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Academic Freedom for All: Palestinians and Israelis Searching Equality



A New Paradigm for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Building

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Boycott against Israel in its various forms has become one of the most significant battlefronts of the Palestinian – Zionism conflict as part of the Palestinian “New Resistance” philosophy, which is centered heavily on unilateralism and the "logic of pressure."

In this paper, we will examine the boycott as it is applied to academic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. What follows is a study of the two main Palestinian-led boycott movements; the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel (BDS) movement.

To this end, we have carried out extensive research based mainly on the evaluation of hundreds of written publications from the two conflicting parties since the beginning of the boycott in 2004. Our findings in this regard have been divided into two parts: a theoretical section and a practical evaluation.

In the theoretical section, we focused our analysis on two main aspects: a diagnosis and prognosis of the conflict. The diagnostic part includes the conflict assessment outlined with the purpose of evaluating the appropriateness or feasibility of a second-track initiative at this time. We offer a thorough presentation of the respective parties' interests, motives, agendas, demands, and perceptions of one another. We have also put forward a conscious refrain to the history of the conflict, existing communication channels between the parties and, of course, previous attempts to resolve the conflict.

In the prognostic section, however, we hypothesize a set of plausible alternative future scenarios, or common futures, to the conflict as a whole. These scenarios include the preferred overall outcome scenario based upon the diagnosis and alongside each BATNA - best alternative to a negotiated agreement .

In the practical section, we propose a design for a second-track initiative that would address the issue of Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation. The goal of this initiative would be to bring Israelis and Palestinians together to negotiate mutually-acceptable guidelines and criteria for academic cooperation between the two communities. This resolution could take the form of an alternative to the existing options facing Israeli and Palestinian academics under the boycott, or even suggest a redesign of the current boycott's application to make it more selective. That is, if this effort succeeds in framing new agreed-upon guidelines and criteria, then Palestinian academia will have a third option, or "selective cooperation," rather than total cooperation or inclusive boycott.

1. DIAGNOSIS

The call of BDS and PACBI

In 2005, on the one-year anniversary of the International Court of Justice's advisory against the West Bank separation barrier, which Israel built on internationally recognized occupied Palestinian territory, over 170 Palestinian civil society organizations issued a call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (for short –BDS), thereby marking the official beginning of the international BDS movement (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 221).

These Palestinian Civil Society organizations called upon the international community and people of conscience all over the world **"to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era."** This call also includes an appeal to the addressee to pressure their respective states **"to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel"**. Even Israelis were invited to support this Call for **"the sake of justice and genuine peace"**.

BDS was preceded by a similar, albeit narrower in scope, campaign referred to as the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel –PACBI for short. This campaign was launched in July 2004 by Palestinian academics and intellectuals calling their colleagues in the international community to **"comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural institutions as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's occupation, colonization and system of apartheid."**

We ought to clarify that this paper is premised upon the notion that PACBI is a pillar of BDS, and so, it is built upon the same logic and it is founded, led and advocated by the same group of people. That is to say, any scrutiny of the Palestinian-led academic boycott against Israel cannot convey a genuine portrayal of the situation without equally referring to both the BDS and PACBI.

According to several Israeli observers the origins of the BDS can be traced back to the 2001 NGO Forum against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance, which took place in Durban, South Africa in 2001 and was known by many as the First Durban Conference (The Reut Institute. (10/5/2010). (The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of Israel. **In The**

Reut Institute. Retrieved 3/12/2012, from <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3868> , pg 2). The conference's agenda, according to these observers, "was taken over by several radical non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and turned it into an anti-Israel fest". However, none of the pro-boycotters writing include, whether intentionally or not, any reference to this conference.

Background

Prior to the launch of BDS and PACBI, two calls for academic boycott of Israel were issued; however, none of them were in the form of a consistent worldwide movement such as BDS and PACBI, but were published via an open letter (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 218). The first letter was issued on April 2002 by British professors Hilary and Steven Rose and was signed by 125 academics calling for an academic boycott of Israel (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 219); The second letter was issued on March 2004 and signed by nearly 300 academics calling for Israeli academics to oppose "**Israeli government action against Palestinian education and academic freedom** " or otherwise face boycott themselves (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,219). Neither of these attempts amounted to a significant academic boycott against Israeli academia¹.

Quite expectedly, the BDS and PACBI campaigns have been affected by the ongoing Palestinian - Israeli conflict. Accordingly, the campaigns have grown rapidly in the wake of both the 2008-09 "Cast Led" operation launched by the Israeli government against Hamas as well as following the Marvi Mara affair on may 31, 2010 .(The Reut Institute. (10/5/2010). (The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of Israe. **In The Reut Institute**. Retrieved 3/12/2012, from <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3868> , pg 3. See also Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 167).

BDS and PACBI call goals

Both BDS and PACBI, as will be elaborated below, are centered on the "logic of pressure" as a resistance philosophy. However, the PACBI call does not mention the goals of its boycott, thus it is presumable, in light of its close affiliation to the BDS, that its goals are similar to those of the BDS. The goals of the BDS campaign as expressed in their call are threefold; **a. Ending Israeli occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the separation wall; b. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; C. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinians refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194**"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 87).

In this context, **Omar Barghouti** , a founder and steering committee member of PACBI and a drafter of the BDS call , elucidated the ostensibly rights-based approach of PACBI and BDS, presenting them as unbiased to any one particular political solution . He explains that " the fundamental pillar of the BDS call was its rights-based approach that does not endorse any particular political solution to the Arab-Israeli colonial , conflict , but insists that for any solution to be just and sustainable it must address all three basic rights stated in the call" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,88). **Asa Winstanley**, journalist and BDS supporter, has expressed a similar a view by arguing that BDS is a liberal, right-based universal campaign. She claims that "The BNC platform (the dominant organization inside BDS) itself is broad, and does not take any position on specific political plans to resolve the conflict (rendering the one-state vs. two-state debate irrelevant in this context). Instead, the BNC's 2005 United Call document took a rights-based approach." (New Left Project, 05/17/10).

Nevertheless, the effort to present BDS and PACBI as right-based movement has been heavily criticized by the anti-boycott movement as being an argument intended mainly to mask the real agenda of these campaigns - which is to delegitimize the mere existence of Israel. For example, it has been adamantly claimed in Reut's 2010 study that:" In contrast to the BDS Movement's attempt to portray itself as a progressive humanitarian movement, there are clear indications that the BDS Movement catalysts² are using the Movement in order to promote an agenda of delegitimizing Israel. This agenda is being promoted by the Movement implicitly by advancing the 'right of return,' branding Israel as an apartheid state, singling Israel out, and seeking to undermine Israeli-Palestinian cooperation"(. (The Reut Institute. (10/5/2010). (The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of Israe. **In**

The Reut Institute. Retrieved 3/12/2012, from <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3868> , 6-9).

Another body worth mentioning in this context is the Palestinian BDS national Committee (for short - BNC). The BNC was established in April 2008 as the principle anchor of and reference for the global BDS movement and it is the broadest Palestinian civil society coalition. It is made up of the largest coalitions, networks, and unions of Palestinian citizens of Israel and refugees, as well as those living in the west Bank and Gaza (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,78; Reut's 2010 Study , p 2). The BNS, according to the Boycott supporters, has been emphasizing and respecting the principle of *context sensibility*- the idea that the call for BDS should be implemented in each community in a way that suits the particular circumstances of the local environment, as decided by local activists (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,78).

Guidelines and criteria of the boycott

The PACBI guidelines for the implementation of the academic boycott, which apply to international academics and students, are essentially clear: any interaction with Israeli universities, regardless of the content or form, violates the academic boycott if such an interaction entails official contact with the institution (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 172). To be more specific, these are two guidelines from the ten mentioned in the PACBI call : "Refrain from participation in any form of academic and cultural cooperation, collaboration or joint projects with Israeli institutions; Refrain from participation in any form of academic and cultural cooperation, collaboration or joint projects with Israeli institutions;". The other eight guidelines present more activist approaches for action rather than mere reaction. They call, for instance to "Advocate a comprehensive boycott of Israeli institutions at the national and international levels, including suspension of all forms of funding and subsidies to these institutions" and to "Work toward the condemnation of Israeli policies by pressing for resolutions to be adopted by academic, professional and cultural associations and organizations" (PACBI. (01-10-2009). PACBI Guidelines for the International Academic Boycott of Israel (Revised August 2010). **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel** . Retrieved 5/3/2013, from <http://pacbi.org/>).

The Institutional and tactical nature of the boycott

Most if not all of the boycott advocates emphasize the fact that the Palestinian-led academic boycott is an institutional one and not personal one, hence, it doesn't target individual scholars (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,167). They also argue that boycott is being led as a tactic and not as a strategy, for instrumental and practical reasons, and not as principle.

Naomi Klein, a well know pro-boycott activist and thinker, has articulated the above stance fairly clear. Boycott, she argues, "is not a dogma; it is a tactic. The reason the BDS strategy should be tried against Israel is practical: in a country so small and trade dependant, it could actually work"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,177). The allegedly tactical and institutional nature of the boycott has been skillfully clarified also by **John Berger**, who claimed that" Boycott is not a principle. When it becomes one, it itself risks becoming exclusive and racist. No boycott in our sense of the term should be directed against an individual, a people, or a nation as such. A boycott is directed against a policy and the institutions which support that policy either actively or tacitly. Its aim is not to reject but to bring about change" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,168).

With accordance to the institutional nature of the academic boycott against Israel, PACBI's guidelines and criteria for implementing the Boycott unequivocally states that:"Mere institutional affiliation to the Israeli academy is therefore not a sufficient condition for applying the boycott." It has been argued that this specific guideline exclude Israeli academics from the boycott if their scholastic related activity is not institutionally funded or sponsored by complicit Israeli or Brand Israel institution (PACBI. (02-03-2013). Brooklyn College , BDS and Palestinean Rights. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel** . Retrieved 20/3/2013, from <http://pacbi.org/.p> 2).

Selective/Partial Boycott

Ostensibly, the boycott thinkers and designers see their boycott as open, in principal, to selectiveness. In some cases, the need to employ partial boycott was justified in tactical terms , as it can be understood from Omar Barghouti's following statement : " The tactical need of our partners to carry out a selective boycott of settlement products , say, or military suppliers of Israel occupation army as the easiest way to rally support "(Forward 90/16/09)

However, the call for a selective boycott is perceived as suspicious and often branded as an effort to undermine the boycott and to vindicate its logic. It has been also attributed to "soft Zionist" looking to hamper any independent Palestinian-led resistance strategy.

As this paper is mainly interested in setting the stage for the establishment of an agreed set of guidelines and criteria that will enable Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation through "selective cooperation", we find it of critical importance to mention the current BDS and PACBI stance toward implementing "partial" or "selective" boycott. This stance was plainly pronounced by **Omar Barghouti**, who claimed the following: "The BNC always welcome initiatives calling for a partial or selective boycott of Israel and its complicit institutions, so long as they do not undermine or negate the basic rights of the Palestinians." However, this proclaimed readiness to redesign the boycott by making it more selective is quite elusive, as it is followed by the following reservation: "Some Zionists now calling for a selective boycott of Israeli academic and cultural institution based in colonial settlements, after decades of silence in the face of a brutal system of occupation and apartheid, are doing so explicitly in order to undermine and circumvent the wider, more principled, and far more morally consistent BDS campaign.". The stated worry of Barghouti stems from a disguised "Zionist" effort to slowly erode the Boycott and is framed in a way which offers us a wider understanding of his concerns and worries. He argues: "Zionists have always tried to maintain a gate-keeping role in channeling solidarity with Palestinian and reducing it to focus specifically on a small subset of Palestinian rights, while actively opposing any attempt to develop an independent, Palestinian-led resistance strategy based on the quest for self-determination and justice. With the advance of BDS, this Zionist gate-keeper hegemony is largely in tatters. Soft Zionists are taking this quite harshly, some going as far as to accuse Palestinian civil society of "betraying" them, and harming its own interests in the process. In their self-centered world-wide, typical of apologists for colonialism anywhere, they think that if they withdraw their support, Palestinian will lose their only hope for emancipation. But this patronizing, colonial discourse has been largely discredited, and increasingly revealed as a fraud, feeding the egos of its proponents while safeguarding Israeli apartheid"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 215-218).

As well, it is vitally important to mention at this point that the PACBI call issued in 2004 originally included an *exclusion clause* whereby "Any conscientious Israeli academics or intellectuals opposed to their state's colonial and racist policies," is to be excluded from the boycott PACBI. (PACBI. (28-01-2006). The Palestinian Call for Academic Boycott Revised: Adjusting the Parameters of the Debate. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel**. Retrieved

10/1/2013, from <http://pacbi.org/>). According to the campaign designers and framers, this clause was intended to address the inevitable grey-area situations where it is not clear whether academics or intellectuals are acting in their personal capacities or as representatives of institutions subjected to boycott. They added that since all institutional boycotts ultimately hurt individuals, PACBI felt the need to add this clause in order to nuance its call and to avoid harming progressive Israelis whom it considers allies in the struggle for justice, equality and genuine peace. Nevertheless, in January 2006 PACBI decided to refrain from adding this clause to its original 2004 Call for Boycott.

Three main considerations were behind the PACBI decision to omit the "exclusion clause" and retreat to an "inclusive boycott" (see PACBI. (28-01-2006). *The Palestinian Call for Academic Boycott Revised: Adjusting the Parameters of the Debate. In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel* . Retrieved 10/1/2013, from <http://pacbi.org/>). First, the will and need to avoid ideological inconsistency by reaffirming the institutional nature of the boycott. Second, is the belief that the "exclusion clause" has brought about continuous discussions which subsequently sidetracked the focus on the very real grounds for this boycott. Lastly, PACBI wanted to avoid giving the impression that it favored establishing blacklists, or, to be more precise, to refrain from opening the door to "political tests" and drawing lists of "good" and "bad" individuals. Quite obviously, careful consideration of these reasons is tremendously important in our effort to offer either a "third way" out of the current binary or to redesign the current boycott.

On the same note, in a statement made by the BNC on 21/2/2013, the movement reiterated its position concerning "individual boycott" by stating that BDS does not call for a boycott of individuals because she or he happens to be Israeli or because they express certain views. Of course, any individual is free to decide who they do and do not engage with. (PACBI . (21/2/2013). *BDS Movement Position on Boycott of Individuals. In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel* . Retrieved 4/4/2013, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2013/bds-movement-position-on-boycott-of-individuals-10679>).

Endorsement

The PACBI call was originally endorsed by Palestinian Federation of Unions of University Professors and Employees; Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions; Palestinian NGO Network, West Bank; Teachers' Federation; Palestinian Writers' Federation; Palestinian League of Artists; Palestinian Journalists' Federation; General Union of Palestinian Women; Palestinian Lawyers' Association; and tens of other Palestinian federations, associations, and civil society organizations. The

BDS call was originally endorsed by the Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and organizations that represent the three integral parts of the Palestinian people: refugees, Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian citizens of Israel (PACBI . (9/7/2005). Palestinian BDS Call. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel** . Retrieved 5/7/2012, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2013/bds-movement-position-on-boycott-of-individuals-10679>).

Nonetheless, The Palestinian authority has neither endorsed nor repudiated the BDS or PACBI call, though it has launched a narrower boycott of settlement-produce good (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 89).

The logic of the BDS

We believe that understanding the logic of the boycott is equally important to convey a precise diagnosis of the conflict alongside its prognosis. That is, understanding the logic of the boycott helps to shed light on the PACBI and BDS agenda, motives, needs, interests, and perceptions of the Israeli academy as well as their fundamental worries.

The logic of pressure

With regard to the logic of the academic boycott, we have observed at least one unambiguous insight; for the boycott designers, thinkers and advocates, the **logic of pressure** is the philosophy cradling the boycott (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 95,165, 176). This philosophy is premised on the adoption of pressure as a last resort, since the three other possible or relevant logics; **dialogue/persuasion, diplomacy and violence**, have either failed or been proven ineffective. Accordingly, we have decided to closely inspect this logic of pressure as seen by its advocates, while elucidating on what is not pressure; in other words , explaining what constitutes dialogue/persuasion, diplomacy and violence in this context.

The call of the BDS clearly deems the failure of diplomacy as a justification to shifting to the logic of pressure. This is clearly stated in the second clause of the BDS call: "Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine" (BDS. (9-7-2005). Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS. **In BDS Movement , Justice & Equality**. Retrieved 5/7/2012, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>). A

similar clause can also be found in the PACBI call: "Given that all forms of international intervention have until now failed to force Israel to comply with international law or to end its repression of the Palestinians, which has manifested itself in many forms, including siege, indiscriminate killing, wanton destruction and the racist colonial wall" (PACBI .(9/7/2005). Palestinian BDS Call. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel** . Retrieved 5/7/2012, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2013/bds-movement-position-on-boycott-of-individuals-10679>).

This view has been reiterated time and again by boycott advocates and thinkers. Mustafa Barghouti, for instance, argues that: " in the face of European inaction, it is crucial that we continue to revive our culture of collective activism by vigorously and none violently resisting Israel's domination over us "(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 5). Quite similarly, **Klein** asserts that the failure of "constructive engagement" and the lack of punitive measure against what she and other pro-boycott activist regard as "Israel's persistent and escalating violation of Palestinian rights" makes the case for departing from diplomacy toward pressure that can only be exerted through a boycott (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,176).

Finally, based open the supposed bankruptcy of diplomacy as an employment of logic of engagement, **Neve Gordon**, an Israeli professor of political science in the Israeli Ben-Gurion University, also argues that the only way to counter the "apartheid trend" in Israel is through massive international pressure (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,191). As to the more recent diplomatic efforts , Gordon observes that " The words and condemnation from the Obama administration and European Union have yielded few results- only a limited and temporary settlement freeze , and no decision to withdraw from the occupied territories " (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,191)

Persuasion and **dialogue** as logic of resistance have, according to boycott advocates, also failed miserably and are expected to remain impotent because of its conceptual incompatibility. It has been claimed that dialogue or persuasion has been revealed to be bankrupt, since in reality no amount of "education" of Israelis about the "horrors of occupation and other forms of oppression" have yielded any significant results (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New

YORK: Verso, 2012 ,166). Conceptually speaking, it has also been claimed that persuasion attempts, from the first place, were predestined for failure.

Illan Pappé , a former Israeli professor at Haifa university , was one of the first thinkers to expose the supposedly innate sterility of persuasion and dialogue. Pappé's following words outline this view : " Though rather late in the game , I came to realize that the problem was not a particular policy or a specific government, but one more deeply rooted in the **ideological infrastructure** informing Israeli decisions on Palestine and the Palestinians ever since 1948. I have described this ideology elsewhere as a hybrid between colonialism and romantic nationalism "(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,180). More specifically, Pappé maintain that Israel will not fix its "distorted" peace paradigm which thwart any possibility of achieving peace unless "It is pressured from the outside or forced to do so on the ground" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,182).

Omar Barghouti (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,212) , **Michael Warschawski** (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 194) and Slavoj Žižek (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,18), rest the same view on a diagnosis made decades ago by the prominent Palestinian thinker Edward Said. According to Said, the struggle over Palestine is not a symmetric struggle where "both sides" are in "conflict", for it is the case of settler colonialism and not the case of two national movements with equal legitimacy. Dialogue, they add, is incompatible mainly because it is rested upon this "false symmetry" in which their "two sides of the story", in the sense that each side must understand the pain, anguish, and suffering of the other, and accept the narrative of the other. In reality, according to pro-boycott advocates, there is no symmetry and the allegedly "false symmetry", which is the basis for any dialogue, serves to reinforce the status-quo instead of promoting the desired change (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,166).

The argument concerning "false symmetry" and the inevitable futility of dialogue, we have observed, is interrelated with a more acute controversy over the nature of the relationship between the Palestinians and Israelis. While anti-boycott usually frames the relationship as an essentially a conflict between two national movements over contested territory, many of the boycott designers frame it in colonized-colonizer perspective. This frame, as we will see in the following, is perceived by anti-boycott as part of the effort to delegitimize Israel.

At this point, we find it relevant to mention that prominent thinkers and advocates of the boycott do not regard boycott as an alternative to the logic of dialogue/persuasion manifested in negotiation, but rather an indispensable catalyst to negotiation. This view was clearly presented by **Illan Pappé**, who argues the following: "... It is essential not to confuse the means (pressure) with the objective (finding a formula for joint living) pressure. In other words, it is important to emphasize that pressure is meant to trigger meaningful negotiation, not take their place "(182). **Klein**, as well, goes as far as arguing that"...As soon as you start implementing a boycott strategy, dialogue increases dramatically" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,177). However, this should not be taken as evidence that Klein's view is necessarily shared by all or most thinkers behind the boycott.

It goes without say that boycott is in essence a nonviolent tactic. Hence the logic of violence is not and cannot be employed in this context. One can add that as in the case of diplomacy and dialogue, the logic of violence is rejected by the pro-boycott movement mainly for practical reasons, i.e. perceived unproductiveness (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,4).

All in all, in light of the ineffectiveness or incompatibility of all of violence, persuasion and diplomacy, pro-boycott elements have resorted to a novel philosophy of resistance premised upon the logic of pressure and manifested, among other forms, in an academic boycott against Israel.

The theoretical framework of the boycott: the Apartheid model

Both The BDS and PACBI Calls leave no room for mistake - the "**anti-apartheid model**" is the relevant theoretical and moral framework that the boycott should rest upon and be inspired by. According to the BDS call, their campaign is "**Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression**"(BDS. (9-7-2005). Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS. **In BDS Movement , Justice & Equality**. Retrieved 5/7/2012, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>). Similarly, the PACBI call describes the Israeli presence in the West Bank as an "**Entrenched system of racial discrimination and segregation against the Palestinian citizens of Israel, which resembles the defunct apartheid system in South Africa**" (PACBI .(9-7-2005). Palestinian BDS Call. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel** . Retrieved 5/7/2012, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2013/bds-movement-position-on-boycott-of-individuals-10679>) .

In this respect , our research has revealed that the decision of the boycotters to derive a parallel mainly, though not exclusively, from the "anti-apartheid" model is based upon three main perspectives that , in turn , can be divided into three distinct categories: ideological, strategic, and tactical.

From the ideological perspective, Israeli presence and control of the West Bank is deemed similar to, if not worse than, the system of apartheid which operated throughout South Africa until 1989 (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 32 , 93). The ideological equation between Israel's system of control over the West Bank and apartheid South Africa is one of the most salient notions undergirding both the BDS and PACBI. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a prominent pro-boycott activist, has unequivocally expressed this notion. According to him " The end of the apartheid stands as one of the crowning accomplishments of the past century, but we would not have succeeded without the help of international pressure ... a similar movement has taken shape, this time aiming at the end of to Israeli occupation ... These tactics are not only parallels to the struggle against apartheid . Yesterday's South African township dwellers can tell you about today's life in the occupied territories ...if apartheid ended, so can the occupation, but the moral force and international pressure will have to be just as determined" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 103)

Following heavy criticism on the analogy between Israel and past Apartheid south Africa **Klein** further elucidates on the alleged similarity between the two states.." The question in not " Is Israel the same as south Africa ? ; it is " Do Israel's action meet the international definition of what apartheid is ?" And if you look at those conditions which includes the transfer of people , multiple tires of law , official state segregation , then you see that , yes , it does meet that definition – which is different than saying it is South Africa . No two states are the same. It's not the question, it's a distraction ". (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 200)

In its 2010 study , "**Building a political firewall against Israel's delegitimization- conceptual framework**(for short – Reut's 2010 study) , the Ruet Institution , a prominent Israeli think tanks , stated that : "Network has significantly succeeded in branding Israel as an apartheid state by deploying related terminology and using similar means to wage a global campaign against it "(pg 45) .

From the strategic perspective, it has been claimed that similar pressure has brought an end to the notorious South African system of apartheid; hence it is presumable that what has succeeded in South

Africa is expected to be have similar results in Palestine as well (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,103). Reut's 2010 study also acknowledged the strategic perspective underlying the rational of employing an anti-apartheid model as a theoretical frame work. This strategy has been referred to by its think tank as "on problem, one solution" strategy that can be epitomized as following : "what worked in bringing down white South Africa in 1994 can also work in Israel's case: Building a global grassroots movement for boycotts, sanctions and divestments that will eventually impact official policies in the leading nations of the world so that the political and economic model of Israel collapses under pressure, and surrenders to the principle of 'one person, one vote.' (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 45) "

From the tactical perspective, **Noura Erakat** , a prominent activist in the BDS campaign , unfolded the consideration behind the adaptation of the "anti-apartheid model ". In its writing about the efforts of Adalah – New York's BDS campain- led, she has stated that boycott advocates "have discovered that American audience relate much more easily to narratives of institutionalized racial discrimination than those of occupation. Hence they (Adalah advocates - A.F.) work to draw parallels between the civil Rights movement and the Palestinian movement to achieve freedom and equality" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,93) .

That is to say, adopting this model is not only consistent with the ideology of the boycott designers which has also proven efficient in similar contexts, but also tacitly wise as it assists in gaining western sympathy and thus serves the greater good of establishing " determined international pressure " against Israel (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 94) .

The "anti-apartheid model," as we have already implied, is not the only theoretical framework of the boycotters, notwithstanding its unquestioned supremacy. **Moustfa Barghouti** , for example, draws parallel mainly from other American freedom movement. We find his following words noteworthy: "A new generation of Palestinian leaders is attempting to speak to the world in the language of a nonviolent campaign of boycott, divestment, and sanction (BDS), precisely as Martin Luther King Jr. and thousands of African Americans did in the Montgomery bus boycott in the mid-1950s. We are equally justified to use this tactic to advance our rights. The same world that rejects all use of Palestinian violence , even in clear self-defense , surely ought not to begrudge us the nonviolence

employed by men such as King and Ghandi" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 6).

Effective Grassroots force

The boycott designers and advocates have disseminated a campaign aimed at spreading to the grassroots level, while not including Israelis, thereby bringing further pressure on the Israeli political elite (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,82). **Lisa Taraki** and **Mark Levine** clearly present this view: "The Palestinian BDS movement does not address the Israeli public directly in order to persuade it or appeal to its sense of Justice. That is not the logic of the BDS. it is up to the Israeli political forces to make that connection and to influence their public". (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 174)

Is the academic Boycott really a threat to Israel?

Quite obviously, no clear answer can be found in this stage to the lingering question of whether the Palestinian academic boycott constitutes a threat to Israel, and if so, to what degree. This is especially evident as each party tends to amplify their gains and belittle their losses. Conversely, the threat that each party actually poses to the other is sometimes augmented to serve each their own interests such as eliciting sympathy or, more likely, raising money to counter the other party's perceived hostile endeavors.

It is worth mentioning in this context that PACBI and BDS have had some relative "successes". To name just few:

1. In April 2005, the council of the UK Association of University Teacher (AUT) voted to boycott University of Haifa AND Bar-Illan University. However, the boycott was rescinded a month later following international pressure (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 221).
2. In September 2009, the British Trades Union Congress, representing 6.5 million workers across the UK, voted overwhelmingly to endorse BDS on Israel (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 223) .

3. In May 2010 congress of British university and collage union (UCU) voted to boycott the Ariel University center of Samaria (AUCS) (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 80) .
4. In February 2009 University workers in the Canadian Union of Public Employees passed a motion calling for an academic boycott of Israel (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 80).
5. In 2009 An Israeli academic team from AUCS was excluded from a prestigious competition on sustainable architecture organized by the Spanish government, because the college is located in the West Bank (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 80).
6. The most significant achievement was in March 2011, when the Senate of the university of Johannesburg, south Africa, voted to end its formal ties with Ben Gurion University, following a campaign endorsed by Desmond Tutu, Breytenbach , and John Dugard (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New York: Verso, 2012, 226)
7. Academic unions in the UK and Canada have voted to support various academic boycott campaign initiatives. There are also active academic boycott campaigns in India, the US, South Africa, Ireland, Chile, Brazil, Pakistan, and in many European countries BDS. (9-7-2012). BDS AT 7!– Celebrating, reflecting and further mainstreaming. **In BDS Movement, Justice & Equality**. Retrieved 1/3/2013, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call> , 2).
8. The extensive reach of the BDS movement is also highlighted by 2012 edition of the BDS Global Day of Action which took place in 23 countries and the fact that the 8 annual Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) was organized last year on campuses in 202 cities across the world BDS. (9-7-2012). BDS AT 7!– Celebrating, reflecting and further mainstreaming. **In BDS Movement, Justice & Equality**. Retrieved 1/3/2013, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>,3)
9. On 20 April 2013, the Association of Asian American Studies (AAAS) in the United States unanimously adopted a resolution which states that AAAS " endorses and will honor the call of Palestinian civil society for boycott of Israeli academic institutions," and that it " support the

protected rights of students and scholars everywhere to engage in research and public speaking about Israel-Palestine and in support of the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement ". (PACBI. (24-4-2013). Palestinians Salute the Association for Asian American Studies (AAAS) for its Endorsement of the Academic Boycott of Israel. **In BDS Movement, Justice & Equality**. Retrieved 28/5/2013, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>).

10. Lastly, is the recent high profile decision of the famous scientists and celebrity Professor Stephen Hawking to heed the Palestinian call for boycott and to pull out of an Israeli conference hosted by President Shimon Peres in June (BDS. (9-5-2013). Five reasons why Hawking is right to boycott Israel. **In BDS Movement, Justice & Equality** .Retrieved 28/5/2013, from <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2013/hawking-boycott-israel-10944>).

On the same note, In its 2010 study titled "**building a political firewall against Israel's delegitimization- conceptual framework**"(Reut Institute . (3/2010). Building a political Framework against Israel Delegitimization (conceptual framework). **In Reut Institute** . Retrieved 18/10/2012, from <http://www.reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf>.), Reut's acknowledged the potential threat of the BDS. They have observed that "The risk posed is that such campaigns will create an equivalency between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa that penetrates the mainstream of public and political consciousness. Given Israel's dependence on vigorous trade – as well as scientific, academic, and technological engagement with other countries – this movement towards isolating the country may pose a strategic threat"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 77, 83, 96)

Likewise, high ranking Israeli political figures, such as President Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak, have also explicitly or at least implicitly categorized BDS, especially its economic possible damage, as a serious threat (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 83).

To conclude, in October 2010, the Jewish Federation of North America and the Jewish Council for public Affairs pledged \$ 6 million for the establishment of an Israel action network designed to combat BDS. Jewish federation CEO Jerry Silverman has referred to the BDS as the second most dangerous

threat to Israel after Iran (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 226) .

Israel's Anti-boycott law

The most visible measure taken by the Israeli government to counter the boycott was in legislating an "anti-boycott" law in July 2011. This law essentially and effectively outlaws boycotting Israel as well as individuals and organizations calling for them (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 83) . According to the law, individuals or organizations who publicize a call for an economic, cultural or academic boycott against a person or entity merely because of its affiliation to the State of Israel and/or to an Israeli institute and/or to a specific region under Israeli control, can be sued by a party claiming that adhering to such a boycott may inflict economic or social damage upon them. The anti-boycott law also allows Israeli authorities to deny benefits from individuals or organizations - such as tax exemptions or participation in government contracts - if they have publicized a call to boycott and/or if they have obligated it to participate in a boycott. The law has been in force since 13 July 2011, with the exception of section 4 (withdrawing state benefits), which became effective on 11 October 2011 (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 83) .

Since its legislation, the Anti-boycott law has faced heavy criticism by both pro-boycott and anti-boycott groups. The main critique has been that this law is possess an authoritarian tinge, as it stifles freedom of speech under the threat of heavy penalties without the need to prove "guilt", or even causality between the expression of support for the boycott and any claimed damages (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 216). Nowadays, the law is awaiting judicial review by the Israeli Supreme Court.

On the same note, BDS and PACBI accuse Israel and anti-boycott in employing "lawfare" strategy against them to "delegitimize BDS and anti-Zionist activism in general". (PACBI. (2/4/2013). Israel's Lawfare against BDS in Tatters. **In Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and cultural Boycott of Israel**. Retrieved 28/5/2013, from <http://pacbi.org/einside.php?id=62&next=40>).

Critique of the boycott

Quite expectedly, the academic boycott of Israel put forward by the BDS and PACBI has been heavily criticized mainly by anti-boycotters. This critique, we believe, can shed light over how the boycott and the boycotters are perceived by their Israel and anti-boycott groups.

The boycott as de-legitimization of the State of Israel

The Academic Boycott is perceived by anti-boycott groups as a clear attempt to delegitimize the state of Israel. In its 2010 study titled "The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of Israel" (The Reut Institute. (10/5/2010). The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of Israel. **In The Reut Institute.** Retrieved 3/12/2012, from <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3868>, pg 5-9), the Reut's think tank argued, based upon an analysis of several statements made by prominent pro-boycott figures, that the BDS movement catalysts³ have clearly sought to delegitimize the state of Israel. This thesis derives from four principle observations: the fact that BDS movement explicitly advances the 'right of return', that it brands Israel as an apartheid state, that singles out Israel, and that it undermines Israeli – Palestinian cooperation.

To be more specific, the fact that only Israel was singled out for boycott was deemed by many anti-boycott advocates as an illegitimate discriminatory acts (Newman, David. " Britain and the Academic Boycott of Israel." *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 2, no. 2 (n.d.): 45-55, 50) It is also viewed as evidence of an anti-Semitic undertone to the pro-boycott arguments (Newman, David." Britain and the Academic Boycott of Israel." *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 2, no. 2 (n.d.): 45-55, 48)

Nevertheless, pro-boycott supporters have responded to these allegations in two main ways: First, they claim that Israel is a "special case," as it consistently presents itself as the "only true democracy" in the Middle East, as opposed to other repressive states with dictatorial regimes that render them resistant to boycotts. Second, it has been argued that some of the boycott advocates are Jews, the argument being that Jews would not have anti-Semitic motives or would not participate in a program that had such undertones (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 189-197).

It has also been argued by Omar Barghouti that the claim that a boycott against Israel is anti-Semitic is itself an anti-Semitic argument . This is because equating the Jews, Barghouti explains;

³ Defined by Ruet Institute as "BDS Movement catalysts are those individuals or organizations that initiate the movement's activities and who drive the trend of Israel's delegitimization. These catalysts collect and spread information, create new initiatives, organize events and demonstrations, harness and train others, increase awareness, and brand and publicize their network".

with Israel as if they were monolithic sum of people, without diversity, is anti Semitic statement in his perspective .

The boycott as an infringement on academic freedom of speech

That the implementation of the boycott would result in the denial of freedom of speech has been the main argument put forth by the anti-boycott advocates to counter the different boycott campaigns such as the Palestinian-led academic boycott. It has been also argued in this relation that many Israeli academics have exercised their freedom to criticize Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories". Many of them have also worked together with Palestinian colleagues to improve the general condition of Palestinians (Newman, David." Britain and the Academic Boycott of Israel." *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 2, no. 2 (n.d.): 45-55, 49). Lastly, anti-boycott advocates have claimed that academic boycott unjustly infringes on their right to pursue their careers without the need to crystallize or voice their political positions (Nussbaum, Martha. "**Against Academic Boycotts**" *Dissent* 2007 , 9).

From the other side, the boycott designers and thinkers have paid a significant amount of attention to the argument that the academic boycott is inconsistent with other freedoms, most importantly the freedom of speech and especially its relevant derivative here - academic freedom of speech. We have observed three main arguments put forward by this group to counter this serious allegation.

First is the "**ivory tower argument**" put forward by almost all of the boycott advocates. For instance, **Nadia Ali , Lisa Tarki and Mark Levine** (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 52-53,173) all postulate that there is an inescapable ethical link between scholarship and ethics ; thus, scholarship is not and cannot be neutral. Ali maintained that "...as the official production of state-sanctioned knowledge is concentrated n the academy, it becomes obvious that there is no "ivory tower", no insular forum of intellectual activity that does not translate into on-the-ground activity "(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 52). Accordingly, Ali derives that, "we must acknowledge that scholarship is not neutral and that the academy does not exist in a bubble or in ivory tower"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 52). Ali also refers to the supposedly "hyper-militarization" nature of the Israeli society as evidence that its academic institutions are heavily

involved in every aspect of the occupation Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , (53).

Whereas Ali puts emphasis on the inexorable relationship between scholarship and politics, arguing that knowledge production is necessarily political, **Tarki** and **Levine** highlight the link between scholarship and ethics rather than politics. They explain the **ivory tower argument**" in terms of "applying ethical principles to the practice of scholarship "(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 ,173) and not in terms of "putting politics above scholarship". We believe that this kind of approach can be seen as an opportunity to redesign the boycott by introducing a negotiated ethical code for academic cooperation between Palestinian and academics affiliated to Israeli academics.

Secondly, there is the "**reciprocity argument**," according to which he who denies academic freedom of speech cannot demand that the same right must not be infringed on in his case. **Elia**, has invoked this argument by writing that "...Palestinians do not have academic freedom, so what one would be protecting in the name of "academic freedom" is the oppressor privilege" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 52). Moreover, Elia notes the refusal of most (8600 out of 9000) Israeli academy members to endorse a call issued by Palestinian academics for lifting the restriction on Palestinian scholars' freedom of movement ,as another validation for the "**reciprocity argument**" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 58). **David Lloyd and Laura Pulido** offer a similar argument, claiming that "the boycott of Israeli institution is called for on account of their systematic collusion with "racist occupation that deliberately denies to their Palestinians counterparts the rights Israeli scholars so abundantly enjoy , and that offers Israeli counterpart Israeli academics the resource and privileges they consider their right " (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 119) . To solidify their argument, Lloyd and Pulido add that Israeli infringement on the Palestinians' right to education and on their academic freedom is also true in the case of the Palestinians citizens of Israel. They maintain that these Palestinians are underrepresented in the Israeli academia because of "Zionist racial policies" and that schooling in Israel is "...almost entirely segregated, to the material and cultural disadvantage of Palestinians..."(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012 , 118)

Furthermore, **Elia** seeks to validate her argument by diagnosing an alleged racism, inequality and lack of academic freedom in the Israeli education system and academic institutions. To mention but a few, Elia cites the controversial observation of Goldberg and Makdisi, authors of the article "The Trial of Israel's Campus Critics", as to the "insinuation, accusation, and defamation ..." becoming in the Israeli academy "the weapons of first resort to respond to argument and criticism directed at Israeli policies"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 60).

Third, is the famous "**complicity thesis**" argument consistently suggested by the pro-boycott thinkers. It has been argued, time and again, that Israeli academic institutions are part of the ideology and institution of what they see as a "Zionist settler-colonial project in Palestine", and as such are deeply implicated in maintaining the structures of oppression over the Palestinian people. The Israeli academic institutions have been largely accused in the following allegations(Yacobi Keller, Uri " Economy of the Occupation", **Alternative Center of Information** (2009), 8-21): conducting research serving the IDF; showing preferential treatment to Israeli students that are soldiers, former soldiers, and reservists at the expense of Palestinian students; advising and assisting Israeli military training, having direct involvement with the "Israeli occupation"; appointing formerly high-ranking military officials to positions within the academic management hierarchy; and stifling political dissent expressed in their universities. The following argument, made by Ali, summarizes this thesis: "far of being a detached, natural ivory tower, the academy, then, is the brain of the monster that generates the ideology and tools of occupation, dispossession, and violation of human rights, whereby the servants of occupation are rewarded, while its victims are alienated, discriminated against as students and scholars "(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 55)

Boycott as trigger for 'siege mentality'

Boycott, in all its form, has been deemed by anti-boycott advocate as counterproductive for BDS and PACBI as it tends to trigger acute paranoia among Israelis, as well as inducing an aggressive siege mentality (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 213).

Boycott as collective punishment

Inclusive Boycott of all Israeli academics and institutions has raised questions concerning the legitimacy of a method based upon collective punishment. The anti-boycott advocates argue that the boycott implicates all Israeli academics of complicit support of the occupation, regardless if they have cooperated with the occupation or criticized it, publicly or otherwise (Baker, Alan, and Adam Shay. "Manipulation and Deception: The Anti-Israel "BDS" Campaign Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions)." *Jerusalem Issue Brief* 12, no. 2 (2012)).

Boycott as an illegal act

Academic boycott have been also deemed illegal by the anti-boycotters, especially in the light of the fifth statute of the International Council of Science (Baker, Alan, and Adam Shay. "Manipulation and Deception: The Anti-Israel "BDS" Campaign (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions)." *Jerusalem Issue Brief* 12, no. 2 (2012) ,11).

Boycott as (un)proportional act

Anti-boycott advocates have also based their stance upon the argument that an academic boycott contradicts the principle of proportionality (Nussbaum, Martha. "Against Academic Boycotts." *Dissent* ,2007,10-11). The principle of proportionality states that if there are numerous methods of achieving a certain goal, an actor is obliged to choose the least harmful. Consequently, it has been claimed that there are other appropriate non-violent methods that may serve the same cause while being significantly less detrimental. Censure, public condemnation of an individual or individuals, and failure to reward were among the different methods mentioned in this regard (Nussbaum, Martha. "Against Academic Boycotts." *Dissent* ,2007,10-11).

Sides to the conflicts

Obviously, the actors directly involved in the conflict presented herein is the BDS movement which include the PACBI and the Israeli academic institution which is mainly represented by the Council for Higher Education in Israel. Still, there are several other actors indirectly or less actively involved in this conflict, thus their roles must be mentioned. Here are the most significant:

- a. The Israeli government: As already explained, the fact that the ultimate goal of the boycott is to exert pressure upon the Israeli government to end the occupation, necessarily implicate the latter as an obvious actor in this conflict.
- b. The Palestinian Authority / leadership: As already noted, the fact that the PA – the body entrusted by the PLO with the governance of the west bank and Gaza under Palestinian control – is the main political body which will enjoy the fruits of the boycott if achieved makes it a possible actor in this conflict .
- c. Quite obviously , the role of the rather few but existing Palestinian and Israeli that for more many years and under the auspices and funding in UNESCO have been working together to find a common denominator that could bridge the gap should be seriously considered .

Previous attempts to solve the conflict

The rocky history of Israeli-Palestinian efforts can be presented along the lines of four main different periods. During the period of 1948-1967, after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, all attempts to establish dialogue with the “enemy” were seen by both sides as pure acts of treason. In the period of 1967-1987- After the Six-Day War in 1967 and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip, few exceptional cooperative ventures have tried to break through the separating wall of rage and hostility. In the wake of the first Palestinian uprising, which began in 1987, a surge of joint work groups for information, protest, and dialogue activities have been witnessed, with thousands of meetings taking place in Israel and the occupied territories. We ought to point out that during this period Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation occurred, as well (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 10).

It is important to note that the academic elite on both sides have played in this period significant role transforming the conflict. For instance, Dr. Ron Pundak and Dr. Yair Hirschfeld were among the first people to engage in the secret negotiations that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the beginning of the Oslo Process. During the 1990s and especially after the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation has blossomed, to include cooperative venture in a range of academic issues. At the end of the 1990s, however, with the stalemate of the peace process and the subsequent outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, many of these contacts were cut off, mostly because Palestinians were either unable or unwilling to carry on cooperative project amidst successive Israeli military campaigns coupled with severe movement limitation. Finally, some cooperative

projects, such as the European-backed project on Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, do continue in this present time (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 11).

In 2004 UNESCO approached the Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development (a Palestinian NGO) and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace (a research institute located at Hebrew University) in regards to a study of the obstacles and promise of establishing a sound basis for academic and intellectual cooperation across the socio-political divide (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 1).

This has set the stage for establishing a dialogue projects executed and orchestrated by the two prominent scholars Edward (Edy) Kaufman and Walid Salem. The dialogue has been held between Palestinians and Israelis representing a wide spectrum of political opinions (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 2). The project rationale as written in its proposal was: “to try to understand the obstacles and promises for academics and intellectuals to contribute more significantly towards a bottom-up process”(Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 34) Specifically, the project was meant “to explore the joint drafting of a code of ethics for academics and intellectuals.” This code was expected “to establish the norms that can actually guide the relationship between academics and intellectuals as a partnership towards attaining a dialogue towards peace.” (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 34)

In accordance with its stated rational, the proclaimed goals of the dialogue were defined as following (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 30)

- Putting together a code of ethics that will motivate and guide potential cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli academics. The expected document was to be developed jointly by individuals from societies in conflict who are engaged in an on-going dialogue with each other, thus enabling the creation of a shared agenda for discussing controversial subjects.
- Appealing to a wide audience and not only to those who are already committed to the dialogue.
- Stimulating similar processes in other areas of Palestinian and Israeli societies, as well as providing a model for establishing a social contract, or relevant source of inspiration, to all those involved in peacebuilding in other violent conflicts around the world.

The project main achievements are threefold (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 36) ; first is the drafting of a document mapping the conditions for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics and intellectuals, including obstacles and possibilities, from both points of view. Second, is the initiating of an awareness-raising process among academics and intellectuals, motivating them to assume social responsibility with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Lastly, A draft code of ethics or set of principles for academic cooperation has been prepared, and may serve as a basis for both uni-national and bi-national discussions.

Quite naturally, this Dialogue project is by far the most serious, effective and professional effort to enhance and/or solidify Palestinian-Israeli academic cooperation across the divide. Hence, its insight stands as a compass for our current endeavor.

Obstacles

It has long been observed that the issues of *asymmetry*, *normalization*, and *reciprocity* pose major obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on all levels, including the development and application of guidelines for academic cooperation to bypass the boycott (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007,12). Asymmetry is interpreted differently within the Israeli and Palestinian contexts:" Palestinians emphasize the unevenness between

the Occupied (Palestinians) and the Occupier (Israel) and seek solidarity and efforts to redress the power imbalance. Israelis, however, point to rising anti-Semitism and the fact that Israel is a small country surrounded by what are perceived to be hostile neighbors" (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007 , 12).

Normalization has many definitions. One of them, suggested by Omar Barghouti, is the "development of joint relations and projects with Israeli side that gives the false impression of normalcy despite the continuation of colonial oppression"(Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso , 212) (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 13) . Palestinians are divided in their stances vis-à-vis normalization (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 12). Its supporters usually argue that normalization can bring about the integration of Israel into the Middle East and thereby change the abnormal, damaging relationship. Anti-normalization advocates, however, are against normalization as it "implies a willingness to accept, and perhaps legitimize the injustice they have experienced at the expense of Israel's creation and expansion" (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 13). It is important to mention that, this anti-normalization stance creates a great deal of pressure on those Palestinians willing to cooperate across the divide.

It is noteworthy that the PACBI has adopted two conditions guaranteeing a "normalization-free" relationship (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 213) ; the first, is the condition that the Israeli side must recognize the internationally sanctioned and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination ; the second is that the project itself , regardless if its exact nature , must have as one of its main objectives resistance against the "occupation and apartheid" (Lim, Audera, ed. *The Case for Sanctions Against Israel*. New YORK: Verso, 2012, 213).

Reciprocity is the idea of holding both sides of the conflict responsible and accountable for their actions (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 12). As mentioned earlier the logic of the academic boycott is premised upon the notion that pressure is needed because dialogue/persuasion is predicated upon "false symmetry". That is, However, reciprocity is often most evident in its negative form, as each side blames the other for initiating the cycle of violence (Salem, Walid and Edward (Edy) Kaufman. *Proposed Guiding Principles of Israeli/Palestinian Cooperation: Translating the Shared Adherence to Academic Freedom into Action*. Paris Cedex, France: UNESCO, 2007, 13)

Obviously, the anti-normalization stance adopted by the PACBI had to be taken into consideration in seeking channels of communication between the conflicting parties, and in assessing the plausibility of a second track initiative.

Stage of the conflict

It seems reasonable to state that the conflict herein is currently of an escalating nature as both the BDS and PACBI are seeking to expand their campaigns. Accordingly, the anti-boycott group is escalating its counter-boycott responses.

PROGNOSIS

Based upon our diagnosis of the conflict, we assume the following future scenarios to be fairly conceivable in the context of the question of the Palestinian-led academic boycott of Israel:

1. **"Status quo"**: Just as the political arena has been characterized with an enduring status quo, it is imaginable that the current states of affairs concerning the academic boycott will remain unchanged. The fact that the Palestinians have adopted and adamantly pursued a new strategy of non-violent unilateralism renders this scenario even more plausible.
2. **Increased boycott**: Yet again, the Palestinian unilateral strategies coupled with a political stalemate make conditions ripe for the academic boycott to be widened to other spheres within civil society.

3. **"Improved boycott"**: Palestinians may seek to 'upgrade' their boycott campaign by adopting more detail and definition. They could clarify terms like 'complicit' to make it less obscure and easier to apply the terms of the boycott. In addition, boycott supporters could outline the ways in which an individual or university could remove themselves from the boycott. The boycott would no longer be applied universally, but only against those whose ideology is incompatible with the spirit of the boycott.
4. **Selective Cooperation**: Based on this option, individuals and institutions that cooperate across the divide may continue to do so despite of the increasing mainstreaming of the Palestinian-led academic boycott.
5. **Counter-boycott**: On the part of Israel, a counter-boycott targeting institutions or individuals advocating an academic boycott is a future scenario worth mentioning. This counter-boycott would not necessarily be public, since a quiet counter-boycott can serve to counter the Palestinian boycott without portraying Israel as hypocritical.
6. **More anti-boycott laws**: is it presumable that if the Boycott is maintained or even continues to spread, more Israeli legal steps to counter the boycott is expected. For instance, the anti-boycott law can be widened to include more cases of Boycott. It can also be modified to become more deterrent by criminalizing an activity which defined as boycott.
7. **Ending the boycott due to a political breakthrough**: A political breakthrough, such as renewing the peace process at the national level, would encourage the Palestinians to abandon non-violent unilateral measures and return to negotiations. The stance held by prominent boycotters whereby boycott is meant to trigger meaningful negotiation and not take their place makes this scenario very much plausible.
8. **(Unofficial) freezing of the boycott due to a political breakthrough**: A political breakthrough, such as renewing the peace process at the national level, can also encourage the Palestinians to unofficially freeze their endeavors to maintain and spread the boycott. Unofficial freeze can be seen more preferable than absolute termination, as it gives the boycotters the opportunity to make sure that negotiation is meaningful and fruitful before they officially end the boycott.

9. **Ending the boycott due to external pressure:** Boycotters might also opt for ending the boycott if heavily pressured by Israel, the PA, or international community. Israel, being an occupier force in the West Bank and Gaza, will enable it to exercise this kind of pressure. Economic sanction and limitation of movement could be two of many possible strategies meant to exert pressure upon the boycott advocates and bring it to an end. However, the effectiveness of "state-like pressure" over non-state actors such as the BDS and PACBI is extremely doubtful. On the same note, it is presumable the PA pressure over the Boycotters is the almost only way by which external pressure brings an end or, at least, freeze boycott activities.

Of the abovementioned scenarios, the *preferred overall outcome* considering the interests of all parties is as following:

Best Possible Scenario for Israelis

Ending the boycott because of a political breakthrough is perhaps the best option for Israelis. If the peace process is renewed, both sides would agree that the boycott is unnecessary and thus should be terminated. This would be a method for Israelis to bring an end to the boycott in a way that does not portray them as aggressors and occupiers that use unilateral strategies to achieve its desired outcome. Israelis might also have an interest in perpetuating the status quo. Currently, the boycott does not do enough harm to the Israelis to motivate them to make the changes called for by Palestinians in order to bring it to an end. As such, Israelis are likely to maintain the existing state of affairs for the foreseeable future.

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement for Israel

Israel's best alternative to a negotiated settlement would be to continue a counter-boycott program like the anti-BDS movement in place. The Israelis behind the anti-BDS movement do not necessarily seek to end the Palestinian's academic boycott of Israel, but would rather use it to their advantage by portraying how they are bullied or vilified by the Palestinians. This may help Israel develop new ties and strengthen existing relationships with sympathetic foreign partners. As mentioned earlier, the boycott does not harm the interests of Israelis who have no desire to collaborate with Palestinians regardless of the existence of a boycott. Instead, some Israelis could see the boycott as a

chance to build ties with other foreign organizations, which they would rather collaborate with than their Palestinian neighbors.

Best Possible Scenario for Palestinians

Based upon our diagnosis in general and the observed logic of the boycott in particular, we believe that the improving of the boycott would benefit the Palestinian cause. If the terms of the boycott were defined so that it could be applied in a targeted manner instead of a universal one, it could no longer be criticized for being 'collective punishment' or overly broad. That is, improving the boycott will be face-saving for Palestinians as they will appear reasonable and flexible for adapting the boycott and using it as mechanism to bring about change. Palestinians would also greatly benefit from ending the boycott because of a political breakthrough. The stated reason for calling for the boycott was to bring attention to the occupation and conditions of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. If negotiations were restarted, it would represent a more direct method of achieving those same goals, and therefore the Palestinians could abandon the boycott. It would also be a significant victory for Palestinians and reinforce their dedication to resistance by nonviolent means.

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement for the Palestinian-led academic boycott

Based upon our diagnosis, we believe that under the current situation the Palestinian-led academic boycott 'BATNA' would be to carry on with the boycott and to push even further into the mainstream to ultimately entrench Israel's image a pariah state. Boycott is, as already mentioned, is seen by its advocates as "last resort" action which is premised on the logic of pressure. Accordingly, in the absence of negotiation the logic behind the boycott and its justification persist, thus leaving no other way to boycotters except escalating by pushing the boycott more and more into the mainstream.

Best Possible Scenario for both parties

Selective cooperation would not delegitimize the boycott nor pressure neither the Palestinians nor Israelis to change their chosen methods. The people who wanted to participate would be free to do so and everyone else would remain unaffected.

Alternavley, both Palestinians and Israelis would benefit from ending the boycott because of a political breakthrough. The current state of affairs is not ideal for either party, and they have both acknowledged that an enduring, peaceful resolution to the national conflict cannot be achieved unilaterally. Thus, restarting talks and ending the boycott would be an important step to realizing the lasting peace both sides desire.

3. Treatment: A Track-two Initiative in Support of Academic Freedom

3A.

Our goal for a problem solving workshop is to revisit the academic code of ethics to guide Israeli and Palestinian academic cooperation and expand or modify it as necessary with regards to developments since its original drafting. This would not be a universal academic code of ethics, but rather one that addresses the unique challenges inherent in the current relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. Individual academics and institutions can adopt these guidelines. The code of ethics will serve to outline responsibilities of academics on both sides to acknowledge and address the asymmetries so that they can cooperate as equals.

We would use as a guide the Proposed Guiding Principles for Israeli/Palestinian Academic Cooperation by Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman. While the final product of the workshop may differ from the principles outlined therein, they offer a helpful starting point to begin the drafting of the code of ethics.

We could potentially partner with Haifa University and Al-Quds University. We would select facilitators affiliated with these places of higher learning: one Jewish facilitator from Haifa and one Arab facilitator from Al-Quds. If Uppsala University convened the initiative, it would be face-saving for those Palestinians who do not wish to out-rightly disregard the boycott.

Ideally, we would engage in a multi-track approach that begins with a track-two effort made up of Palestinian and Israeli academics which is followed by a track-one venture involving Palestinian and Israeli university Presidents, Rectors, or Deans with the authorization of their universities. While our project (a track-two workshop) can stand alone, it is optimal with the addition of the track-one comprised of the heads of universities. With the addition of this initiative, the track-two participants (academics) know their product will go to the next level (the heads of universities) and they will take the workshop more seriously, enhancing its likelihood of success.

A track-one workshop is more difficult to organize but is possible if the convener has a respected reputation (like a high-ranking diplomat, head-of-state, or NGO) and if it were held at a historically-meaningful place that would make it even more attractive to potential participants. At this time, however, we think it is prudent to focus on a single track-two effort made up of Israeli and Palestinian academics. It is our hope that this initiative, if successful, will help facilitate the organization of a track-one workshop as described above in the future.

The national Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been characterized by a tense status-quo punctuated by periods of extreme violence. At this point, there is no track-one peace process taking place. However, the Oslo Accords have already demonstrated the efficacy of track-two efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Recent developments like the recognition of Palestine as a state by the UN General Assembly and the overwhelming support for Palestinian statehood on the part of the international community implied by the same seem to put Palestinians on more equal footing with their Israeli counterparts. Such enhanced symmetry facilitates cooperation and probable success of this workshop. However, the firing of thousands of rockets from Gaza into Israel last year and the subsequent Israeli military response designated as Operation Pillar of Defense showed just how explosive and unpredictable this conflict is. Anger over the deaths on both sides (although there were considerably more casualties among Palestinians) has aggravated the status quo.

However, it is our belief that the timing is ripe for a workshop of this nature. While at the moment tensions are so high as to prohibit a track-one initiative, academics that are not politically obligated will be free to participate. If the workshop is prepared thoughtfully, mindful of both recent developments and the history of the conflict, we believe this initiative is feasible at this time.

3B.

The workshop would be convened in an inspiring and at the same time isolated place in Norway, convened by professor who have shown concern about the Palestinian/Israeli conflict and with a professional interest both in this part of the world as well as the issues related to academic freedom, higher education ethics, etc. This university or the individual professors should also have some experience of facilitating as a third party and is to be selected for several characteristics that make it well-suited for a conflict resolution attempt. Norway has stimulated reports with data on violent conflicts and peace agreements, as in the Journal of Peace Research. In addition, UCDP publishes yearly reports in conjunction with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). This data program could be a resource for both the workshop facilitators and participants. In addition, the choice should be of a university committed and interested in global society as well as collaboration with universities worldwide. We believe that this university would be amenable and well-suited to convene this workshop. The workshop would be facilitated by a team to include at least two professional facilitators, one Arab and one Jew. They would be joined by local assistant facilitators.

The Israeli and Palestinian sides would be represented by working academics in the major universities in Israel and the Palestinian territories. These academics would not necessarily have to be holders of a Ph.D., but rather identified as young and innovative in their fields. The preference off “partners in conflict” [two parties divided across the divide but with at least one common attribute], to include “young” and “academics” from both sides.

Each group (Israeli and Palestinian academics) would be represented by a team of 10-12 academics. Each team will have an equal number of representatives. We would seek at least one Israeli professor from each of the major universities in Israel and at least one Palestinian professor from each of the major universities in the territories. Gender-equal representation would be encouraged.

Participants will be chosen by a selection committee made up of the facilitators and assistant facilitators. The committee will advertise the workshop and solicit applications. In addition, the facilitators can send emails to individual academics that they believe would be suitable for the workshop. Applicants will submit their CVs for review. The committee will review the applications and hold personal interviews between both facilitators and the applicant. During this review and interview process, the facilitators will analyze the academics’ suitability for the workshop. The facilitators have control over the selection process so that they can avoid including ‘spoilers’ – or those who would obstruct cooperation – from the workshop.

The facilitators will inform the participants of the ground rules and what is expected of them at the workshop. General rules, such as mutual respect and courtesy, will be emphasized as essential from

the start. For example, participants will be instructed to not leave the workshop individually, but to wait for scheduled breaks or recesses announced by the facilitator. If one participant leaves the room during a workshop exercise, it can disrupt the flow of the activity and the connection with and between his or her fellow participants.

In addition, the facilitators must discuss with potential participants what will be done in case of crisis or other disruption during the workshop. Facilitators can outline the types of events that may force the cancellation of the workshop. They will also describe how the participants will respond if certain politically-charged events (like a terrorist attack) occur during the workshop. It is essential to discuss and reach understanding on topics such as these prior to the beginning of the workshop to ensure that the proceedings are not halted in case of something that the facilitators did not foresee. The facilitators should urge that the workshop continue in all but the most serious occurrences.

3C.

After the teams have been selected, both groups will have separate pre-workshop meetings. The purpose of these meetings will be to build trust and cohesion within the groups. Another focus of the pre-workshop meeting will be to build skills that participants will need to call upon during the workshop. For example, participants will learn about and how to interpret non-verbal communication (body language) and will be given instruction on how to communicate non-violently (how to build phrases that do not sound like an attack on the listener). Facilitators will demonstrate and participants will practice these abilities as well as active and reflective listening techniques (how to convey understanding and how to show empathy to the speaker, respectively). These skills will enable the participants to communicate more constructively and facilitate effective discourse during the workshop. Going through this training separately will build stronger interpersonal bonds within the groups and hopefully reduce intragroup conflict (which can have a spoiler effect) once the workshop begins. These measures will enhance the likelihood of reaching a consensus and achieving enduring effectiveness.

Time	Activities
Months 1-3	Selection of participants
Month 4	Intragroup (separate) trust building and skills building
Month 5	Ten-day problem solving workshop in Norway
Months 6-11	Begin re-entry, implementation period of one year
Month 12	One-day follow-up and re-entry workshop in East Jerusalem or Bet Jala (access for all participants)

Month 18	One-day evaluation meeting (

3D.

The two facilitators will work together to plan the workshop in detail. They will determine the issues to be discussed, the variety of activities to be held, the order, and what to cut or add according to time constraints. The agenda must be varied in material, pace, and style to avoid monotony and keep participant energy high. The schedule for the workshop will be made available to each participant so that they can prepare for what is to come, which will limit loss of productivity due to lack of preparedness. The participants and facilitators will meet prior to the beginning of the workshop so that the participants can ask questions and offer suggestions for the facilitators (this can be done individually, as part of the review/interview process, or as a group).

The workshop would last ten weekdays, including two five-day weeks and one weekend. This will allow for at least three days of trust- and skills-building in the beginning with enough time to explore the issues at an unhurried pace. The inclusion of at least two weekend days will provide time for participants to socialize and become more comfortable with each other and in the space where the workshop is to be held.

Possible issues to be discussed during the workshop would include: the right of academics to speak publicly and express their ideas, no matter how unpopular, without fear of detriment to their reputations or careers. Another topic could be freedom of movement for academics regarding their professional obligations in order to realize the universally accepted right to academic freedom. In addition, the usefulness of the method of boycott can be addressed, as well as the role of academics in society (whether they must be active in the defense of human rights or if they can remain apolitical).

The first part of the workshop will be dedicated to trust building and skills building between the participants (inter-group). In order to build trust between the teams, several exercises will attempt to get them to view one another as partners in conflict. Both teams will take 10 minutes to write a list of hot-button words that are hurtful or inflammatory when used by the other side. Then, the groups will share the lists and they will make a commitment to avoid the use of these derogatory catch phrases. This, combined with the participants' prior training in non-violent language, should facilitate effective communication.

Next, participants will work together to design best- and worst-case-scenarios for the conflict at hand. First, they will envision the best possible realistic scenario that they can hope for. Second, they will be asked to describe the worst case scenario possible. The point of this exercise is to emphasize the importance of peace building initiatives like this workshop, and highlight the outcomes (good and bad) that would result from the success or failure of the process. This will make the participants take ownership of the process and have more respect for their roles and responsibilities. Hopefully, it will allow for them to view themselves as partners in conflict, whose futures are irrevocably tied, who can work together to bring about the best-case-scenario they envisioned.

After trust building, the facilitators will lead the participants in a series of skills building exercises selected for the specific conflict and issues at hand. Among these activities would be instruction in mediation skills. Mediation – simply, a facilitated negotiation – is a method of conflict resolution that takes for granted that the parties can solve their own dispute with the guidance of an intervener (the third-party mediator). Instruction will focus on how mediators successfully reframe

conflicts so that disputants can view it as a shared problem and focus on resolution instead of the assignment of blame. The participants can apply this skill not only within the workshop setting, but in their professional and personal lives. Being able to resolve conflict peacefully and thoughtfully will benefit the participants' community, as well. With this new skill, participants can return to their communities and promote the outcome and spirit of the workshop.

Then, the participants will get a chance to review and refresh the skills they learned at the pre-workshop meetings. The topics of effective non-violent communication and reflective listening will be revisited, this time with both groups together. This will reinforce these skills and give the participants a chance to demonstrate their new expertise.

In addition to mediation, non-violent communication, and reflective listening, the facilitators will instruct the participants on how to mobilize a group or community using modern social media. Social media is an incredible tool for reaching the masses. Those who have mastered the ability to spread their message through social media resources like Facebook and Twitter have access to and can be accessed by their base of supporters at any time. The use of social media is becoming increasingly essential in the modern age, and this skill will enable the participants to spread knowledge and support of the workshop outcome.

3E.

In order to facilitate consensus building and find mutually-satisfactory solutions, the participants will need to think 'outside of the box.' The facilitators will assist by leading the teams in a few activities to encourage creative thinking. First, facilitators will ask participants to think laterally and compare their conflict to another. Both teams will take turns drawing comparisons between the two conflicts. At the end of the activity, the participants will hopefully view their conflict more critically and be able to generate additional options for potential solutions.

Second, participants will take part in a brainstorming activity. Participants will be asked to make suggestions and the activity will not be over until everyone has contributed at least one idea and the facilitators believe that all options have been explored. No one may interrupt or criticize another person's recommendation, which would discourage people from sharing their options. At the end of the activity, there should be an impressive selection of options that some of the participants had not previously considered. Next, participants can vote on which options they find satisfactory, and the recommendations that receive the most votes can be discussed in further detail.

3F.

The facilitators will guide the participants to frame the issue at hand (lack of academic cooperation) as a shared problem that can have a mutually beneficial solution. When the Israeli and Palestinian academics are able to view one another as partners in conflict, their relationship and the conflict itself will be transformed from a winner-take-all scenario to one with a range of options that can satisfy the most important needs and interests of both sides.

Ideally, the workshop participants will be able to draft and agree upon a more relevant and updated set of principles for academic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. These improved principles could be applied to narrow the application of the indiscriminate denial of cooperation and allow for collaboration on equal footing according to the terms described therein. This would be a short-term response designed to have a measured but immediate impact in order to address an ongoing concern. It is our hope that some of the participants will be successful in winning support from their home institutions to help spread awareness and, ideally, adoption of the principles. If the principles

were widely accepted, it would be the first step in a larger, incremental process to enhance cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian academics and promote peace within and between both communities.

This outcome addresses the needs of the Palestinians as it does not delegitimize their chosen method of resistance, the boycott. At the same time, it considers the interests of academics on both sides to be able to cooperate if they so choose. In addition, the adoption of the principles will give legitimacy and leverage to academics that collaborate across the divide, as a defense to critics of cooperation who would argue that collaborative academics are conceding to the demands of the boycott or normalizing with the occupying power. Thus, this outcome is face-saving for all parties.

3G.

The outcome of the workshop would be implemented by an action committee that would be formed of the participants. If requested, the facilitators could also serve as advisors to the committee. As such, the action committee would be made up of the 20-24 participants and two advisors.

Six months after the workshop there would be a follow-up meeting of the action committee to report on the awareness about and success of the implementation of the principles within their own communities. The committee members will share successful techniques and advise one another on overcoming obstacles to implementation. They will broadly evaluate the success of the first six months of the probationary period and extrapolate what should be done in the next six months and assign agreed-upon responsibilities among themselves.

After another six months – one full year after the end of the workshop – the probationary period will end. The action committee will meet once more (again made up of all participants) to evaluate the policy after the first year. Success will be measured in terms of how many Israeli and Palestinian academics and universities have adopted the principles. This will be compared to the state of affairs six months prior and participants will be able to measure their ability to spread awareness and implement the policy over the course of the last year.

This second meeting will also serve as a reminder to workshop participants before they return to their communities to continue to take part in or start a discourse regarding the principles as well as to encourage other colleagues and institutions to adopt the principles. At this final (proposed) meeting, the action committee will use the information gathered about the successful implementation strategies to set goals and assign duties for the future. While this is the last proposed meeting of the action committee, if circumstances and funds allow, additional workshops and meetings could be held.

3H.

It is expected that the participants will be able to amend the proposed guiding principles to academic cooperation with regards to recent developments and make them more suitable given the current asymmetries. At the very least, they could be able to generate a list of recommendations to future workshops of the same nature and purpose. As long as all Israeli and Palestinian participants reach some sort of consensus, the resulting document will be valuable. If the workshop process remains symmetrical, the outcome will be symmetrical, as well. It is our belief that if the facilitators ensure the equality of the process, the participants will have faith in the process and will be more likely to reach a consensus that broadly satisfies the needs of both sides.

The effects of the workshop will be seen at the individual, group, and – ideally – state levels. Individual participants will benefit from positive social contact with academics from the other side and it may encourage intergroup communication in the future. If participants then go back to their communities and start a new discourse in favor of cooperation, they will set a positive example for their communities and act as visible and outspoken challenges to the status quo. This workshop would

represent the first successful attempt to bridge this particular gap and it would have significant repercussions within academia. It would be heartening to members of both communities to see breakthrough peace building initiatives achieving success especially because the peace process at the national level has been stalled for the last four years.

3I.

At the beginning of the workshop, the participants will work together to agree upon a set of workshop-specific objectives that they hope to achieve. Examples of possible objectives could be: “revise and reach consensus on a new set of guiding principles for academic cooperation,” “personally agree to uphold the agreed-upon principles,” and “promote the awareness and adoption of the principles within our home universities and communities.” Setting objectives at the outset of the workshop will enhance participant focus and responsibility in the process that follows. This activity sets a precedent of participatory decision making that will facilitate cooperation during the remainder of the workshop.

Prior to the trust and skills building components of the workshop, the participants might find it difficult to reach consensus on any but the most general objectives. However, as the workshop progresses, the participants may review, refine, and expand upon the original objectives as their skills and group dynamic evolve. These objectives can also be used as a guide for the final consensus document and in the analysis of the overall success of the workshop at the subsequent action committee meetings.

During the workshop, anonymous evaluations will be collected. Five-question assessments will be distributed and collected at the end of every day. Examples of evaluation questions could be, “what did you like about this activity? What could have been done differently? What is one thing you learned during this activity?” The responses will be read and evaluated by the facilitators. Popular topics can be brought up again, pressing questions can be answered, and lingering concerns can be readdressed the following day so that nothing goes unfinished.

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