5

Israel/Palestine

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is thought of as an ethnopolitical conflict that pits Jews and Arabs against each other in a fight for the same territory: the land that lies between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, comprising Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.

Apart from the partition plan dated after World War II, other elements of the conflict can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. The Zionist movement started in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, holding that Jews should have a state of their own—and not just any state, but a state in their historic homeland, at that time part of the Ottoman Empire and then populated by a large majority of Palestinian Arabs.

Between World War I and World War II, three key pledges were made and became basic sources of the present land dispute. In 1916, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed by France and Great Britain, with the assent of Russia. This agreement called for the disassembling of the Ottoman Empire and for the division of the region into French- and British-administered areas. That same year, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, promised the Arab leaders postwar independence for the former Ottoman Arab provinces. Then in 1917, the British foreign minister, Arthur Balfour, committed to work toward "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," later known as the Balfour Declaration.

In 1920, parts of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were implemented in the form of mandates legitimated by the League of Nations. France received parts of Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria, while Britain received Iraq and Palestine. In 1923, with the intention of partially fulfilling its commitments with the Arabs, Britain granted limited autonomy to Emir Abdullah I of Jordan and set Transjordan separate from Palestine to the west of the Jordan River.





Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/british_control.stm

Jewish immigration increased markedly during the 1920s and 1930s. Due to mounting anti-Semitic sentiments in Europe, the British severely limited the exodus of European Jews attempting to enter Palestine and, at the height of the Nazi persecution, declared this immigation illegal. Meanhile, tensions between Arabs and Jews escalated sharply, leading to violent clashes in 1929 and to an Arab revolt by 1936. Britain was having more and more problems maintaining peace and order within its mandate. During and after World War II, despite the mandatory restrictions posed by the British authorities, the Jewish population escaping persecution in Europe increased threefold in Palestine. The Palestinian nationalist movement also started to gain momentum in its struggle against the British mandate and against the Jews who were flocking back to the Holy Land.

In 1947, at the end of World War II, Britain handed over its mandate in Palestine to the United Nations. The General Assembly passed UN Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state and made Jerusalem an international city. In 1947, fewer than two million Jews and Arabs lived in Palestine: 67 percent were Arab and 33 percent were Jews. The land was divided, with 56.47 percent assigned to the Jews and 43.53 percent assigned to the native Palestinian Arabs. The partition plan was explicitly rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and, therefore, was never implemented.

In May 1948, two events occurred simultaneously: the British withdrew their troops from Palestine, and the State of Israel was proclaimed. As a result of that declaration, seven surrounding Arab countries declared war on Israel. (This was only the first in a series of wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors.) In 1949, after nine months of combat, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed armistice agreements, which resulted in Palestinian Arabs suffering a significant loss of the territory assigned to them while Israel's jurisdiction increased to 78 percent of the territory. Egypt retained the Gaza Strip, and the Kingdom of annexed the West Bank.

In the following reading, the authors pay significant attention to the wars that occurred once in each decade between the Israeli army and various Arab, Palestinian, and Lebanese resistance groups in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1991, and 2006. Six-Day War in June 1967 resulted

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Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/six_day_war.stm

in Israel occupying Arab territories, such as the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Israel retained control over Sinai up until the landmark 1979 peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt—the first Arab state to sign a peace agreement with Israel. The agreement was based on the principle of land for peace: Israel returned all the garnered land and Egypt recognized Israel as a state and established diplomatic relations and a secure border. Above all, this treaty served as the first recognition by an Arab government—in this instance, the most important one—of the existence of a Jewish state.

Because of the restrictive policies implemented by the government of Israel and its military occupation, the Palestinians embarked on major *intifadas* (uprisings) in 1987 and in 2000. During the first *intifada,* protest consisted mostly of nonlethal civil disobedience, general strikes, boycotts of Israeli products, graffiti, and stone throwing aimed at the heavily armed occupation troops.

In 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, a multilateral conference took place in Madrid and opened the way to bilateral negotiations. Meanwhile, following this first *intifada,* the secret Oslo Track II diplomatic negotiations initiated between civil-society Israelis and Palestinians began to take shape and soon involved U.S. President Bill Clinton in framing several agreements. Significant progress was made: the Palestinians recognized Israel's sovereignty in return for the beginning of phased dismantling of Israel's occupations in the West Bank and Gaza. Negotiations included a Declaration of Principles signed by Y. Rabin and Y. Arafat in in 1993 in Washington D.C., which led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994. Also in 1994, Israel resolved disputes with Jordan and signed a peace treaty. In spite of several subsequent agreements, implementation failures on both sides and a last attempt to address all controversial issues at once at the Camp David summit in 2000 resulted in no progress. During the second militarized *intifada,* the Palestinians used firearms and suicide bombings against the occupying Israeli forces, which responded massively with heavy weaponry and the reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

A few months before the Camp David summit in 2000, after almost twenty-five years of occupation, Israel decided unilaterally to withdraw from southern Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982. Redeployment without an agreement was also implemented by Prime Minister Sharon in 2005 in the pullout of the Israeli Army and Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip. Following the kidnapping of one soldier in the Gaza border and two more in the Lebanese frontier in the summer of 2006, however, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched major aerial and ground military campaigns against Hezbollah ("Party of God"), a pro-Iranian and radical Islamist group. This conflict was perceived to be an indirect battle between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran, Syria, and their clients (Hamas, a major radical Islamist group and political party, and Hezbollah) on the other. During the first years of the twenty-first century, Palestinians witnessed the emergence to political power of Hamas. Early in 2006, Palestinians voted to give Hamas legislators a majority in the Palestinian legislature . After a bloody confrontation in 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, leaving the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) effectively maintaining power only over the West Bank Palestinans.

The following chapter is cowritten by an Israeli and a Palestinian political scientist who are experts in conflict resolution. It explores jointly the dispute that has expanded from a local confrontation in the middle of the twentieth century to an East–West conflict. The first part examines the centuries-old relations between the Jews and Muslims who have lived side by side and shared common traits of heritage and culture. The chapter continues with an examination of the nationalism that started to take root at the end of the nineteenth century, with both Jews and Palestinians initiating more frequent confrontations. The authors explain in detail the six wars that have occurred between Israel and Palestine, beginning in 1948. The next part of the chapter explores the peace trends that started in 1979 with the Camp David Accords signed by Egypt and Israel. The concluding part examines various peace scenarios aimed at ending this half-century-old conflict and implicating many inside and outside actors.

Understanding Our Israeli–Palestinian Conflict and Searching for Its Resolution

Edward (Edy) Kaufman and Manuel Hassassian

I. INTRODUCTION

Framing a historic period of analysis is a matter of subjective interpretation of history, determined not only by the national ethos of each of us but also by our joint approach. Conventional wisdom has taught us that we should start our analysis from the moment when the two emerging national movements clashed. Indeed, the early Zionist arrival in "the land of the ancestors," *Eretz Israel,* coincided with the Arab awakening to emancipation from the Ottoman yoke. Both processes occurred around the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Jewish nationalism was naturally resisted by the Arab indigenous population as part of an initially wider Arab national movement occurring in the same territory as *Filastin* (Palestine). However, we also could argue that Arab–Jewish relations need to be traced back many more centuries and that we should study relations over a period longer than the last hundred years of bloody confrontations. A colleague of ours has written about the "Common Heritage of Arabs and Jews," and that is how we like to start team teaching the conflict resolution course we have taught for more than ten years at the University of Maryland–College Park.[1] Based on Israeli and Palestinian narratives, watersheds for both nations were the defeat of 1948 and the results

of the 1967 conflict leading to the separation of the West Bank from Jordan and Gaza from Egypt. For Israel, peace with Egypt in 1978 was an important landmark. For Palestinians, landmarks were the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1965 and the transition from a call to steadfastness to an active uprising—an intifada (Arabic for "shaking off")—in 1987 that provided a strategy for ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and creating a two-state solution. Again, for both sides, the mutual recognition in the Oslo agreement of 1993 was the first step toward direct negotiations and mutual acceptance.

These preliminary observations led us to develop a fourteen-point approach to teaching and writing about our protracted violent conflict, as is reflected in this chapter. In our opinion, coauthoring and team teaching provide readers with a better perspective not only on the history that separates us—mostly the ultimate responsibility of our leadership—but also the shared understanding of reality shaped by an epistemic community of academics and intellectuals that has evolved over years of working together.[2] While presentation of an antagonistic black-and-white picture might sharpen readers' grasp of the differences that divide us, it does not highlight the common ground, an understanding of which we hope will move readers not only to understand the Israeli–Palestinian conflict but also to consider alternative solutions. Briefly, our "rules of engagement" in coauthorship are these:

1. *Don't get locked into conventional zero-sum and deterministic interpretations of past conflicts.* Our approach is to take a more imaginative and analytical view of the past, present, and future. We suggest dealing not only with the history that separates us—mostly the ultimate responsibility of our leadership—but also the shared understanding of reality shaped by our academics and intellectuals.

2. *Periodization is a matter of choice.* A significant decision must be made when presenting our common history: Shall it be offered in the context of struggle between two national movements at loggerheads for the same piece of land, Palestine/*Eretz Israel,* or shall we opt for a retrospective on encounters between Arabs and Jews or between Islam and Judaism fourteen centuries ago? If we choose the first option, then conflict epitomizes our relationship. However, if we opt to teach our common heritage and ignore the previous century, one can infer that the interaction throughout the ages in the Middle East and the Iberian Peninsula was a history of coexistence, even in asymmetrical situations in which Jews comprised a minority in the lands of Islam. Surely the Jewish community under Islam enjoyed better privileges and treatment than under Christendom. While courses like ours normally focus only on the era of conflict, we are prompted to salvage the longer historical trajectory to remind ourselves that confrontation is not a permanent feature in our relationship. Since we have had a record of coexistence in the past, a fashionable deterministic prediction that we cannot live in peace in the future is not substantiated when envisioning the long-term perspective. Hence, the main challenge lies in knowing how we can bring it forward without leaving a legacy of violence and denial for future generations.

3. *Historical events are a genuine part of the collective memory of both Arabs and Jews, and we should present both narratives as they are predominantly taught in Israeli and in Palestinian schools.* To understand with empathy the other's subjective perception of realities, it is important to be familiar with both sides of the story. Looking back into our respective nation-building processes, the tendency is to glorify our own role and explain the conflict as an outcome of the adversary's misdeeds or bad conduct. Seeing the other's parallel history can be an important eye-opening experience. We need to respect each other's narratives and, whenever we differ, to include both versions in our analysis. Once we have acknowledged our differences, we have a better hope of affirming our common ground and discovering a shared vision of the future.

4. *In presenting a respective of our own past, we must frame each of the two distinct narratives in their own staged approach.* When introducing the phases of our conflict, we address the prevailing historiography of each side and present it as such, even if the periods and events that marked the Palestinian and Jewish developments at times do not converge. For instance, the periodization of the making of the State of Israel was preceded by the imprint of six distinct migratory waves (*Aliyah,* in the singular), each with different

origins, characteristics, and idiosyncrasies. After the "War of Liberation" in 1948, the "wars of Israel" (1948, 1956, 1967, 1982, 1991, and 2006) with established Arab countries (even if triggered or affected by hostile behavior by Palestinians) are often recognized as turning points. From the other perspective, the pre-1948 *Al Nakba* (The Catastrophe) is characterized as the transition of an overall Arab national movement toward a distinct Palestinian patriotism. By and large, from 1948 until the Oslo process, the movement was transformed from a leaderless people through its formative stages of armed strategy to the establishment of the PLO, which was the culminating response to the failures of inter-Arab politics. Even if the causality of events presented in different sequences contradicts each other's official narratives, we contrive to present them with a degree of empathy (rather than antagonism or sympathy) and with a sense of respect for each other's truth.

5. *As with many other parts of our teamwork, we want to respect the references used by both Palestinians and Jews.* One matter over which we have had lengthy deliberations and negotiations is how to name incidents, territories, and wars. In some cases we have made ad hoc decisions to use both sides' formulations. For example, we consider the 1948 war as both Israel's *Milhemet ha-Atzma'ut* (War of Independence) and the Palestinians' *Al Nakba* . And we address a more current controversy as the Palestinians' uncategorical condemnation of the "Apartheid Wall" in the West Bank and Israel's official support of the "Security Barrier." Sometimes we use parallel nomenclature, separated by a dash, as in "Israel–Palestine." In other cases, we have accepted the vocabulary in common usage by most of the world—for example, West Bank of the Jordan River, rather than the Jewish biblical names Judea and Samaria. We have chosen to relate to all these territories as "occupied," using the language of international institutions, rather than the Jewish settlers' reference to "liberated" lands or the official Israeli term "administered" territories. On the other hand, we have related to the Jewish state as "Israel"—its official name as a recognized member of the United Nations (U.N.)—rather than "Occupied Palestine" or the "Zionist entity," terms expressing the reluctance of many in the Arab world to recognize Israel's existence.

6. *We use the tools of social history so that the focus is not only on leadership and elites but also on social and political movements as they developed on the ground.* This is not to say that leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Menachem Begin, or Yasser Arafat have not played critical roles in determining crucial decisions about our two peoples, but we must recognize that this is a protracted, identity-driven, and ethnopolitical conflict with deep roots. Through the years of prolonged violence and fear, it is not so much a government-versus-government border dispute as a classic protracted communal people-versus-people conflict. It is when focusing on our own communities rather than talking only about governments and leaders that we are able to find, in both camps, individuals and civil society organizations that have reached a high level of agreement about concrete ways of resolving our conflict.

7. *An important challenge in co-teaching and co-authoring is how to stress common stands and avoid adversarial discourse.* For the sake of simplification, the tendency often is to show a black-and-white picture of confrontational positions, to audiences who learn more about what separates us than about our common ground. Such a version of history is justified when Israeli and Palestinian leaders have shown adversarial tendencies, as they often have, have failed to build trust, and have continued to point to the other's failures rather than to look inward and address their own inadequacies. In the pictures that we present, we do not ignore the alternative historic narrative, but we also present the voices of moderation and compromise. Even when those voices represented minority views, their insights are sometimes vindicated, often decades later, when leadership endorses their views. For example, until 1977 Israel's Labor governments stressed the "Jordanian option," which viewed the Hashemite dynasty as partners and ignored the distinctive voices of the Palestinians, even while important Israeli voices called for dialogue with the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, an approach that was duly formalized only with the Oslo Accords in 1993. Likewise, Palestinians advocating a two-state solution were ostracized and often assassinated, only to be vindicated in 1998 when the Palestinian National Council convened in Algiers and adopted such a policy. Likewise, the vociferous opposition of the Likud

leadership—led by General Ariel Sharon—included the suggested pullout from Gaza and Jericho (in the east and center of the West Bank) in the Oslo process in 1993. However, this idea became compatible with the 1995 unilateral disengagement plan of Prime Minister Sharon, which included Gaza and four settlements in Samaria (in the north of the West Bank), closer to the city of Jenin.

8. *Understanding the asymmetries between us is an essential element of judgment.* Ugly atrocities, missed opportunities, and leadership mishaps have occurred on both sides, but we must avoid promoting a false parallelism. We must stress the difference in status between the Palestinians (the weaker party, living as an occupied people) and the Israelis (the stronger party, which occupies large parts of Palestinian territory). Although the case is in many ways an example of top-dog Israelis versus underdog Palestinians, we also must be aware of the perceptions of many Jews who see the conflict as little "David" (Israel) facing threatening "Goliath" (the Arab and Muslim worlds).

9. *In sharing our contending stories, the point is not to score debating points, or to argue with selective facts about who came first or who is acting or reacting, or to determine who has more rights.* In reality, we often face a conflict of right versus right. Judging from the stubbornness of both nations to remain on the land in spite of adverse circumstances, it can be agreed that both nations have enough claims and rights. We sense, and rather should emphasize, a common destiny: our nations are "doomed" to live together.

10. In a conflict situation, the natural tendency is to highlight the positive features of each society's history. However, *we do not need to balance the pluses or equally share the blame all through the process, as long as the picture we present recognizes change over time.* For instance, it is clear to us that in the years that preceded Israel's 1948 independence, the Zionist leadership was mostly supportive of moderate options and difficult compromises with the Palestinians, whose leadership was overwhelmingly rejectionist to all plans of reconciliation. At the same time, the peace forces in Jewish society, though insignificant, were more proactive than those well-intentioned individuals within the Arab community. In fact, an opposite trend can be discerned after 1967, when Palestinian institutions increasingly and dramatically changed their policies toward the acceptance of "the other" while fanaticism based on religious and expansionist premises developed intensively within Israeli society and political leadership. As Yeoshafat Harkabi mentioned in his landmark *Fateful Decisions,* in the first fifty years it has been the Zionists who knew to differentiate between grand design and reality, opting as a small minority in Palestine for incremental and moderate policies. However, when the relative strength of Israel over its Arab neighbors became self-evident, it was the weakening Palestinian side that was giving away its vision of a state from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea. Hence, since historic failure for achieving peace fluctuates over the years, we cannot share responsibility for it equally at all times.

11. *When the contradictory claims to tangible and intangible needs are expressed, the issue of a real conflict of rights calls for innovative ideas of conflict transformation, moving from zero-sum equations to win–win solutions.* We consider this to be not just a slogan but rather a doable approach that leads to alternatives to resolving the core issues (called the final or "permanent status" issues in the Oslo peace process), such as underground water aquifers or Jerusalem or generating new future scenarios.

12. *While the dimensions of the larger Arab–Israeli or "Middle East" conflict have fluctuated over time, we both recognize in our narratives the centrality of the Israeli–Palestinian issue.* Over time, many additional layers have been added to, or subtracted from, the original and continuous strife of the protracted communal conflict of two peoples who consider the same land to be their own. As a result, addressing the core of the issue in depth is an essential way to minimize the added complications created by other state and nonstate actors.

13. *While we recognize the importance of foreign powers in the conflict (nowadays, chiefly the United States), these outside powers have usually been unable to prevent war or impose peace.* The United States was at times able to stop armed struggle and channel such efforts into diplomacy. Yet both in the case of the 1977–1979 Begin–Sadat negotiations (Camp David I) and the 1993 Oslo peace process between Palestinians and Israelis, the main initiative was bilateral, and only later did the White House play a key role.

14. *In short, understanding the historical circumstances that in the past brought about either cooperation or confrontation can be helpful in understanding the future shape that the relations between these two nations may take, but a forward-looking approach is the best guarantee for resolution.* Indeed, many aspects of the future can be imagined or predicted by understanding the past. If we can agree and determine that confrontations between Arabs and Jews are a product of historical circumstances rather than a result of inherent contradictions between the two cultural systems, then we know that future relations can, to some degree, be controlled and managed by human decisions. We must seek ways to avoid repeating the historical circumstances that have led to so much confrontation in the recent past, while at the same time we must understand the common cultural dimensions and common heritage that have brought about much cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the more distant past. Yet, using lateral thinking and learning from the costly lessons and best practices for the transformation of other disputes into peaceful coexistence has an inherent value that also needs to be integrated.

II. JEWISH–ARAB RELATIONS THROUGH THE CENTURIES

If we focus on the fifteen hundred years when Arabs and Jews lived together in peace instead of on the last hundred years of conflict, we would observe much commonality between the two groups: Abrahamic religions, Semitic languages, similar archeological sites, historic periods of coexistence, and Arab–Judeo cultures, music, terminology, and body language, as well as food.[3] However, when focusing on the past hundred years, we also can highlight two distinct languages, religions, ethnicities, and preferences toward the East and West. So let us first remind ourselves of the long-term relationship. According to Shukri B. Abed, it is hardly possible to overemphasize the degree of cross-fertilization, mutual influence, and even cooperation that have existed between Arabs and Jews during many periods and in many places as they shared a common history. Although Arab–Jewish contacts have created their share of conflict, oppression, and violence, they have at other times been characterized by tolerance, close cooperation, and cross-fertilization.[4]

Summarizing Abed's important work we concur that since the inception of Islam in the seventh century, Jews living in Muslim lands have played an important part in the intellectual, cultural, economic, and even political life of various Islamic empires. In spite of several unfavorable references in the *Qur'an,* as well as occasional persecution by some rulers, Jews, as one of the *dhimmis* (protected peoples), fared, generally speaking, rather well as a minority in Islamic states.

Under the Abbasid (750–1258), Jews assumed responsible state positions under the caliphate. Within Baghdad, the Abbasid's capital, the Jewish community flourished. By the end of the twelfth century A.D. one finds a similar positive contact between Muslims and Jews in Muslim Spain. When the Muslims conquered Spain in 711 A.D., the Jews of that country welcomed the new rulers, considering them their saviors from the Visigoth Christian kingdom within which they were forced to hide their Jewish identity. Within the new regime, many of the Jews who had previously left Spain to escape religious persecution returned to Spain because they felt protected and saw much better economic prospects.

The economic and social status of Jews further improved under the tolerant rule of the Umayyad. The Jewish community in Spain flourished economically, culturally, and intellectually. Jews occupied high positions in many fields, including medicine, agriculture, commerce, and craft. Jewish scholarship and culture flourished alongside their Arab counterparts and were positively influenced by them. Jewish culture in Spain flourished in many cities to the degree that later Arab geographers referred to certain cities—including Lucena, Granada, and Tarragona—as "Jewish cities." The real cultural prosperity of the Jewish community in Spain, however, began under the rule of Abd Rahman III (912–961). Under him, such people emerged and thrived as the physician and chief negotiator Hisdai ibn Shaprut, the poet Samuel ha-Nagid (who served as vizier and commander of the army of Granada for more than twenty-five years, the astrologer Isaac ibn Albalia (who served as the court astrologer under al-Mu'tamid, who ruled from 1068 to 1091), the scholar Joseph ibn Migash

(who was sent on diplomatic missions by al-Mu'tamid), and the great Talmudist Isaac Alfas.

In 1146 another politico-religious Berber dynasty of Morocco, Al-muwahhidun, conquered Muslim Spain, which was largely under the control of another Arab group. This marked the beginning of uneasy relations between Muslims and Jews as this dynasty persecuted Jews and forced some of them to leave Spain and to seek shelter elsewhere. One of the families that suffered this fate was none other than that of the most famous Jewish thinker Moshe Ben Maymun, known in the West as Maimonides (1135–1204), who is considered to be the most famous Jewish philosopher and physician of the entire Muslim epoch.

The same observations can be made about Jewish–Muslim relations and Jewish–Arab relations during the various successive empires that ruled the Islamic world: the Seljuks, the Fatimites, the Ottoman Empire, and so on. During all these periods, and in almost all cases, one finds that Jews and Arabs continued to maintain relations of peaceful coexistence and cooperation.[5]

Understanding the historical circumstances that brought about either cooperation or confrontation can be helpful in understanding the future shape that relations between these two nations will take. Indeed, many aspects of the future can be predicted by understanding the past, for if we can determine that the confrontations between Arabs and Jews are a product of historical circumstances rather than a result of inherent contradictions between the two civilizations, then we know that future relations can, to some degree, be controlled and managed. We can avoid the historical circumstances that have led to so much confrontation in the recent past while at the same time we can understand our common cultural dimensions and common heritage, which have brought about so much cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the more distant past.

III. THE CYCLE OF WARS IN RETROSPECT: AN OVERVIEW

The first violent episodes between Arabs and Jews occurred under the British Mandate, primarily in 1921, 1929, and 1936. What eventually became a pattern of one major military confrontation in each subsequent decade has lasted until the present. We review key events in the following sections.

1. *The 1948 War of Liberation/Al Nakba:* With the final withdrawal of the British, the declaration of Israel's independence on May 15, 1948, enlarged to *regional* dimensions what had been until then a *local* armed conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. Seven Arab states declared war on Israel, and the actual fight in Israel's southern and eastern front lasted until 1949. Israel and then Transjordan divided between themselves the land of the Palestinian state conceived in the 1947 partition.

2. *The 1956 Sinai Campaign/Suez War:* Israel's concern about the incursion of *fedayin* (armed infiltrations) through its border with Egypt and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea brought about collusion with France and the United Kingdom to reverse Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The nature of the conflagration was characteristic as a south/north dispute about sovereignty over national resources, and joint Soviet/United States pressure brought about a territorial withdrawal from Sinai.

3. *The 1967 Six-Day/June War:* This armed conflict brought Israel into confrontation with its three main neighbors, first with a preemptive strike against Egypt, then action against Syria, and then a swift military response after being attacked by Jordan. The fast victory of the Jewish state resulted, respectively, in the occupation of Sinai (including the Gaza Strip), the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. The increased support of Israel by the United States resulted in many Arab countries cutting relations with Washington and the Soviet bloc (except Romania and Cuba), severing ties with Israel, and shaping the Israel–Arab conflict into a typical East–West Cold War case. Eventually a war of attrition followed on both sides of the Suez Canal.

4. *The 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan/October War:* In a surprise attack, Egypt crossed the Suez Canal into Sinai and the Syrians regained part of the Golan Heights, but then Israel's troops advanced even deeper into the west side of the Suez Canal and into an enclave within Syrian territory. The Soviet Union considered sending in its own troops, and the initial reaction of the United States was to declare a nuclear alert. This act served to

deter further inter-bloc escalation. Subsequent shuttle diplomacy by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brought about a separation of forces between Israel and both Egypt and Syria, but only after months of artillery exchange. The war precipitated an oil crisis, including a sharp price increase and a boycott of Israel's allies by Arab countries. In this we see the global reach of this new round of conflict, including fears of a nuclear war and the economic impact experienced both by oil exporters and importers.

5. *The 1982 Operation of Peace in the Galilee/ Lebanon War:* Collusion between Israel and a short-lived Christian-led government in Beirut brought about an invasion and occupation of a large part of Lebanon, including its capital, Beirut. Aimed presumably only at dismantling the PLO-dominated *Fatahland* (a forty-mile strip of land bordering southern Lebanon), at that time Defense Minister Sharon may have facilitated the displacement of Palestinian refugees through Syria into Jordan, fulfilling a master plan to replace the Hashemite Kingdom with a Palestinian state. The partial occupation lasted for nearly two decades, backed by Israel controlling a strip along its entire northern border in an alliance with a co-opted South Lebanon Army. In this war, no Arab countries came to the rescue of the Palestinians massacred in Lebanon. This reduced the dimensions of the conflict primarily to an Israeli–Palestinian conflict, with Lebanese elites divided mostly across denominational lines and militant Shiite Muslims becoming in favor of the Palestinians and Syrian proxies. With the subsequent exile of the PLO leadership to Tunis and then eruption of the first *intifada* in 1987 the communal conflict focused again on the land under dispute. The militarized response by the Israel Defense Forces, which killed more than a thousand Palestinians, provoked a Palestinian reaction of "limited violence," with fewer than a hundred Israeli casualties, mostly from weapons. (We present a more in-depth analysis within the "Cycle of Peace" section.)

6. *The 1991 Gulf War/Second Gulf War:* A new war led by the United States in 1991 (considered to be the "Second Gulf War" when the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s is referred to as the "First Gulf War") successfully caused Saddam Hussein's troops to withdraw from occupied Kuwait and resulted in Iraq's subsequent loss of control over northern and southern Kuwaiti territory. For the first time, Israel was asked by the United States, and agreed, to refrain from reacting militarily to an Arab attack, this time to the long-range missile attacks of the Baghdad regime. Paradoxically, this time the Jewish state was indirectly assisted by a large coalition fighting Sadam Hussein, including both Egypt and Syria.

7. *The Second Intifada:* In September 2000, the second *intifada* began. Compared to the limited violence of the first *intifada,* it was highly militarized and given the eponym *al-Aqsa Intifada* after the mosque on the Temple Mount (also known as the al-Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. This uprising was triggered by the visit to the Temple Mount of Ariel Sharon, the Likud opposition leader. At the very least, this visit further provoked mostly civilian Palestinian and unarmed Israeli victims to suicide bombings and targeted assassinations. What one hundred years earlier was perceived as a conflict motivated by two national movements of liberation had become predominantly a religious one, fueled by fanatic messianic nationalist Jews and extreme political Islamists. This added a dangerous component of fundamentalism to the ongoing struggle. The continuous chain of armed acts and retaliations took place without direct military involvement of any Arab country, although it was encouraged by such Islamist movements as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamist regime in Iran. The unfortunate outcome resulted indirectly in a growing recognition by most on both sides, as well as globally, of the need for a two-state solution.

IIIA. THE ORIGINS OF ARAB–PALESTINIAN AND JEWISH–ZIONIST NATIONALISM (1870S–1948)

In this section, we briefly explain the parallels in the development of both the Arab–Palestinian and Jewish–Zionist movements during the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the British occupation of the Holy Land until the expiration in 1948 of its mandate over Palestine.

The formation of the Jewish national movement was due to three distinct factors: the diffusion of nationalism throughout Europe, the impact of new forms of anti-Semitism, and the keeping of the

strong relation between the Jewish religion and the "Promised Land."

The *first factor* reminds us that during the second half of the nineteenth century the sentiment that nations can have a legitimate claim to a state of their own enjoyed wide popularity, and numerous struggles led to the eventual independence of many who had been subjugated for generations. A case in point is Poland. After being split since the seventeenth century under Russia's tsar, the Austro–Hungarian empire, and Germany, Poland once again became independent and united at the end of World War I. The decline of monarchies in Europe raised the issue of people's self-determination. Large segments of Jewish people who were scattered around Europe dreamed that the idea of a nation-state should apply to them.

The *second factor* relates to disillusionment caused by discrimination against Jews in the most advanced and enlightened European states, such as France and eventually Germany. Generation after generation of people had being resigned to the authoritarian Tsarist rule in Russia. Persecutions included pogroms and other raids against innocent Jews, as well as restrictions applied to property, movement, residence, and studies. Much of the movement's origins were attributed to the despotic nature of the regime, so not a few Jews began embracing socialist ideas with the hope that a new ideology based on equality to all would erase ages-old patterns of suffering against a minority whose only crime was to attempt to remain different. France was in many ways an example of an enlightened nation that offered hope and a new relationship to Jews. Beginning with Napoleon, discriminatory laws against Jews and the official banning of the call for formation of a new Sanhedrin (council of judges) to represent World Jewry were defined as examples of discrimination and were no longer tolerated.

Theodore Herzl, an assimilated Viennese journalist, who earlier thought that the solution for avoiding persecution against Jews was conversion to Catholicism, came to Paris as a correspondent and in 1894 encountered the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Dreyfus, a non-practicing Jew, was charged with and found guilty of spying for the German enemy, while the upper echelons of the army were aware that the real informant was an officer with a noble pedigree. The writer Émile Zola, who with other liberals denounced this new form of anti-Semitism, revealed the conspiracy that pointed to Dreyfus as a scapegoat. Herzl understood that the issue was not only state policies that discriminated against people but also much deeper societal trends that could not be easily uprooted. For a majority of those Jews who wanted to escape the persecution of the ruthless tsar and Catholic anti-Semites in Europe, the idea of going to another continent was seen as a way of creating a new home, but a minority started to believe that the self-realization of the Jews was not going to take place there either. In 1896 Herzl wrote the famous *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*). A year later he managed to convene in Basel, Switzerland, a large number of Zionist leaders who formed the World Zionist Organization (WZO). Zionist groups had been active since the 1860s, especially in Russia, but they were united as WZO members in a political movement seeking world legitimacy and power to assert their claim and grant them the possibility of settling in a community and eventually declaring a state in *Eretz Israel.*

This brings us to the *third factor:* the longstanding connection of the Jewish religion with a specific territory, from which Jews were dispersed into exile two thousand years earlier. Since then, Jews have been praying "Next year in Jerusalem." Forgetting Jerusalem was like forgetting one's right arm. Mount Zion was for Jews a symbol and the source of the Old Testament. With this vivid connection, it was obvious for most nationalistic thinkers that the return to Zion was the only option. Even in 1904, sensing the urgency of providing a national home for the Jews escaping persecution, a minority in the World Zionist Organization called for settling in Uganda, but in 1904 the majority of the delegates refused to trade off their deep-rooted link with the Promised Land, as the covenant between Moses and God had established. Some have said that dispersed Jews around the world carried the scrolls of the Bible as their "portable state." By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of fulfilling their longing for Jerusalem became a reality, a doable proposition. "Nothing can stand against the will of people," it was said. The tragedy was that this was not an "empty land for a landless people." For more than a millennium an established Arab community not only had been settled there but had come to consider the land genuinely theirs by birth and right.

Herzl tried to secure a charter for a Jewish settlement from the Ottoman sultan and from the German kaiser but did not. After Herzl's death in 1904, the new leader of the WZO, Dr. Chaim Weizman, continued efforts to secure the support of leading world powers to legitimize and eventually help to realize Zionist claims. Weizman, was a great admirer of the British and preferred to associate the WZO's predicament with the new colonial designs of the British, so he worked together with important Zionist leaders to receive British support. After the outbreak of the World War I, WZO leaders' learned that Mark Sykes, on behalf of Her Majesty's government, and François George-Picot, on behalf of the French Republic, had agreed to a division of Palestine that was supposed to ensure joint dominion. Other potential allies, such as Russia and Italy, were also putting their claims on part of the soon-to-be-defeated Ottoman Empire. Through excellent diplomacy, in 1917 Sykes' Zionist partner, Nahum Sokolov, secured a declaration of sympathy with Zionists' aspirations for a Jewish home in the land of their ancestors from the Director General of the French Quai D'Orsay, Jules Cambon. This statement was used to further lobby the British government to rush into the proclamation of a similar statement, as was issued on behalf of the Cabinet on November 2, 1917, by Lord Arthur Balfour, and known as the Balfour Declaration.

The outcome of World War I was a watershed for the Zionist movement. This unilateral promise was legitimized in the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 and a year later by formalizing British rule in a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. The promising new era started with appointment of a pro-Zionist British high commissioner, Lord Herbert Samuel. Over the next decade, the relationship between Zionists and local authorities started to cool as a greater awareness emerged regarding the hostility of the local Arab population to the new *aliyot* (Hebrew for "immigration waves"), the gradual disposition of land, and fears regarding further plans. The change of government in London also precipitated a revision of official policy, which led to commissions of inquiry coming to Palestine and checking the outbreaks of violence. The commissions blamed not only the perpetrators but also Jewish immigration and settlement. Two white papers were issued, both limiting the development of the independent Zionist movement in Palestine.

The obstacles for immigration to Palestine became even more serious after 1935 when Jews started to escape from Nazi Germany and eventually from the vast territories under Hitler's rule. In 1938 an appeal devised at a conference in Évian, France, and addressed to the international community to accept the thousands of escaping Jews was met by only one country, the Dominican Republic, which was willing to accept only four thousand Jews with agricultural experience. Thus, immigration to Palestine became a top objective. Many ships were stopped, and Jews were sent back to their eventual deaths in concentration camps in Europe. Other Jews were sent to a detention camp in Cyprus. The determination of Zionists to continue with illegal immigration through World War II and beyond was confirmed at the WZO conference held in 1942 at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, during which the WZO openly declared its aim of establishing a Jewish state in *Eretz Israel.*

On the other hand, the Arab people were looking for allies against the oppressive, corrupt, and arbitrary Ottoman rule, and many Arab leaders sealed their loyalties with France (particularly Christians in Greater Syria) and with Great Britain (led by tribal leaders in the Arabian Peninsula). This support came on top of Britain's already strong presence in Egypt. Through an exchange of letters in 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, and Sharif Hussein, the Emir of Hedjaz, the Arabs' expectations of independence were generated by interpretations of the British mentioning specific locations on an unwritten map, which implied the inclusion of most Arab territories.

What led to the misinterpretation of the Balfour Declaration was that Sharif Hussein was not aware that the *villayet* (Turkish for "province") of western Beirut (roughly equivalent to most of Palestine) was not included in the land that was to be given to the Arabs. This news was conveyed to him through correspondence with Sir McMahon. The latter was not in a position to promise Palestine to the Arabs, regardless of the fact that during World War I about 700,000 Muslims were living there, as were 53,000 Christians and 56,000 Jews.

The dual promise meant that the Balfour Declaration's promise—which stated that no acts should

be conducted to the detriment of the native Arab population—could not be honored. The clause initially was not followed and later was only partially respected. Most official versions of the history of both sides highlight the armed confrontations or riots that took place in 1921, 1929, and 1936; caused serious casualties on both sides; and often triggered people-to-people clashes. Still, it is important to mention that Palestinian families were known to rescue Jewish neighbors in life-threatening situations in Hebron and Jewish settlers were known to offer friendly gestures toward Arabs when the pressure to leave their lands was mounting in the 1947–1948 war.

Over time, Palestinian nationalism has grown into a distinct submovement within the larger Arab movement. To understand its genesis, we cannot avoid exploring the historical development of Palestinian nationalism in the context of the bigger pan-Arab ideology—that is, Arab nationalism.

Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled western Asia for almost five hundred years. From the seventh century until almost the mid-twentieth century, Palestine was predominantly a Muslim country, although Christian Arabs and Jewish communities also shared this small land. Then the Ottoman Empire encountered many problems: first was the loss of its centralized system of government; second was Turkey's involvement in many wars with Russia, Prussia, and Austria; third was warlords taking action on their own and imposing additional taxes on the poor peasants who comprised various ethnic and national minorities.[6] Moreover, the ideology of the West swept the nation-states in response to the French Revolution. In addition, the ethnic and national minorities always wanted reform, though they never achieved it. The result was more and more frustration for everyone.

Secessionists of many of the minorities grouped themselves into political parties to try to achieve their independence from the Ottoman Empire. Arabs were the ones who really carried the banners of Islam and accepted Ottoman domination of the Islamic Empire. However, when nationalism grew within Turkish society, the imposition of Turkification on all national minorities led to the revocation of this acceptance by national minorities and by the Muslim Arabs who in particular felt that they were treated as second-class citizens. Economic repression and total control of these minorities prompted the feeling that the Turkish sultans were no longer ruling by the principles and tenets of Islam. In response, rebellion against the Ottomans began underground at first and then in the open. One of the most important turning points occurred when, for the first time, the East (meaning the Arab and Muslim world and the Ottoman Empire) was exposed to the West's culture, history, and politics. This crossroad led to the belief among Arabs that Muslim civilization was no longer the leading culture.

This turning point in Arab history started with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, at which time the Mamluk governor, Muhammed Ali Pasha, wanted to secede from the Ottoman Empire. However, when Napoleon invaded Egypt he brought all kinds of sophisticated technology with him, such as weapons and a printing press. The Arabs were surprised to learn the extent to which the Ottoman Empire was backward in terms of technology. Consequently, Muhammed Ali sent officers to Paris. When the delegation returned five years later, it opened schools of translation and started to translate into Arabic the literature of the French Revolution and such Western concepts as the nation-state.

Two ideologies emerged at that time. First came the Arab Christian intellectual idea that the Arabic language was the determining factor of Arab identity. Arab Christians in the Ottoman Empire, who felt they were treated as third-class citizens, had ties with the West and spoke more than on language, so they were able to make direct contact with the West. For them, expressing nationalism was best achieved through reviving the Arabic language and not religion, and soon these individuals became leaders. Separation between church and state provided Arab Christians with the same privileges enjoyed by Muslims. Second came the Islamic reformers who did not want to touch Islam but wanted to get rid of certain ideas that distorted Islam, which in the final analysis made all the Ottoman sovereigns abusers of power by their misinterpretation of Islam. Islamic fundamentalists considered Islamic reformism at a later stage to be heresy because they thought that reformists were trying to misinterpret Islam in the context of alien Western ideals. Between Islamic reformism and Arab nationalism, forces were joined against

Ottomanism, which represented authoritarianism and repression.

It is important at this point to talk about Palestinian nationalism. The ideas of nationalism and nation-state really found ground in the Fertile Crescent (eastern Mediterranean region) in the latter part of the nineteenth century. However, the development of Arab nationalism was straightforward because the Arabs shared the same language, culture, and history; were rooted in their land; and mostly did not migrate. Several factors led to this sense of shared identity being expressed in a more explicit national form. By 1918 a political movement based in Damascus and Beirut was demanding the independence of Levantine (bordering on the eastern Mediterranean) Arabs from the Turks, after many requests for reform had failed. At that time Palestinians were part of the general Arab national movement that swept the Levantine area. At the San Remo conference in 1920, Britain was given Palestine under its own mandate system. The British Mandate came into existence with its first high commissioner, Herbert Samuel, who was a Zionist and was assigned by the British government to be the commissioner of Palestine. In Arab eyes, Britain acted unfairly. While Britain has been accused of favoring the Arabs on paper, in reality it never curbed Jewish immigration or the buying of land in Palestine by Zionists.

Palestinian nationalism passed through three phases. The *first phase* (1921–1929) is referred to as "peaceful resistance" to the British Mandate. The Palestinians used obstructionist methods, such as civil disobedience (not paying taxes, etc.). In opposing the British, the *second phase* is portrayed as the radicalization process of the Palestinian national movement, which started with the Wailing Wall incident in 1929—the result of a long-running dispute between Muslims and Jews over access to the Western (or "Wailing") Wall—and ended in 1935 with the formation of the Arab Higher Committee and the emergence of Palestinian political parties. The *third phase* was the outright rebellion in 1936, which ended in 1939 with the downfall of traditional leadership in Palestine.

In discussing the social structure of Palestine, it is important to note that the society was traditional, primordial, and tribal, with three social divisions: Bedouins, rurals, and urban centers. Political leaders were from the "notables" (as the ruling elite were called) of the urban centers, and rurals were those who fought and carried swords. The political center was in the cities, and Jerusalem was considered the main location for political activity. When the British came to colonize Palestine, the first thing they did was change the power structure of the notables, such as the two top political figures: the mayor and the *mufti* of Palestine. The highest religious figure was from the Husseini family; however, two families held most political control: the Husseini and the Nashashibi. Politics of the notables, which were linked to the politics of factionalism that also swept the PLO leadership structure, were considered an important part of Palestinian history.

The Nashashibi family controlled the Islamic *Shariah* courts and controlled considerable amounts of land. According to Islamic *Shariah* law, when the *mufti* dies, an election should take place and *ulamahs* (religious leaders) will determine the elections and decide who will be the next mufti. The British realized that the elected candidate belonged to the opposition, which put the Husseini family in an awkward position. After a riot in Jaffa in 1920 the British ousted the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazen, who was a Husseini, and appointed Rougheb Nashashibi, a leader from this extended family in his place. During the 1920 revolt, a young man named Amin Husseini was considered to be the inciter of the revolt. He fled to Transjordan as a result of the British decision to allow capital punishment. When Sir Herbert Samuel became the first high commissioner to Palestine in 1920, he brought with him as his legal advisor a British Jew by the name of Norman Bentwich, who advised officials to bring back Amin Husseini to create balance.

The encounter between the Zionist and the native Arab population in Palestine was not a success story. Although a few thousand Jews who stayed in the land or came before the 1860s resided in the ancient cities of Jerusalem, Safad, Hebron, Haifa, Tiberias, and Jaffo and were living in friendly relations with their neighbors, the new waves of immigration posed a great threat to the indigenous population. In addition to settling the land and starting new agricultural ventures, at times on land purchased from absentee owners to the detriment of the working peasants, some of the socialist ideas were also perceived to be a threat by the tradi-

tional Arab establishment. Members of the new *ishuv* (Jewish settlement, community) brought with them innovative and even revolutionary ideas. Most of their actions between the two world wars were introspective. They tried to build the pillars for a future state in a secluded society but did not prioritize the building of relations with their already difficult Arab neighbors. Some of the more militaristic Zionists—such as Ze'ev Jabotinsky with his Iron Wall concept—did not believe that the Arabs would accept the Jewish state unless convinced that the Jews could not be thrown out or that the socialists were fully merged in building their new society based on new forms of production. Eventually the two trends converged and leaders concurred that the "Arab question" did not need to be fully explored at that time. The fact is that the low priority given in the Zionist agenda to relations with the local Arab population did not allow for anything more than sporadic efforts to reach out. On the other hand, the official leadership of the Arab community was not amenable to such contact with the Zionist "colonizers." Hence, the idea of splitting the land became by default the more realistic option. The British endorsed this idea through the Peel Commission of 1935. It was later endorsed by the UN, through the partition plan offered in 1947 by the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine.

Was the conflict unavoidable? Most likely the collision course was set from the early stages. Yet even after the frustration experienced by the Arabs in relation to the fulfillment of the full territorial promise in the aftermath of World War I, Sharif Hussein's son Feysal agreed in a draft document with the Zionist leader Chaim Weizman to a mutual recognition of their rule, respectively, over Lebanon/Syria and Palestine. Such initiative was not implemented, given that the 1919 Paris Peace Conference granted a mandate to the French and not to the Hashemite to rule over Lebanon and Syria. A second opportunity was the partition plans suggested in 1935 by a British commission of inquiry led by Lord Earl Peel and the UN in 1947. The Palestinian leadership was unwilling to compromise when a disproportionate amount of land was promised to the Jews relative to the population ratio, and that may be an added reason for a more radical rejection of a Jewish state in this Land of Islam.

IIIB. FROM THE WAR OF LIBERATION/*AL NAKBA* IN 1948 TO THE 1967 SIX-DAY/JUNE WAR

From a Jewish perspective, the immediate reaction to Israel's independence on May 15, 1948, was a declaration of war by seven Arab countries, which ended in the Jewish state victory and an enlarging of the territories promised by the 1947 UN partition plan. Israeli officials, in collusion with King Abdullah of Transjordan, conducted a secret negotiation that resulted in splitting between them the West Bank and, after a real military confrontation, a divided Jerusalem. Israel improved its borders and territorial control from 55 percent of Palestine to 78 percent, following the armistice agreements signed with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1949. Between 1949 and 1967 the "armistice lines" became the de facto borders of the State of Israel, recognized as such by the international community and by international law. During these years, no Arab Palestinian state was created in the West Bank, which was occupied and annexed by Jordan in 1950, or in the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian military control. The human cost of the war was high (1 percent of the 600,000 Jews in Palestine were killed), and approximately three-fourths of the Arab native population found themselves being removed from their homes and put into refugee camps, mostly in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The figures fluctuate according to contending calculations. Perhaps 400,000 to 700,000 Arabs went into exile and 133,000 stayed; others returned by themselves or on a small reunification-of-families plan. The official Israeli version is that most Arabs left of their own volition as a result of the pressure exerted by the Arab governments, which wanted to pave the way for the bombardment and maneuvers of the expectedly victorious Arab armies. On the other hand, the official Arab version is that massacres perpetuated by extremist factions, such as the one committed by Menachem Begin's *Irgun* in Deir Yassin in the outskirts of Jerusalem, as well as deportation acts of mainstream Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's *Haganah* army, were responsible for their forceful eviction. Books based on currently available official Israeli documents seem to corroborate a mixed picture comprised of fear and panic accompanied by decisions for deportation adopted by local Israeli

commanders and official policies to not have Arab populations staying near the frontiers, which all bordered enemy countries.[7]

The leadership and vast majority of the population of Israel were willing to sign a permanent treaty based on the existing borders of the 1949 armistice lines, including a divided Jerusalem. Under the short tenure of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, they were even willing to consider the return of a small number of Palestinian refugees. Overall, the consensus was that such an option was not met due to Arab intransigence. Hence, the main effort continued to be introspective. The new "Law of Return" encouraged Jews to come back to their homeland, which multiplied their numbers threefold in eight years. Such an unprecedented historic effort required food rationing for the entire population and the temporary settlement in tents and provisional housing of immigrants—mostly Holocaust survivors arriving in the immediate post–War World II period, and subsequently mostly Jews from Arab countries through the 1950s.

While some indirect and secret contacts with Egypt could have led to some possible agreements, the conventional wisdom of the Israelis was that peace had no chance. Civil societies on both sides were not involved in dialogue. With Jabotinsky's Iron Wall perception of the enemy, it was premature to expect the Arabs to agree to Jewish existence and build a strong Israel. They had no choice but to accept Jews and then negotiate from a position of strength, which has continued to be part of the prevailing ethos.

The 1948 war also strengthened the "Jordanian option," namely that the partner for peace for the Zionists was Sharif Hussein's son, Abdallah. In a secret agreement he agreed that Israel could keep part of the territory promised to the Palestinians in the 1947 UN Partition Plan, while Transjordan would annex the larger part of the West Bank to become the Kingdom of Jordan. Hence, in the view of moderate Israelis the remaining issue needed to obtain peace was a gesture of acceptance of some of the Arab refugees displaced during the war. While waiting for a partner of peace, Israeli efforts within Israel turned domestically to a struggle against discriminatory policies directed at the Arab minority. In the years before 1967, several domestic Arab–Jewish rapprochements occurred within Israel, with projects aimed at fighting against such restrictions as the military authority governing the Arab population of Israel. Most human rights–oriented Israeli forces focused on Arab–Jewish coexistence until 1966, when Arabs came to be regulated a military government.

From an Arab perspective, *Al Nakba* was catastrophic not only in the sense of so many lives and so much property being lost in the war against the Jews, but also in the precarious situation resulting as the majority of Palestinian people became refugees scattered in alien lands. Over the next decades, three main groups became instruments in the hands of others. In Israel, the remaining minority became second-class citizens yet retained full voting rights, mostly represented in the Knesset (Israeli parliament) by the Communist Party. With the incorporation of the West Bank into Transjordan, the West Bankers and the 1948 refugees living there were forcefully co-opted to become Jordanians, the subjects of foreign Hashemite kings, and they joined their displaced brethren who had found refuge in the East Bank. While discriminated against and mistrusted by the ruling elite, at least they were granted documentation that allowed them to travel, and eventually some of them attempted to settle in other countries, such as Kuwait. What was worse was the situation for refugees living in temporary camps in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip under Egyptian rule. Added to their daily suffering was the fact that they were denied access to the nationality of their host countries.

Given the subsequent shock and despair, it would have been considered tantamount to an act of treason for any well-intentioned Palestinian leader to come to the Israelis with a message of peace. The only place where cooperation did exist in those early years of the conflict was between the marginalized Marxist groups that found mutual coexistence feasible on a class, rather than an ethnic, level.

Suffering a total loss and weak, manipulated leadership, as well as intra-Arab rivalry, the main belief among most Palestinians then scattered in the Middle East was that only the triumph of pan-Arabism could solve their problem. They were not in control of their destiny until 1964, when Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) and the PLO became the Palestinians' representative organizations and triggered some new, now dominant, strategies through their own institutions.[8]

At that time, the use of armed struggle was seen by the dispossessed Palestinians as the only way to redress the injustice of the creation of Israel. Ideologically and practically, no legitimacy was given to dialogue with the enemy. The Palestinian National Charter (PNC) of 1964 and the amended National Charter of 1968, drawn up during drafting of the fourth PNC using the resolutions of the second and third PNCs, emphasized the total liberation of Palestine through armed struggle and self-reliance leading to the creation of sociopolitical and economic institutions that could cater to the needs of a shattered society.

IIIC. ISRAEL IN CONTROL OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: FROM 1967 UNTIL THE GULF WAR

The 1967 Six-Day/June War followed a slow escalation of Fatah-sponsored infiltrations and bombs, low-scale Israeli retaliatory acts, artillery exchange, a decision by President Nasser to evict the UN peacekeeping force from Sinai, the closure of the Straits of Tirana in the Gulf of Akaba, the unsuccessful effort of Israeli diplomacy to secure international action for freedom of navigation, massive demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere calling for the destruction of Israel, signs of preparation for a combined Egyptian attack in the southern and eastern fronts of Israel, and eventually a surprise preemptive strike of Israeli planes that destroyed the air force capability of Egypt. In the subsequent six days, the Israel Defense Forces conquered the entire Sinai and the Golan Heights. In spite of a message transmitted from Prime Minister Eshkol to King Hussein to keep out, the monarch felt that he could not remain idle and, perhaps misled by false information from Egypt about alleged military victories, he ordered artillery fire on Jewish West Jerusalem and initiated infantry occupation of border posts. Israel then destroyed all convoys coming from the east to the West Bank, conquering the latter and, after heavy fighting, the Old City with its holy places.

By generalizing, it could be said that the Six-Day War was perceived by Israeli Jews to be a case of an imposed military confrontation that threatened Israel's very survival. The resulting control over the territories was deemed necessary for security reasons, rather than as the result of premeditated annexationist policy. For this reason, Israeli Jews overwhelmingly have not seen the occupation as a colonial one but rather as an unforeseen outcome of an unwanted conflagration because they believe the territories were taken in a just war, one launched by Arab states wishing to destroy Israel.[9] A considerable portion of the Israeli public perceived itself as a nation facing the danger of annihilation.

Israel's occupation of Sinai, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights as a result of the military victory in the 1967 war produced a polarization within its society between two "camps." On the one hand, the more nationalistic religious and secular wing calling for the annexation of territories grouped themselves in the *Eretz Israel Hashlema* movement (in Hebrew, this literarily means "the complete land of Israel"). Triggered by the new territorial gains, this group "represented the revival of a traditional ideology never renounced by some groups within Israel that had now found new relevance."[10] The Six-Day War was explained in a memorial speech by its victorious military leader Yitzhak Rabin to be a war of self-defense, not one for purposes of conquest. He said that the territories were to be seen as a guarantee for peace. However, soon after the war, the Labor-led government was "pragmatically" experimenting with the crippling annexation by encouraging military/civilian outposts in strategic areas. Labor's reluctance to take a clear stand was recognizable to "doves" and "hawks" within its ranks. By then the settlers' *Gush Emunim* ("Block of Faith") movement had started. Around 1974 settlers started to push for the establishment of their own "illegal" settlements throughout the entirety of the Occupied Territories and announced a return to the "old homes" in Hebron. On the other hand, the "Movement for Peace and Security" could be seen as a countermovement, but it is clear that it would have developed even if the Land of Israel movement had never been formed. For the peace movement, the Six-Day War provided the opportunity to solve the problem of Israel– Arab relations.[11]

The popular terms *right* and *left,* used elsewhere in the world to characterize the forces supporting more capitalist and working-class policies, correlate to a large extent with political groups in Israel, although one could find within the *kibbutz* movement some annexation trends and, among

industrialists and large entrepreneurs, a large number supportive of a meaningful compromise with Palestinians. Likewise, within both Labor and Likud, it was possible to find individuals approaching the territorial preferences and policies of the other. Within the two "camps," a silent majority of the Jewish population has been indecisive and willing to follow leadership on such crucial decisions.

Considering the Labor Party's politically pragmatic socialist–democratic platform, which advocated the return of the Occupied Territories for the sake of peace, the Israeli Labor governments in power until 1977 should have enhanced the development of democratic and peaceful tendencies among the West Bank Palestinians. In fact, however, during the first several years of the occupation the Israeli Labor government cultivated alliances with traditional and conservative leaders in the West Bank, who were neither democratic nor socialist. This government was also inclined to trade the West Bank for peace with Jordan but not with the Palestinians, whom Prime Minister Golda Meir, for example, would not consider a nation. Although the Labor government acknowledged for the first time in 1974 the existence of a Palestinian "problem," it continued until its demise in 1977 to seek a Jordanian solution for the West Bank Palestinian problem.

From previous European experience, a question that comes to our minds is, To what extent does a colonial situation affect the democratic values of a people in a metropolis? The Occupied Territories are adjacent to the pre-1967 Israel; they are not separate or remote, as were the historical European colonies. Such geographic proximity introduces associations with the type of determinism required to ensure "vital space" (or *lebensraum*)—secure borders and a reservoir for potential Jewish immigration—and the demographic prevalence of a Jewish majority. Furthermore, the consolidation of a Jewish nation-state may still be at a premature stage. Israel's current boundaries are not yet historically well grounded. Israel is a new state, where melting-pot ideas are considered necessary for the formulation of a strong national spirit. The conception of Israel as a Jewish state (rather than as a state for Jews to come to if desired or needed, as well as with equality to all its citizens) does have exclusivist connotations. It puts the remaining 20 percent of non-Jews in a position of unequal access to the same opportunities, a policy rationalized by many of Israel's Jews because of their Arab co-citizens' shared traits with their enemies in the rest of the Middle East.

Israeli governments' expansionist policies came to the fore at a time of postcolonialism, when the processes of self-determination reached an advanced stage all around the globe. The conquest of territories and the expulsion, extermination, or subjugation of populations was a common albeit declining practice until World War II, but only a look into the past can corroborate such policies now that the international protection of human rights has gained a high level of legitimacy.

If the 1967 war gave Israelis a sense of security even when a war of attrition continued along the Suez Canal, the surprise combined attack of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan/October 1973 war was a reality shock and a reminder that the state was not invulnerable. The conception of the impenetrability of the Bar Lev Line (a chain of fortifications built by Israel along the eastern coast of the Suez Canal after it captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt during the Six-Day War) became a trap that caused hundreds of Israeli casualties. Some of the *kibbutzim* in the Golan Heights were evacuated when faced with the initial offensive of the Syrian troops. The quick mobilization and excellent military strategy of the Israelis, aided by the United States with a quick refurbishing of military software and hardware, brought a swift recovery over the previously occupied territories of Egypt and Syria, as well as a new incursion into both countries that crossed the Suez Canal and stopped only a few hours away from Cairo and at artillery distance from Damascus. Israel's advance was also stopped by Henry Kissinger with a stalemate, providing for a "no defeat, no victory" policy, whence he became the shuttle diplomat negotiating on both fronts for a separation of forces based on Israeli partial withdrawal. The feeling that the war was a "treacherous attack" on the holiest Jewish day, along with anger against Golda Meir's reluctance to launch a last-minute, though perhaps futile, preemptive strike, further polarized Israelis. A sign that Arabs could not be trusted brought back the concept of a garrison state. This sentiment prevailed and led voters to punish Labor in the 1977 elections and look for the toughest candidate, represented by then Likud leader Menachem Begin.

Meanwhile, racist Rabbi Meir Kahane started to speak about the transfer of the "fifth column," the peaceful Arab community that was becoming self-reliant within Israel.

The new facts on the ground for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were that they were both now formally under the control of one authority: Israel. The possibility of a joint future in an independent entity was regained, as was the understanding that a victorious Israel was a reality, and as such that perhaps the more realistic end would be the now new chance to have a state next to Israel, a sort of new partition. In fact two main factions developed among the Palestinians: those in exile, using the term *Diaspora* as coined in relation to the Jewish people, and those in the Occupied Territories, whose main purpose was their determination to stay in the land—*summud* ("steadfastness" in Arabic)—and not to become refugees, some for a second time. While accepting of being subordinated to the PLO in exile, a process of leadership formation with distinct characteristics was shaped.

Democratic trends and institutions have in fact developed among the Palestinians in the West Bank since 1967 through the formation of many social, professional, and municipal bodies, most of which were elected and operated democratically.[12] They conducted de facto political activities and through a variety of newspapers and journals freely expressed political opinions and views, including severe anti-Israeli expressions. Simultaneously, alongside a prolonged and vigorous struggle against the Israeli occupation, since 1967 significant tendencies have appeared among the West Bank population toward accommodation and coexistence with Israel. The Israeli military authorities, while prohibiting the formation of new political parties, maintained part of the previous quasi-democratic political system in the West Bank. They permitted and often encouraged the functioning of municipalities and village councils in accordance with the 1955 Jordanian law that allowed only men beyond age twenty-one who paid property taxes—primarily members of the wealthy classes—to vote. Indeed, most of the town councilors (and certainly the village *sheikhs*) who operated in the West Bank following the 1967 war and those elected in the 1972 municipal elections belonged to traditional, conservative, rich families. Most advocated the return of the West Bank to Jordan as part of a political agreement with Israel. Yet a few personalities, notably the mayor of Hebron, *Sheikh* Muhammad Ali al Ja'bari, and a small group of more progressive intellectuals, such as lawyer Aziz Shihada and Dr. al-Taji al-Faruqi, suggested the establishment of a Palestinian entity or state that would peacefully coexist with Israel. Some of these progressive personalities called for the convening of a popular Palestinian congress to discuss these issues and a constituent assembly to elect a new leadership to initiate direct negotiations with Israel.

This new position was articulated and developed by the Palestine National Front (PNF), which was established in 1973 by the outlawed Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), some followers of Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and representatives from labor unions, professional associations, student councils, and other groups. The PCP agenda of a two-state solution to the Palestinian–Israeli dispute, to be achieved by political means, won over significant sections of the Palestinian urban intelligentsia and workers in the West Bank. Unlike the PLO's notion of a secular democratic state, the communist ideas were more pragmatic than those of the PLO. Such pressure was also expressed by a group of mayors elected in the 1976 free elections in the West Bank. Fahd Qawasmah of Hebron, Elias Freij of Bethlehem, and Rashad al-Shawwa of Gaza were among those advocating a peaceful coexistence between the State of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and welcomed U.S. President Jimmy Carter's speech of March 1977 calling for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza and initially praised Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historical visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

Prime Minister Begin, backed by his hard-line comrades, notably Ariel Sharon, adopted an uncompromising policy regarding the Camp David talks, while prompting Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman to resign in 1980 from the Israeli cabinet. With Ariel Sharon as defense minister after 1981, a series of harsh measures were aimed by Israel at eliminating Palestinian representatives and democratically elected institutions and organizations. Several elected mayors were dismissed, the National Guidance Committee (NGC) was outlawed,

universities were periodically closed, and newspapers became subject to heavy political censorship. More Arab lands were confiscated while new Jewish settlements were established in the West Bank, and various aggressive and illegal activities of the *Gush Emunim* settlers were tolerated by the Israeli government.

In place of elected officers, the Israeli government endeavored to promote but eventually failed to install an alternative Palestinian leadership, the "Village Leagues." Those individuals were neither elected by nor representative of the West Bank residents but were composed of traditional rural families who collaborated with the Israeli military administration. Moreover, the removal of the representative, partly democratically elected West Bank leaders did not stop the democratization process among the West Bank Palestinians. On the contrary, it enhanced the process. Indeed, partly in reaction to the elimination of the top elected leaders and national institutions, partly as a defense mechanism vis-à-vis Israeli repression, the democratization process further expanded among the grassroots of the Palestinian community through the growing number of and membership in trade unions; professional associations; women, student, and youth movements; and the like. An increasing number of Palestinians regarded their participation in these organizations as a major way to combat Israeli occupation and establish democratic institutions. Thus, for the first time the notion of democracy became, alongside the ideas of national solidarity and struggle against occupation, a major ethos among West Bank Palestinians.

Evidently, the PLO, under Chairman Arafat at the time, vehemently opposed both the return of the West Bank to Jordan and the creation of an independent state in the framework of a political agreement with Israel. This organization was then fully committed to the total destruction of Israel through an armed struggle. Not only did the PLO threaten the lives of Palestinians who supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, but the idea was still premature and heretical among most Palestinians in the West Bank, notably the modern urban intelligentsia and followers of the various radical groups (including multiple guerrilla organizations, the Arab Nationalist movement, the Ba'th Party, and a militant wing of the Communist Party).

Yet this phase was characterized by a marked revision of the PLO objectives, from total liberation to a democratic secular state in which Christians, Muslims, and Jews could live together harmoniously. After the October 1973 war, the PLO embarked on a pragmatic course culminating in the declaration of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories and the ultimate acceptance of a two-state solution in 1988. This historic decision was not made in a vacuum; it was, rather, a response to such successive important events as the Lebanese Civil War, the Camp David Accords, and the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the *intifada* uprising in the Occupied Territories.

The Lebanon Civil War in 1982

The Israeli official sequence of events starts with the attempted assassination in London of Israeli Ambassador to England Shlomo Argow, which left him incapacitated for life. Retaliation came in the form of heavy air strikes in Beirut, which killed 45 people and wounded 150. This assault was answered by heavy rocket and artillery fire into northern Israel, which drove inhabitants into shelters. Israel's massive reaction was Operation Peace for Galilee. It was perceived initially as a large armed incursion. It started on June 6, 1982, and it is likely that nobody expected it would be twenty years until the unilateral pullout took place under Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The originally declared cleansing of "Fatahland," where the PLO was totally autonomous, was bypassed by the troops already dominating Beirut. Israel declared a ceasefire and insisted that the armed Palestinians (approximately 6,000 in Beirut) leave the country. With the mediation of U.S. envoy Philip Habib, about 15,000 were evacuated in the last week of August. Israeli forces nevertheless moved back around the area of Palestinian refugee camps. Two camps were attacked by Christian militias under the umbrella of vigilant troops of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and hundreds of victims, mostly unarmed civilians, were killed. An Israeli commission of inquiry led by Supreme Court Judge Yitzhak Kahan in February 1983 published a report putting direct responsibility on the Phalange (the Kataeb Party of Lebanon) but concluded that the Israeli authorities carried indirect responsibil-

ity and pronounced that Defense Minister Sharon's irresponsible behavior should bar him from again becoming minister of defense. One of the factors that led to Prime Minister Begin's resignation was his seeing Sharon's betrayal in getting his endorsement only for the original and lesser goals without disclosing from the outset the full range of the operation. Begin's fear was that Sharon had long before developed a grand design to push out the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon via Syria (which would not accept them) and into Jordan and to gather under total control of what was to become the Palestinian state the already large majority of Palestinians living among the Jordanians. Needless to say, such a far-reaching plan failed, but Arafat had to move the PLO headquarters to Tunis and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories felt the impotence of the Arab world in coming to the rescue of the Palestinians in Lebanon. This aggravated subsequent intrafactional fighting within the PLO. The sense was that *summud* was not conducive to liberation. Palestinians were now on their own and sensed the need to take their destiny in their own hands. This sentiment was one of the main factors leading to the *intifada.*

In September 1983 Israeli troops pulled out from most of Lebanon but maintained, in cooperation with a sponsored South Lebanese Army, control until 2000 of a security zone across Israel's northern border. The Gulf War of 1991 was about the only case in which Israel, when attacked by Iraqi missiles, did not retaliate militarily. The real perception of threat among its citizens was that chemical, biological, and even nuclear warheads would be used. In 1980, in an audacious air strike, Israel knocked out an atomic reactor in Baghdad. Even so, the United States insisted that the IDF keep out, which worked, and the Israeli population stoically waited for worse attacks that, fortunately, did not materialize.

IV. THE CYCLE OF PEACE IN RETROSPECT: AN OVERVIEW

The 1948 war ended with a temporary ceasefire and armistice agreements, which were subsequently violated in the cycles of war. It took nearly three decades to reach a formal peace treaty.

1. *Israel and Egypt's 1978 Camp David agreement and subsequent peace treaty* brokered by President Jimmy Carter translated into a full Israeli withdrawal from the territory taken from Egypt in the 1967 war, the institution of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, the presence of an international force of observers in Sinai, and both sides becoming the recipients of massive economic and security foreign aid from the United States. The border has been quiet ever since, with limited bilateral interaction among the political elites and minimal trade and technical cooperation.
2. *The October 1991 Madrid-based Middle East Regional Peace Conference,* in the aftermath of the Gulf War, was attended by nearly all Arab countries and opened both multilateral tracks of negotiations on issues such as economic cooperation, water, refugees, and the environment and bilateral tracks of negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation and between Israel and Syria. The initial advance on the multilateral tracks was slowed down when the bilateral negotiations did not advance as expected and was revived again for a short time with the initial advance of the Oslo peace process, discussed in the following section.
3. *The Oslo Track II* channel of communications between the Palestinians and the Israelis materialized in a number of formal agreements launched at the White House under the auspices of President Bill Clinton in September 1993. Based on an interim period of devolution of power and territory to a Palestinian authority, it was to provide by the year 2000 the formulas for the solutions to the permanent status issues (borders and security, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem). The last-ditch efforts undertaken at Camp David in August 2000 by President Clinton convening Prime Minister Barak and Chairman/President Arafat and subsequent meetings in Taba and Sharm el-Sheikh brought negotiations close to agreement, but it failed to materialize.
4. *The Israel–Jordan peace treaty of 1994* initially produced a "warm peace," which was to include security and economic cooperation, but the outbreak of the second *intifada* (al-Aqsa) after the failure of the Oslo process to be completed in 2000 lowered to a large extent all expectations. Other incipient but promising ties that Israel established with some *Maghreb* (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) and Arab Gulf states were severed.
5. *Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the*

north of the West Bank in the summer of 2005 was an important precedent for the political viability of removal of settlements, although the remaining limitations to a restricted Palestinian administration in the strip, and the internal weaknesses and fragmentation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA, or Palestinian Authority) put in question the continuity of such a first step.

IVA. THE SADAT–BEGIN INITIATIVE: A PIONEER EFFORT (1978)

Even in the more limited Israeli–Palestinian focus of our chapter, it is important to put the Sadat–Begin episode into historical perspective. After the Yom Kippur/October War of 1973, Israel and Egypt initiated a peace process, which led to a peace treaty in March 1979. At Camp David in September 1978 Israel, Egypt, and the United States formulated a five-year autonomy plan for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. Yet this formula was not implemented due to lack of political engagement by the Palestinians themselves, as well as lack of serious intent by Israel throughout the 1980s, as evidenced by the continuation of its fait accompli policies of expanding the settlements in the Occupied Territories. Many books and articles have been written about this incredible and often moving story, including the arduous but successful negotiations in Camp David, with President Jimmy Carter as an "honest broker."[13] Not only was Egypt the first Arab country to make peace with Israel—it also was the strongest and most important of the inter-Arab regional system. It also legitimated the principle of "territories for peace." Egypt got "up to the last inch" of Sinai back, mostly in the peace agreement. It got back the remaining few square kilometers in the Taba through a groundbreaking arbitration verdict. Israel got a firm peace with a four-time war opponent. Under the supervision of the Multilateral Force of Observers (MFO), the border became one of the quietest borders in the Middle East. People spoke about a "cold peace" given that the Palestinian issue remained unresolved in the agreement and its aftermath. But the mere existence of a peace with the exchange of embassies; some trade and tourism (particularly with Sinai being one of the preferred locations for Israelis traveling abroad), notwithstanding the negative expressions as reflected in the media, the more recalcitrant left and Nasserite circles; and the Islamists on both sides of the spectrum do not erase the fact that there is peace that has taken away from Israel the existential military threat. In other words, since the peace agreement was struck with Egypt, the subsequent wars with other Arab neighbors or Palestinians did not constitute a threat to Israel's integrity, as the previous 1967 and 1973 wars were perceived to have done. Since then, the wars that Israel has waged have been more a matter of choice than existential self-defense.

The closure of the agreement that cost the life of President Sadat, who was assassinated by extreme Islamists in dramatic circumstances during a military parade, did not encourage an immediate following by other less courageous Arab leaders. However, the main reasons for a delay of more than a decade in moving on with the peace cycle was the debate between incrementalists and maximalists, who resisted any territorial compromise, particularly since the Camp David agreement offered the Palestinians only temporary autonomy and not full independence. On the Israeli side, the additional lesson was that when facing difficult choices in security, the trading of the tangible for the intangible, as provided by more distant borders and peace—an abstract term yet to be proven—the role of leadership can be crucial. Prime Minister Begin could have opted out of the negotiations and gotten the overwhelming support of the majority of voters. Likewise, when opting to accept the formula of "all territories for peace," he took a calculated risk, a decision that eventually made him the most popular prime minister in Israel's history (close to 90 percent support of the agreement). Learning from such a lesson, he also counted on massive support when deciding to annex the Golan Heights to Israel two years later (approximately 80 percent supported that move).

As the peace process continued to unfold after a decade-long interruption, the issue of leadership came up once again with Prime Minister Rabin's growing openness toward the Palestinians. Then in 1995, toward the end of one of the largest-ever peace rallies in Tel Aviv, Rabin was assassinated by a fanatical Jewish religious student.

IVB. FROM THE FIRST INTIFADA TO THE END OF THE OSLO PROCESS (1987–2000)

We have been challenged conceptually to decide where to fit the first *intifada* in this dichotomous analysis of war and peace. In respect to past and subsequent levels of violence in the Occupied Territories, the nature of Palestinian rebellion consisted to such a great degree of nonviolent sanctions and civil disobedience that it tilted more toward peace than war. In addition, the political message was one of moderation and acceptance of a small Palestine side by side with Israel.

Palestinian national identity and the process of nation building have become a concrete reality. Between 1982 and 1987 the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories started building an infrastructure that challenged Israeli occupation. In terms of ideology, the *intifada* could not be ignored by the factionalism of Palestinian politics, and it managed to create a national debate among the various political groups within the PLO, between the "interior" and the "exterior," and between the "nationalist" and "religious" camps. This debate reflects the democratic trend within the Palestinian national movement. Differences exist in the national camp over how to pursue the strategy of peace, but detractors are not disruptive and could yet be categorized as "loyal opposition." However, the religious groups spearheaded by the Islamic resistance movement Hamas reject the idea of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel and the convening of an international conference. Hamas espouses the establishment of an Islamic state in the entire area of Palestine and members are willing to fight for it through all forms of violence.

The catalyst for the first *intifada* was a sequence of escalating events, starting with a military track accident in Gaza that left four Palestinians dead. The funerals led to massive stone-throwing demonstrations throughout the Occupied Territories and to subsequent Israeli repression. The level of violence of the 1987 Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza initially was characterized as an intermediate strategy appropriately placed somewhere between the use of firearms and nonviolence. Proponents, sympathizers, and analysts have called such phenomena "restricted violence," "limited violence," "nonlethal power," "restrained violence," "symbolic violence," "unarmed resistance," "offensive nonviolence," "relatively nonviolent," "predominantly nonviolent," "nonmilitary uprising," "low intensity warfare," "unarmed uprising," "low-level violence," and similar characterizations.[14] Whether downgrading from violence or upgrading from nonviolence to a middle-of-the road form of rebellion, such forms of violence generally have been described as the use of methods primarily intended to intimidate, aggravate, and/or cause minor injuries to the opposing party in the conflict. Acts are not aimed at causing great bodily harm. The main method highlighted has been stone throwing, which has become symbolically important. Prevailing arguments condoning limited violence call for a restricted use of weapons other than firearms. They also often call for a limitation in terms of specific geographic areas (mostly Israel's Occupied Territories); specific noncivilian targets (security forces and settlers); selected occasions (mostly retaliatory to Jewish violence); and a nonlethal or only intimidating or symbolic purpose. Acts may be limited in comparison to previous standards or in terms of available projectiles for resistance (an abundance of stones as compared with scarce quantities of firearms in the Occupied Territories). They may be limited in time, as a conditional and situational stage that may further escalate in the future; limited in the sense of sporadic and spontaneous rather than organized from above; or organized at a level adequate to sustain steadfastness when facing a measurable Israeli reaction of bearable proportions of any type of violence with massive casualties, leading to the forceful ejection of the population. Limited violence is a middle-of-the road compromise between the deep-rooted advocacy and use of violence of major Palestinian organizations and new trends of nonviolence as proposed by some prominent West Bankers.[15] The meaning of *limited* can also be seen in those who stressed that only a minority of acts were of a violent nature and that the overwhelming aspects of the struggle included nonviolent techniques that were not used in previous stages of the Palestinian struggle.[16] It appeared at first as an eclectic and reasonable way of looking for a middle ground, which could provide to such a struggle a significant level of visibility and relevance while at the same time showing a reluctance to inflict large numbers of victims on the opponent. In summing up the issue of the level of violence in the *intifada,* what comes across to Israelis is that

"limited violence" is "more violent than limited." "For the children of the Intifada, the STONE is a symbol of protest; for the majority of Israelis, the ROCK that can miss its target or injure can also predictably kill."[17] An Israeli survey showed a more comprehensive list that included explosive devices, assault with a handgun, assault with other types of small arms, throwing hand grenades, knife attacks, throwing Molotov cocktails, and property arson.

To what extent has the moderation of the PLO—moving away drastically in 1988 from the idea of the liberation of all of Palestine toward an acceptance of a two-state solution—been blurred by the only relative move away from terror as a means for goal attainment? Limited violence would arguably be more congruent with what has been perceived as a maximal willingness to compromise on the final objectives and parallels a similar shift away from violent to nonviolent actions. The militarized nature of the current and second *intifada* shows that the Palestinians did not internalize the inherent power of nonviolent struggle.

The Israeli perception of the uprising had an impact on the acceptance of a two-state solution. De facto, most Israelis felt afraid to step into the West Bank and Gaza—the settlers being the exception to the rule. At the same time, the message became louder and clearer that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, even the PLO outside them, were willing to compromise on the 1967 border, the 22 percent of "historic Palestine." Furthermore, an internal debate was generated about the morality of occupation, triggered by the increased level of gross human rights violations. More than a thousand people were killed by the IDF, and tens of thousands were imprisoned. Within civil society, new human rights organizations were set up to focus on protecting the rights of the "other."

These positive trends were undermined by the uncompromising position of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who opposed splitting the land and was vehemently opposed to negotiations with the PLO, a sentiment that lasted until Shamir lost in the 1992 elections. Yet the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War obliged even Shamir to acknowledge some of the realities of the U.S.-imposed "New World Order" and to agree reluctantly to participate in October 1991 in the Madrid Middle East Regional Peace Conference under explicit pressure from Washington, which threatened to withhold a $10 billion loan guarantee. As the public's determination to leave Gaza and eventually the West Bank increased and settlers became divided over strategies, Likud's internal crisis helped Labor's Rabin—the legendary chief of staff during the Six-Day War—come to power, supported actively by the dovish left-wing Meretz faction and indirectly by the Arab members of the Knesset.

Arafat's initial mediating efforts between Iraq and Kuwait and eventually his declared support of Sadam Hussein not only got the burgeoning Palestinian community expelled from Kuwait but also further isolated him globally and from many Arab states; it was also ruinous for the laborious efforts undertaken in previous years for the PLO to gain recognition by the United States as a legitimate representative. Hence, the Palestinian representatives at the Madrid conference was conditioned on them being concealed within the Jordanian delegation. Israel vetoed participants residing in East Jerusalem (which the Knesset unilaterally declared annexed), as well as declared PLO officials. Many of the points gained with the *intifada* at the international, regional, and Israeli levels were now lost.

The Oslo Peace Process

More than a decade later, retrospective analysis of the Oslo peace process between Palestinians and Israelis highlights more failures than achievements, as we ourselves do in the following pages. We coined the term for the three stages as *WWW: What Went Wrong*. The first "W" relates to problems that occurred during the Oslo agreement. The second "W" represents the failure of leadership when Camp David II negotiations took place in 2000. The third "W" is the current Intifada al-Aqsa, which has brought us back full circle into war.[18]

On the one hand, secret Track II negotiations were conducted in Oslo by two Israeli academics with an entry to then Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin and through him to Shimon Peres and eventually to Prime Minister Rabin. On the other hand, with Palestinian advisors close to Chairman Arafat, negotiations resulted in a series of agreements beginning with an exchange of letters between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat. Their intense work translated into the official "Declaration of Principles" of September 1993, which was signed on the White

House lawn under the auspices of then U.S. President Clinton. The two parties committed themselves to implementing a gradual process of granting political autonomy to the Palestinians, a scheme very similar to the one previously signed at Camp David in 1978, but leading toward full independence, first to manage and ultimately to resolve their conflict exclusively by peaceful means.

According to this framework for peace (more a timetable toward a final treaty), a transitional process of five years would put in place a self-governing Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza, followed by final status negotiations (no later than three years after the beginning of Palestinian autonomy) about the "core" and most difficult issues, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, security and borders, and the underground water issue. Following the Declaration of Principles, a series of interim agreements were signed between Israel and the PLO during the period of 1993–1999: the May 1994 Cairo Agreement on the implementation of autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area (of the West Bank); the September 1995 interim agreement dividing the West Bank into areas under direct Palestinian control (area A), civilian Palestinian control (area B), and Israeli control (area C, including settlements and self-defined "security zones"); the January 1997 Hebron Protocol dividing the city between Israelis and Palestinians; the October 1998 Wye Memorandum implementing the interim agreement of 1995; and finally the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum concerning the stipulation and timetable of the final status negotiations on refugees, borders, water, jerusalem, and settlements. After Israel withdrew political control from less than half of the Occupied Territories and military control from the urban areas, the Palestinian Authority under the elected Arafat government and a legislative council administered all civilian affairs for the cities in the West Bank and Gaza and a large part of the villages.

In its signed agreements, the PLO and the emerging Palestinian Authority promised to stop the violence, arrest terrorists, dismantle the terrorist infrastructures in the territories, collect illegal weapons, and end incitement to violence. Soon mutual recriminations about not fulfilling their parts of the deal and delays of the timetable for implementation poisoned the atmosphere. On the one hand, Israel did not see a contradiction between the continuing expansion of its settlements in the occupied territories and the outcome of the permanent status negotiations that would enable Palestinians to determine their future. On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority, while routinely condemning the use of suicide bombings, did not act systematically to stop them, and Arafat did not distance himself totally from the perpetuators, who he called *sahyid* ("martyrs," in Arabic).

IVC. THE CAMP DAVID II, SHARM EL-SHEIKH, AND TABA ISRAEL–PALESTINE–UNITED STATES MEETINGS

After Prime Minister Rabin's assassination, Shimon Peres, an advocate of the Oslo process, was prime minister only briefly until he was displaced, by a small margin, by Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu, who used a negative campaign depicting Labor leaders as terrorist Arafat's buddies. Even if the Hebron agreement and the Wye River understandings were forced upon him, Netanyahu worked to undermine the entire Oslo process, which he opposed. When Ehud Barak's impressive victory brought back renewed hopes for negotiations, his pullout from Lebanon and insistence on moving away from a gradual piecemeal approach to a final agreement sounded promising. He was tempted to move first toward compromising with a moribund Hafez al-Assad, but Syria did not reciprocate and insisted on its demand for five hundred meters to get her to the shore of Lake Tiberiades. Barak then leaned the opposite way and made his position toward the Palestinians in Camp David II more rigid. The comparison of the two Camp David encounters (the first under the auspices of Jimmy Carter, the second under Bill Clinton) is a fascinating exercise.

The hard issues of the final agreement were put on the agenda. Contending interpretations were provided within and between both sides' participants and analysts. We would like to adopt, with some changes, the shared "third narrative" provided by Arie Kacowicz in his "Rashomon in the Middle East: Clashing Narratives of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict."[19] Prime Minister Barak showed sincere intentions to compromise, by addressing many of

the Palestinians' expectations. He broke the Israeli taboo of negotiating over Jerusalem and accepted the concept of being the capital of the two states, and he offered the return of approximately 91 percent of the West Bank and added to the swap 1 percent more from Israel's land. A settlement range could not be obtained at that time since the "maximum" Israeli offer at Camp David was below the "minimum" Palestinian demands regarding territory. After the publication of the Clinton parameters in late December 2000, the two sides came closer to reaching an agreement at Taba in January 2001, yet these talks collapsed. By January 2001, the two parties had lost their respective legitimacies (especially Barak's minority government), their nerve, and their remaining negligible trust of each other. In addition, the indefatigable mediator and go-between, President Clinton, was on his way out of the White House.

In addition, some of the Israeli negotiating dynamics and procedural aspects of the political interaction contributed to the failure of the talks. By presenting early positions as bottom lines, the Israelis provoked the Palestinians' mistrust. By subsequently shifting their terms in the direction of the Palestinians' political goals, the Israelis whetted the Palestinians' appetite. Moreover, Barak concealed his final proposals, the "endgame," until Arafat had moved. And Yet Arafat would not move until he could see the "endgame"; he came to Camp David reluctantly and insisted that he needed more time for preparation while at the same time he realized that this was a last opportunity for engaging President Clinton in concluding the negotiation process. Also, several Palestinian declarations adversely affected the course of the negotiations. Arafat's doubts about the importance and holiness of the Temple Mount for the Jewish people and the reiteration of an absolute right for every Palestinian refugee to return to Israel derailed any positive dynamic interaction. He remained reactive because he believed that the Americans had not planned enough for Camp David and that the process had not been thought out. In spite of the important fact that the Palestinians agreed to the principle of rectifications along the pre-1967 border on the basis of equivalent territorial swaps, no substantial bargaining or sensible political initiative was offered in Camp David by the Americans, who seemed to convey the Israelis' ideas, which made Palestinians lose confidence in the Americans as honest brokers. In retrospect, the negotiations should be assessed against the different realities in which Israelis and Palestinians found themselves and their inability or unwillingness to understand each other's perspectives. In its aftermath, and even following the outbreak of the Israeli–Palestinian cycle of violence on September 29, negotiations continued for four additional months. The process remains inconclusive, but the "parameters" offered by President Clinton, not at Camp David but albeit too late at Taba, remain the most feasible outline for a shared solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict at some point in the future.

V. THE CURRENT CYCLE OF WAR AND PEACE (2000–2007)

The World Zionist Organization was able to manifest its dream of a Jewish State recognized by the international community in a half century (1897–1947). The additional hope that further partitioning and the emergence of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel was shelved during the second half of the twentieth century. The longer cycle of war has emerged again to surpass the shorter cycle of peace. The few years that have elapsed since the collapse of the Camp David talks reveal mixed trends and do not allow us to make any conclusive remarks.

VA. THE INTIFADA AL-AQSA AND ITS AFTERMATH

Since the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister followed by his massive stroke and the subsequent succession of Ehud Olmert and the new Kadima Party, no meaningful negotiations have been resumed. After the electoral parliamentary victory of Hamas in 2006, negotiations between the first and the moderate Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) have been zigzagging back and forth, leaving both sides full of uncertainties. Sharon's policies during his years in office accelerated the ongoing high-intensity conflict that has lasted close to four years and killed more than three thousand Palestinians and a thousand Israelis. In a region where conspiracy theories prevail, where one can always imagine the worst from the enemy and

attribute it to post-facto premeditated intentions, the interpretations of the facts that led to the Intifada al-Aqsa are diametrically opposed.[20] The official Israeli version is rather straightforward: this was a terrorist war preplanned and premeditated by Chairman Arafat, as a result of a strategic Palestinian decision to use violence—rather than negotiations—as the primary instrument of advancing the Palestinian political cause. The true roots of the war can be found in the Palestinian rejection at Camp David of the concept of a peacefully negotiated resolution of disputes. Paradoxically, it was the very Oslo peace process and particularly the far-reaching offers at Camp David that caused the Palestinians to respond with violence, following the "precedent" of the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon triggered by the successful Hezbollah guerrilla attacks. Therefore, Palestinian terrorists—starting with Arafat himself and including the Palestinian Authority (a "terrorist entity"), Hamas, the even more militant Al Jihad Al Islam (Islamic Jihad), and factions within Fatah—are not opposing the occupation of the territories per se but rather the whole concept of peace through compromise. On the other hand, the Palestinians' prevailing version was that Sharon's forced visit to the al-Haram al-Sharif, protected by a large police contingent, was a premeditated effort to defy Muslim sovereignty over this holy place. It was meant to trigger an Arab popular reaction that would be severely repressed and would escalate into an armed confrontation that Israel would use to crush the PLO and Arafat as the leader of the newly built state institution in the land of the Palestinian Authority.

According to Kacowitz, the second *intifada* was "either a Palestinian war of extermination (the Israeli version) or a Palestinian war of national liberation (the Palestinian version)".[21] A third interpretation suggests the simultaneity of not just two different wars but four. Within each side, one could find two contending goals, as argued by Michael Walzer: (1) a Palestinian war to destroy the State of Israel, as epitomized by the suicide bombing attacks of fundamentalist Islamists and since 2002 of some elements of the more mainstream Fatah faction (such as the al-Aqsa Brigades), directly associated with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority; (2) a Palestinian war to create an independent state alongside Israel, ending the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza after 1967, as illustrated by the guerrilla actions against the Israeli army in the occupied territories; (3) a legitimate and just Israeli war of self-defense against Palestinian terrorism, in order to secure Israel within the pre-1967 borders; and (4) an Israeli expansionist war to keep the settlements and hold onto the "liberated" (occupied) biblical territories of "Greater Israel."[22] As throughout the peace process, extremists on both sides kept fighting the illegitimate first and fourth types of war.

If the popular eruption was aimed initially at both the corrupt and malfunctioning Palestinian Authority regime and against Israel, it was rapidly channeled and manipulated by the PLO leadership, first to change the political status quo and improve its bargaining positions in the short term (as indeed happened between Camp David and Taba) and second to focus the resentment and anger from the most marginalized sectors of Palestinian society toward Israel itself. In this sense, Arafat and the Palestinian Authority did not do much to stop the uprising, believing that it might well serve their interests. They preferred to "ride the tiger" rather than to confront terrorism and violence. It seems that the militarized uprising was not Arafat's master plan but rather an exploitation of the violent situation. A "blank check policy" accompanied the often futile post facto "plausible denial," as attempted in the case of the *Karine A,* the ship captured in 2002 in the Red Sea and found to be loaded with weapons.

In the first few weeks following September 29, 2001, the Palestinian uprising was not yet catalogued as a war but rather as a series of confrontations between largely unarmed Palestinians and armed Israeli security forces that immediately resorted to excessive and deadly use of force, fueling a further escalation of the violence. At the same time, it is equally true that members of the Palestinian security forces initiated many of these acts of violence (like the shootings at the Israeli neighborhood of Gilo, in southeast Jerusalem). Moreover, since the collapse of Camp David, Arafat had reneged on the promise to prevent and fight terrorism. By April 2002, even if the Palestinian Authority had wanted to do so, stopping the violence completely might have had no impact on reversing the progressive degradation of internal Palestinian control as a result of Israel's military actions. By adopting the "default option," which increased the number

of suicide bombings, the situation on the ground has continued to deteriorate. At the same time, the Israeli government has maneuvered to postpone the reinitiation of political negotiations "under fire." The Israeli military has exacerbated the already precarious humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population; has turned to extrajudicial killings of alleged terrorists and military incursions into Palestinian cities, towns, and villages; and has violated the rules of war by responding in nonproportional ways, which has led to the death of many innocent victims. The obsession of the official Jewish state to always act from a position of strength brought about an unusual escalation of violence that in itself precluded the negotiations that have been reopened time and again.

Because it stressed the importance of fair and transparent elections in the process of democratization, the election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the PNA initially provided the first reason for optimism toward the very smooth transfer of government following the death of President Arafat. The task confronting Abbas has been formidable, for he has inherited internal anarchy, polarization, political stagnation, and corruption compounded by the gloomy atmosphere created by five years of a bloody intifada. He intended to break away from Arafat's legacy; specifically, with the help of professionals he hoped to reform Palestinian political, security, and economic systems, and above all to halt the militarization of the intifada. It seems, though, that with Arafat no longer around and with his galvanizing effect gone, the evolving Palestinian leadership is still impotent in dealing with those corrupt officials who could not have survived and thrived that long without their leader Arafat, for whom they always acted as sycophantic and obedient cronies and hangers-on in return for tolerating their leader's indulgences. While the intermediate stage led by Abbas has encountered increasing difficulties, a critical introspection leads to the conclusion that a generational replacement of leadership is necessary.[23] A logical justification for the weakening of the leadership expected to prevent chaos and lawlessness, and possibly a destructive power struggle, can be found within the ranks of the heterogeneous Fatah movement. It is worth mentioning that Fatah's various components had always been kept together by Arafat, often through a combination of financial appeasement and a policy of divide and rule. The movement's institutions have been controlled by a combination of the old guards of Fatah with more universally appreciated professionals, such as the former World Bank economist and then prime minister Salam Fayyad, thus denying the second and third generations any control of power. The conflict between the "old" and the "young" guards is ongoing, which weakens the movement and strengthens the surging role of Hamas as an opposition enjoying tremendous political importance and relevance. Fatah, on the other hand, cannot transform into a full-fledged political party because of the ideological contradictions within its own ranks, vis à vis Israel, and personal and clannish preferences, and hence it cannot develop a clear political platform.

Fatah's image of corruption compared to Hamas's benevolent work and institutions makes it even worse. One immediate major challenge—albeit weakened by relentless Israeli military efforts that have deprived the faction of several of its charismatic leaders—has been put forth by Hamas's major players with their capabilities and political ambitions. Hence, the tragic mistake of a militarized *intifada*—the leadership should have expected the overwhelming asymmetry to play into the hands of Israel's superiority in this field—has resulted in the victorious and surprising election of a Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council. A failed effort to create a shared Fatah/Hamas government brokered in Mecca by the Saudi royal family ended in 2007 with the dismembering of the Palestinian National Authority, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas controlling Gaza. Openly challenged by Hamas's coup d'état in Gaza, Abbas definitely has little time left to wield his power, establish control over the numerous Palestinian security services and factions' militias, and improve the daily living standards of Palestinians before risking any major concession to Israel. Palestinians would want him to lift Israeli travel bans and restrictions, rebuild the shattered economy, root out corruption, and impose law and order. Meanwhile, new but still small political forces have been formed, and much public opinion seems keen to give a chance to a third party other than Hamas and Fatah.

From the outbreak of the Intifada al-Aqsa until the split within Fatah, the emphasis has moved into "how to stop war" rather than "how to make peace".

A large number of demarches undertaken by Senator George Mitchell, CIA Director William Tenet, U.S. envoy General Anthony Zinni, and State Department representative William Burns, as well as other missions, did result in a nominal and conditional adherence to the Quartet's Roadmap to get both sides to cease violence and negotiate.[24] Through creative and extensive "second-track diplomacy," consensus has been reached on nearly all the permanent status agenda items. The components of a possible official accord have been discussed ad nauseam, and the issue is no longer the final status but how to move from the current paralysis into action.[25] The Clinton parameters are considered to be a realistic expression of the consensus found among moderates and pragmatics on both sides.

Peace Prospects

At the end of November 2007, just after we finished writing this chapter, an Israeli–Palestinian meeting was convened by the United States in Annapolis, Maryland, to obtain agreement on a blueprint for a peace accord. Over time, expectations have been lowered to a more general set of principles that can facilitate future negotiations. On one hand, the opportunity for a practical agreement has increased because, following the split of Hamas, the government led by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayed is as moderate as the Palestinians can provide. On the Israeli side, battered Prime Minister Olmert understands that the only way to remain in power—while Qassam rockets continue falling into Israel after the unilateral withdrawal in Gaza and the disastrous Lebanon II war—is to embark on the road to peace. Israeli and Palestinian public opinion has been ready for a long time for "painful concessions"—the vague expression used by Ariel Sharon—if provided by strong leadership. The added asset could be the possible participation of Saudi Arabia, after the ruling dynasty led in 2002 an initiative, ratified by the Beirut Arab League Summit, that calls for "acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security in the context of a comprehensive settlement," based on the withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and a just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees issue.

However, such an initiative can be derailed easily. On the Palestinian side, violent activities against civilians instigated by Hamas, this time from the West Bank and Israeli retaliations resulting in overkills, can escalate and regain the levels of the Intifada al-Aqsa. On the Israeli side, the components of the Cabinet have expressed different types of reservations and former prime minister and now opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu is more popular than the leaders of the Kadima and Labor Parties together. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been investing her energies in an enterprise that at best requires heavy presidential involvement and the ability to gain the confidence of both parties, which clearly is not the case with President George W. Bush. Furthermore, Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas are transitional types—weak leaders with many internal problems, challenged within their own milieu—and, hence, they may not be able to pull anything together. It may be for another generation of leaders to conclude the deal, after the election of a new president in the United States in November 2008, especially if the Democrats win.

At first glance, we can concur with the premise that "A pessimist is an informed optimist," since many opportunities have been missed by both sides, but when looking forward and backward we can sum up the situation as ambiguous. If we do not focus only on the immediate past and present but speculate in terms of decades, significant progress has been made toward the resolution of our dispute. The legacy of the failed Oslo process has been the consolidation of mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel; the wide bilateral, regional, and global consensus regarding the two-state solution; and the advance made around such thorny issues as refugees and Jerusalem. Even disagreements on specific problems can be overcome when they become part of an overall package that includes other attractive inducements. Furthermore, what was once the agenda of the moderate minorities (two-state solution, sharing Jerusalem, etc.) is now endorsed by most political forces, except the fundamentalists, zealots, and ultranationalists. The impact of such groups as spoilers has been neglected, but the lessons learned could illuminate the searchlight at the end of the tunnel. Since eight thousand Jews were pulled out of Gaza, anxiety seems to be growing in settlers' circles that keeping control over an additional two million Palestinians (in addition to more than a million Arabs in Israel)

is widely perceived as a "demographic bomb." The settlers' lobby for "Jordan is Palestine" or for remaining in their homes in the Occupied Territories without citizens' rights is not acceptable to most in the Israeli establishment and public.

Albeit too late, the failure to reach consensus at the Camp David meeting between Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat has been bridged by the Clinton parameters (see the following paragraphs) and by now has become the basis of any pragmatic agreement. What remains is *not what but how* to achieve such increasingly shared goals, and how to move toward reducing violence and provide confidence-building measures that will give to the Palestinians and Israelis a taste of what peace could be if they threw their lot into a treaty. With this in mind, can we look at the future with certainty? In a region where rationality has not seemed to prevail, we conceive of five plausible scenarios for moving toward peace, triggered by different configurations:

1. *A Negotiated Bilateral Agreement.* The disintegration of the Hamas/Fatah government and territorial split in 2007 opens the possibility of direct negotiations that cover both the means to ensure confidence-building measures during the negotiation process, as well as a shared vision about the final peace agreement based on the principle of the two-state solution. At this stage, the commitment to such process is weaker in the Kadima-led government than in the Abbas entourage, a Cabinet composed of independent individual professionals. So far, the release of prisoners and removal of checkpoints is cosmetic rather than meaningful, and the commitment of the Palestinian Authority to curb terror in the areas under its control is still curbed by controversial IDF incursions to crush Hamas and Jihad supporters in the West Bank. Within these limitations, visualizing a promising result to the negotiations is a difficult undertaking.

Many details for how to achieve Palestinian statehood and a long step toward peace in one year are offered by Jerome Segal.[26] In brief, if agreement can be reached along the lines of the Clinton plan, then a comprehensive end-of-conflict/end-of-claims treaty is signed by Abbas as head of the PLO and brought to a referendum through ratification by the Palestinian people. However, if agreement is not achieved on Jerusalem and refugees but consensus on the permanent boundaries of the Palestinian state is reached, then this limited agreement on permanent boundaries is separated from the other issues and brought to a referendum. Negotiations continue regarding Jerusalem, with a dotted line signifying that the city will be divided but putting off the exact line until the conclusion of this negotiations track. The limited accord provides for the establishment of a Palestinian state and mutual recognition between the two states. However, it is not an end-of-conflict/end-of-claims treaty. Rather it is more than a *Hudna* (long-term ceasefire) but less than end of conflict. The treaty on statehood and permanent borders utilizes the distinction between "de facto" sovereignty (which means that a government actually functions on the ground as a sovereign) and "de jure" sovereignty (which means that a government is recognized as the rightful sovereign over a territory, whether or not it actually controls it).

As soon as the treaty is ratified by a referendum, Israel withdraws from an identified portion of the West Bank. This is a region where the PLO actually exercises a monopoly of political power on the ground, and for the first time exercises de facto sovereignty over part of Palestine and affirms its de jure sovereignty over all of the territory within the agreed permanent boundaries. Israel recognizes it and immediately begins the process of dismantling settlements and withdrawing militarily from all areas where its government is the sole Palestinian entity with weapons. A third party from the international community is established to adjudicate disputes and to assess whether or not the State of Palestine has gained the required monopoly of force.

2. *Palestinian Unilateral Decisions.* Clearly, the option of military struggle has been exhausted. The chances for negotiations between the Hamas breakaway leaders and the PNA are low, but being alone and in case outcomes from the bilateral negotiations fail to materialize, the president comes up with daring ideas. Among them are these:

a. *Unilateral Declaration of Statehood.* In case the Israeli government is unable or unwilling to move along the suggested negotiations into a long-term agreement, the Palestinians have completed their promise to declare a "provisional" state while a large part of the territories remains occupied and has asked the UN to accept Palestine as a sovereign

state. (Such a declaration was made by the 19th Palestine National Council meeting in 1988, and now it should ask to be recognized as such by the world community with jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza.) The UN Security Council, author of the famous Resolution 242 of November 1967, calling for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and the establishment of secure and recognized borders, is now asked to draw a map suggesting what those frontiers should be. Given that both sides are on record as having accepted this resolution, and given the 1947 precedent in which a clearly delimited partition plan was accepted by Israel, it is difficult for the Israeli government to reject a configuration that offers far more than the 1947 plan. Furthermore, room can always be left for border rectification based on mutual agreement. The majority of the Palestinian people favor a sovereign state in the entire West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital: 22 percent of historic Palestine, living side by side in peace with Israel. Time has come to ask that Palestine be given a full seat at the United Nations, and with membership comes the Palestinian undertaking to adhere to all international human rights conventions. In addition, the Chairman of the Palestinian National Authority (in the Oslo accords, it is still "PA" with the "N" omitted) is recognized as the independent country's first president and its representatives abroad as legitimate ambassadors. For the international community, bringing Palestine into the family of nations heals an open wound and atones for the dissonance that resulted from the world's support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1948.

b. *Incorporating Hamas to Fatah's Move Toward the Palestinian State.* Clearly, a second stage is needed to legitimate the daring premises of the previous stage, no less so if declared unilaterally. With respect to the referendum on the treaty with Israel, or the unilateral declaration of statehood, Abu Mazen calls on Hamas to permit the referendum to be held within Gaza and, if approved, to do so also in the West Bank, which will constitute ratification and become binding law that all individuals and organizations must obey. In a "Prisoners' Document," as well as in the Mecca Accord, Hamas accepted that negotiations would be conducted by the PLO and that such treaty would be binding if ratified through a referendum. Because Hamas can urge that the treaty be rejected, it has an indirect way of influencing the terms of the treaty, even though it was not participating in the formal negotiations. If the referendum passes, Mahmoud Abbas will appoint an interim government of the State of Palestine. This government will be in power only until elections can be held for both a president and legislature of the State of Palestine. Participation in the interim government is open to Hamas members provided that they accept the results as binding and to turn over power in Gaza, thereby relinquishing its role as an armed faction.

If, contrary to the preceding scenario, Hamas initially refuses to recognize sovereignty of the State of Palestine, and refuses to relinquish control of Gaza, and refuses to disarm, then the state will expand its sovereign control only in the West Bank. Once Israel has fully withdrawn from West Bank territory, the credibility and well-being of the new State of Palestine will become a popular incentive to a similar outcome in Gaza. Under those circumstances, it may be difficult for Hamas to remain idle and not join its brethren in the independence process.

c. *A Call for a Judicial Decision About the Future Entity by an International Court.* The current building of a fence/wall by Israel, which includes parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (different from the fence in the Gaza Strip built along the pre-1967 borders) has been challenged by the UN General Assembly and by the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Rather than asking for an ad hoc decision, once Palestine asks for full membership at the UN, it declares a border dispute with its neighbor Israel and requests a ruling on its final boundaries or requests that the case be determined by arbitration. Under the leadership of former Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Israel accepted the principle of signing a peace treaty with a neighboring country while withdrawing from territories, and outstanding issues, such as ownership of Taba, was determined by arbitration and returned to Egypt.

d. *New Legislative Elections.* Such elections are now scheduled for early 2008., This requires challenging, if necessary and nonviolently, the restrictions posed by the Israeli occupation, including the participation of Hamas's candidates who accept the prior commitment to the Israeli/Palestinian agreements that have led the establishment of the body in which they would like to serve. Furthermore, the candidates will endorse a priori the principles established in the provisional constitution. The political wing of Hamas will meet considerable Arab and international pressure when the electoral option leads to power sharing and, if so, will tell its military wing that no more suicide bombings will be tolerated. It matters little whether Islamist Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's identification with the endgame suffering of the Palestinian people is a ploy to elicit

support among the Muslim masses or a cynical stand shared with similar fundamentalist forces who have tried to stop peace and reconciliation efforts between Israelis and Palestinians. The emergence of a third large new party has been discussed, including Wassatieh ("moderation" in Arabic) based on a different interpretation of the Muslim texts, and could ally forces around one shared democracy, social justice, and peace platform.

Past experience has shown that Israeli acts of violence and terror tend to switch the vote toward the more radical groups and individuals. Most likely, Israeli occupation, curfews, building fences on confiscated Palestinian land, increasing military control, collective punishment, and settlers' violence produce radical results among Palestinians. Over time, long-standing working relationship has been established between civil society organizations of both sides sharing the values of human rights, democracy, justice, and lasting peace. This new party initiative provides a dominant strategy over those forces that emphasize short-term military actions and political schemes that are only reactive to Israeli initiatives.

e. *The Arab Peace Initiative.* Taking into account the inability of the Palestinian leadership to properly organize itself, perhaps the Arab states can upgrade their role as surrogates. The Saudi statement made originally in 2002 and revamped in 2007 as the Arab Peace Initiative offered regional peace to Israel in exchange for a return to the pre-1967 borders.[27] From a practical perspective, we visualize Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states providing a regional umbrella for Palestinians to conduct staged negotiations in a more attractive framework with Israel. Hopefully, a sustained campaign with professional publicity and the peace and justice camp's active support can bring the conflict to an end, once and for all, and foster acceptance of Israel as a legitimate member of the Middle East region. Such an effort may be enough to motivate many Palestinians, who are sick and tired of security threats and economic deterioration, to go along with it.

3. *Unilateral Israeli Steps.* Unwilling to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority leadership even after Arafat's death, Prime Minister Sharon announced redeployment in the West Bank (the word *withdrawal* has not been considered "politically correct") but left such a legacy to Prime Minister Olmert, who called in the 2006 elections for a "strategy of unilateralism determining the permanent borders of the State of Israel." Instead, following the outcome of the Second Lebanon War, a growing sense of vulnerability is present in Israel today, produced by an enormous shift in how the Israeli public views peace talks with the Palestinians—in particular, how it views withdrawing from the West Bank. While Qassam rockets fired from Gaza have done relatively little damage, future missiles from the West Bank that land on the runways of Ben-Gurion International Airport are an entirely different story. Added to the nightmare of Hezbollah's Katyusha rocket barrages falling into Haifa—Israel's third-largest city—no Israeli leader will withdraw from the West Bank unless he or she is confident that of little danger of that sort. Today, the unilateral withdrawal concept is dead. The lesson of Gaza is that it matters a great deal for Israel's security who is power in Palestine and what kind of relations are had with them. The extent of this shift was exploited by Benjamin Netanyahu when he wrote against negotiating with Mahmoud Abbas on the grounds that turning territory over to a weak government was the functional equivalent of unilateral withdrawal. On the other hand, the PLO demands not less than the 22 percent of what is left of historic Palestine. No single member of the Israeli government is calling for unilateral withdrawal to the 1967 borders, as was the case following the pullout from Lebanon. Hence, the current options of "separation" through redeployment are these:

a. *Replicating Implicitly Another Version of the "Gaza–Jericho" First Step.* Israel agreed with the Oslo agreement to consider pulling out eventually from West Bank areas A and B and annexing the remaining 60 percent. That in itself is not much worse than the continuously deteriorating status quo and the confusing idioms of "allowing for the demographic growth in the settlements," since it will unmask the protracted policy of creeping annexation through settlements. Since the Golan Heights was unilaterally declared annexed by the Knesset without any international legitimacy, governments have been willing to negotiate for that land with Syria. Even if such a move is doubtful and could maintain the current coalition, it may totally isolate Israel.

b. A Pulling Back Behind the Wall/Fence. This would imply the de facto annexation of 10 percent to 16 percent of the West Bank while keeping the expanded Jerusalem exclusively as the Jewish capital, thus generating a new de facto situation. It took forty years for the Palestinian leadership in 1988 to recognize Israel's borders within the pre-1967 limits,

which neighboring Arab states considered to be only armistice lines. The new Israeli borders, imposed by demographic constraints, are clearly not acceptable now to the Palestinians, but in the eyes of the "Iron Wall" optimists, perhaps forty years from now the Arabs will come to the pragmatic understanding that this imposed solution is permanent and they will live with it.

c. *The Iran Factor.* The early stages of a nuclear race in the Middle East—with Iran's leadership having decided to develop its nuclear capability because of or despite the scrutiny of the international community—challenge Israel's exclusive holding of such weapons in the region gave them an edge that made negotiations on conventional threats less acute. At this stage, it is hard to predict if this overt challenge, accompanied with statements by Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, calling for the destruction of the Jewish state and the expulsion of Jews to their countries of origin—notwithstanding that the majority are Israeli born—is a scary and worrisome scenario. We need not remind ourselves that an Iranian nuclear device detonated over Israel will kill not only the Arab population but also the Palestinian neighbors. As Manuel Hassassian often says in class, "We are doomed to live together," and now perhaps also to "die together." The idea of a preemptive strike, albeit more difficult than the one successfully conducted in Baghdad in 1981 when Saddam Hussein was building his Osirak reactor, is mentioned without cease. Unchecked balances may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, such a unilateral move may jeopardize at least in the short run the growing chances for normalized relations between Israel and the Arab world. Lately, Iran's increasingly radical role as protagonist in the region has contributed to concerns shared by Israel and the pro-Western Arab regimes. To what extent can Israel use this shared concern, short of speculating about an Israeli military strike? Secret negotiations, within which concessions to the Palestinians would be seen as part of an alliance with the Arab countries could lead to significant results.

d. *The Syrian Option.* It is unclear why negotiations related to abandoning the Golan Heights often address neutralizing the Bath regime in Damascus that is acting as a spoiler and protector of irregular militias fighting Israel. Yet this seems to be a condition for the fulfillment of the Arab peace initiative. The likelihood that the Israeli political leadership could handle withdrawals on two fronts is nil, and opting to prioritize an agreement with Syria at the expense of neglecting a solution to the burning Palestinian problem is ill advised. No pressure has been exerted by the international community, and even less has been wielded by the Bush administration, to resolve what amounts to one of the many latent border disputes in the world. On the contrary, the human rights issues, especially when related not only to individual suffering but also to restricting self-determination, have been highlighted as urgent. The continuous military occupation of the West Bank and the encirclement of Gaza have been the main causes of criticism of Israel, and diverting the attention to Syria, at this stage, is not going to change the threat of terrorist activities.

4. *Imposed Solutions by the International Community.* As mentioned, it has not been possible for the major powers in the international community to act separately or together to force upon Israelis and Palestinians the resolution of this conflict. Yet high-level and persistent involvement has made the difference at crucial moments. The record includes Presidents Carter and Clinton. The latter, still a popular figure with Israelis and not a few Palestinians, may take the challenge again after the November 2008 elections and become the Democrats' special emissary to complete the job that remained unfinished at Camp David. Furthermore, the Quartet's appointment of Tony Blair as special envoy to help the Palestinians rebuild their homeland in concert with Israel may provide added value.

a. *The Idea of a Provisional State.* This option has appeal because an overwhelming majority of member countries are ready to welcome such an initiative. Great Britain has been supportive of a "viable Palestinian State," and Tony Blair may be on his way to joining former U.S. presidents as the appointed xxxxxxx. In addition, President George W. Bush has expressed support for the UN's backing of a "State of Palestine" next to Israel. If the Palestinians themselves would endorse it, the international community will easily follow suit.

b. *A Quartet Initiative.* The Quartet, under whose aegis the conference ought to be held, should put forward its own outline, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and the 2003 Roadmap. According to former prominent U.S. foreign policy makers, it should reflect the following:[28]
   - Two states, based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal, and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap

- Jerusalem as home to two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty; and special arrangements for the Old City, providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them
- A solution to the refugee problem that is consistent with the two-state solution, addresses the Palestinian refugees' deep sense of injustice, and provides Palestinians with meaningful financial compensation and resettlement assistance
- Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty

c. *An International Trusteeship Over Palestine.* Several ideas have been considered, and the most seriously debated has been granting the United Nations the main role in setting an "International Protectorate."[29] Over time, international interventions have played a key role in various conflict situations around the world, their mandates varying with circumstances and needs. Examples include Namibia (1989), Cambodia (1992), Rwanda (1993), and more recently East Timor (1999) and Kosovo (1999). Within the region, a multinational task force in Sinai and a UN force in the Golan Heights have operated successfully for many years. A transitional international protectorate would provide to each side impartial protection from the violence of the other and generally would create some breathing space. For this to happen, serious muscle is needed, but the aim is not to contain the conflict but to end it. Thus, the security role is not enough. It must be accompanied by a political mandate to assist Palestinians in restoring basic services, reviving civil society, and rebuilding national institutions, with the explicit outcome of the establishment of an independent, democratic Palestinian state after, say, three to five years. Virtually none of these vital tasks could be carried out properly or at all as long as Israel remains the occupying power, both because it would continue to provide a magnet for Palestinian attacks and because it would retain an effective veto over any initiative. The protectorate administration, would be divided between the civil and security tasks, with military personnel drawn from countries assented to by both the Palestinians and the Israelis. One proponent, *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, has suggested designating the security task to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Alternatively, it could fall to a "coalition of the willing and acceptable," which may include troops from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and possibly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan or other countries. It is hard to imagine this working without the United States playing a prominent role. Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, has suggested that the mandate would initially embrace Oslo areas A and B, comprising some 42 percent of the West Bank, with a possible extension to 52 percent to provide better contiguity.

5. *An Israeli-Palestinian Joint Bottom-Up Initiative.* Some ideas related to this idea come from the laboratory of civil society members, including Track II, think tanks, and individual academics, working together across the divide or separately. The following are a few of those ideas:

a. *A Common Peace Platform:* Over a decade of Israeli–Palestinian civil society cooperation, strong bonds have been established and an epistemic community with shared values of democracy, human rights, and peace has evolved. Many past Track II exercises in different cities and universities around the world, which have produced numerous detailed documents on final status issues (water, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders and security), have shown creative points of convergence that could be used for drafting a common plan of action. In spite of polls showing strong support for the use of extreme retaliatory violence against each other, large majorities of both Palestinians and Israelis approve of a compromise solution based on the side-by-side existence of two states. The problem is that leadership is lagging behind this popular support for a two-state solution, perhaps under the influence of domestic intra- and interparty politics, and the violent extraparliamentary behavior of fundamentalist groups in both societies. Lately, such peace initiatives include, among others, "One Voice."[30] The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Plan ("The Peoples' Choice") has gathered more than 150,000 signatures for a "Civil Pact" (more from the Israeli side).[31] The Geneva Initiative, launched in December 2003 by Beilin-Abed Rabbo, detailed a peace accord covering nearly all points of dispute and incorporating Saudi Prince Abdallah's peace initiative.[32] After being sent to each Israeli household and published as an advertisement in major Palestinian newspapers, the accord has already won support from 47 percent of Israelis and 39 percent of Palestinians.[33] At this stage, we are witnessing a nongovernmental peace accord. If more moderate Palestinian candidates win elections, adherence to a shared peace and justice platform may also occur within Israeli society. Palestinians inside and outside the current

factions, as well as independents, have been discussing the formation of a unified force. Different possibilities have been discussed. Clearly, the modes of operation for such processes to take place within the current Palestinian political setting would be very different. The unclear rules of the electoral game will require distinct yet coordinated long-term strategies.

b. A recent initiative of Hebrew University geographer Yehoshua Ben Arieh that was advanced in Track II suggests *a trilateral land swap:* Egypt will give up a bit of territory south of the Gaza Strip (between Rafah and el-Arish), thus making it possible to create "Greater Gaza." The area annexed to the Gaza Strip, which would include a coastal strip at least twenty kilometers in length, would become the site of a new modern city, a resort area, an international airport, and a deepwater port and would triple the size of the Gaza Strip. In return for this territorial concession, Egypt would receive from Israel a slice of land in the area of the Paran Desert and thus would gain an overland route from Sinai to Jordan and neighboring countries.

   The Palestinians would concede territory in the West Bank identical in size to the territory that they get from Egypt in Sinai. It is Ben-Aryeh's hope that Egypt will consent to the territorial exchange because of the great economic benefit that would accrue from control of the direct route from the city of Suez to Jordan and because of the prestige that it would enjoy for having brought about a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

   The other participants in the deal would also get a lot out of it. Israel would be able to hold onto some territory ("settlement blocs") in the West Bank. The Palestinians would receive full territorial compensation in the form of an area with tremendous development potential (in the territory annexed to the Gaza Strip) for the territory it ceded to Israel in the West Bank; they would also receive from Israel at least one (and possibly two) overland passages from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, as well as access to the overland passage between Egypt and Jordan. This way, the Palestinian state would really have viability.

Of course, ideas are easier than implementation, and the dwindling and aging peace camp is losing ground. Brainstorming is necessary for widening it to include large segments of the vibrant civil society organizations of both sides, active in many walks of life, but alienated for joint or separate peace.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

It seems that none of the five sources of initiatives mentioned in the preceding sections has any chance of materializing on its own and that what is needed is a mixture of the best of the suggested scenarios. The process may begin with secret and subsequently direct negotiations (either back channels for Sadat–Begin or Track Iis, as in the Oslo process) and then may be endorsed and mediated by the United States with energetic involvement at the presidential level (as was the case for Presidents Carter and Clinton), accompanied by effective, reciprocal, and unilateral confidence-building measures offered by the Israeli and Palestinian governments. From the Israelis, that would include prisoner release, removal of checkpoints, permits for work in Israel, dismantling of illegal outposts, no government permits, and no new settlements; from the Palestinians, that would include effective curbing of violent threats through cooperative security and a halt to media incitement). The international community could provide endorsement, in terms of both peacekeeping and support of civil-society peace building.

In retrospect, the identity-driven Palestinian–Israeli conflict has become one of the world's quintessential and most intractable ethnopolitical disputes. Several barriers were built over a century, and differentiation was affected by a psychological dimension that resulted from the bloodshed that occurred at least once a decade. Today, we highlight our ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic, and national differences. Extreme groups in our societies claim control over the entire land of Palestine and Israel and insist on the expulsion of the "Other," but as we reviewed encounters of Arabs and Jews through the centuries, we found strong affinities based on the common ground provided by Semitic languages, Abrahamic religions, shared history of peaceful relations, and joint scientific and cultural contributions to world civilization. Even if conflict resolution is a faraway stage, we should aim for conflict management. Even in these difficult times, conflict should not be perceived as a zero-sum game because taboos have been broken. Israelis and Palestinians have taken steps toward peace in the past. The lack of mutual trust is a major impediment in this process. Acknowledging history is not enough. Rather, we must look toward the future by

analyzing what is happening today. Living in a state of trauma exacerbates people's fears and frustrations, which leads to irrational behavior.[34] We need conditions that are conducive to easing tensions and making our lives easier so we can become reengaged in the political process.

Historically speaking, it is hard to deny that the Jewish quest for national independence is one of the success stories of the twentieth century, albeit following the great suffering incurred by their brethren in Europe. Israeli Jews may associate contemporary events with previous traumatic experiences in which survival in the Diaspora was seriously at stake during centuries of persecution, and particularly during the single and most brutal event in human history: the Holocaust. However, for many Palestinians, there is no question about who has been the victim of more recent history or about the necessity for the Israelis to redress the injustices they have inflicted. Depending on different stages of the peace process and political violence, each civil society understandably weighed the situation with its own self-interests in mind.

Hence, suicide bombings prompted Israelis to expect Palestinian society to give up the monopoly of the role of "victim" and share with them a sense of empathy. Palestinians contrasted this with the reference to the "structural" violence of the Israeli government's practices in the Occupied Territories, combined with its seeming disregard for the value of Palestinian life.

In addition to gross human rights violations and the collective punishment of an entire population through restriction of its freedom of movement, the economic situation also must be factored. According to some estimates for 2005, almost 60 percent of Palestinians were unemployed or underemployed; almost 70 percent lived under the poverty level. With no food and high unemployment, and with generalized repression, people become frustrated and turn into walking bombs. We must understand that meeting some basic needs and supporting economic development can also increase peace building.

September 11, 2001, and the defeat of Sadam Hussein undoubtedly constituted a watershed in the world and in regional political trends, with direct and indirect implications for our "narrow" Israeli–Palestinian conflict—albeit that very conflict has been identified by large numbers of people worldwide as a potential cause of a world crisis. A *crisis,* as the Chinese language represents this word, is combined with the characters of both "danger" and "opportunity." Major catastrophes during the last century have created opportunities for significant new developments that have spilled over into the Jewish–Arab struggle for Israel–Palestine. World War I, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Balfour Declaration supporting the idea of a Jewish national home, and President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points together paved the way for the British mandate over Palestine. World War II and the post facto revulsion toward Nazi genocide strengthened support for the establishment of a Jewish state. After the 1991 Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush announced a "New World Order" that triggered the Madrid Peace Conference, which was followed by the Oslo breakthrough of mutual Israeli–Palestinian recognition and the call for "No more war."

The Palestinian quest for statehood is an urgent call to give back their dignity to the people of the West Bank and Gaze and to allow them to master their destiny in a manner nonprejudicial to its neighbors, and to Israel in particular. Within this context, our protracted Israeli–Palestinian dispute has shrunk back to its original dimension: two nations fighting for a small piece of land. And now, when most of the people on both sides are willing to settle for a part of the land, the national conflict has been sidetracked by Muslim and Jewish religious zealot minorities, who through their violent and undemocratic acts are determining our destiny, fostering confrontation, and postponing a peaceful resolution.

More and more, our national identities seem to be based only on how we differ from each other, from the enemy. Our identity-driven conflict seems now to be confined to the two major issues being contested: geography and demography. "Separation" is a poor second best to interactive cooperation between two sovereign entities. Failure to move in the direction of the solutions mentioned in the previous section may necessarily lead to the "one-state solution" that would include all the Palestinian territories currently under military control and pre-1967 Israel. An unwilling coalition with "Greater Israel" supporters emerged when some reputable Palestinians suggested warning the Israeli government that the dissolution of the Palestinian

Authority will require in the near future that it take full responsibility over the territories and grant full citizens' rights to the natives of Palestine. This dramatic act, in their eyes, should not mean the dismantling of the PLO as the legitimate partner in power sharing.[35] Some academics have been saying for many years that it may already be too late for a two-state solution and point deterministically to the need to address realistically the picture in which Arabs and Jews will live together in one state, in competitive numbers. If this is the case, the challenge would be to make the best of a binational state with an adequate political superstructure, multiculturalism, and equality. But this is unfeasible. What many Israelis see as a demographic threat may also harbor some unfounded expectation on the part of Palestinians who prefer to wait until the time that Jews will be outnumbered. Rather than prolonging the suffering for another generation or more, some other radical options, such as ethnic cleansing or forcing the Palestinians into fragmented "homelands" (as happened to Bantustans in South Africa during the apartheid era), may perpetuate the conflict indefinitely.[36]

A quick assessment of the present political realities show that the present use of violence against each other signals even more the hatred and animosity of the two nations toward each other. Most Palestinians were born after 1967 and identify Israelis only as soldiers and the instruments of their oppression. Jews relate emotionally to the civilian victims, now reaching two-thirds of the total in Israel, who have been harmed through acts of terror and suicide bombings; this sense of a "home front" brings them back to the insecure situation of 1948, since more than 90 percent of the deaths afterward have been of soldiers killed on the borders of Israel. Even Chairman Arafat was unable to totally stop the acts of indiscriminate violence against Israeli civilians. Like leaders such as Gandhi and Arafat's successor Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat could have disowned and totally condemned the violence as illegitimate. As much as suicide bombings had popular support, endorsement of nonviolent methods had even more support, but Arafat preferred to be silent on the alternative, losing the opportunity, after the failure of terror, to tilt the balance in a more peaceful direction.

It has often been said on the Israeli side that facing a common enemy is the glue that keeps a very diverse society together. Israelis are 20 percent Arab, secular and religious, and Jews come more than ninety countries and are rich and poor. Still, the idea of uniting to face the "Zionist enemy" has been a convenient delaying factor for democratic change in the neighboring Arab countries and for the Palestinians. Achieving peace is not necessarily a factor of disintegration, since in the democratic context, diversity and multiculturalism are inherent features of pluralistic societies in which hyphenated identities exist and flourish. In fact, the political stability in Israel has been decreasing steadily since putting the politicians face to face with the peace option. During the first twenty-nine years following independence, the Labor Party ruled effectively. Paradoxically, it was Begin's Likud that formalized the first peace option (with Egypt) and kept itself in power for fifteen long years. However, in the equivalent amount of time since the 1993 Oslo peace process, seven heads of governments of both parties have been unable, so far, to complete even one full electoral period.

At this stage, the strengthening of civil society linkages seems to be as important as a signed peace of paper. At first glance, the assumption would make sense that people share similar values that could help bridge the divide, and the potential of such interactions would be strong. However, if such is the case, why has cooperation been so difficult to achieve? While it seems logical for people with similar professional backgrounds and attitudes toward each other to work together, what makes such a relationship the domain of only a small fringe of both communities? In addition to technical and financial restrictions, other political and psychological barriers may well exist. In general, we need to realize that this effort to work with the "enemy" is initially more difficult than working for peace or justice separately. This is the case particularly now, when the expectation gap on both sides between the expected benefits and dividends from the peace process and the gloomy reality makes for a sense of frustration and depression. Keeping the Israeli– Palestinian interaction based on a sense of equality and reciprocity, while acknowledging the asymmetries resulting from the forms of dominance in an occupier–occupied relationship, is no doubt a complex enterprise. Such exchanges generate a high level of emotional involvement that could fail or result in a long-term commitment that could help overcome other practical obstacles.

As in other intrastate conflicts, the peace issue is strongly related to the relevance of human rights and clearly must be an essential part of any solution.[37] It is here that the societal involvement in peace building may represent a powerful ingredient in the problem-solving process. A sustained search for common ground and the advancement of "sectorial peace" (through academics, professional groups, artists, target sectors, women, children, etc.) can be the most effective way to change attitudes through frequent encounters. This can lead to the development of epistemic communities that share a common understanding of the issues at stake and the ways to resolve it and generate new discourse and ideas.

With all these complexities, if we look ahead into centuries beyond our lifetime, we all know that these hostilities resulted from political conflicts that can, hopefully, be solved. The cultural ties between Arabs and Jews are too deep and too profound to be totally undermined by the current state of political hostility. This is why we believe that a settlement of the political problems is both desired and possible. It is desired because we know that a peaceful coexistence is of mutual benefit for both Arabs and Jews, and it is possible because we are equipped with a rich common heritage that is strong enough to carry us through this difficult enterprise.

Our journey in this presentation needs to come to an end. We thank the editors for this opportunity "to tell our own stories in our own words," and we hope that our joint analysis has made a modest contribution toward understanding and peace.

Appendix

The Clinton Parameters, December 23, 2000

Source: The Web site of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, http://www.fmep.org/resources/peace_ plans/clinton_parameters.html.

Note: After the failure of the Camp David Summit in July, 2000 to achieve a peace agreement between Israeli and Palestinian delegations led, respectively, by Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, negotiations continued between the two sides and gaps between the parties on various issues were narrowed, but there was no comprehensive agreement. In a last ditch effort, U.S. President Bill Clinton offered the following "Parameters" on December 23 to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at a meeting in the White House. President Clinton's "Parameters" were not the terms of a final deal, but guidelines for final accelerated negotiations he hoped could be concluded in the coming weeks. He said his terms would not be binding on his successor when he would leave office in January 2001.

Arafat, after a delay, accepted the Clinton parameters, but with questions and reservations. Barak accepted the parameters, but Israel's position was also equivocal. The parameters laid the foundation for the final negotiations that took place in January 2001 at Taba before the election of Ariel Sharon in February 2001 that effectively ended the peace process. [See "Taba Agreement" below. The text of the Clinton Parameters follows. PCWilcox, 7/7/03])

TERRITORY

Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90%'s, between 94-96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.

The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in addition to territorial arrangement such as a permanent safe passage.

The parties should also consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. [There] are creative ways for doing this that should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and concerns.

The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

- 80% of the settlers in blocks
- Contiguity
- Minimize annexed areas
- Minimize the number of Palestinians affected

SECURITY

The key to security lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides.

My best judgment is that the Israeli withdrawal should be carried out over 36 months while international force is gradually introduced in the area. At the end of this period, a small Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.

On early warning situations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review after 10 years with any changes in status to be mutually agreed.

Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you still have to develop a map of relevant areas and routes. But in defining what is an emergency, I propose the following definition:

Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature requires the activation of a national state of emergency.

Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a "demilitarized state" while the Palestinian side proposes "a state with limited arms." As a compromise, I suggest calling it a "non-militarized state."

This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrence purposes.

JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES

I have a sense that the remaining gaps have more to do with formulations than practical realities.

JERUSALEM

The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to the symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.

I know you have been discussing a number of formulations, and you can agree on any of these. I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people. Regarding either one of these two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.

1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over [the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part][the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part].

   There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.
2. Palestinian shared sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall as mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.

REFUGEES

I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level.

I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem.

An international commission should be established to implement all the aspects that flow from your agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation, etc.

The U.S. is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees.

The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning this principle.

The Israeli side could simply not accept any reference to right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policies on admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

Any solution must address both needs.

The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach that both sides have accepted as the [end to] the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state will be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

In light of the above, I propose two alternatives:

1. Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Historic Palestine. Or,
2. Both sides recognize the right of the Palestinian refuges to return to their homeland. The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list five possible final homes for the refugees:
    1. The state of Palestine
    2. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap
    3. Rehabilitation in a host country
    4. Resettlement in a third country
    5. Admission to Israel

In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the areas acquired in the land swap would be a right to all Palestinian refugees.

While rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third world countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.

Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel's sovereign decision.

I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon.

The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.

I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all its claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Council Resolution that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented through the release of Palestinian prisoners.

I believe that this is an outline of a fair and lasting agreement.

It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine the future on their own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by the international community, Al-Qods as its capital, sovereignty over the Haram, and new lives for the refugees.

It gives the people of Israel a genuine end to the conflict, real security, the preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settlers into Israel, and the largest Jewish Jerusalem in history recognized by all as its capital.

This is the best I can do. Brief your leaders and tell me if they are prepared to come for discussions based on these ideas. If so, I would meet the next week separately. If not, I have taken this as far as I can.

These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, they also go with me when I leave the office.

ENDNOTE

1. When we started team teaching in 1992, we called the course "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," but with the Oslo process a sense of optimism led us to try to avoid perpetuating calling our relation a "conflict." Initially, we considered highlighting the term *peace,* but cautionary intuition suggested that we replace the original title with "Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian Experiment."
2. For a description of previous coauthoring efforts, see "Israeli-Palestinian Co-authoring: A New Development Towards Peace?" *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXII, 88, no. 4 (1993), 32–44.
3. Since the pioneering writings of the late S. D. Goitein (d. 1984) on contact between Arabs and Jews through the ages, no major work has been produced to reexamine the long history of contact between these two Semitic peoples.
4. Shukri Abed, "The Common Heritage of Arabs and Jews: An Historical Perspective" (unpublished manuscript, 1996). "While the medieval epoch may have been exceptional in terms of Jewish-Arab productive relationships, from antiquity to the present and whenever their destinies met, some Jews and some Arabs found ways to cooperate-mostly within the limits of their time and place, and sometimes transcending these limits." Arabs and Jews are the two surviving representatives of the Semitic people, and their respective languages-Arabic and Hebrew-have preserved the major characteristics of the mother Semitic tongue. As two languages that have many semantic and structural similarities, they reflect a major cultural affinity between the two peoples who use them: Arabs and Jews, respectively. Similarities between Arabs and Jews, indeed an overlapping of world views, are codified in the patterns of these languages. Likewise, notwithstanding the variations in narratives and emphasis, much of the teachings of the *Qur'an,* Islam's holy book, can be traced back to Jewish and Christian origins as reflected in the Bible. Thus, Arabs and Jews share linguistic and religious traditions that were handed over to them by their forefathers and the founders of their respective religions. The linguistic and religious elements they share created the cultural affinity, provided the platform for a historical bond, and led to intellectual and political cooperation between them for many centuries. This cooperation is reflected in the works of many scholars, scientists, philosophers, and artists, of both peoples, who worked together throughout the various Islamic empires and produced one of the most profound and important cultures known in history, the Judeo-Arabic culture.
5. The persecution of Jews that began in medieval Christian Europe was alien to Muslim lands. Religious and ethnic tolerance continued to characterize Muslim societies even when the horrible crimes against Jews in modern history were taking place in Europe. Jews continued to enjoy the protection and the friendship of their Muslim and Arab neighbors until the two respective national movements, Zionism and the Arab National Movement, began to clash on political, not cultural, grounds. The creation in 1948 of Israel as a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab world signaled the beginning of strained relations between the two Jews and Muslims/Arabs. The wars, the acts of violence, and the hostility that have erupted as a result of the political developments in the Middle East over the last hundred years are unwelcome phenomena for both peoples.
6. When we talk about national and ethnic minorities, we typically refer to Arabs in general who overwhelmingly were Muslims; the Armenians who were Christians; and the Serbs, Croatians, Greeks, and other minorities who lived within the Ottoman Empire, which engulfed many different communities under a community system of control (the "millet system") for which the head of the church and the head of the community were accountable.
7. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
8. Manuel Hassassian, "The Democratization Process in the PLO: Ideology, Structure and Strategy," in *Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,* ed. E. Kaufman, S. Abed, and R. Rothstein (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 257–88.
9. A colonial situation is one in which "one ethnic group rules over another, ethnically different, group within the same territory. The ruling group holds a monopoly of power, as well as a disproportionately large share of the territory's economy resources." Emmanuel Sivan, "The Intifada and Decolonization," *Middle East Review* (Winter 1989/1990), 2–6.
10. Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 45.
11. Ibid., 73.
12. The following pages have condensed the chapter by Moshe Maoz, "Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli Relations," in ed. E. Kaufman, S. Abed, and R. Rothstein, *Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 213–44.
13. Shibley Telhami, *The Path to the Camp David Accords* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
14. The different sources of the terms are given in E. Kaufman, "Israeli Perceptions of the Palestinians' 'Limited Violence' in the *Intifada," Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 3* (Winter 1992), 1–38.
15. Sari Nusseibah, Faysal el-Husseini, and particularly Mubarak Awad develop this idea in *Nonviolent Resistance as a Strategy for the Occupied Territories* (Santa Cruz, CA: New Society Publishers, 1983).
16. An analysis of the first sixty leaflets of the Unified National Command of the Intifada by Nafez Assaily, Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, Jerusalem (June l99l), can be obtained by contacting mawad@iyaf.org.
17. Edy Kaufman, "The Intifada's Limited Violence," *Journal of Arab Affairs,* no. 9 (Fall 1990), 120–21.

18. A critical analysis of the "WWW," including articles of both authors, can be found in E. Kaufman, W. Salem, and J. Verhoeven, eds., *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
19. Arie Kacovicz, "Rashomon in the Middle East: Clashing Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (unpublished manuscript, Hebrew University, Department of International Relations, 2003).
20. Sari Nusseibeh and Edy Kaufman, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Reflections on a Turning Point," *Palestine-Israel Journal,* vol. VII, no. 8 (2000), 32–45.
21. Kacovicz, "Rashomon in the Middle East: Clashing Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
22. Michael Walzer, "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine," *Dissent Magazine* (Fall 2002).
23. Khalil Shikaki, "A Palestinian Civil War?" Foreign Affairs (January–February 2002), 89–105.
24. This "Roadmap for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace"—developed by the United States and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia (the Quartet)—was clear in its early stages and then vague in showing the road toward the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.
25. Among the more elaborate plans, see "Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement," *Middle East Report No. 2* (Amman/Washington/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 16, 2002).
26. Jerome Segal, "How to Bring a Unified Palestinian State into Existence," published in *Al-Quds* in Arabic, September 27, 2007.
27. Shafeeq Ghabra, "The Arab Peace Initiative: The Necessities of Reviving the Initiative and the Risk of Stagnation," *Common Ground News Service,* November 18, 2003.
28. This statement was coordinated by the International Crisis Group in October 2007 and included as signatories Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter; Lee H. Hamilton, former congressman and co-chair of the Iraq Study Group; Carla Hills, former U.S. trade representative under President George H.W. Bush; Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, former senator; Thomas R. Pickering, former undersecretary of state; Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush; Theodore C. Sorensen, former special counsel and advisor to President John F. Kennedy; and Paul Volcker, former chairman of the board of governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System.
29. "An International Protectorate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip?" Summarized from a study undertaken by Tony Klug (London: Middle East Policy Initiative Forum, May 2003).
30. The aim of "One Voice" is to achieve consensus at the grassroots level to reach a ten-point agreement based on security, dignity, respect, and the right to build a better future for the next generation of Palestinians and Israelis. For more information, see www.onevoicemovement.org.
31. This short document endorses the two-state solution along the pre-1967 border with mutually agreed modifications: Jerusalem as the capital of the two states, Jews returning only to Israel (no settlements), and Palestinian refugees given compensation and the choice to return to Palestine. See www.mifkad.org.
32. For an analysis of the Saudi peace initiative and the endorsement at the Beirut Arab League Summit in March 2002, see Shafeeq Ghabra, "The Arab Peace Initiative: The Necessities of Reviving the Initiative and the Risks of Stagnation," *Common Ground News Service,* November 17, 2003.
33. For the full peace treaty, covering in detail maps for borders, Jerusalem as a capital for both states, refugees, and settlements (only chapters on water and economic cooperation are missing), see www.heskem.org.il. For the full results of the public opinion poll conducted by the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, see http://truman.huji.ac.il.
34. Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1977).
35. Gazi Hamad, "To Dissolve or Not to Dissolve," *Palestine Report Newslist,* January 31, 2004.
36. Many publications have compared the South Africa and Israel-Palestine realities, although not predicting as yet the same one-state outcome. See Manuel Hassassian, "NGOs in the Context of National Struggle," in ed. Benjamin Gidron, *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 130-50. See also E. Kaufman and Mubarak Awad, "Back from South Africa: Lessons for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace," *Tikkun,* vol. 10, no. 5 (September-October, 1995), 63–64, 93–94. Also see Yair Hirschfeld, Avivit Hai, and Gary Susman, *Learning from South Africa: Lessons to the Israeli-Palestinian Case* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Economic Cooperation Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003).
37. Edward (Edy) Kaufman and Ibrahim Bisharat, "Introducing Human Rights into Conflict Resolution: The Relevance for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," *Journal of Human Rights,* vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2002), 71-91.

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In September 1996, Dr. Hassassian was awarded an honorary doctorate from the Université de Reims in France for his academic contributions in the field of political science. He also has served as the head of the Jerusalem Task Force in the Negotiations Affairs Department. He was president of the Rectors' Conference at the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education, and since 2001 he has been president of Palestinian/European Academic Cooperation in Education (PEACE), located in UNESCO's Paris headquarters. In 2005 he was appointed as Palestinian Ambassador to Great Britain.