

Chase: your proposal has the potential for implementation, both in terms of the urgency and the well conceived ideas, such as USAID coming up with some financial stimulation if and when the DIP and the locals find some common projects. But I believe that with more time you would have covered more systematically all points of the 3 parts of the guidelines [or otherwise tell us why not do cover a specific one as not relevant]. I will give a couple of examples:  
For instance, here is the list of part 1

**Part 1** should assess the *dynamics of the conflict* and the feasibility of potential second track intervention (diagnosis):

- a. What is the conflict about? Place the *conflict issues* briefly in historical and regional context, noting significant *factors* driving the conflict. Note what *stage* the conflict is in now (unstable/militant politics, low-level/escalating violence, war, talk-fight/stalemate, de-escalating/contained, contested settlement, reconciliation—see Gurr and Davies chapter).
- b. Who are the *parties* involved, including states, minority groups, leaders, organizations, factions, alliances, spoilers, regional or international stakeholders? How are they affected, what are their sources of relative power, and what are their *agendas or demands* (positions)?
- c. What are their *perceptions of each other*, and what information and *communication channels* are available between or among them? What cultural (and value) contrasts are involved here? To what extent do the groups need each other to achieve their goals?
- d. Identify the primary *interests* of each party motivating these agendas and perceptions, and the (non-negotiable) human *needs* underlying them. Note which interests or needs are shared, which may be complementary and which are conflicting.
- e. What previous *attempts to settle* the conflict have been made or are being made, by whom and with what results? Reasons for failure or limited success?
- f. Are the groups *willing to talk* with each other? At what level (officials, informal leaders or grass roots)? What factors are pushing them to talk or inhibiting them? Under what *conditions* and at what level might they be willing to talk?

I THINK THAT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH RESEARCH DONE ON POINT E, IT MAY BE IMPORTANT TO LEARN FROM PAST EXPERIENCES OR NOT TO PRETEND TO RE-INVENT THE WHEEL.

**Part 2** should focus on *future scenarios*, specific to the conflict situation you are addressing (prognosis):

- g. What are some plausible *alternative future scenarios*, or common futures, for the conflicted society *as a whole*? Note the assumptions or conditionalities on which each overall scenario is built (refer to factors driving the conflict as noted in 1a above), going beyond simple war/no-war dichotomies, and not restricting yourself to single issues or strategic choices in isolation from the big picture.
- h. Of these scenarios, which is the *preferred overall outcome* considering the interests of all parties? In contrast, what is the best overall outcome *each* of the main parties could achieve *without negotiating* an agreement with the others (“BATNAs”)? This contrast needs to be clear to motivate the parties to deal.

HERE THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO B.A.T.N.A., NAMELY WHY SHOULD ANY OF THE PARTIES FIND MORE USEFUL TO NEGOTIATE IF THEY COULD WIN MORE FOR THEMSELVES BY NOT DOING IT? YOU ARE NOT COVERING IN-DEPTH THIS POINT

AND FINALLY, PART 3, WHERE YOU DO HAVE SOME ORIGINAL IDEAS, ONCE AGAIN THERE IS NO SYSTEMATIC COVERAGE OF ALL POINTS. ONE NEEDS TO BE

## MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHY SELECTION A COUPLE OF THE TRACKS AND NOT OTHERS

**Part 3** should outline the *proposed second/multi-track initiative*, giving a *time-line* including preparation steps, problem solving workshops and follow-up steps for implementation and evaluation, and outlining some *potential outcomes* (treatment):

- i. What are your organization's *goals* in the initiative, who are your (potential) *partner organizations*, and what representatives of the parties have expressed interest in your assistance?
- j. Which organizations would convene and facilitate the workshops and *who would represent the parties* in such talks? *What issue(s)* might they be willing to discuss?
- k. What *specific steps are proposed to prepare the ground* for a suitable interaction among the parties as "partners in conflict" or "partners in peacebuilding"? How will participants be selected and agreed to? What prior caucusing with each party may be needed to ensure agreement on an agenda and ground rules?
- l. What *steps for trust building and skill building* are proposed for the participants in the first workshop before focusing on their own conflict?
- m. What *steps are proposed for facilitating consensus building in the first workshop* by the participants toward better understanding and cooperation in seeking common ground?
- n. Give examples of *specific integrative options* for conflict transformation or peacebuilding (sustainable development) that might emerge from the proposed second track initiative, that would promote the realization of the preferred overall outcome. Explain how they address key interests/needs of the main parties, who might implement them, and whether each one represents a short-term response (e.g., threat containment, confidence building), medium-term strategy (e.g., structure for a peace process) or long-term objective (e.g., appropriate new institutions of inclusive democratic governance, power sharing, autonomy).
- o. How is it proposed to *facilitate action planning, re-entry, implementation and longer-term constructive engagement* by participants and other actors in building on the initial workshop?
- p. Give examples of *expected outcomes*, including impact both on participants and on their communities, that could provide criteria for evaluating the success of the initiative. For example, how will the process link into or promote an official peace process or otherwise facilitate constructive official engagement and/or broaden grassroots support for peacebuilding?
- q. *How will the initiative be evaluated* throughout? Include output, impact and outcome assessment.
- r. What *specific actions or support are now requested* from the organization(s) to whom this paper or brief is addressed, in order to help make this initiative happen? (No budget required at this stage.)

THE ITEMS O AND Q ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED OR NOT AT ALL, THE METHOD OF CONSENSUS BUILDING TO BE ONE THAT NEEDS TO BE ADAPTED TO THE LOCAL CULTURES,, WHILE TAKEN FROM AN INVENTORY MENTIONED IN CHAPTER 11 OR ROLE PLAYED IN CLASS PROVIDES THE POTENTIAL FUNDER WITH A SENSE OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE TOOLS TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT. AS SAID, ALL IN ALL , A GOOD PAPER, "A-", THIS TO BE TABULATED WITH THE OVERALL GRADE IN THE CLASS,

# USAID Peacebuilding Project Proposal in Kenya: Reintegrating Internally Displaced Persons in the Rift Valley and Central Province

Chase Ballinger  
Center of International Development and Conflict Management

*PeaceNet*  
*National Council of Churches of Kenya*

United State Agency for International Development

## Executive Summary

Instability in Kenya has profound implications for the United States and the Horn of Africa, a region grappling with issues ranging from famine to Terrorism. Four years

following the post 2007 election violence, over 200,000 Kenyans remain internally displaced. Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps have breed resentment among Kenyans and have created ethnic polarization, which many observers fear could lead to future violence. Security of IDP communities is inextricably linked to local and national reconciliation in Kenya. Indeed, success in reintegrating the IDPs back into Kenyan society will be a litmus test for the country's progress.

Politicians have not taken seriously the fate of those displaced by ongoing ethnic violence. Instead, members of the government continue to use IDPs as pawns for political aims. Civil society organizations are too dispersed and polarized to facilitate a dialogue between the IDP communities and host communities. Yet without substantial peacebuilding efforts in Kenya's volatile regions, violence is likely to persist.

Most Kenyans favor pursuing reconciliation and are reluctant to return to the violence that plagued them in 2007 and 2008. A peaceful future lies with the growing Kenyan middle class of entrepreneurs and women and civil servants. The Center of International Development and Conflict Management proposes a local peacebuilding project in the Rift Valley and Central province that facilitates economic cooperation between communities deeply affected by the conflict. The initiative includes a national workshop on conflict management training and ten other workshops in the Rift Valley and Central province on local community building.

Without a comprehensive strategy to address reconciliation in Kenya, the country again experience systemic violence following the March 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections. Our initiative aims to redress these root causes of violence in Kenya through problem solving and skill building workshops.

Following the 2007 elections in Kenya over 1,500 were killed and 600,000 were displaced.<sup>1</sup> Ethnic groups were driven from their homes as other ethnic groups

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<sup>1</sup> Barkan, Joel. "Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability." A Report of the CSIS Africa Program. Washington:

systematically cleansed ethnically mixed regions. In the aftermath of the election violence, President Mwai Kabaki and Raila Odinga, the opposition candidate, entered into a power sharing agreement facilitated by Kofi Annan and others. Yet five years on, hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are still unable to return home and there remain fear that the country could break out again in violence. At the national level, politicians have postured with regard to reintegrating the IDPs and, apart from the new constitution, have taken few steps to consolidate peace. It is for this reason that multi-track intervention is so critically important in transforming the deep-seated conflict.

Ethnic tension and localized violence have prevented reintegration. In several documented cases, IDPs who returned home were killed or maimed by the host communities. “Foreigners” have been warned that they would face attacks if they tried to return. Worsening the situation, community leaders have in some cases urged collective violence against the IDP who attempt to return home.

Addressing the reintegration of the IDPs in Kenya must be viewed in the broader context of sustained peace in the country. The long-standing issue of status of the IDPs is inextricably linked to long-term peace in Kenya. Indeed, to prevent further conflict during the March 2013 elections, effective reintegration should be a top priority for the government.

This paper will detail a multi-track proposal for Kenya’s Rift Valley and Central province. Our initiative, in partnership with USAID, will aim serve two objectives: (i) Support reconciliation among opposing ethnic groups in order to reintegrate the country’s IDP population; and (ii) pressure the Kenyan government to take action on a serious plan to resettle the citizens displaced by ethnic violence.

### Background

The protracted ethnic conflict in Kenya has lead to a large-scale displacement – particularly in the Rift Valley province. The Kikuyu and other smaller tribes live among the Kalenjin who views itself as the “native” tribe of these two regions. The conflict

broadly is between Kenyans indigenous to the region (Kalenjin) against those seen as “outsiders.” Following the disputed election results in 2007, it was mainly members of the Kalenjin that drove the members of Kikuyu from their homes. Kikuyus orchestrated attacks in the Rift Valley and in parts of Nairobi as retribution.

In addition to ethnic identity, causes of the conflict stem from political, economic and social pressures.<sup>2</sup> The dialogue in Kenya around the land grievances, the nature of violence – and the extent to which they are related – needs to be expanded. Land tenure, which has become a flash point for violence, is intensified by poverty, HIV/AIDS, and poor education. During British colonialism, Kikuyus benefited greatly from their proximity to Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. As a result, the tribe benefited more with regard to education and economic growth. Kikuyu were given land in the Rift Valley by the British that was owned farmed by the Kalenjin. Preferential treatment under colonial rule and then again under Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, has created historical resentment among other tribes.

Prior to the 2007 election violence, hot spots in Kenya’s Rift Valley had experienced sporadic displacement. Yet, throughout the 1990s, the thousands of Kenyans displaced from conflict were never given assistance from the government or civil society organizations.<sup>3</sup> Instead, the government actively discouraged civil society and the private sector from helping with the peace process. Since the Kenyan government has never addressed the root causes of the violence in these provinces, ethnic tensions continue to create fault lines for future violence.<sup>4</sup>

In many communities, Kenyans are taught at an early age that all other tribes are inferior and should be hated. Redressing these ingrained cultural practices will take time and patience. We will pursue educational campaigns that are targeted toward youth. These public campaigns should be done especially in rural communities to eliminate stereotypes and prejudices.

Apart from the historic ethnic fault lines, “population pressures, legacies from colonial times, agriculturalist-pastoralist tensions, a culture of political corruption and

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<sup>2</sup> Diamond, Louise. "Reflections and Resources for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Kenya." Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. USAID. (1996)

<sup>3</sup> Klopp, Jacqueline M. et al. Internal Displacement and Local Peacebuilding in Kenya. Rep. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. Print.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

greed, unequal distribution of power and wealth” have all contributed to instability in Kenya.<sup>5</sup> Kinship, class, labor, religion and even geographic identities, however they are perceived, commonly trump ethnic differences.

Without any noteworthy results, there have been a number of efforts to resolve the conflict and address reconciliation. At the local level, civil society organizations have politically polarized and have not spoken with a unified voice against the human rights abuses taking place.<sup>6</sup> The ties that local organizations have with political parties or tribes restrict their ability to facilitate negotiations.

At the national level, in 2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution, which most observers say provides the groundwork for resettlement of the IDPs. Additionally, the government adopted a National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy, which had proposed to establish the Government Resettlement and Reintegration Committee to study the causes of displacement and propose legislation, policy and other mechanisms to mitigate future occurrences. Regrettably, as a result of politicians following their own agendas instead of taking serious the issue of reconciliation, both the National Strategy and the constitution have not been properly implemented.

Instead encouraging reconciliation among tribes in the Rift Valley and Central Province, politicians continue to exploit tribal identities for political gains, especially in the run up to elections. Politicians activate claims that certain constituents hold land illegally since they are not indigenous to the region. They use such claims to mobilize supports to forcefully remove voters who they think will support opposition parties in the election.

From the perspective of the displaced, peace will follow from a restitution of property and compensation. The majority of the IDPs view their return home as a non-negotiable demand. Basic needs of the IDP communities in Kenya are rarely met. The camps in which they live remain without basic services such as sanitation and electricity. These communities are in need of both physical and economic security. Without arable land, the IDPs are left with no way to produce a livelihood for themselves or their

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<sup>5</sup> Diamond, Louise. "Reflections and Resources for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Kenya."

<sup>6</sup> Klopp, Jacqueline M. et al. Internal Displacement and Local Peacebuilding in Kenya.

families. They require a means to produce a better life for themselves and their families. This will provide them with their basic need of dignity and respect from others. Just as important, however, is access to the political process, which many IDP communities have been left out of for decades. Continued displacement creates a situation where thousands of people could fail, challenging the legitimacy of the entire political process.

The needs of the host communities are more challenging to illustrate. According to a study by the US Institute of Peace, the Kalenjin feel economically marginalized. This involves exclusion from assistance and a failure to recognize their suffering and grievances, including historical land injustices.<sup>7</sup> The Kalenjin, which have in the past, have lived in the shadow of the Kikuyu and would like to see the Kikuyus recognize past wrong doings and apologies. The host communities ultimately share many of the same basic human needs as the IDP communities. Our initiative aims to find areas where the needs of both groups can be concurrently met. On the issues economic empowerment and security the interests and needs of the two groups intersect. We will economic interdependence in our project proposal below.

### Alternative Future Scenarios

Barring a comprehensive agreement on land disputes, Kenya will continue to experience protracted social violence. If politicians continue to quarrel over the issue of land ownership, IDP communities will remain in camps without opportunities for relocation or resettlement. Without reconciliation between the two groups, in the near term, it is unlikely the IDPs will be resettled in their homes. As two potential alternatives, the IDPs could be relocated or the national government could reform the security and judicial sectors.

### **Relocation of IDPs**

A number of politicians in parliament have proposed the relocation of the IDPs to a region different from their homes. Under this scenario, we assume the new homes of

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<sup>7</sup> Diamond, Louise. "Reflections and Resources for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Kenya."



the IDPs would be separate and geographically unique from the host communities and that the IDPs would not have the opportunity to visit their homes. Under this plan, the IDPs would be provided with land and training. With an absence of security in their homes, this plan provides the best alternative for the IDPs. They would be compensated for their land and given the opportunity to provide for themselves. Yet for both communities, this plan would not bring security, a fundamental human need. The threat of attack on both communities from the other would persist in the absence of sincere reconciliation.

### **Security Sector and Judicial Reform**

The security sector, particularly in rural Kenya, is underfunded and weak. Corruption among local police is endemic and police forces have been unable to neither prevent nor quell ethnic violence. Observers have blamed of the violence – at least in part – on the inability of security forces to control violence. At worst, police partook in the ethnic violence. Likewise, the local courts face financial difficulties and corruption. Perpetrators of violence have not been held accountable for inciting violence. If the government adopted comprehensive reform of the security and judicial sector, local authorities could provide security and justice for both groups. Perhaps, under these conditions IDPs would have enough protection to return home. Yet, while such reforms are recommended, under this plan, the root causes of the conflict would not be addressed and the government could not necessarily provide security

### **Preferred Overall Outcome: Resettlement and Reconciliation**

While resolving the IDP issue is a necessary condition for conflict transformation in Kenya, it is not a sufficient one. We must view the issue of IDP resettlement in the broader context of Kenyan politics. Reconciliation at the local level is only part of the solution. Politicians must work toward fully implementing the constitution. Furthermore, those perpetrators of the post-election violence must be held to account either in a local or international court.

Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons to their home communities, the preferred overall outcome, is likely only to be achieved through widespread peace building and reconciliation efforts. Resettlement under a negotiated agreement between the parties is most likely to meet the interests and needs of all. Our initiative, therefore aims to provide genuine healing and reconciliation for both the IDP communities and host communities.

### Multi-track Initiative in the Rift Valley and Central Province

We have two primary goals for the initiative. Our first goal, as stated above, is to facilitate healing for both the IDP communities and host communities through physiological, spiritual and social support. Without healing at the local level, Kenya is likely to toward ethnic polarization and could fall back into violence. The second goal is to facilitate an ongoing dialogue between the two communities. Ultimately, our hope is that these communities continue to discuss their grievances and come up with solutions following the peace building workshops.

### **Peace building and Reconciliation Workshops**

The USAID-sponsored multi-track peace building initiative in Kenya would include two separate components. First, CIDCM partnering with USAID and three local peace building CSOs, will host a two-week conflict management workshop in Kampala, Uganda. Ten targeted communities will be chosen for the workshop: one representative from the IDP community and one representative from the host community, totaling 20 participants. The communities will be selected on two criteria: The proportion of displaced persons and level of violence experienced in the past election cycle. The workshop will focus on training the participants in the field of conflict management in the hope that they can mediate societal conflicts upon returning home.

Following the conflict management training, the second component of the initiative is ten local community building workshops in the targeted regions of the Rift Valley and Central province. Two representatives from the IDP community and host

community that went through the conflict management training will facilitate each workshop; a member of local peace building organization will be the third facilitator. The ten weeklong workshops will include student leaders from the IDP communities and host communities; and youths from civil society, media and business. A proportional number of tribes will be represented at the workshops.

We have reached out to a number of potential organizations to partner with. PeaceNet, which has been doing peace building work in the region long before the most recent election violence, has agreed to help facilitate the ten local workshops. Also, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) has agreed to help with the logistics of the local workshops.

Finally, tribes in Kenya largely have unique languages; however, Kiswahili is language taught to all Kenyans in primary school. To encourage a sense of shared identity, the workshop will be conducted in Swahili, opposed to a local language or English. Facilitators will underscore similarities between the participants by conducting the sessions in their language.

### **Conflict Management Training**

Holding a workshop between the IDPs and host communities will present many challenges. Without certain preconditions, bringing these two groups together in workshop setting could undermine the overall peace process. Moreover, the “winner takes all” attitude toward politics in Kenya makes any accommodation appear as defeat. Politics is viewed as a zero game where one’s tribal either “wins” or “loses.” In this context it is important to first set certain ground rules around mutual respect.

Those chosen for the intergroup dialogues will be leaders from the community. Kenya has an extensive and resilient civil society, which unfortunately has not been involved in the peace building process to a large extent. The workshop will bring mid-level leaders for religious communities, civil society groups. Seeing that these groups have influence in their wider communities, they are best suited to change deeply held opinions. In addition, these individuals may have access to politicians. Mid-level leaders have a greater stake in the peace process at the local level and will be more willing than

politicians at the national level to negotiate an agreement.

Multi-track diplomacy will also allow peace advocates space conduct negotiations. In order for the benefits of the intervention to spread beyond the group, the group members must be respected and influential members of society. Conducting an interpersonal intervention cannot be at the macro level and therefore choosing a selection of key people is important. Furthermore, the Church can plan an important role at the grassroots level in mediating peace.

Peace building efforts have rarely tapped into IDP networks.<sup>8</sup> It should be clear that failure to engage these communities would doom any peace agreement. Our initiative will create the space for IDPs to participate in the peace process, which in the past has been left to negotiations by political officials. By bringing the IDPs together with those parties do not wish to see them return, they can engage in a successful dialogue with one another. There needs to be a serious public discussion in Kenya about the land grievances, the nature of violence and the extent to which they are linked or not linked. We must be careful not to divert from the real sources of conflict.

Active listening will be a major part of these workshops. Participants will be divided into groups and go through active listening exercises with one another. The hope here is that the opposing parties can learn to empathize with the other. These workshops will also focus on skills building, particularity problem solving techniques. It is through these exercises that we hope to achieve a sense of community. It also our hope that by the end of the workshop, the participants will have developed enough skills to mediate their own workshop in the week that follows at the local level.

### **Community Building Workshops**

Paradoxically, Kenyan youth, the main perpetrators of the recent electoral violence, have largely been left out of the subsequent peace building and reconciliation process. Such efforts have been left to community elders. And, while capacity development for community elders should remain a priority, equally important is reconciliation among the youth. High levels of unemployment in rural Kenya coupled

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<sup>8</sup> Klopp, Jacqueline M. et al. Internal Displacement and Local Peacebuilding in Kenya

with high levels of income inequality have been contributing factors to ongoing violence. The contributing economic factors have led to a sense of disenfranchisement and neglect among the youth. Economic conditions have led to resentment toward the Kenyan government and have led to a stronger tribal identity. The youth likely the one ones to engage in violence in the future and therefore these workshops will address their needs.

Local workshops will include student and business leaders. The pain runs deep for the communities affected by the violence and the participants must be chosen carefully to ensure the workshops do not undermine the peace process. The participants that are chosen must have a close link to their respective communities with the intent that they will share what they learned with their respective communities. Student leaders have influence in their communities and are good candidates for spreading the “peace dividend.” Similarly, entrepreneurs are respected and carry influence in their communities and also will be chosen to participate.

Mistrust between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu (and other tribes as well) is the largest barrier to peace in the Rift Valley and Central province. Accordingly, the workshop will firstly work toward building trust between the two communities. The shared hatred between the tribes makes getting them to engage in dialogue a challenge. The exercise in the workshop will work toward addressing trust at the interpersonal level. This should be done through an open dialogue as well as through problem solving workshops. The mediators must first provide ground rules for the parties to ensure verbal or body language does not derail to peace process.

Violence in Kenya disrupted the local economy, which had depended historically on interethnic cooperation for access to market and transportation services.<sup>9</sup> The disruption adversely affected the host communities due to the loss of producers. The community building workshops will, therefore, focus on interethnic economic cooperation. The multi-track intervention will focus on encouraging economic cooperation between and among warring tribes through joint economic projects. The future of peace lies with the growing Kenyan middle class, specifically the business community, women and civil servants. The wealthy Kenyans with large investments in East Africa have a vested interest in keeping peace in their country. Their desire to

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<sup>9</sup> Klopp, Jacqueline M. et al. Internal Displacement and Local Peacebuilding in Kenya.

increase economic activity transcends tribal identity and may play a strong role in mediating peace. We will work toward ensuring the idea of economic empowerment is shared not only by the Kenyan elites but the general public as well.

For each of the ten workshops USAID would provide \$10,000 for a community development project. These projects would require a use of a shared resource such as an agricultural coop, sanitation project or water project. The second week the workshop will deal only with problem solving, i.e., how to best address the communities development needs with \$10,000. This creates a non-bargaining setting where the participants can work only solving the problem at hand. The intent is to create a new sense of culture where cooperation is the norms, rather than divisiveness and a willingness to use force to gain advantage.<sup>10</sup>

The process will be evaluated on the willingness of the participants to cooperate to find a way to allocate the funds to a development project. To ensure the process is sustained after the mediators leave, it will be important that local actors are trained in conflict resolution. This will give the process more legitimacy as well as make sure the conflict resolution can still place without funding or an outsider to meditation. The participants would be given action items with respect to how they are to implement the project.

Finally, only in the case that the participants come to a consensus on the how the funds should be allocated, will they be award the \$10,000. The project also assumes the host communities reach an agreement for the IDP communities to return home. Only under these conditions would the funds be released. Furthermore, the community would be given technical assistant in addition to the funds to implement the project.

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<sup>10</sup> Diamond, Louise. "Reflections and Resources for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Kenya."