Andes (Colombia), American University (Washington) and George Mason University (Virginia), Uruguayan Academic Network (Uruguay), Catholic University of Uruguay, etc. CAAAP frequently provides training to indigenous communities and the general public about conflict resolution in Peru. In addition, information will be disseminated using SASE's institutional network, Partners for Democratic Change International network, working in fourteen different countries in Eastern Europe and the Americas and international organizations such as International Alert, Consensus Building Institute, etc.

- Present articles and papers at several national and international conferences a year including; mediation, facilitation and conflict resolution conferences; environmental and social policy conferences; political science conferences, etc.

## **V. PARTNERS CAPABILITIES**

### **SASE Consultores**

Since its beginnings, SASE has developed almost a hundred consultancies in its various areas of expertise. These services respond to the different needs of its clients with high responsibility and commitment. SASE conducts research and policy design in different sectors relevant to development in Peru. It also works in every phase of a project: design, baseline, follow up and evaluation. Finally, it provides assistance and training services in Social Responsibility, improvement of public administration, and institutional enhancement for a better Peruvian public sector. Its mission is to provide innovative solutions for the creation of the economic, social, environmental, institutional, cultural, and ethical conditions needed to generate development and wealth, to promote equity and to overcome poverty in Peru and in Latin America. This organization has a good reputation and legitimacy (it is supported by the Prime Minister's Office) and rallying power. It has been able to draw funds from large entrepreneurial groups, such as the Romero Group, Backus, etc for some of its projects.

Relevant Projects:

- Social Responsibility, fully funded by the private sector (Backus, Romero Group, Nestle, Coca Cola, etc.)
- Identification of processes that transform social conflicts in social crisis. Project Conga 2008.
- Workshop: Social Responsibility, dialogue, and leadership to generate knowledge. Consultancy offered to subcontractors of the Yanacocha mining company. 2008.
- Workshop: Social Responsibility, dialogue, and leadership to generate knowledge. Consultancy offered to Arasi mining company's staff. 2008.

### **Amazon Center of Anthropology and Practical Application (CAAAP)**

The Amazon Center of Anthropology and Practical Application (CAAAP) was created in 1974 by nine bishops of the Amazon to promote the development of the marginalized Amazon indigenous peoples. CAAAP promotes an inclusive model of human development in which the needs of all human beings in the Peruvian territory are met, especially those of land tenure, employment, and knowledge, with a real possibility of a true human development. This model champions the strengthening of the capabilities and competencies of indigenous peoples to participate and manage local, regional and national processes of development. In other words, CAAAP seeks to empower the indigenous citizens of Peru to be agents of their own development. In this context the

center provides citizen training to stimulate people's social, political, economic, and cultural initiatives that improve their quality of life.

According to CAAAP, in Peru, 43% of all poor households are indigenous and show the worst poverty indicators and suffer more social exclusion than other poor sectors of society. Given the magnitude of the challenge of promoting an inclusive model of development for the indigenous people in such conditions, the center builds relationships and partnerships with other public and private institutions. CAAAP seeks to promote a culture of inclusion that results in a truly democratic political system that eliminates discrimination and all forms of exclusion, favoring the rights of indigenous peoples throughout the Amazon.

### **Center for International Development and Conflict Management (University of Maryland)**

**CIDCM** is an interdisciplinary research center at the University of Maryland focusing primarily on conflict analysis<sup>14</sup> but also working towards the prevention and transformation of conflict, to understand the interplay between conflict and development, and to help societies create sustainable futures for them. Using the insights of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers, CIDCM devises effective tools and pathways to constructive change.

For more than 20 years, scholars and practitioners at the Center have sought ways to understand and address conflicts over security, identity, and distributive justice. The Center's expertise in data collection and analysis, and its direct involvement in regional conflict management efforts make the Center a unique resource for discovering enduring solutions to the world's most intractable conflicts. The Partners in Conflict and Partners in Peacebuilding Projects work to facilitate the prevention or transformation of complex, violent conflicts strengthen civil society and promote transitions to appropriate and sustainable forms of democracy, using the techniques of multi-track or citizens' diplomacy. They also help to build capacity for conflict prevention and transformation through providing training programs both locally and overseas, and through participating in crisis early warning and early response programs designed to support preventive diplomacy.

Building on the pioneering work of CIDCM's founding Director, Edward Azar and his successors- among them Edward Kaufman who will be directly involved in this project, have developed related projects in dozens of countries around the world, including in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Burma/Thailand/China, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Russia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Lesotho, Senegal, Argentina, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador/Peru<sup>15</sup>, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, the United States and Canada.

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<sup>14</sup> 'Peace and Conflict' The analysis of the different sources of conflict is being published every two years, the last issue (July 2008) edited by Joe Hewitt, Ted R. Gurr and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, a summary of findings available at the CIDCM website,

<sup>15</sup> The Ecuador/Peru Second Track Diplomacy experience is particularly relevant to the suggested project, for an article explaining the approach used, see Edy Kaufman and Saul Sosnowski, "The Contributions of Track II Diplomacy to the Peru-Ecuador Peace Process", in Ronald Fisher (ed.) ,Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking, (Boston, Lexington Books, 2006).

## **V. BUDGET**

This Project seeks to obtain US\$94,000. Funds will be administered by the cofacilitators (i.e. Partner organizations in Peru, CAAAP and SASE) in direct coordination with CIDCM. A detailed budget description is available upon request. The Peruvian partners are committed to fund initial trainings in mediation and non violent communication from the Peruvian private sector.