

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301

and in the United Kingdom by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Democracy, peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict / edited by Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed, and Robert L. Rothstein.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-55587-342-1

1. Jewish-Arab relations—1973- 2. Democracy—Israel. 3. Israel—
Politics and government. 4. West Bank—Politics and government.
5. Palestinian Arabs—Politics and government. I. Kaufman, Edy.
II. Abed, Shukri. III. Rothstein, Robert L.

DS119.7.D398 1993

327.5694017'4927—dc20

92-39883

CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	vii
INTRODUCTION	
1 Coauthoring in a Conflict Situation <i>Edy Kaufman</i>	3
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
2 Democracy and Conflict <i>Robert L. Rothstein</i>	17
3 The Relevance of Democracy to Israeli-Palestinian Peace <i>Edy Kaufman and Shukri B. Abed</i>	41
THE ISRAELIS: SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY	
4 Garrison Democracy: The Impact of the 1967 Occupation of Territories on Institutional Democracy in Israel <i>Alon Pinkas</i>	61
5 War, Occupation, and the Effects on Israeli Society <i>Edy Kaufman</i>	85
6 Attitudes Toward Democracy Among Israeli Religious Leaders <i>Charles S. Liebman</i>	135
7 The Democratization of a Traditional Minority in an Ethnic Democracy: The Palestinians in Israel <i>Nadim Rouhana and As'ad Ghanem</i>	163
THE PALESTINIANS: CRAFTING DEMOCRACY	
8 Democracy and the Arab World <i>Shukri B. Abed</i>	189
9 Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli Relations <i>Moshe Ma'oz</i>	213
10 Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy <i>Ziad Abu-Amr</i>	245
11 The Democratization Process in the PLO: Ideology, Structure, and Strategy <i>Manuel Hassassian</i>	257

The Relevance of Democracy to Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Edy Kaufman

Shukri B. Abed

Machiavellian realists have often said that there are no eternal enemies, although such protracted struggles as that between the Palestinians and the Israelis seem to belie this assertion. Yet history has seen far more virulent and long-lived enmities eventually transformed into productive and mutually beneficial relationships. Turning conflict into cooperation and moving from enmity to friendship requires concerted effort and constant attention to common interests, needs, and characteristics. Israelis and Palestinians, though they often seem not to realize it, do have a common interest in ending their century-old conflict. This chapter shows that pursuit of democracy and the adherence to democratic values may provide a means for effecting significant and positive change in the relationship between the Semitic cousins. Drawing on the discussion of the relationship between democratic regimes and peace developed in the previous chapter, we consider the prospects for such a proposition in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with democracy seen as a converging interest of the two parties.

Setting the Frame of Mind

It seems at times as if every idea about peace between Palestinians and Israelis has already been formulated. So wide has been the gap between them that few new avenues are perceived as open for the resolution of a conflict that has persisted, with more or less vehemence, for close to a century. The stakes are astronomically high and the penalty for failure extremely grave, as this local conflict continually threatens to spill over into broader disputes among the nations of the region and of the world. Because of the strategic importance of the Middle East and its oil reserves, regional confrontations such as the Gulf War escalate rapidly and loom as formidable obstacles to moderate thinking on the Palestinian question.

Five years after the intifada (Palestinian uprising) against the Israeli occupation began, two years after the Gulf War, and with the opening of the Middle East Peace Regional Conference, it seems that prospects for a resolution are improving, although obstacles remain visible. On the one hand, no future accords between Israel and surrounding Arab states can lead to a lasting peace unless the demands and aspirations of the Palestinians as well as those of Israelis are minimally addressed. On the other hand, reducing the level of expectations, at least on the part of one party, may allow the limited conditions of both to be met halfway in an interim, staged agreement.¹ Partial solutions can provoke serious upheavals among the maximalist groups and their followers, and implementing such agreements will most likely produce serious cleavages in both societies. However, lack of progress in the peace process will also have negative domestic effects (discussed in Chapter 5) as well as regressive outcomes in the region. The "cold peace" with Egypt may be jeopardized if there persists a lack of visible progress in the peace process.

In situations of conflict, each side tends to fixate on the negative and to assume that concessions to the opponent are detrimental to its own interests. Palestinians and Israelis are no exception. Statements by leaders of both communities often express mutual frustration, suspicion, and even apathy, only serving to further protract the political stalemate. What are the basic parameters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? For Palestinians, the foremost concern appears to be the pursuit of statehood; for Israelis, the maintenance of their security. Given that most Israelis view an autonomous Palestinian state as antithetical to Israeli security, we must proceed to ask how these two seemingly contradictory concerns can be reconciled. In other words, how can we achieve a solution that simultaneously satisfies the fundamental needs of both communities? What type of future solution can best guarantee Israel a lasting peace and secure borders while addressing the basic Palestinian aspirations for an independent governmental entity?

Current discussions about moving one step at a time through a period of Palestinian self-rule under Israeli control encounter many technical concerns. Some resistance can be overcome by not disclosing the light at the end of the tunnel—*independent statehood for the Palestinians*—to either side. Even if such constructive ambiguity has the merit of postponing the wider areas of disagreement for a future discussion, it may be best accompanied by examination of the lessons of history as well as assessments of the current progress toward reconciliation in other regions among national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural communities. This exercise requires huge leaps of imagination and continual re-examination of the problem from ever new and different angles. Until recently, the political leaders of both nations have explored a limited number of creative avenues

in their search for resolution, stressing the uniqueness of the protracted state of conflict. Oversimplified, one-dimensional solutions are usually premised on the popularly accepted principle that one side's concession may signal to the other one side's defeat. For example, an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied after the 1967 war could likely have mutually beneficial consequences, but the concept is often dismissed without closer examination because it is broadly perceived as a security threat to Israel. This perception holds despite Israel's qualitative military strength (superior to that of the surrounding belligerent Arab states combined), the strong prospects for demilitarization of the West Bank, and even the feasibility of expanding Israel's security zone by guaranteeing the inviolability of Jordanian borders to Iraqi and Syrian incursion.²

What is needed today is a move beyond the boundaries of our present grim, patently unacceptable reality. Transcendence of the current paradigms of inquiry necessitates what Edward de Bono refers to as "lateral thinking." De Bono explains: "Instead of proceeding step by step in the usual vertical manner, you take up a new and quite arbitrary position. You then work backwards and try to construct a logical path between this new position and the starting point. Should such a path prove possible, it may eventually be tested with the full rigors of logic. If the path is sound, you are then in a useful position which may never have been reached by ordinary vertical thinking."³

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are there future options, points of convergence, once we reject the zero-sum premise? Thinking laterally, for example, we can ask ourselves: Are there possible safeguards against war other than the occupation of the territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Let us assume that for most citizens of the Jewish state there is no single issue more important than security. No country faced with the actual and potential threats of both conventional and guerrilla warfare to which Israel feels itself vulnerable could deny the importance of geopolitical considerations. Yet, in light of the meteoric proliferation of deadly arms in the region, there can be no doubt about the decreasing importance of conventional topographic obstacles, so often mentioned as a justification for retaining the territories. Powerful missiles can be launched from Syria, Saudi Arabia, or, as we saw, Iraq and reach Tel Aviv in a matter of minutes.

Lateral thinking encourages consideration of nonmilitary "soft" aspects of security, new dimensions of foreign policy that should be considered in the region's search for formulas promoting peace. In addition to formal treaties and agreements offering guarantees such as demilitarization, the presence of international peace forces, early-warning stations, and satellite monitoring, emphasis should be placed on *de facto* common interests that could strongly motivate both sides to seek and maintain peace.

The Relationship of Democracy to Peace

Following De Bono's lead, we can return to the study's basic assumption and a basic tenet in world politics: In general, democratic states tend to avoid war as a tool for settling disputes among themselves. An important security priority for Israel, then, is to ensure that the Palestinian entity develops democratic institutions. By the same token, the Palestinians have a legitimate interest in seeing their neighbor Israel remain democratic.⁴

Since the creation of nation-states and the establishment of Western-style, liberal, democratic regimes the tendency has been to resort to means other than formally declared warfare to solve their conflicts. From Kantian theories to meticulous checks of data banks that tabulate the correlates of war, this proposition seems to hold firm. It is confirmed in a pioneering study entitled *Resort to Arms* (1982), wherein Small and Singer provide a chronological table of international wars over the past 200 years.⁵ Other scholars and statesmen have added their support. In the appendices of his article "Liberalism and World Politics," Michael Doyle provides a table of "liberal regimes" based on Kant's four characteristics: market and private economics, politics that are externally sovereign, citizens who possess juridical rights, and republican representative government. These have grown in number from only three in the eighteenth century to fifty during the period between 1945 and 1982.⁶

Using the data of a most comprehensive work by Brecher and Wilkenfeld entitled the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project,⁷ we can analyze the few cases showing a positive correlation between wars and democracies. These two scholars studied international conflicts fought between 1929 and 1985; within this span, so rare and so marginal are those instances of warring democratic regimes that they are worth enumerating:

1) *Israel-Lebanon, 1948-1949*. Lebanon's involvement in the war against the newly independent state of Israel consisted essentially of a declaratory position in solidarity with other nondemocratic Arab states. No significant acts of combat took place between the two democracies.

2) *Guatemala-United States, 1954*. In this confrontation, an expeditionary force, armed by the United Fruit Company and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency but mostly composed of and led by Guatemalan exiles, invaded from Honduran territory and took control of Guatemala a few days later. The United States's high level of involvement still falls short of the many other direct military interventions in the region.

3) *Turkey-Cyprus, 1974*. The Cypriot National Guard, led by officers of the Greek army, seized the government on July 15, 1974, committed to the union of the island and Greece. They deposed elected President Makarios, who fled the country, and on July 20 Turkey sent the army and

effectively took control of part of the island. A few days separated a democratic regime and an act of aggression.

4) *Israel-Lebanon, 1982*. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was originally aimed at the "semiautonomous" Palestinian zone in the south of Lebanon. It was coordinated, to a certain extent, with the tacit understanding of the late Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayl. Some have questioned if this torn country could be considered a democracy at that time.

The relative weakness of the handful of exceptions is self-evident. It is nonetheless a significant finding that half of the borderline cases involve Israel. Since the early 1980s many countries have provided further illustrations of democratization. In his 1986 acceptance speech in Oslo, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica, expressly linked the formal solution of the conflicts in Central America to parallel efforts to democratize the regimes in the area. In Central America policymakers are not seeking peace alone, "nor only the peace that will follow some day from political progress, but rather peace and democracy together, indivisible elements." Bloodshed among the contending guerrilla and armed forces, declared Arias, is inseparable from the end of the repression of human rights. While every nation has the right to freely choose its political or ideological system, the Costa Rican leader insisted that every government respect universal human rights, and he stressed that a nation that mistreats its own citizens is more likely to maltreat its neighbors.

In Chapter 2, Robert Rothstein points to the fragility of generalization, noting that in developing countries the scarcity of resources, the unequal income distribution, and the vast sectors of the population below the poverty line generate a highly unstable situation. The impact of economic constraints on an Israeli-Palestinian peace may be of lesser significance given relatively high standards of living, the foreign aid that can be anticipated as a built-in dimension of the conflict's resolution, and prospects resulting from regional cooperation. Nonetheless, the lessons of history call upon the parties to capture in their imagination the meaning of such developments elsewhere. Caution is surely in order given the profound roots and existential characteristics of the Arab-Jewish dispute.

Democracy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The theory of peaceful coexistence between democratic neighbors remains to be tested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Perhaps the most significant stumbling block to peace is mutual doubt regarding the wavering commitment to such ideals by the involved parties. Criticism notwithstanding, Israel continues to be a vibrant democracy internally. While not a few Israelis might be willing to concede that a democratic Palestinian state

could be a desirable future neighbor, many disbelieve absolutely that the Palestinians (or any Arab nation, for that matter) are capable of establishing and maintaining a democracy. The fact that there has never been an Arab democracy (with the exception of Lebanon—hardly an encouraging example) is considered proof that there never will be one. The Arab people are often viewed by Israelis and other Westerners as inherently incapable of self-government through democratic means.

To be sure, an analysis of the surrounding Arab regimes does not provide much encouragement, with authoritarianism and human rights violations a regular feature of the region's political landscape.⁸ The political traditions in the Arab world certainly do not support or provide role models for any fledgling efforts at democratization. Such negativism, however, can be countered by the following observations.

First, nothing in world politics is etched in stone. It has been widely documented that the commitment to developing democratic forms of government—once an exclusive province of the West—has spread in the past two decades into southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In Africa, too, the strengthening of democratic institutions at a grassroots level seems to be an emerging, consistent pattern.⁹ Even as latecomers to the democratization processes, Middle Eastern nations are beginning to initiate small-scale yet significant democratic reforms. And the dizzying pace at which certain Eastern European states have plunged into democratization in recent years, as well as the more plodding efforts of the former Soviet republics, demonstrate how quickly a political landscape can change once a commitment to change exists.

In the second place, the Palestinians do not equal the Arabs. Their experiences are unique in the Arab world and, in fact, render them likely candidates to spearhead democratization reforms in the Middle East. Certain developments in the Palestinian community—within Israel, in the Occupied Territories, and at large—definitely justify a cautious optimism regarding the prospects for a future democratic Palestinian state, as the following points suggest:

1. The language of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence reflects a philosophical commitment to the development of democratic institutions.¹⁰

2. Within the PLO the importance of democratic procedures for leadership succession or in relation to majority-supported resolutions, replacing consensual decisionmaking, is gradually being recognized. Even the more radical groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), stated in 1988 their willingness to play the role of loyal opposition during the exploration of political avenues.

3. In the Occupied Territories, Palestinians have become acquainted with the election process, beginning with the 1972 and 1976 municipal elections and continuing today, for example, in the election of representa-

tives to a large number of trade, professional, and other civil-society organizations.

4. The high percentage of educated Palestinians, including an impressive number of university graduates, has contributed to a considerable loosening of the traditional structure. An educated and well-informed population is certainly a prerequisite for building and maintaining democratic societies.

5. For many years now, the Palestinians have engaged in dialogues and heated debates among themselves concerning their future. The debates have led to a wider acceptance of the principles of *negotiation* and *compromise*, two cornerstones of democratic development. Indeed, these are the essence of democracy in its truest sense.

6. The issue of freedom is fundamental to the outlook of many in the present Palestinian professional and political elites in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Almost exclusively Western-educated, the elite strata of the Occupied Territories is Western-oriented and will most likely play a major role in formulating the nature of the regime in the future Palestinian state. In fact, should the Palestinian entity *not* be a democratic one, many of the social, political, and cultural leaders of the community today would be censured, replaced, and possibly exiled, something they would certainly choose to forestall.

7. The dispersion of the Palestinians around the world can be seen as a further guarantee for decentralized decisionmaking. The diffusion of power is an important precondition for pluralism. Only democracy can encompass the cultural diversity and the varying points of view that are a result of the conditions of exile suffered by the Palestinians over the past forty years.

8. Paradoxically, military control in the Occupied Territories has promoted the stirrings of democratization among people who are ruled *undemocratically*. Repression of Palestinian leaders during the intifada, for example, has accelerated the dispersion of decisionmaking power to the grassroots level and to the younger generations.

9. The Palestinian uprising represents a landmark in terms of Palestinian *self-assertion*. Under the conditions of the intifada, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have taken the initiative and established *new patterns of collective behavior*, including different forms of grassroots organization. Taking one's destiny into one's own hands and collective behavior are two characteristics of democratic behavior.

10. The intifada has also enhanced the role of women in the Palestinian community. Many women are considered community leaders, and some of them have become internationally recognized as spokeswomen for the Palestinian cause. The centrality of women in the Palestinian community undermines the *traditional* view of women in the Arab world and brings the Palestinian society one step closer to social equality.

11. A Palestinian state will most likely be dependent to some degree on

the economic and even political support of Western countries (including the United States and the Western European countries, particularly those of the Common Market), as Palestinians have recognized that they cannot afford to alienate Western countries by creating a nondemocratic state.

Although the intifada has certainly been a decisive factor in the development of democratic behavior among Palestinians living within the Occupied Territories, it has also created certain stumbling blocks to such development, the most important being the large number of political assassinations of "alleged collaborators," which only contributes to a climate of insecurity for expression of dissent from leadership decisions.

Yet Palestinian political elites seem increasingly to realize that their best chance for an independent state lies in their genuine espousal of democratic principles, an expedient position to adopt in an increasingly Western-led world community. For their part, Israelis must realize that they have good reason to support the gradual and eventual establishment of a democratic Palestinian governmental entity that would not only guarantee the rights of its own citizens but also preserve cooperative and productive relationships with its neighbors, as democratic states are wont to do. Achieving such shared values in an admittedly polarized situation may contribute to shifting alliances in the region by stressing acquired commonalities between the two regimes and their constituencies.

Contradiction and Convergence

De facto arrangements based on common norms and values have been implicitly adopted by the two warring parties since before the Six Day War. Armistice lines, "red lines" restricting military presence, and the often limited nature of wars have frequently been based on tacit understandings by both sides. The reciprocal treatment of prisoners of war serves as a graphic illustration of this phenomenon: Both sides usually refrain from executing prisoners of war and are willing to exchange prisoners. Other areas of convergence include the "open bridges" policy by which Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians benefit from the passage of merchandise and people over the Jordan River. The use of water from the Jordan and Yamuk rivers, once seen as a source of friction, is now understood to work to the mutual benefit of Israel and certain Arab countries. President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin altered the course of history with a peace treaty and emerging forms of cooperation, leaving unresolved aspects of the conflict to be addressed in an incremental and gradual fashion in the future.

The most perceptive leaders on both sides understand that war and continued civil strife exact their toll on both sides and are of no lasting benefit to either. The late Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan, for example,

stressed the importance of rebuilding the cities on the Suez Canal, thus increasing the economic costs of a new war with Egypt. In a similar vein, one retired Israeli general emphasized the damaging psychological consequences of repression. He argued that Israel's abstention from excessive harshness and repressive behavior should reduce the intensity of Palestinian hostility, thereby mitigating (even if only mildly) the motivation of individual Palestinians to seek revenge against their oppressors.¹¹ Pursuing this logic implies that avoiding forms of collective punishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where retaliatory antagonism is manifold, should be considered a high priority for promoting Israel's security concerns.

Questions once considered unnegotiable are now becoming the subject of political discussions, increasing the possibility that pragmatism will win out over dogmatic, ideological positions. For example, a prominent member of the PLO has admitted the possibility of Jewish settlers remaining in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after an Israeli withdrawal: "The right of Israelis to live in the state of Palestine and the right of Palestinians to live in the state of Israel should be subject of negotiations."¹² The presence of settlers in a Palestinian state, even as a result of a unilateral decision, may further legitimate the status of the Palestinians born and living as citizens within the Jewish state. Other discussions revolve around the unilateral preference of many Palestinians to restrict their security forces in a future state to a well-trained police guard rather than a full-scale army. Military balance with Israel cannot be realistically achieved given the lack of sufficient air space for the effective operationalizing of combat planes. Forgoing an army would save the new state the high expenditure of a full defense budget and complement the widely shared Israeli aspiration for demilitarization in a future Palestinian state. Even if it coincides with Israeli security concerns, not forming a military cast may be in the best interest of Palestinian civil society. Without a praetorian guard and without any Palestinians with inherited royal claims, chances for democracy may be better there than elsewhere in the Arab world.

The aforementioned examples illustrate that the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their Arab supporters have already adopted certain informal, mutually beneficial rules of the game despite the unresolved, indeed conflict-riddled, political situation. All of these examples demonstrate some of the existing areas of convergence and offer insight into other possible areas of mutual benefit, such as the development of democratic norms in the region.

The strengthening of democratic institutions and practices among both the occupier and the occupied can represent an important priority for promoting a peaceful relationship between Palestinians and the Jewish state. If the Israeli government were to acknowledge and pursue multidimensional aspects of security maintenance (for example, economic, political, and cul-

tural areas of convergence) rather than propagate historical or mythical commitments to promote purely military security, a rational strategy could be developed to encourage democratization in both communities. However, if such options are unavailable, it may be important for pragmatic Palestinians to agree to the short-term measures proposed by the Israeli establishment that by design or default will encourage future democratic reforms. Arguments about immediate resolution of questions related to the jurisdiction over territories (land, natural resources, water, the subsoil, the territorial sea, and air space) may take longer to resolve than agreement between the military occupier and the occupied on the democratic transfer of authority from one people to another.

Furthermore, many favor the idea of holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for an interim self-governing authority or an administrative council as an integral part of the Palestinian autonomy scheme, as suggested in the Camp David agreement. The idea of the interim authority appeared initially to be the preference of the PLO, while the administrative council plan came to be embraced by Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, as well as by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in his "Ten Point" document. What was seen until 1991 as a unilateral Israeli preference can now be argued to benefit both sides. A solution involving a key mechanism of democratization may be preferable to one that comes mostly as an imposition from outside. As it happened, the Madrid peace conference paved the way in October 1991 for a combination of both Israeli and Arab strategies.

As an illustration of how matters of confrontation can become issues of convergence, we may elaborate this idea in more detail. At the early stages of the peace talks that took place in 1992 in Washington, focus on an interim period of autonomous self-rule as part of a staged solution appeared as a potential area of agreement by both sides, to which the main world actors also assented. Within it, the question of voting is of crucial importance.¹³ Although the Israeli government only promised municipal elections within the framework of the Camp David agreement, even such limited steps could further democratic processes. Israeli authorities moved in the direction of dialogue with traditional or elected Palestinian leadership during the first decade after occupation after 1967, but then switched to a preference for deals with the traditional, authoritarian, uneducated, and sometimes corrupt elites (the Village Leagues) on the assumption that such elements of the occupied population would more readily acquiesce to Israeli rule. This tactic was clearly not designed to encourage future cooperation on an equal footing between the two nations. Unfortunately, a tendency to support indigenous democratic leadership among the Palestinians—as a reflection of enlightened self-interest—does not prevail within the Israeli establishment. Judging from the experience of elections held by nonrepresentative regimes in other areas of the world (including the Philippines, Chile, and

Nicaragua), problems of control by the authorities have been bypassed by the strong presence of an international observer. Representatives of international organizations—parliamentarians, journalists, and other formal or informal observers—play a crucial role in ensuring that political campaigns and elections are conducted such that the state authorities cannot control the results. The international community could encourage Israeli authorities to see that elections in the West Bank and Gaza adhere to similar standards for voting as within Israel. Active foreign monitoring could provide the Palestinian leadership with the necessary and reasonable protection of their interests in the elections without unduly infringing on Israel's safety. Cooperation among Israeli authorities and Palestinian leaders regarding electoral procedures and perhaps even the formation of mixed Israeli/Palestinian bodies might serve as yet another incremental step toward addressing each other's needs and interests, thus forming an additional area of political convergence.

The results of such elections will most likely leave Israel in the position of having to recognize and interact with individuals who have unequivocally identified themselves with the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, the past stands, advocacy, and behavior of the PLO in exile have left many Israelis without trust in its present leadership. Hence, the more specific question to be considered is: What type of leadership can answer Israel's concern for lasting peace and security while meeting the basic aspirations of the Palestinians?

Once municipal leadership is elected, there should be no reason the mayors could not constitute the temporary representative body and serve as a partner for negotiations regarding the subsequent steps in the peace process. In fact, it would not be the first time the elected mayors played a major role in the political life of the Occupied Territories. Following the sweeping 1976 victory of the nationalist candidates in most towns and cities of the West Bank, the mayors "within the first few months in office . . . performed impressively in municipal affairs, and demonstrated a remarkable cooperation and coordination among themselves in political issues. . . . Despite . . . different approaches and personal-regional rivalries, most, if not all, West Bank mayors endeavored to sustain a united front toward the Israeli government and other external forces."¹⁴

In other words, there is a historical precedent for the elected mayors becoming the temporary representative body for the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza. To be sure, according to Moshe Ma'oz, this earlier elected body was subjected to measures undertaken by the Israelis "to counter . . . independent tendencies of the mayors. While upholding its own financial allocations and supervising the registration of external monies, [the military government] tried to confine the activities of the mayors to merely municipal issues, and, accordingly, reduce their powers and hold them on a short leash."¹⁵ However, the military government's efforts

to curb the political activities of the mayors were not successful at the time, and today, given the intifada and the emergence of a new post-Cold War world, it would be even more difficult, if not impossible, to implement such a repressive strategy. Increasingly, leading Israeli politicians have advocated the principle of Palestinian elections.¹⁶

It is interesting to consider in this connection what processes have occurred in the past when occupying powers have withdrawn from territories where democracy eventually prevailed (Austria, West Germany, Italy, Japan). Where the occupying power perceived its presence to be the result of an unprovoked attack by a nondemocratic regime, it has not felt obliged to evacuate the conquered lands until a democratically elected government is in place. Moreover, restrictions have been enforced on the vanquished, such as the outlawing of irredentist parties advocating *revanche* or territorial expansion. In most cases, interim periods of self-government last a good number of years. When the defeated countries became independent, some elements within them originally perceived such stipulations as limiting their freedom, but in retrospect they may not be unhappy with the outcome. A key example is post-World War II Japan.

Following this line of reasoning (i.e., turning disadvantages into advantages), we see that the Israeli government, consciously or unconsciously, can facilitate the development of a Palestinian leadership compatible with both minimum PLO aims and the implementation of democratic processes. These first steps are most likely to endure and evolve if begun from below rather than from above. In a well-known article on developmental democracy, Richard Sklar has advocated the formation of local government or an autonomous judiciary as a stage in bottom-up democracy building in developing countries.¹⁷ From this point of view, and given the fact that the Palestinians have no previous experience in independent statehood and truly representative institutions, beginning from the grassroots and working upward may be a more prudent and systematic way of establishing permanent pluralistic institutions. Interim periods of transition to democracy are not necessarily a disadvantage for the Palestinians; at the same time, they can provide an increased sense of security and familiarity to the Israelis.

The above discussion has attempted to illustrate means by which the Israeli government might facilitate the development of a Palestinian leadership that is compatible with PLO-declared aims *and* committed to strengthening democratic norms, with a clear endorsement of the principles of coexistence within both communities.

There is a broad preference among those politically active on both sides for a democratic form of government in any type of future solution.¹⁸ Without defining the specific terms of which existing democratic model would be selected, many analysts now believe that the Palestinians' political agenda is grounded in a Western-style democracy and that they seek

respect for civil and political rights within a state providing for the basic needs and promoting the welfare of the entire population.

The Effect of the Situation on the Standards of Democracy

It is also sensible to speculate on the future effect of prolonging the current state of belligerence. If democracies contribute to peace, is it reasonable to make the inverse inference? Subsequent chapters discuss the present trends in Israel, an established regime, in a systematic manner. Briefly, it may be necessary to recall that the democratic nature of Israel, or of any state, is not axiomatic. In fact, some of the democratic standards of the Jewish state have significantly deteriorated since 1967. As Pinkas and Kaufman show in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, striking examples of institutional problems can be found in the rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice relating to the population of the Occupied Territories and in the rulings of lower courts concerning Arabs in Israel.¹⁹ No less troublesome is the lack of popular support for basic principles of civil and political rights, particularly among the youngest age groups. In one recent public opinion poll, 40 percent of Israeli youth indicated that they "hate all Arabs."²⁰

Prior to the Palestinian uprising, many analysts contended that Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was a model of "benign occupation." Proponents claimed that even if rule in the territories did not attain the democratic standards within Israel proper, Palestinians there nevertheless enjoyed relatively greater freedom than those living under Arab occupation or in Arab countries. Freedom of the press, academic freedom, and other civil liberties were relatively greater under Israeli occupation than under Arab authoritarian regimes in the region. However, the concept of benign occupation and its alleged relative benefits have been sharply repudiated since the uprising began in earnest.

The intifada represents a landmark in terms of Palestinian self-assertion in the process of political development in the West Bank and Gaza. For the first time since the 1967 war and the beginning of the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians have taken the initiative and established new patterns of collective behavior, including different forms of grassroots organizing. For twenty years, from 1968 to 1987, the local population reacted to the directives of the Israeli authorities. Since then the trend has been reversed: Most of the time the local population has gained the initiative, and its dominant strategy has forced the military and civilian administration into primarily reactive measures. The focused striving for empowerment, coupled with increasingly pragmatic views (such as the acceptance of territorial compromise with Israel), has been persuasive in advancing the Palestinian point of view. Yet frustration with the dearth of political achievements has strengthened the hand of extremist factions, intensifying the number of exe-

cutions as a form of struggle, for example. Similarly, there exists a clear and present danger that democracy within Israel proper will begin to disintegrate as extreme chauvinist, militarist, and fundamentalist forces seek to silence those with opinions that differ from their own.

Both Palestinians and Israelis may fail to recognize this dangerous trend, which threatens to blight their chances for a political life without intimidation. And both sides need recognize that the surest way to guard against such dangers is to proceed with haste to resolve their mutual differences. For the Palestinians, democratization should not necessarily be made contingent upon the outcome of either the cessation of intifada or progress in the peace talks. For the Israelis, the setbacks in democratic practices require immediate institutional and educational remedies, regardless of the outcome of the peace negotiations. The long-term commitment to Israeli and Palestinian democratization should prove a powerful impetus toward a future peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Discussions of things that can be done to improve the human rights situation have been a confidence-building factor in the peace talks. Some measures, such as the release of Palestinian minors, the elderly and sick, and peaceful dissenters from Israeli prisons, could be seen as unilateral humanitarian gestures that would, it is hoped, meet with some relaxation in the intifada resistance. Other measures could be advanced multilaterally: such as granting that Jews in Syria be allowed to exit the country, and similar number of Palestinians be allowed back in the West Bank and Gaza.

Conclusions

For the Jewish people, the highest priority has been and continues to be assuring security in a complex Middle East landscape that is perceived as hostile. With powerful missiles that can now be launched from neighboring and remote Arab countries, the traditional approach to Israeli security—focusing on the maintenance of a qualitatively strong military force, diplomatic cease-fires, and unwritten understandings—is no longer adequate. More creative approaches are called for in addressing security questions. Rephrasing the question often allows for broader insight into the problem than traditional modes. The symbolic presence of limited military forces to assert claims of sovereignty without posing an offensive threat, disbanding and disarming irregular forces, a commitment to refrain from preemptive strikes or surprise attacks, notification of military maneuvers, regular meetings of military officials of all sides, the mutual acceptance of early-warning systems and international observers, interim nonbelligerency statements—all these measures can build confidence in the realm of security. Beyond military de-escalation and conventional diplomacy, can emphasis

be placed on de facto common political interests that will strongly impel both sides to promote their respective security and identity needs?

The Palestinians have been coming to terms with the irreversibility of Israel's existence as an established state and adjusting their demands; they now seek the end of occupation in the remaining areas of Palestine occupied by the Jewish army after 1967. In a spacial sense, accommodation to two states, side by side, seems a viable long-term proposition.

There was a trend that suggested that in order to avoid an imposed solution from outside the region, the Israelis and Palestinians should come to a gradual agreement via concrete incremental actions, such as holding elections among the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. If perceived to be expedient, elections moving gradually from local to central bodies in itself could be justified by the top leadership of both sides. Granted, serious differences exist between the Israeli proposal for an administrative council²¹ and the model of the Palestinian Interim Self-government Authority (PISGA).²²

The ascendancy of a Labor/left-of-center coalition in June 1992 substantially changed the degree of concessions and the willingness to compromise by the Israeli partner. Still, asymmetry in the level of power of both sides may predetermine that the concessions the Israelis are willing to undertake will fall short of the Arabs' minimum expectations. Replacing the leadership of one of the parties with a more internationally accepted figure could be a great incentive for peace.

Nonetheless, the Palestinians may come to a moment of truth in which they must decide whether to consent to those restricted choices proposed by the occupation government. If such conditions would be considered negligible, the door remains open for unusual challenges, such as the formula of "unilateral elections"; namely, if the peace talks fail to lead anywhere, the Palestinians can declare their intention to proceed with the election plans on their own.²³ At the same time, can Palestinians visualize even the replacement of Chairman Yassir Arafat by democratic procedures? (As a rule, leadership changes in the Arab world occur "by accident"—natural or purposeful.) Can a new leader with a different, peace-loving image strike more international support and inspire more confidence among Israelis?²⁴ These questions have begun to be addressed publicly.²⁵

With respect to the PLO leadership in Tunis, it could be argued that it is not in the Palestinians' overall interest to elect alternative representatives from the West Bank and Gaza at the national level because of the possible antagonism—whether real or merely perceived—between leaders in the territories and leaders in exile. Alternatively, the PLO can make very clear that any legitimately elected authorities in the territories will automatically be accepted as *their* representatives, thereby co-opting them into its structure. As previously mentioned, it is highly likely that the local elected rep-

representatives will identify themselves with the majority groups within the PLO organizations, particularly with its mainstream.

In short, there do seem to be areas of potential agreement based on interests shared by the Israelis and the Palestinians. Not a few people on the two sides have expressed their conviction of the need to end an increasingly senseless confrontation in emotional terms.²⁶ In the words of Bassam Abu Sharif, a noted Palestinian leader who has stressed the urgency of moving from points of conflict to issues of convergence, "No one can understand the Jewish people's centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it is to be stateless and the object of fear and prejudice of the nations."²⁷ Tom Segev forecasts the long-term implications of the Holocaust to be a more humanistic and universal interpretation of suffering²⁸ that may also encompass the tragic lot of the Palestinian people.

The search for democracy in the Middle East at this moment in history is increasingly seen to be in the best interests of both peoples. The Gulf War may have served as a catalyst by accelerating processes already in motion. Yet it is simply too soon to tell whether the ultimate outcome of the crisis will be further bloodshed or a move toward peace and democratization in the region, or perhaps some of both.²⁹ Harkabi has coined the idea that the parties have to choose "between bad and worse," an outcome only feasible with the Israelis gaining back their own and with the growing capability of the Palestinians to separate grand designs from realistic possibilities.³⁰ While concurring with those who are pessimistic that there is room for doubt, we can but append the lesson learned from bloody enemies in Europe and elsewhere: The correlates of peace and democracy provide a most fertile ground for prosperity and growth.

Notes

1. For a more detailed analysis see Edy Kaufman, *Israelis and Palestinians in the Peace Process* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1992).

2. For a detailed exploration of this option see Joseph Alpher, "Palestinian Settlement: The Security Issues," Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project, Working Paper Series, No 14, Harry S Truman Research Institute (Winter 1991/1992).

3. Edward de Bono, *The Use of Lateral Thinking* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975).

4. General reference to the idea is made in Jerome Segal, *Creating the Palestinian State* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1989), pp. 129-130. ("This perception [lasting peace] will be strengthened by an additional consideration: it is almost unknown for two democracies to wage war on each other. Thus, given Israeli democracy, Palestinian democracy will mean increased security for both sides.")

5. Melvin Small and David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982).

6. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political*

Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec. 1986), pp. 1151-1169. An analysis of the argument that democracies do not fight other democracies is offered by Robert Rothstein in an unpublished speech, "Weak Democracy and the Prospects for Peace and Prosperity in the Third World," delivered at the United States Institute for Peace conference, Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Third World, October 3-5, 1990, in Washington, D.C.

7. Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, *Crises in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1988.)

8. Interestingly enough, Egypt, the only Arab country to have thus far concluded a peace treaty with Israel, has a regime that appears to be more open and free than those of its Arab neighbors. But even there, much remains to be desired.

9. See Richard L. Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (October 1987), pp. 686-714.

10. Sari Nusseibeh, *Ha'aretz*, September 7, 1989. See also Jonathan Kuttub, *Jerusalem Post*, September 10, 1989.

11. Reuven Gal, ed., *The Seventh War: The Effects of the Intifada on Israeli Society* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1990), in Hebrew.

12. Nabil Sha'ath, speech at Columbia University, in *Davar*, magazine supplement, March 13, 1989, in Hebrew.

13. Advocacy has been increasing within the civil society in the West Bank and Gaza for the principle of free and democratic elections. See Talal As-Safi, "Peace Plan to Solve the Palestinian Question" (Jerusalem, May 1991).

14. Moshe Ma'oz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), p. 140.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

16. For former Minister of Defense Moshe Arens the issues of elections in chambers of commerce or municipalities were "positive steps in a chain of democratic processes." *Yediot Hachronot*, September 17, 1991.

17. Richard Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 29, No. 4, October 1987, pp. 686-714.

18. Mark Heller, *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

19. *Ha'aretz*, March 9, 1988.

20. *Ha'aretz*, August 8, 1989.

21. "A Pocket of Autonomy in a Sea of Security," *Ha'aretz*, March 3, 1992.

22. The draft text of "The Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation—The Palestinian Track," circulated in Washington on January 14, 1992, called for a freely elected 180-member legislative assembly in which Palestinians from the West Bank, including Jerusalem and Gaza, should participate fully, and in which freed political detainees should be included.

23. One scheme calls for elections among Palestinian constituencies worldwide, including the Occupied Territories. The plan includes four sequential components: 1) education and training in democratic procedures; 2) voter registration; 3) establishment of a reliable, computerized system for tallying ballots; and 4) establishment of an internal and international monitoring system of the election process. See Mubarak Awad, "Draft Proposal: Democratic Development and Internal Elections in the West Bank and Gaza," *Nonviolence International*, Washington, D.C., 1991).

24. According to Segal, "It is almost inconceivable that any Israeli government could refuse to sit down with the elected leadership of the Palestinian population. . . . Even without elections, the PLO has won something close to this exclusive right [as representative of the Palestinian people], though its hold on this right is periodi-

cally tested. But it is one thing to be viewed in the Arab world as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; it is very different when that is how a Palestinian leadership is perceived in Israel and the United States." Jerome Segal, *Creating the Palestinian State* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1989), pp 128-129.

25. See article by Mubarak Awad and Edy Kaufman, "Side by Side: Two Paths to Change," *Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1992.

26. "1) Are the Palestinians and Israelis satisfied with the ongoing conflict and the bloodletting, as well as the displacement of thousands of families and the destruction? 2) Do both people deny the fact that they are the sons of Adam and Eve? 3) Have the Israelis and Palestinians pledged to pursue their enmity? 4) Is it true that the Palestinians and Israelis cannot ever live together? 5) Do the Israelis and the Palestinians see any difference between the God of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad?" Talal As-Safi, *Peace Plan*, p. 3. The author of the pamphlet has been arrested five times since 1980.

27. *New York Times*, June 22, 1988.

28. Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million—The Israelis and the Holocaust* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House and Domino Press Ltd., 1991), in Hebrew.

29. Paradoxically, democratization has begun to seem possible in Kuwait and even in Saudi Arabia as a direct result of the conflict in the Gulf. See the analysis by Thomas Friedman in "Curiously a Dictator Forces the Middle East to Ponder Democracy," *New York Times*, September 2, 1990.

30. Yoshefat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1988). See also Edy Kaufman, "Co-authoring in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (forthcoming, Spring 1993). In a review essay of *No Trumpet, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh say that the authors are searching for what Heller calls 'the least undesirable choice'."

THE ISRAELIS: SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY
